Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this appeal by allowance, the issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether an order denying a petition to intervene in a custody action was appealable as a collateral order as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. Child ("L.A.") was born on in late 2011 to L.A. (“Mother”) and Q.M. (“Father”). Several months later, Northampton County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed an emergency application for protective custody over Child. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent and granted CYS legal custody. CYS subsequently removed Child from Mother’s home and placed her in the care of Appellant D.M. (“Maternal Aunt”), and Appellant L.N., a friend with whom Maternal Aunt resided (collectively “Appellants”). Child lived with Appellants from February 10, 2012 to September 20, 2012, at which time the trial court granted Appellants and Father shared legal and physical custody over Child. The trial court later vacated its adjudication of dependency on April 4, 2013, awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody to Father, and awarded partial physical custody to Appellants every other weekend. Throughout the entire period during which he exercised custody over Child, Father resided with his mother and stepfather, Appellees V.C. and K.C. (“Paternal Grandparents”). Nearly two months after he had been awarded primary custody, Father suddenly passed away. Paternal Grandparents began caring for Child, and, on June 13, 2013, they filed a complaint for custody against Mother, seeking sole legal and physical custody over Child so as to “preserve and maintain the status quo.” Mother did not contest the matter; however, Appellants filed a petition for intervention, wherein they asserted that they stood in loco parentis to Child and sought primary legal and physical custody. In response, Paternal Grandparents filed an answer and new matter in which they alleged that Appellants lacked standing to seek legal or physical custody over Child, claiming they were only temporary foster parents. Appellants appealed the order denying intervention to the Superior Court, which directed them to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed in light of the fact that the order did not appear to be final or appealable. In response, Appellants argued that the trial court’s order was final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, and, alternatively, that the order was a collateral order subject to an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 313. After review, the Supreme Court held that such an order is a collateral order appealable under Rule 313, and reversed the Superior Court’s order quashing the appeal and remand to that court for consideration of the issues raised therein. View "K.C. v. L.A." on Justia Law

Attorney Irene Schrunk represented Mary Ellen Nylen in a divorce and was involved subsequent legal matters regarding Mary Ellen and her new husband, Mark Nylen. When Mark served Mary Ellen with a summons and complaint for divorce, Schrunk advised Mary Ellen that Schrunk could not represent her because Schrunk had represented Mark in the past. On July 31, 2014, Mary Ellen’s adult children, Molly and Brendon, commenced this action against Mary Ellen seeking a declaration that Mary Ellen had gifted them personal property. Molly and Brendon sought to depose Schrunk regarding communications she had with Mary Ellen between November 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014. Mary Ellen moved to prohibit the discovery, citing the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The circuit court determined that the initial communications were privileged but did not extend the privilege to communications and documents shared with Schrunk after January 1, 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mary Ellen failed to meet her burden of proving entitlement to the attorney-client privilege after January 1, 2014, and Mary Ellen waived the privilege with respect to certain documents when she shared with Schrunk privileged communications between Mary Ellen and her current attorneys. View "Nylen v. Nylen" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on the validity of a 1995 Florida divorce decree. Sarath Sapukotana (Sarath) and Palihawadanage Ramya Chandralatha Fernando (Fernando) were married in Sri Lanka in 1992. Sarath moved to the United States a year later. In 1995, a Florida court entered an uncontested divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of Sarath and Fernando. In 2004, Sarath then married Martha Gay Weaver Sapukotana (Martha) in Mississippi. Sarath died intestate in 2008 from injuries which led to a wrongful death suit. The trial court granted Martha’s petition to be named the administratrix of the estate, over the objection of Fernando, Sarath’s first wife. This allowed Martha to file, and later to settle, the wrongful death claim. Fernando claims that the 1995 Florida divorce decree was fraudulent and void for lack of service of process, and that she instead was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate and to the proceeds of the wrongful death action. Fernando filed a motion to vacate the chancery court’s decision to appoint Martha as administratrix of Sarath’s estate. The chancery court dismissed Fernando’s motion and held that Martha was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate. Fernando appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court, finding that the chancery court lacked authority to vacate the 1995 Florida divorce decree. View "In Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Sarath Sapukotana" on Justia Law

In November 2014, 21-month-old A.A. (Child) was detained and removed from the home and care of her mother, As.A. (Mother). While in the family home, Child had been allowed to play with lit matches, exposed to heavy marijuana smoke, and surrounded by a variety of drug paraphernalia and drugs in plain sight. Mother was arrested and temporarily incarcerated. Child's father, S.S. (Father), who lived separately, had a history of substance abuse and declined to take custody of Child. Mother and Father did not contest the juvenile court's jurisdiction, and Child was placed with foster parents, the C.'s. At the C.'s, Child was reportedly healthy, happy, and enjoying visits with Mother, who wanted to regain custody of Child. At a disposition hearing approximately one month later, the Imperial County Department of Social Services reported that Child had passed away the previous day. The Department informed the court that multiple investigations were ongoing regarding the circumstances of Child's death. The Department was conducting a separate investigation for the welfare of other children who had been living in the C.'s home. The police department was conducting a criminal investigation, and other governmental agencies were investigating the C.'s for foster care and day care licensing purposes. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether a juvenile court could retain jurisdiction over a dependency case after the subject child has died, for the purpose of learning the child's cause of death and/or appointing a guardian ad litem to investigate potential tort claims for the child's estate. The juvenile court determined it must terminate its jurisdiction under the circumstances. The Court of Appeal agreed and affirmed. View "Imperial County Dept. etc. v. S.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Barry Schneer (father) appealed a family court order finding California lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to make an initial child custody determination regarding his daughter. Father filed his child custody petition on June 24, 2013. In support of the petition, father declared the child was born in June 2011 in Miami, Florida, and that the child and mother resided with father in Twentynine Palms, California, from April 2012 onward. In an attachment to a request for an emergency decree, father alleged mother took the child to Florida to visit the child's grandparents “under [the] presumption of her return following a short visit,” but mother and the child had been in Florida for more than three months “with no date of return.” In her response and in a motion to quash and dismiss the petition, defendant-respondent Alice Llaurado (mother) alleged the child lived in Miami since her birth and never resided in California. Mother declared she and the child visited California several times between August 2012 and March 2013, but she never stayed more than a few weeks at a time. Mother denied having any intent to relocate to California, and denied residing in any state other than Florida. Father argued the California family court erred by ruling California was not the child's home state for purposes of the UCCJEA because the child did not reside in California during the six-month period immediately before father filed his child custody petition. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with father's interpretation of the UCCJEA and reversed the family court's order. View "Schneer v. Llaurado" on Justia Law

Mother and Father met in Guatemala, and their child was born there. When the child was approximately fifteen months old, Father filed a complaint in Maine to establish parental rights and responsibilities. Mother was not served in Maine and did not consent to jurisdiction in Maine, and neither Mother nor the child ever resided in Maine. Mother moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Maine lacked long-arm jurisdiction over her. The district court granted Mother's motion to dismiss, determine that Maine lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined that the UCCJEA governed its determination of jurisdiction in this matter. View "Seekings v. Hamm" on Justia Law

Petitioner Terrie Harman appealed a circuit court order denying her and her ex-husband Thomas McCarron's request to un-do their divorce. The parties were married in 1989. In July 2014, they were granted an uncontested decree of divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences that caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. In March 2015, they jointly filed a “Petition to Change Court Order,” stating that they have “reconciled and therefore request the [trial court] to approve the attached agreement to vacate the July 1, 2014 divorce decree.” The attached agreement, signed by both parties, stated that they “agree that the . . . 2014 divorce decree shall be vacated in full and in all respects.” The trial court denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that because New Hampshire courts “have authority to set aside, vacate, modify or amend their orders,” and have vacated final divorce decrees upon the request of one of the parties, the trial court erred in ruling that it had no authority to vacate the parties’ divorce decree. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that in the absence of a statute authorizing the trial court to vacate a final divorce decree on the ground of the parties’ reconciliation, the trial court did not err in concluding that it had no such authority. View "In the Matter of Harman & McCarron" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a trial court's order that appellant Kierstin Smith pay $124,352 to claimant-respondent Cindy Smith, and $151,967, subject to a specified offset, to respondent Mark Smith. Kierstin argued that the trial court erred by combining cost shifting pursuant to Family Code section 2030 with sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271, making no explicit differentiation between sums awarded pursuant to each statute. She further argued that the trial court abused its discretion in making an award under either statute. Mark and Kierstin divorced in 2002, but they have remained engaged in litigation regarding child custody and support, which has expanded to involve Cindy, Mark's current wife. The most recent proceedings began in December 2008, when Mark applied for a post-judgment modification of child support, attorney fees, and sanctions, and also included consideration of Mark's January 2010 application seeking a change in child custody, and Kierstin's August 2012 application for a modification of child support. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's order, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Marriage of Smith" on Justia Law

Same sex couple planned to have a child and co-parent. Upon the termination of their relationship and following almost ten years of co-parenting, the biological mother denied plaintiff's status as a parent and sought to end all interaction between plaintiff and child. Couple did not have a written agreement regarding parenting. Plaintiff petitioned the District Court in Oklahoma County seeking a determination of parental rights and custody. The District Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether the district court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction finding plaintiff lacked standing as a non-biological parent seeking custody and visitation. Specifically, the Court addressed: (1) whether the district court erred finding that a non-biological parent lacked standing because the same sex couple had not married and had no written parenting agreement; (2) whether a biological mother had the right as a parent to legally erase an almost ten year parental relationship that she voluntarily created and fostered with her same sex partner. The Court answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ramey v. Sutton" on Justia Law

In 2014, Appellant filed a Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion seeking to set aside a 1999 default judgment granting Appellee a divorce. In support of her motion, Appellant alleged that the default judgment was void because the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the default judgment against her. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the motion was not filed within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in rejecting Appellant’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion based solely on Appellant’s delay in filing the motion, as Rule 60(b)’s time limitations do not generally apply to Rule 60(b)(4) motions to set aside a judgment as void; but (2) none of the defects Appellant alleged in the district court’s default judgment rendered the judgment void for lack of jurisdiction. View "Linch v. Linch" on Justia Law