Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In their one-day dissolution trial, Paul was represented by his attorney. Susan was not represented by counsel. The court denied Susan’s continuance request and admitted Paul’s 22 exhibits into evidence.The court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage, declining to award spousal support to either party, dividing the couple’s property, stating that Susan waived future spousal support and that the court would not have awarded spousal support in any event because “each party was self-supporting,” and finding that Paul was entitled to a credit of $2,500 for support payments he had made to Susan in 2012 and 2013. Susan timely filed notice of appeal. Because there had been no court reporter, Susan requested a settled statement under California Rules of Court, 8.137. The court of appeal vacated; the order cannot stand because it was entered without a motion, without the required findings, and based on the false premise that Susan was responsible for the protracted nature of the proceedings on her motion. View "Mooney v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

When Mother and Father divorced, the decree gave Mother the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the couple’s two sons and ordered Father to pay monthly child support. After Mother moved to another city with the children, Father filed a motion to modify the divorce decree to obtain the right to determine the children’s residence and to reduce his child support. The trial court granted Father’s petition. After the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction had expired, Mother filed a motion to reopen and vacate order, arguing that she had not been given notice of Father’s motion to modify because she did not live at the address where the citation was posted. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Mother’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, concluding that Mother’s motion did not extend the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction and post-judgment deadlines to run from the date she received notice of the trial court’s order because it was not captioned a motion under Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that justice plainly required the trial court and court of appeals to treat Mother’s motion as extending post-judgment deadlines and that Mother's appeal was timely filed. Remanded. View "In re Interest of J.Z.P." on Justia Law

When Mother was about one-month pregnant, she and N.S.’s father were arrested for illegally growing and possessing marijuana for sale in their Hayward home. About two weeks after N.S. was born, they were again arrested for possessing marijuana for sale in their home. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a dependency petition alleging that N.S. faced a substantial risk of harm (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)). N.S. was placed with a maternal relative who lived in a two-unit building in Union City. Mother moved into the other unit. Visits between Mother and N.S. went well. Mother regularly attended a support group, participated in therapy, repeatedly tested negative for drugs, had no contact with Father, and moved out of the Hayward home, listing it for sale. N.S. had no medical issues and was not alleged to have suffered any physical harm in her parents’ care. The Agency nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction because Mother had been arrested twice for serious charges. The court sustained the dependency petition, concluding that there was a current risk of harm. While appeal was pending, the juvenile court dismissed dependency jurisdiction, awarding custody to Mother, with supervised visits for Father. The court of appeal dismissed an appeal, noting that Mother suffered no harm as a result of the jurisdictional findings below. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

Raul and Ingrid married in 1978 in Santa Cruz County. In 1993, the family moved to Chile, where Ingrid had been born. The couple separated in 1995. Since 2010, Raul has resided in New York. In 2012, Ingrid filed a dissolution petition in Santa Cruz, seeking attorney fees and spousal support. Raul signed a receipt for papers mailed to New York, but did not appear. The court ordered him to pay support plus attorney fees. Later, the court garnished Raul’s wages. In 2013, Ingrid sought an order determining Raul’s arrearages. Raul appeared on his own behalf. The court ruled that the support order was valid and awarded arrearages. Months later Raul moved to quash service for lack of jurisdiction and to set aside the 2013 orders and garnishment. Raul asserted that Ingrid “has lived and continues to live in Chile since . . . 2000 or 2001.” Ingrid introduced evidence showing her presence in the county for at least part of the six months prior to her filing. The court found that Raul had submitted to jurisdiction and later entered default. The court of appeal reversed. While Raul’s appearance constituted a general submission to jurisdiction and he forfeited his objection to an untimely hearing notice, the court erred by entering default while Raul’s court of appeal petition was pending. View "In re: Marriage of Obrecht" on Justia Law

A father appealed a superior court order terminating his parental rights with respect to his two children, A.M. and T.M. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the State failed to meet its threshold burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that sufficient changed circumstances existed to modify the previous disposition order establishing concurrent goals of reunification and adoption. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re T.M. and A.M." on Justia Law

A couple with three children divorced after 15 years of marriage. In 2012, the superior court ordered the father to pay roughly $1,500 per month in child support. That calculation relied on a finding that the father’s income was $40,000 annually despite his self-reported financial documents showing significantly less income. The father appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s findings and support order in early 2014. Before that appeal was resolved, the father moved to modify his support obligation, filing similar self-reported financial documents and arguing that his actual income was less than $10,000 per year as shown on his 2013 tax return. The superior court denied his motion to modify without an evidentiary hearing. It also awarded close to full attorney’s fees to the mother despite the fact that she raised her fee request in her opposition to the motion to modify and never made a separate motion for fees. The father appealed the denial of his motion to modify his child support obligation without an evidentiary hearing. He also appealed the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees in the absence of a motion for fees. After further review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the father’s motion to modify child support without a hearing, concluding that an evidentiary hearing was not required because the father presented no new evidence that would require a hearing. But it was error to award attorney’s fees without either requiring the mother to file a motion for fees or advising the father that he had a right to respond to the fee request made in the mother’s opposition brief. The Court therefore vacated the superior court’s fee award and remanded to give the father an opportunity to respond. View "Limeres v. Limeres" on Justia Law

Appellant the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes intervened in the adoption proceedings of a minor child (Child). While the adoption itself was not at issue on appeal, disputes that arose during the adoption proceedings were. Respondents Jane and John Doe (Does) initiated adoption proceedings for Child after the rights of Child’s parents were terminated. Because Child might have qualified for protection under the laws protecting an Indian child’s welfare, the Tribes were given notice and intervened in the adoption proceeding. The trial court appointed an independent attorney for the child whose costs were to be split by the Tribes and the Does. Discovery disputes arose during the proceedings, and the trial court issued sanctions against the Tribes. The trial court found the facts before it insufficient to establish that Child was an Indian child, and thus concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not govern the proceeding. Despite this conclusion, the court applied the ICWA’s placement preferences out of concern for Child’s best interests. The Does prevailed in the adoption, and the court granted them attorney fees as the prevailing party. The Tribes contested the discovery rulings, sanctions, failure to find Child an Indian child, and the grant of attorney fees against them, claiming sovereign immunity and a misapplication of the law. The Idaho Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the trial court’s failure to find that Child was an Indian child because it concluded any error was harmless. However, the Court found that trial court’s order compelling discovery was an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s order preventing the Tribes from processing or filing any enrollment for tribal membership on behalf of Child was also an abuse of discretion. Further, the additional order granting attorney fees in the Does’ favor as the prevailing party violated the Tribes’ sovereign immunity. The Court reversed on these latter issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "John Doe v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes" on Justia Law

Gabriella Moir was the plaintiff in the underlying divorce case. Judge Mary Kovack, the only judge in the Medina County Domestic Relations Court, recused herself from the case. Acting in her capacity as the administrative judge of that court, Judge Kovack subsequently issued orders assigning magistrates to the visiting judge, Judge Carol Dezso of Summit County Domestic Relations Court, for the purpose of presiding over the divorce. Moir brought this action for a writ of prohibition against Judge Kovack and Judge Dezso, as well as the two courts and one of the assigned magistrates, asserting that the two judges lacked jurisdiction to assign magistrates in the case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ as to Judge Kovack, holding (1) because Judge Kovack recused herself based on a potential conflict of interest, she was without jurisdiction to assign magistrates in the case; and (2) Judge Dezso as the appointed judge may assign magistrates to help her hear the case. View "State ex rel. Moir v. Kovack" on Justia Law

After a two-day permanent orders hearing, the trial court felt it lacked insufficient information to allocate attorney's fees in this divorce action. Therefore, the court chose to issue the decree dissolving the marriage, along with permanent orders addressing parental responsibilities, child support, the division of marital property, and spousal maintenance, but postponed a determination on fees. The hearing on fees was approximately six months later. In the gap between the permanent orders hearing and the fees hearing, Wife's counsel requested additional documents regarding her Husband's financial circumstances. Husband objected and requested a protective order, which the trial court issued. The court ultimately ordered each party to pay their own fees and costs. Wife appealed this order, and the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the trial court should have permitted additional discovery in order to ensure an equitable determination of fees. The Supreme Court, after review, disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion, and instead held that for the purpose of deciding whether to award attorney's fees, a trial court should consider the parties' financial resources as of the date of the issuance of the decree of dissolution. The case was reversed and remanded to reinstate the trial court's protective order and the order instructing both sides to pay their own fees. View "In re Marriage of de Koning" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether an order denying a petition to intervene in a custody action was appealable as a collateral order as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. Child ("L.A.") was born on in late 2011 to L.A. (“Mother”) and Q.M. (“Father”). Several months later, Northampton County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed an emergency application for protective custody over Child. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent and granted CYS legal custody. CYS subsequently removed Child from Mother’s home and placed her in the care of Appellant D.M. (“Maternal Aunt”), and Appellant L.N., a friend with whom Maternal Aunt resided (collectively “Appellants”). Child lived with Appellants from February 10, 2012 to September 20, 2012, at which time the trial court granted Appellants and Father shared legal and physical custody over Child. The trial court later vacated its adjudication of dependency on April 4, 2013, awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody to Father, and awarded partial physical custody to Appellants every other weekend. Throughout the entire period during which he exercised custody over Child, Father resided with his mother and stepfather, Appellees V.C. and K.C. (“Paternal Grandparents”). Nearly two months after he had been awarded primary custody, Father suddenly passed away. Paternal Grandparents began caring for Child, and, on June 13, 2013, they filed a complaint for custody against Mother, seeking sole legal and physical custody over Child so as to “preserve and maintain the status quo.” Mother did not contest the matter; however, Appellants filed a petition for intervention, wherein they asserted that they stood in loco parentis to Child and sought primary legal and physical custody. In response, Paternal Grandparents filed an answer and new matter in which they alleged that Appellants lacked standing to seek legal or physical custody over Child, claiming they were only temporary foster parents. Appellants appealed the order denying intervention to the Superior Court, which directed them to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed in light of the fact that the order did not appear to be final or appealable. In response, Appellants argued that the trial court’s order was final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, and, alternatively, that the order was a collateral order subject to an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 313. After review, the Supreme Court held that such an order is a collateral order appealable under Rule 313, and reversed the Superior Court’s order quashing the appeal and remand to that court for consideration of the issues raised therein. View "K.C. v. L.A." on Justia Law