Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Petitioners were six individuals who sued for divorce in Tarrant County between 2008 and 2012. Petitioners filed uncontested affidavits of indigence in lieu of paying costs pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 145, but Petitioners’ final divorce decrees nevertheless allocated costs. In 2012, the District Clerk of Tarrant County sent collection notices to each Petitioner demanding about $300 in court costs and fees and threatening the seizure of Petitioners’ property to satisfy the debt. Petitioners sued for mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief in a district court that had not issued any of their divorce decrees. The district court temporarily enjoined the District Clerk from collecting court costs from indigent parties who have filed an affidavit on indigency. The court of appeals vacated the injunction and dismissed the case because the trial court had not rendered the judgments in the cases in which costs were billed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction over the petitions; and (2) the temporary injunction was proper. Remanded. View "Campbell v. Wilder" on Justia Law

This appeal resolved on in many disputes between Mark Rath and Kayla Rath. Mark appealed a disorderly conduct restraining order. In 2015, Kayla petitioned for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Mark, citing a litany of conduct purportedly rising to the level of disorderly conduct. These allegations included: Mark calling his children nearly twenty times in one night, Mark using foul language towards Kayla, Mark saying he had a business associate seek Kayla's phone records, Mark reporting Kayla to authorities out of concern she may be illegally receiving government benefits, and other miscellaneous conduct. After the hearing, the district court concluded Mark's conduct consisted of unwanted words and actions intended to adversely affect Kayla's safety, security, and privacy. After reviewing its order, the Supreme Court was concerned by the district court's lack of explanation for the necessity of the procedure it used in granting the restraining order. "While the court cited ensuring safety, minimizing conflict, and limiting the hearing to the pertinent issues before the court as justifying this procedure, the court did not elaborate on what facts or circumstances justified these concerns in this instance. Without further specificity, these conclusory justifications are insufficient to justify deviating from standard trial practices in restraining order proceedings because they leave us to speculate about the specific circumstances justifying denying Mark Rath the opportunity to directly question Kayla Rath." The Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in not allowing Mark to directly cross-examine Kayla without adequately explaining, on the record, its reasons for not allowing him to do so. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for a new hearing. View "Rath v. Rath" on Justia Law

A federally recognized Alaska Native tribe adopted a process for adjudicating the child support obligations of parents whose children are members of the tribe or are eligible for membership, and it operated a federally funded child support enforcement agency. The Tribe sued the State and won a declaratory judgment that its tribal court system had subject matter jurisdiction over child support matters and an injunction requiring the State’s child support enforcement agency to recognize the tribal courts’ child support orders in the same way it recognized such orders from other states. Because the Supreme Court agreed that tribal courts had inherent subject matter jurisdiction to decide the child support obligations owed to children who are tribal members or were eligible for membership, and that state law thus required the State’s child support enforcement agency to recognize and enforce a tribal court’s child support orders, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alaska v. Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska" on Justia Law

The juvenile court granted the Department of Health and Human Services temporary custody of Jackson after finding that he had suffered head injuries at home. Jackson was placed with his maternal grandmother, Erin, and her husband, Paul, where he remained in foster care for the next two and a half years. The Department later removed Jackson from his placement with Erin and Paul and placed him with other foster parents. Erin and Paul filed a motion for placement requesting an order that the Department place Jackson back with them and also filed a motion to intervene. The court granted Erin and Paul’s motion to intervene but denied their motion for placement, finding that the State had met its burden of proof that its placement plan was in the best interests of Jackson. Erin and Paul filed a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the court’s order. The motion was denied. Erin and Paul appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Erin and Paul had no right to take an appeal under the circumstances, and therefore, they had no standing. View "In re Interest of Jackson E." on Justia Law

The juvenile court granted the Department of Health and Human Services temporary custody of Jackson after finding that he had suffered head injuries at home. Jackson was placed with his maternal grandmother, Erin, and her husband, Paul, where he remained in foster care for the next two and a half years. The Department later removed Jackson from his placement with Erin and Paul and placed him with other foster parents. Erin and Paul filed a motion for placement requesting an order that the Department place Jackson back with them and also filed a motion to intervene. The court granted Erin and Paul’s motion to intervene but denied their motion for placement, finding that the State had met its burden of proof that its placement plan was in the best interests of Jackson. Erin and Paul filed a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the court’s order. The motion was denied. Erin and Paul appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Erin and Paul had no right to take an appeal under the circumstances, and therefore, they had no standing. View "In re Interest of Jackson E." on Justia Law

This case was a continuation of "contentious" divorce proceedings between parties who "accumulated significant assets during their marriage." Sandra Hendricksen Martire appealed from an amended divorce judgment modifying Michael Martire's child support obligation and leaving unaltered his spousal support obligation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in refusing to modify Martire's spousal support obligation. The Court further concluded, however, that the court failed to follow the Child Support Guidelines in setting Martire's child support obligation. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Martire' v. Martire'" on Justia Law

D.V.T., the father of minor child K.J.C., appealed a district court's final decree of adoption, terminating his parental rights and granting a petition for step-parent adoption. The father argued the district court clearly erred in terminating his parental rights and finding his consent to the adoption was not necessary. The father contended there was not clear and convincing evidence he intended to abandon the child. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded evidence supports the court's findings, and, based on the entire record, it was not convinced a mistake had been made. The record reflected the mother and step-father's attorney prepared the proposed written termination order before the hearing terminating the father's rights. "We recognize the court wanted the termination and adoption finalized quickly and the use of a document prepared by one of the parties may save time, but the court has an obligation to ensure the findings are correct." The trial court's written order erred in stating no person appeared at the hearing claiming to be the natural father; however, D.V.T. did appear. The Supreme Court found the error did not require reversal. The Court modified the final decree of adoption to reflect the father was present at the hearing and objected to the petition to terminate his parental rights and grant a step-parent adoption. View "Matter of K.J.C." on Justia Law

Patricia Schurmann (now Heidt), appealed after the district court modified parenting time and child support. She argued the district court failed to properly weigh evidence of domestic violence in increasing Ralf Schurmann's parenting time. She also argued the court should not have reduced child support. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order regarding parenting time, but reversed and remanded the order regarding child support, finding that the district court relied on unreliable information to calculate child support in this case, and as such, failed to comply with statutory guidelines. The court's child support calculation was clearly erroneous. The judgment was reversed and the remanded for recalculation of child support. View "Schurmann v. Schurmann" on Justia Law

V. L. and E. L. were in a relationship from 1995-2011. Through assisted reproductive technology, E. L. gave birth to a child. in 2002 and to twins in 2004. The women raised the children as joint parents. V. L. rented a house and filed a petition to adopt the children in Georgia. E. L. gave express consent to the adoption, without relinquishing her own parental rights. A final decree recognized both V. L. and E. L. as the legal parents of the children. The women ended their relationship in 2011, while living in Alabama. V.L filed suit, alleging that E. L. had denied her access to the children and interfered with her ability to exercise her parental rights. She asked the Alabama court to register the Georgia adoption judgment and award her custody or visitation rights. The Family Court of Jefferson County awarded V. L. scheduled visitation. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Georgia court had no subject-matter jurisdiction under Georgia law to enter a judgment allowing V. L. to adopt the children while still recognizing E. L.’s parental rights and that Alabama courts were not required to accord full faith and credit to that judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on summary disposition, stating that the Georgia judgment appears on its face to have been issued by a court with jurisdiction; there is no established Georgia law to the contrary. View "V.L. v. E.L." on Justia Law

On February 11, 2015, the State of Alabama on relation of the Alabama Policy Institute and the Alabama Citizens Action Program initiated this case by filing an "Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus." The petition sought a writ of mandamus "directed to each Respondent judge of probate, commanding each judge not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and not to recognize any marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples." By this order, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed all pending motions and petitions with regard to this matter. View "Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy Institute" on Justia Law