Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A Massachusetts district court awarded damages to Dawn Irish arising out of her divorce from Craig Irish and the separation agreement filed in their divorce proceeding. Dawn later filed a complaint in federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction, alleging various contract, tort, and fraud claims against Craig for Craig’s alleged failure to fully disclose his assets or deal in good faith during the negotiation of the parties’ separation agreement. The federal court exercised jurisdiction over the claims, and Craig appealed. The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. Remanded for dismissal of the action, with prejudice as to federal jurisdiction and without prejudice as to the assertion of claim in an appropriate state court. View "Irish v. Irish" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant S.P. (mother) and respondent F.G. (father) were parents to E.P. (child). Mother appealed the trial court's child support order requiring father to pay her $14,840 per month, as well as pay expenses relating to E.P.'s extracurricular activities, health and education directly to those providers. Mother argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion as to the appropriate amount of child support considering E.P.'s historical and then-current expenses; (2) there was insufficient evidence that it was in E.P.'s best interests to aware support in an amount below that contemplated by statute; and (3) the trial court erred by not making findings explaining its reasons as to (1) and (2). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's support order. View "S.P. v. F.G." on Justia Law

Cynthia C. and Gerardo L. appealed the termination of their parental rights to their daughter, R. L. Gerardo contended the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders, and all subsequent orders, had to be reversed because the juvenile court did not have home state jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. He also contended he did not receive notice of the proceedings pursuant to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. Cynthia joined in Gerardo's arguments to the extent they inured to her benefit, but raised no other issues. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeals found Cynthia and Gerardo's arguments unavailing, and affirmed termination of their parental rights. View "In re R.L." on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether Father and Stepmother's adoption of the Child, at which proceedings the Child's biological maternal Grandmother did not appear, controlled the outcome of Grandmother's previously filed and pending visitation petition. The trial court ruled that Grandmother's nonappearance divested her right to seek visitation, and the opposition of both parents in this newly created intact nuclear family precluded the court from authorizing such a visitation. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this judgment, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari. Grandmother argued that she did not lose her right to seek visitation by not appearing at the adoption (at which she lacked standing to do so); her due process rights were violated by the trial court's sua sponte ruling; and the adoption--granted subsequent to and while her visitation petition remained pending--equally did not divest her of this right. The Supreme Court found that Grandmother's properly filed, undecided petition arrived to the court four months before Stepmother petitioned to adopt and six months before the court granted the adoption. Grandmother followed all required procedure by filing, providing notice, and awaiting her day in court. "She should not be penalized for another court's decision to resolve the separate and subsequently-filed action of adoption without reference to the impact of that ruling on her pending petition." Furthermore, by deciding the adoption prior to resolution of the visitation petition--thereby framing Grandmother's rights in reference to the subsequently filed, subsequently granted adoption--the trial court disposed of Grandmother's opportunity to ever obtain any "previously granted" visitation right. The court's determination of the adoption before resolution of the previously filed visitation effectively deprived Grandmother of her statutory right to seek visitation of the Child. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court to hear Appellant's petition for grandparental visitation. View "Birtciel v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue the appellant raised for further review was the contention that the chancellor erred in awarding a child-support judgment to her son, who was a nonparty to this case. This issue was never raised in the chancery court case at trial or in post-trial motions. As a result, the issue was not properly before the Supreme Court and thus barred from further review. View "Taylor v. Taylor" on Justia Law

A very high wage-earner making $1.9 million during the marriage agreed to a stipulated divorce judgment providing for above-guideline child and spousal support. In this appeal of the denial of the high earner's post-judgment request for a reduction of his child support obligations to guideline and his request to terminate spousal support in the wake of the wife's remarriage, he raised two issues: (1) with respect to a clause in the stipulated judgment that any future modification proceeding would be reviewed de novo, did that clause eliminate the usual change-of-circumstances rule that applied to post-judgment modifications?; and (2) with respect to a clause that said if the high earner's ex-wife remarried to a person making less than $400,000 a year, the high earner would still keep paying her spousal support (but at a reduced rate). did the ex-wife's remarriage terminate spousal support anyway, given that the clause did not expressly mention Family Code section 4337? The Court of Appeals answered both questions in the negative, thus concluding there was no error in the orders challenged here. View "In re Marriage of Cohen" on Justia Law

This case centered on whether a father could use the doctrine of laches to defend against a mother's claim for interest on his child support debt. In the precedential case "Hauck v. Schuck," (353 P.3d 79 (1960)), the Colorado Supreme Court decided laches did not apply to a claim for unpaid child support that accrued within the statutory limitations period. The court of appeals determined in the present case, that laches could not apply to bar one parent's right to collect interest on arrearages owed by the other parent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this matter to address whether laches was an appropriate defense in an interest-collection action, and also to resolve "the arguable tension" in "Hauck." The Court concluded that laches could be asserted as a defense to a claim for interest on child support arrearages, and therefore reversed the court of appeals. View "In re Marriage of Johnson" on Justia Law

The trial court found respondent Hugo H. committed an act of domestic violence against appellant Celia S., and therefore awarded her sole legal and physical custody of the couple’s two children because Hugo presented no evidence showing an award of custody to him was in the children’s best interest. Nonetheless, the court also awarded Hugo “visitation” consistent with the “50/50 timeshare” arrangement to which Celia and Hugo agreed nearly a year earlier. Under that arrangement, the children alternated living with Celia for one week and then Hugo for a week. Family Code section 3044 established a rebuttable presumption that prevents a trial court from awarding sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a parent who commits an act of domestic violence against the other parent, unless the offending parent establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that an award of custody to that parent is in the child’s best interest. Celia appealed the visitation order, arguing that the trial court could not circumvent section 3044 by characterizing its order granting physical custody as visitation. The Court of Appeals agreed: "The nature of any order must be determined based on the order’s legal effect, not the label the trial court attaches." The trial court therefore abused its discretion awarding Hugo equal time with the children without requiring him to establish that arrangement was in the children's best interest. That portion of the trial court's order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Celia S. v. Hugo H." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Melissa Solomon appealed the dismissal, without consideration of the merits, of her petition for dissolution of a nonresident civil union. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a civil union in 2001 in Brattleboro, Vermont, but both resided in Wake County, North Carolina. The parties were separated by May 2014. The parties had no children. In 2015, they decided to dissolve their civil union and filed an uncontested complaint in Vermont, accompanied by a final stipulation as required by 15 V.S.A. 1206(b). The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the parties failed to produce evidence that they attempted to obtain a dissolution of the civil union in North Carolina. The court expressed concern that if Vermont courts “continue[d] to accept these filings and allow courts in other states to ignore precedent [set by Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015)], the situation [would] never be resolved.” Because civil marriage and civil unions remained legally distinct entities in Vermont and because "Obergefell" mandated that states recognize only same-sex marriage, uncertainty remained as to whether Obergefell required other states to recognize and dissolve civil unions established in Vermont. The parties here followed the section 1206(b) mandates. Plaintiff contended that the provided affidavit satisfied the “acknowledgment” required by § 1206(b), and thus the court erred when it refused to consider the issue and held that North Carolina was the proper venue for all filings and appeals. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff, and reversed and remanded the trial court's dismissal. View "Solomon v. Guidry" on Justia Law

In this case, the natural mother schemed to give away her child without the natural father's consent by falsely claiming in a sworn consent and joinder and in sworn testimony at the adoption proceedings, that she didn't know the child's natural father. The deception caused the court to grant an adoption to a third party based on false, material representations. The natural father discovered the deception and filed a petition to set aside the adoption. The chancellor heard the "independent action" to set aside a "judgment based on fraud." The adoptive parents moved to dismiss the natural father's petition, attacking the father's standing to bring such an action. The chancellor denied the adoptive parents' motion, and finding no error in that denial, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Doe v. Smith" on Justia Law