Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Daniel Raak appealed and Danel Jacobs-Raak (now known as Danel Jacobs) cross-appealed a divorce judgment distributing their marital property, and ordering Raak to pay child support. Except with regard to the division of the mineral estate, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err as a matter of law, did not abuse its discretion, and its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. “When the parties agree to a division of property, the district court should explain its reasons for not dividing the property according to that agreement.” The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with respect to the division of a mineral interest for an identical division of that interest or an explanation concerning the division of that mineral interest. View "Jacobs-Raak v. Raak" on Justia Law

Jerry Harvey and Christine Rasmussen divorced in January 2014. The parties had three children together, and Rasmussen was awarded primary residential responsibility of the children. In December 2015, Rasmussen moved to modify Harvey's parenting time and requested the court find Harvey in contempt. In April 2016, the district court granted Rasmussen's motion, modified Harvey's parenting time, found Harvey in contempt, and ordered Harvey pay Rasmussen's attorney's fees and costs. Harvey appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. The district court found Harvey had the ability to pay Rasmussen's costs and fees, but did not make any findings about Rasmussen's need. The court ordered costs and attorney's fees under both the contempt and divorce statutes, but did not provide the required analysis for attorney's fees under N.D.C.C. section 14-05-23. Because the court did not award attorney's fees only for the contempt and it did not make any findings about Rasmussen's need, its findings were insufficient for appellate review. The case was therefore remanded for the district court to make its required findings. View "Rasmussen v. Harvey" on Justia Law

In 2012, B.C., age 30, suffered cardiac arrest and brain damage from the use of methamphetamine and alcohol. She initially lived with and was cared for by her mother. When her mother died, B.C. inherited $450,000. She also received disability payments. Although she had limited cognitive function, she subsequently married Jesse, with whom she had been “partying” at the time of her cardiac arrest. In 2014, B.C.’s aunt, C.S., sought appointment as probate conservator. Through counsel, B.C. opposed the petition. Jesse participated in hiring and advising the attorney. The court appointed the Ventura County Public Defender to represent B.C. An appointed conservator for B.C.’s estate sought reimbursement of $30,000, for disability benefits that Jesse had diverted to himself. Jesse has no assets and is responsible for five children. After a bench trial, the court appointed C.S., Prob. Code 1800. The court of appeal affirmed. Probate conservatorships do not require a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial because the proceedings pose no threat of confinement and are conducted according to the law relating to civil actions, including trial by jury if demanded by the proposed conservatee. B.C.’s attorney had authority to waive a jury trial on her behalf, even if the court failed to recite that B.C. had a right to a jury. The record supports the finding that B.C. cannot take care of her own needs, nor can her husband be trusted to do so. View "Conservatorship of B.C." on Justia Law

Husband petitioned for dissolution of his marriage from Wife. Previous to filing this action, however, Husband was declared incompetent and Wife was appointed as his guardian and conservator. The trial court dismissed Husband’s petition on the basis that a person who has been declared incompetent cannot bring a legal action in Kentucky. The court of appeals affirmed. Both courts relied exclusively on the 1943 case of Johnson v. Johnson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is not a Johnson issue in this case because the guardian was not bringing this action as required by Civil Rule 17.03(1); and (2) it necessarily follows that this case was procedurally flawed. View "Riehle v. Riehle" on Justia Law

In 2014, Tana Brown filed a complaint seeking a divorce from Darold Brown. Six days later, the district court signed a proposed stipulated decree of divorce. Ten months later, Tana moved to vacate or modify the divorce decree. After trial was scheduled, a scheduling conference was held and resulted in the entry of a scheduling order. Tana then filed a motion for sanctions asserting that Darold had not complied with a deadline in the scheduling order. The district court granted the motion for sanctions, imposing the requested sanction of prohibiting Darold from presenting witness testimony or exhibits at trial. After a trial, the district court granted physical custody of the parties’ children to Tana and divided remaining property and debt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions. View "Brown v. Brown" on Justia Law

Shane Stolz appealed the district court's order: (1) denying his motion to vacate judgment and the judgment granting Stacy Hildebrand primary residential responsibility of their two minor children; (2) requiring Stolz to make $761 per month in child support payments; and (3) partitioning real property held jointly between them. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion denying Stolz's motion to vacate, the Supreme Court affirmed. However, the judgment incorrectly stated the matter came before the district court "on motion" and "as a stipulated divorce action," rather than an action for partition of real property and for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities. The Supreme Court remanded this matter back to the district court to correct the judgment to accurately reflect this action. View "Hildebrand v. Stolz" on Justia Law

Ethan Mattingley and Rebecca Schweitzer had one child, born in 2012. Schweitzer lived in Minot and Mattingley lived in Velva, approximately 22 miles southeast of Minot. In 2014 both parties sought primary residential responsibility of the child. The district court, through Judge Hagar, entered an interim order in February 2015 establishing parenting time and requiring Mattingley to pay $970 per month in child support. Approximately one month after entry of the interim order, Mattingley moved to modify child support. While the motion was pending, Mattingley moved to recuse Judge Hagar. In June 2015, Judge Hagar entered an order decreasing Mattingley's child support obligation. In July 2015, Judge Hagar denied Mattingley's motion to recuse, but subsequently disqualified himself from the case on the same day. Judge Louser was assigned to the case and presided over a September 2015 trial. Before trial, Judge Louser informed the parties she intended to "proceed anew on all issues raised in the initial pleadings" including primary residential responsibility and child support. After trial, Judge Louser informed the parties of a personal conflict and requested the case be assigned to another judge. Presiding Judge Lee assigned himself to the case, awarded primary residential responsibility of the child to Schweitzer and established parenting time for Mattingley. The court found it was in the child's best interests to live with Schweitzer in Minot where the child would be attending school. Judge Lee also addressed Mattingley's motion to recuse and concluded it divested Judge Hagar of authority to proceed in the case. The court vacated Judge Hagar's order modifying child support and reinstated a $970 per month of child support amount under the February 2015 interim order. After filing his notice of appeal, Mattingley moved to modify child support because he lost his job in March 2016. After a hearing the district court reduced Mattingley's child support obligation. Mattingley argued the district court erroneously calculated child support. He also argued the court erred in vacating the June 2015 order modifying child support. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Judge Lee erroneously vacated Judge Hagar's June 2015 order modifying child support. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Schweitzer v. Mattingley" on Justia Law

Father filed a petition seeking a permanent injunction precluding communication and contact between his minor children and their former softball coach. The district court granted a permanent injunction against the former coach that prevented him from contacting or communicating with the children but allowed him to attend certain extracurricular activities and to be present in the home of the children’s mother. The district court also ordered that the ruling granting permanent injunctive relief be sealed and not be disseminated. Father filed a motion requesting that the district court allow for the redissemination of the ruling and expand the terms of the permanent injunction. The district court denied the motion but allowed redissemination of the terms of the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision with regard to the terms of the injunction and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) because no hearing was conducted pursuant to the Iowa Open Records Act in support of the district court conclusion that the permanent injunction be sealed, the case must be remanded for a hearing regarding redissemination of the ruling granting permanent injunctive relief consistent with the requirements of the Act; and (2) the terms of the permanent injunction should not be expanded. View "In re Petition of Kent Langholz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal of a superior court’s orders setting aside, in part, a final judgment and decree of divorce, and amending the final judgment of divorce. After a proceeding in which Wife was held in contempt, she filed in late 2013, a motion to set aside the March 2009 judgment and decree claiming, inter alia, that in his 2008 financial affidavit, Husband failed to disclose his interest in certain real properties. Husband opposed the motion to set aside, contending that the three-year statute of limitations barred any such claim under OCGA 9-11-60 (f). The trial court held that the three-year “statute of limitations” of OCGA 9-11-60 (f) was tolled until Wife became aware that Husband possessed certain previously undisclosed funds. However, the Supreme Court found that motion to set aside the judgment under OCGA 9–11–60 (d) was filed more than three years after the 2009 judgment. Because the motion to set aside the judgment was filed outside he exclusive time limitation for such a motion, the trial court’s order setting aside the judgment, as well as its subsequent order, was reversed. View "Myles v. Myles" on Justia Law

All parties to this matter appealed a district court’s judgment. Orange County Social Services Department (SSA) sought to remove Z.G. and I.L. from their parents’ custody, C.G. (Mother) and H.L. (Father), after Children’s sibling, H.L., Jr. (Junior), died. The juvenile court found Parents’ “neglect” was a cause of Junior’s death. Despite the Parents essentially doing nothing to move the family towards reunification, the court found reunification was in the “best interest” of Children. The Parents appealed the jurisdiction and disposition orders and argued there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding their neglect was a cause of Junior’s death. Thus, they contend the court erred by concluding Children were subject to jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (f), and that Parents were subject to the reunification services bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4). The Children appealed the disposition order and contended there was insufficient evidence to support the finding reunification with Parents is in the best interest of Children. Hence, they argued, the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents under section 361.5, subdivision (c). SSA joined the Children’s argument. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding Parents’ neglect was a cause of Junior’s death, but there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding reunification with Parents was in Children’s best interest. Therefore the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents. Consequently, the Court reversed that portion of the disposition order, but affirmed the jurisdiction and disposition orders in all other respects. View "In re Z.G." on Justia Law