Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The State filed motions for termination of Mother’s parental rights to her five children due to abandonment, neglect, and aggravated circumstances. After a hearing, the county court granted the State’s motions to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The consolidated order was issued on April 4, 2016. On April 28, 2016, the court issued a consolidated order nunc pro tunc, which stated that the April 4 order would be vacated and reissued under the date of April 28 to allow the parties to have an appropriate amount of time to file an appeal. No party moved to vacate the April 4 order. Mother subsequently filed notices of appeal from the court’s April 28 order nunc pro tunc, arguing that the county court erred in finding that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding (1) the district court had no authority to issue its April 28 order; and (2) Mother failed to file notices of appeal within thirty days of the April 4 order, and therefore, this Court was without jurisdiction. View "In re Interest of Luz P." on Justia Law

N.S. was placed in foster care at age 11. After she turned 18 in 2014, she remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a nonminor dependent. (Welf. & Inst. Code 11400(v)), having been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and depressive disorder. She was participating in therapy and taking medication. The report indicated that N.S. would be enrolled in an educational program. A 2015 report indicated that N.S. qualified for extended foster care because her mental health, prevented her from participating in education or an employment program. In 2016, the Agency recommended that N.S.’s dependency be dismissed because her exact whereabouts were unknown and she had not participated in any services. N.S. had admitted she was using methamphetamine. She was not interested in treatment referrals or placement. She was meeting with her therapist, Chan, sporadically. At the contested hearing, both N.S. and Chan testified. Counsel asked Chan about N.S.’s diagnosis; she and N.S. asserted the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The juvenile court concluded the privilege did not apply because N.S. had put her mental state at issue. The court of appeal disagreed, rejecting an argument that the Agency and the court will be unable to verify the eligibility requirement without information from Chan. It is the Agency’s position that it is N.S.’s substance abuse, and not her mental health condition, that prevents her from meeting the criteria. View "N.S. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Glen and Danielle Rollins divorced in December 2013, and they agreed at that time to submit to binding arbitration of their respective claims to certain furniture and furnishings in the marital home. The arbitrator rendered an award in July 2014, and Glen promptly moved for judicial confirmation. While his motion was pending, in August 2014, the trial court ordered Danielle to account for some of the furniture and furnishings that the arbitrator had awarded to Glen that he could not find. Dissatisfied with her accounting, Glen filed a motion to hold Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order. In April 2015, the trial court found Danielle was in willful contempt of the August 2014 order in at least one respect, and it entered an initial contempt order that directed Danielle to show cause why she ought not be incarcerated for her contempt. Danielle appealed the initial contempt order, both by filing an application for discretionary review with the Supreme Court, and by filing a notice of direct appeal. In May 2015, the Supreme Court denied the application for discretionary review. The direct appeal was not docketed until November 2015. In December 2015, the Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal, explaining that any appeal of the initial contempt order had to come by application, and noting that it already had denied an application for discretionary review. In the meantime, the trial court held a final hearing on the motion for contempt and entered a final order on November 24, 2015, finding Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order in additional respects, directing her to immediately surrender any property awarded to Glen, ordering her to pay Glen for any such property that had gone missing or was damaged, and ordering her to pay fines for 34 separate instances of contempt. The trial court also awarded Glen attorney fees. Danielle then applied for discretionary review of the final contempt order, and the Supreme Court granted her application. Danielle argued that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a final contempt order while her direct appeal from the initial contempt order still was pending with the Supreme Court. The Supreme agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law

After an adjudicative hearing, the juvenile court found the three children of Mother and Father were within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) as to both parents due to physical abuse. The State subsequently filed a supplemental petition alleging that all three children were within the meaning of section 43-247(3)(a). Father filed a motion to dismiss the supplemental petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the allegations were barred by claim and issue preclusion. The juvenile court agreed and dismissed the State’s supplemental petition. The Supreme Court vacated the order of dismissal, holding (1) the juvenile court erred by not converting the motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment and allowing both parties an opportunity to produce evidence supporting their arguments; and (2) the doctrine of claim preclusion should not be strictly applied in abuse and neglect cases when doing so would fail to protect children from continuing abuse or neglect. Remanded for further proceedings on the supplemental petition. View "In re Interest of Noah B." on Justia Law

Appellee filed a complaint for dissolution of marriage against Appellant. During the pendency of the dissolution case, Appellant filed a separate complaint for declaratory judgment seeking an order regarding the parties’ rights under a prenuptial agreement. In the declaratory judgment action, the district court found the agreement to be valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court and remanded with directions to enter an order dismissing Appellant’s complaint for declamatory judgment, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it entertained Appellant’s declaratory judgment action when another action was pending involving the same parties and the same issues. View "Mansuetta v. Mansuetta" on Justia Law

Petitioner J.B. argued that his parental rights with respect to his biological child K.J.B. could not be terminated without express written findings of fact on “incarcerated parent factors” from the 2013 amendment of RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). The Supreme Court held that while explicit findings on the incarcerated parent factors were not statutorily required, consideration of the factors was mandatory. Because the trial court failed to consider the incarcerated parent factors in this case, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the incarcerated parent factors. View "In re Parental Rights to K.J.B." on Justia Law

Appellants Bruce Schultz and Jared Bruce mutually sought to vacate their adult adoption granted ten years prior. The issue in this case was whether the trial court lacked authority to vacate an adult adoption where both parties sought the termination of parental rights as competent adults. The trial court opined that because the Oklahoma Adoption Code, 10 O.S. 2011, section 7507-1.1, neither authorized nor prohibited the vacation of adult adoptions, it lacked authority to vacate the existing order. Appellants appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court directly, and the Supreme Court retained the first impression matter. Based on the Legislature's provisions in granting adult adoptions, parallel provisions for vacating adoptions of minor children, and the overall intent of the Adoption Code, the Supreme Court found an error warranting remand to the trial court to rehear Appellants' petition. As the trial court correctly found consent and competency of the parties, upon remand it needed only conduct a best-interest determination in deciding the matter. "With neither bad faith nor fraudulent motive of the parties, we find no evidence to suggest that the termination of rights herein would not serve their best interests." View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights of Schultz" on Justia Law

A mother sought an emergency protection order to keep her soon-to-be ex-husband away from her and their children because, she alleged, he had abused them. The father denied the allegations and sought to cross-examine one of the daughters about her claim that he had repeatedly tried to suffocate her, among other things. Evidence was presented that the daughter was suicidal, was unable to confront her father, and would be significantly traumatized by this cross-examination. The issue this case presented was whether the father had a constitutional or statutory right to question his minor daughter in court before the protection order could be issued. Finding under the facts of this case that he did not, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Aiken v. Aiken" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Henry married in 1987 and divorced in 1993. The Divorce Judgment granted Plaintiff one-half of the pension benefits Henry had accrued during the marriage, with full rights of survivorship. Henry was forbidden from choosing a payment option that would deprive Plaintiff of these benefits. Henry worked for Chrysler from 1965 to 1992, and began receiving retirement benefits in 1994, under a “Lifetime Annuity Without Surviving Spouse” option, in violation of the Judgment. Plaintiff’s attorney submitted the Judgment to the Plan administrator, who stated that the Judgment lacked information required by 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(C) to qualify as a “qualified domestic relations order,” so it could not override ERISA’s anti-alienation provision. Plaintiff did not contact the Plan again until after Henry had died in 2007. The Plan denied her benefits request, noting “the participant does not have a remaining benefit to be assigned.” For six years, Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to have the Plan qualify the Judgment. The Plan noted that changing the type of benefit was impermissible under plan the rules. In 2014, plaintiff obtained a nunc pro tunc order, correcting the Judgment. The Plan again denied benefits. Plaintiff filed suit under ERISA. The district court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, reasoning that, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim was based on the 2014, denial of benefits based on the Nunc Pro Tunc Order, it was timely and that the Order relates back to 1993. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the claim untimely. View "Patterson v. Chrysler Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Lincoln County Sheriff took three children into shelter care in 2013 on the ground that the children were endangered in their surroundings and that prompt removal was necessary to prevent serious physical or mental injury to the children. On the same day, the prosecuting attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act (“CPA”) and the magistrate court appointed a public defender to represent the children’s mother (Mother) and another public defender to represent the children’s father (Father). Two years later, the Department of Health and Welfare filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. The evidentiary hearing on that petition was held in 2016. On the morning of the first day of the hearing, Mother’s counsel stated that he would like the magistrate court to determine whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed for Mother pursuant to Idaho Code section 16-2007(5). The magistrate court denied the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Based upon the evidence presented during the hearing, the court found that the parental rights of Mother and of Father should have been terminated on the ground that they each had neglected the children and that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The court entered its judgment on June 21, 2016, and an amended judgment on July 21, 2016. Mother appealed, but Father did not. Finding that there was no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights" on Justia Law