Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a mother and father who appealed an order that declared their daughter, M.M., a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). The State had filed a petition in April 2023, alleging that M.M., then eleven years old, was without proper parental care and that her parents were resisting recommended mental-health services. M.M. was placed in the emergency custody of the Department for Children and Families (DCF) and then returned to her parents' care under a conditional custody order (CCO). In August 2023, a hearing concluded that M.M. was CHINS at the time the petition was filed. In October 2023, DCF recommended that custody be returned to the parents, and the court vacated the CCO, returned custody to the parents without conditions, and closed the case.The parents appealed the CHINS adjudication, arguing that the factual findings were insufficient to support the conclusion that M.M. was CHINS and that the family division referenced an inapplicable legal standard. The State argued that the appeal was moot because the family division’s jurisdiction terminated with the return of unconditional, unsupervised custody to the parents.The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the State, concluding that the case did not present a live controversy or fall within a recognized exception to the mootness doctrine. The court found that the CHINS adjudication had no current impact on the family division’s authority to make orders regarding M.M.’s legal custody. The court also found that the parents had not shown that the CHINS adjudication subjected them to negative collateral consequences or that the issues were capable of repetition but evading review. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between ex-spouses Robert Bassi and Susan Bassi. After their divorce, Susan sent a series of e-mails to Robert, which he claimed were harassing and disturbed his peace. These e-mails were related to Susan's intent to file a federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against Robert and others. In response, Robert filed a petition for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Susan. Susan then filed an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion, arguing that her e-mails were protected free speech and litigation correspondence. The trial court denied Susan's anti-SLAPP motion, finding that several of the e-mails were not privileged or protected speech, and that Robert had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his DVRO petition.The trial court's decision was based on the conclusion that several of Susan's e-mails were not protected activity as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also found that even if Susan did meet her burden at the first step, the motion would fail because Robert had met his burden of demonstrating a probability of success on the merits of his DVRO petition. The court noted that it had previously found, in granting the requested temporary personal conduct and stay-away order, that Robert’s petition was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for a permanent DVRO under the applicable Family Code provisions.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court found that while some of Susan's e-mails were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, others were not. The court also found that Robert had made a prima facie showing of facts sufficient to sustain a favorable result on his DVRO petition if the facts he alleges are substantiated. Therefore, Robert's claim under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act had at least the requisite minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. View "Bassi v. Bassi" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jennifer Ripple, who married Richard Counter after he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease allegedly caused by asbestos exposure from the 1950s to the 1990s. Counter filed a personal injury complaint against multiple defendants, claiming negligence and strict liability. After Counter's death, Ripple, as the personal representative of Counter's estate, amended the complaint to wrongful death claims under the Florida Wrongful Death Act. The estate sought damages for Ripple under section 768.21(2) of the Act, which allows a surviving spouse to recover for loss of companionship and mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ripple could not recover damages under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his alleged asbestos exposure. The court based its decision on Florida's common law rule that a party must have been legally married to the injured person at the time of the injury to assert a claim for loss of consortium. The trial court also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of Counter's adult children, concluding that Ripple was Counter's surviving spouse, thus barring the children from recovery under section 768.21(3) of the Act.The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision regarding Ripple's claim but reversed the decision regarding the adult children's claim. The district court held that Ripple could not recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his injury.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court rejected the argument that the common law "marriage before injury" rule bars recovery under section 768.21(2). Consequently, the court approved the holding in Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, where the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court concluded that Jennifer Ripple can recover as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). View "Ripple v. CBS Corporation" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the dissolution of a marriage between Barbara Henderson Green and Jeffry Howard Green. The couple was married in Connecticut in 1982 and lived in Nebraska for most of their marriage. In 2018, Mrs. Green moved to Colorado to assist their pregnant daughter, while Mr. Green remained in Nebraska. The Greens purchased two houses in Denver, one for themselves and one for their daughter. Mr. Green financially supported Mrs. Green from Nebraska and listed one of the Denver houses as an asset on his personal financial statements. In 2021, Mr. Green took out a loan secured by a mortgage on their Denver house, stating that his Nebraska home was his former residence and the Denver house was his primary residence. However, he continued to live in Nebraska. In 2022, both Mr. and Mrs. Green filed for divorce in separate jurisdictions—Mrs. Green in Colorado and Mr. Green in Nebraska.The Colorado trial court found that Mr. Green had the requisite minimum contacts to be subject to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado. This decision was largely based on Mr. Green's assertion that the Denver house was his primary residence when he applied for a loan. The court concluded that Mr. Green's continuing financial obligations in Colorado meant that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, and thus it denied his motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed the case and held that for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over an individual, the individual must be domiciled within the state. The court found that Mr. Green was not domiciled in Colorado and therefore was not subject to general personal jurisdiction there. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re the Marriage of Green" on Justia Law

Scott and Traci Musland, married in 1997, separated in 2022, and Scott filed for divorce. The couple resolved several interim issues through mediation, including exclusive use of the marital and lake homes. A bench trial was held in July 2023, where both parties provided testimony and exhibits. The district court found the Musland marital estate to be valued at just over eight million dollars. Traci Musland was awarded sections of land, a lake home, all of the couple’s retirement funds, miscellaneous equipment, and personal property. She also received an “equity payment” of $700,000 and was allocated responsibility for the debt associated with her credit cards and appraisal fee, leaving her a net estate of $3,224,357. Scott Musland was awarded a net estate of $4,961,915, which included the marital home, farmland, and debt, totaling $2,388,931.Traci Musland appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the property division was clearly erroneous, that the court erred in setting a land rent value, and failing to award her rent for the 2023 tax year, and that the right of first refusal granted to Scott Musland was not appropriate. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s distribution of marital property under a clearly erroneous standard. The court found that the district court provided a thorough analysis of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and applied the law properly. The court concluded that the division of the marital estate was not clearly erroneous.However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Traci Musland that the language of the right of first refusal as written was not appropriate. The court remanded that issue to the district court to modify the right of first refusal to provide that it is triggered by the acceptance of an offer by Traci Musland, subject to the right of first refusal. The court affirmed the district court’s distribution of the marital estate in all other respects. View "Musland v. Musland" on Justia Law

The case involves Katrina Danforth and Ryan Hansen, who share a child, SLD. Hansen filed a petition to terminate Danforth's parental rights to SLD, which Danforth answered pro se, requesting the appointment of a guardian ad litem for SLD and the termination of Hansen's parental rights. The district court ordered the termination of Danforth's parental rights but did not address her request to terminate Hansen's parental rights. Danforth appealed the decision.Previously, an Idaho court had established Hansen's paternity and awarded joint legal and physical custody of SLD to both parents, with Danforth as the primary caregiver. However, after discovering Danforth's involvement in the adult entertainment industry and her inappropriate use of SLD in her work, Hansen filed for custody modification. The court awarded temporary sole legal and physical custody to Hansen. Later, Danforth was sentenced to 10 years in prison for hiring a hitman to kill Hansen. After relocating to Wyoming with SLD, Hansen filed a petition to terminate Danforth's parental rights.In the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Danforth argued that the district court erred by disregarding her counterclaim to terminate Hansen's parental rights. The Supreme Court construed her request as a counterclaim, which remained unresolved. The court found that the district court's order terminating Danforth's parental rights did not satisfy the criteria for an appealable order as it did not resolve all outstanding issues, specifically Danforth's counterclaim. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "In the Matter of SLD" on Justia Law

A German citizen, Asli Baz, filed a suit under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) to compel Anthony Patterson, a U.S. citizen, to return their six-year-old son, A.P., from Illinois to Germany. The couple had previously lived together in Chicago, but after their relationship ended, they continued to cohabit and share custody of their son. Baz later moved to Germany with A.P., with Patterson's consent. However, Patterson later took A.P. from his school in Germany and brought him back to the U.S., refusing to return him to Germany.The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that A.P.’s habitual residence at the time he was retained was in Germany, where he had lived with Baz for over a year, and that the retention in Illinois violated Baz’s rights of custody under German law. It thus granted Baz’s petition and ordered the child’s return. Patterson appealed, challenging both the jurisdiction of the district court and its rulings on the merits of the petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court rejected Patterson's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to a provision in the Illinois Allocation Judgment, which stated that the Circuit Court of the State of Illinois had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The court also found that the district court did not err in determining that A.P.'s habitual residence was Germany, and that Baz was exercising her rights of custody at the time of the retention. The court emphasized that its decision did not touch on any matters of custody, which should be resolved by the courts of the child's habitual residence. View "Baz v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The case involves Carl Michael Seibert who appealed a summary judgment by the Madison Circuit Court in favor of Lorri Stricklen and Zoe Aldige. Seibert had filed claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process against Stricklen and Aldige. The case originated from a divorce proceeding between Seibert and Stricklen. Seibert believed Stricklen was having an affair and began gathering evidence. Stricklen filed a criminal complaint against Seibert for stalking, leading to his arrest and indictment. The criminal case ended in a mistrial, and Seibert subsequently filed his complaint alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process.The Madison Circuit Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Stricklen and Aldige, noting that Seibert's case had effectively languished due to his failure to conduct meaningful discovery or prosecute the case. The court found that if Seibert could not defeat a motion for a summary judgment after 58 months, a trial on his claims would be useless. Stricklen and Aldige also filed a motion for an award of attorney fees and costs under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act ("the ALAA"), which the court granted in part.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of Stricklen on the malicious-prosecution claim and in favor of Stricklen and Aldige on the abuse-of-process claim. However, it reversed the trial court's implicit determination that Seibert's lawsuit was filed without substantial justification, remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to set forth its reasoning as to why Stricklen and Aldige are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under the ALAA. View "Seibert v. Stricklen" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff, referred to as "Clara," who alleged that she was sexually assaulted by the defendant, referred to as "Martin," in June 2018. Following the incident, Clara applied for a temporary protective order (TPO) and then a final protective order (FPO) under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA). The trial court found that Clara had been subjected to nonconsensual sexual contact due to her extreme intoxication and that there was a possibility of future risk to Clara’s safety or well-being. The court issued an FPO directing Martin to have no contact with Clara.The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision based on the test used to assess consent. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the affirmative consent standard is the correct standard to be applied in determining whether sexual activity was consensual under SASPA. The case was remanded for reconsideration.On remand, Clara testified about her ongoing trauma from the assault. The court found Clara’s testimony credible and Martin’s testimony not credible. The court held that consent to sexual contact was not affirmatively and freely given and found a significant risk to Clara’s psychological well-being should the order not remain in effect. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification limited to the interpretation of the statute regarding the possibility of future risk to the victim's safety or well-being.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the plain language of the statute creates a standard that is permissive and easily satisfied. The court found that Clara's testimony about her ongoing trauma and fear for her safety was sufficient to demonstrate a "possibility of future risk" to her "safety or well-being." View "C.R. v. M. T." on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal against a county court's decision to appoint a permanent guardian for Patrick W., an individual deemed incapacitated due to a stroke. The appellant, Patrick W., argued that the court erred in admitting a neuropsychological report as evidence over his hearsay objection and that without this report, the evidence was insufficient to prove his incapacitation.Previously, Adult Protective Services (APS) had opened an investigation into Patrick's medical needs and financial management. Concerned about Patrick's vulnerability to financial exploitation, self-neglect, and undue influence, APS contacted an attorney to inquire about establishing a guardianship. Becky Stamp was identified as a potential guardian. The county court appointed Stamp as Patrick's temporary guardian, and later, Patrick's cousin, Terry Crandall, was substituted as the temporary guardian. The court also ordered Patrick to undergo a neuropsychological evaluation.At the guardianship hearing, the county court received several exhibits into evidence and heard testimony from six witnesses, including Patrick. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Patrick was incapacitated and appointed Crandall as his permanent guardian.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the county court's decision. It held that the neuropsychological report was admissible in evidence under Nebraska Revised Statute § 30-4204, as it was a medical report obtained by the guardian ad litem regarding the person for whom she was appointed. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the county court's finding that Patrick was incapacitated and that a full guardianship was the least restrictive alternative to provide for his continuing care. View "In re Guardianship of Patrick W." on Justia Law