Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A grandmother petitioned for guardianship of her adult granddaughter, who had developmental disabilities and other health issues. In 2012, the Superior Court of Alaska found the granddaughter incapacitated and appointed the grandmother as her guardian. However, the guardianship was terminated in 2014 after the grandmother failed to submit a required report. From 2014 to 2022, the grandmother and the granddaughter’s sister provided informal care. In 2022, Adult Protective Services (APS) and medical providers raised concerns about the granddaughter’s care, leading APS to file a new petition for guardianship.The Superior Court of Alaska initially appointed a temporary guardian and later granted APS’s petition for full guardianship without a new finding of incapacity, relying on the 2012 determination. The granddaughter requested a jury trial on the issue of her capacity, but the court denied this request, applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, which prevents relitigation of issues already decided.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the Superior Court erred in applying issue preclusion to the granddaughter’s capacity. The court noted that capacity can change over time and that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the facts regarding the granddaughter’s capacity were the same in 2012 and 2022. The court emphasized that APS, as the petitioner, had the burden of proving the granddaughter’s current incapacity. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order appointing a permanent guardian and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the granddaughter’s capacity. View "In re Protective Proceeding of S.J." on Justia Law

Lizette Aguilar petitioned for a domestic abuse protection order against Ana Valdez-Mendoza, her daughter's stepmother, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924. Aguilar alleged that Valdez-Mendoza physically assaulted her during a visit to drop off her daughter at the home of her ex-husband, Fernando Mendoza, who is married to Valdez-Mendoza. The district court issued an ex parte protection order, which was affirmed after a hearing. Valdez-Mendoza appealed, arguing that the court erred in concluding that she and Aguilar were related by "affinity" under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903.The district court for Madison County found that Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza had a relationship by "affinity" because Aguilar is related to her daughter, and the daughter's father is married to Valdez-Mendoza. The court overruled Valdez-Mendoza's motion to dismiss and affirmed the protection order, reasoning that the statutory phrase "related by affinity" was broad enough to include their relationship.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in its interpretation of "affinity." The court defined "affinity" as the relationship arising from the marriage contract between one spouse and the blood relations of the other, not extending to Aguilar herself, who is not related by consanguinity to Mendoza. Therefore, Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza were not related by affinity under § 42-903. The court reversed the district court's decision and vacated the protection order. View "Aguilar v. Valdez-Mendoza" on Justia Law

Leanne Nester and Cody Gamble divorced in 2022, with custody arrangements for their two minor children outlined in the divorce decree. Gamble later moved to modify custody, and during the proceedings, a press organization requested media access, which the district court granted. Nester moved for reconsideration, seeking to close the hearing to protect sensitive information about the children, including medical and Child Protective Services records. The district court denied her motion, interpreting a previous case, Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court, as precluding closure of family law proceedings.The district court concluded it lacked discretion to close the hearing, stating there was no statute or rule allowing it. Nester then sought writ relief from the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that the district court misinterpreted Falconi and failed to consider her privacy interests and those of her children.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its interpretation of Falconi. The court clarified that Falconi does not prohibit the closure of family law proceedings but requires a case-by-case analysis to determine if closure is warranted. The court outlined that closure is permissible if it serves a compelling interest, there is a substantial probability that the interest could be harmed without closure, and no alternatives to closure would adequately protect the interest.The Supreme Court of Nevada granted Nester's petition, directing the district court to vacate its order denying the motion to close the hearing and to reconsider the motion using the test outlined in Falconi. The court emphasized the need for the district court to properly apply the factors to determine whether closure is justified. View "NESTER VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

The State of Wyoming filed a petition against MF (Mother) and JF (Father) on June 22, 2020, alleging neglect of their minor children, JF and TF. Following a shelter care hearing, the juvenile court removed the children from the home and placed them in foster care. After a disposition hearing, the children remained in the custody of the Department of Family Services (the Department), with a permanency plan of family reunification. On January 19, 2024, after an evidentiary permanency hearing, the juvenile court changed the permanency plan to adoption.The juvenile court found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The court noted that Mother had made some progress but ultimately failed to consistently address the children's needs and safety concerns. The court also found that the children's best interests were served by changing the permanency plan to adoption, given their progress in foster care and the lack of stability and safety in Mother's care.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan to adoption, as the Department had made reasonable efforts at reunification, which were unsuccessful. The court also found that the juvenile court's decision to cease reunification efforts with Mother was supported by Wyoming law, which allows for discontinuation of such efforts when they are inconsistent with the permanency plan.Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that Mother's due process rights were not violated by the denial of a continuance of the permanency hearing or by the juvenile court's evidentiary rulings. The court found that Mother had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and the juvenile court's decisions were within the bounds of reason. The court also declined to adopt Mother's request for a change in procedures to require compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Evidence in evidentiary permanency hearings. View "In the Interest of: JF v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The case involves D.H.E., the biological father of V.S., a minor. The Cook County circuit court found V.S. neglected due to an injurious environment and dependent due to his mother's disability. Consequently, V.S. was adjudged a ward of the court, and guardianship was granted to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). D.H.E. appealed, arguing that the neglect finding violated his due process rights, was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the court failed to provide a factual basis for its disposition.The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's adjudication and disposition orders. It found that D.H.E.'s challenges related to the neglect finding were moot because he did not also challenge the dependency finding. The appellate court also upheld the disposition order, which granted guardianship and custody to DCFS based on the finding that D.H.E. was unable to care for V.S.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that D.H.E.'s appeal was moot because he failed to challenge the dependency finding, which alone was sufficient to support the wardship and disposition orders. The court also found that the collateral consequences exception to mootness did not apply, as no significant collateral consequences specifically tied to the neglect finding were identified. Therefore, the court did not address the remaining issues on appeal. View "In re V.S." on Justia Law

A.K. appealed a disorderly conduct restraining order issued against her. Jennifer Gooss, on behalf of her minor daughter, filed the petition alleging A.K., also a minor, engaged in disorderly conduct. A temporary restraining order was issued, and a hearing was held. After a 30-minute hearing, the district court issued a disorderly conduct restraining order against A.K.The District Court of Mercer County, South Central Judicial District, conducted the hearing. A.K. argued on appeal that she was denied due process because the court's time limit on the hearing deprived her of a reasonable opportunity to rebut the evidence and testify on her own behalf. She also contended that the district court's findings were not supported by the evidence.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court noted that a district court's decision to grant a restraining order or conduct a hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court found that A.K. did not object to the 30-minute time limit at the outset of the hearing and did not request additional time. The court determined that the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by setting the time limitations and that A.K. had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner.The Supreme Court also reviewed the district court's findings and concluded that sufficient evidence supported the finding that A.K.'s conduct affected the minor petitioner's safety, security, or privacy. The court held that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the restraining order. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the disorderly conduct restraining order. View "Gooss v. A.K." on Justia Law

Samantha Davis filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Richard Romanyshyn in April 2024. The district court granted a temporary restraining order and outlined the hearing procedure, which limited the hearing to 15 minutes unless a full evidentiary hearing was requested. The procedure required the requesting party to file a notice of witnesses and a summary of their anticipated testimony three days before the hearing. If no request was made, evidence had to be presented by affidavit, and affiants had to be available for cross-examination if notified 24 hours before the hearing.Davis did not request a full evidentiary hearing but filed a notice to cross-examine Romanyshyn. Romanyshyn argued he requested a full evidentiary hearing and filed a notice to cross-examine through his answer, but the district court found he did not follow the proper procedure. The hearing was limited to arguments from Davis’s counsel and Romanyshyn, along with Davis’s petition and Romanyshyn’s affidavit. The district court granted Davis a two-year restraining order, later amended to include the parties’ two minor children, conflicting with an existing parental responsibility order.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the district court deprived Romanyshyn of a full evidentiary hearing as required by N.D.C.C. § 12.1–31.2–01(1). The court found that the district court relied solely on inadmissible hearsay in Davis’s petition and Romanyshyn’s affidavit, without allowing cross-examination or presenting admissible evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the restraining order and remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing. The court also noted that any restraining order issued on remand must not conflict with the existing parental responsibility order. View "Davis v. Romanyshyn" on Justia Law

Thomas Steiger and Hope VanDelden have two minor children, G.L.M.S. and T.L.S. Thomas filed a Petition for Establishment of a Permanent Parenting Plan in October 2016, which was granted in May 2017 after Hope did not respond or attend the hearing. The plan allowed the children to reside primarily with Thomas and have contact with Hope on alternating weekends, holidays, and up to 14 days of vacation each year. Hope filed a motion to amend the parenting plan in October 2017, claiming Thomas had reduced her parenting time. Thomas’s mother and stepfather also petitioned to intervene, asserting their grandparenting time had been decreased.In October 2023, Hope filed a motion to proceed with mediation to address the parenting plan. After unsuccessful mediation, she filed another motion to amend the plan in January 2024, claiming Thomas did not allow the children to spend additional time with her. Thomas opposed the motion, asserting there was no change in circumstances to warrant an amendment. The District Court set an in-chambers interview with the oldest child, G.L.M.S., but did not hold an evidentiary hearing before granting Hope’s motion to amend the parenting plan in July 2024.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court erred by not holding a hearing on the motion to amend the parenting plan, as required by Montana law unless the motion is denied for lack of adequate cause. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded the case for a hearing to determine if the statutory criteria for amending the parenting plan were met and to amend the plan in the best interests of the children. View "In Re G.L.M.S. and T.L.S." on Justia Law

David Morway sought review of an unpublished order by the court of appeals that dismissed his appeal as untimely. The appeal was against a May 24, 2023, circuit court order denying his motion to modify or terminate spousal maintenance. The court of appeals concluded that the order was final for purposes of appeal under WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1) and dismissed the appeal because David filed his notice of appeal outside the 90-day timeframe.In the Ozaukee County Circuit Court, David and Karen Morway were divorced in 2019, with David ordered to pay spousal maintenance. David filed a motion to modify the maintenance in May 2022 due to a change in his employment circumstances. The family court commissioner reduced David’s maintenance obligation, but Karen appealed. The circuit court held a trial and denied David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance in an oral decision on April 19, 2023, which was later memorialized in the May 24 order. Karen’s post-trial motion for attorney fees based on overtrial was also denied at that time.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the May 24 order was final because it disposed of the entire matter in litigation, specifically David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance. The court held that the order was unambiguous in its finality, despite lacking an explicit finality statement. The court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, concluding that David’s notice of appeal was not timely filed within the 90-day period, and thus, the court of appeals properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Morway v. Morway" on Justia Law

A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law