Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jessica Klein appealed the district court's temporary order for custody after it denied her motion to transfer jurisdiction to Iowa. Klein argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and North Dakota was an inconvenient forum to hear the case. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding North Dakota properly retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the matter and did not abuse its discretion in finding North Dakota to be a convenient forum. View "North Dakota v. Winegar" on Justia Law

Defendant Ashley Nutbrown-Covey is the mother of three children: J.N., born in 2013; A.N., born in 2008; and A.C., born in 2004. In August 2011, defendant and A.N.’s father took A.N. (then three years old) to the emergency room for an injury to A.N.’s leg. A.N. was examined by a physician, whose treating records indicate that although it was obvious that A.N. was injured, there were no deformities or external bruising to A.N.’s leg. The physician ordered X-ray examinations, which showed that A.N. was suffering from a spiral fracture of the left leg, meaning that A.N.’s leg had been subjected to significant torque. Although the physician was a mandated reporter, he did not notify the Department for Children and Families (DCF) of A.N.’s injury because nothing indicated that A.N. had been injured by defendant or any other adult. Neither DCF nor the State took any action until 2014. This case presented the question whether the doctrine of issue preclusion bars the State from prosecuting defendant for alleged abuse of one child, A.N., after the family court, in an earlier child-in-need-of-supervision (CHINS) proceeding involving a different child, J.N., found that there was insufficient evidence to adjudicate J.N. CHINS for being without proper parental care or subsistence. The Vermont Supreme Court held that, given the facts of this case, the prosecution was not barred by issue preclusion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss. View "Vermont v. Nutbrown-Covey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant seeking to establish paternity, custody, and support of the parties’ minor child. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to disqualify Defendant’s privately retained legal counsel. The district court granted the motion. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. Defendant then filed a purported appeal from the court’s order, assigning seven errors relating to the district court’s disqualification of her attorney. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) this Court improperly exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority twenty years ago when it adopted the so-called Richardson exception to the final order requirement, and therefore, the Court’s line of decisions purporting to authorize an interlocutory appeal are hereby overruled; and (2) because the appeal from the order at issue in this case is not statutorily authorized, the appeal is dismissed. View "Heckman v. Marchio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her three siblings, on behalf of her 88-year-old mother. Plaintiff claimed that her siblings' actions individually and while serving as trustees of her mother's revocable living trust constituted financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult. The siblings demurred. The mother, separately represented by counsel, intervened and joined the demurrer to the amended complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the elder abuse action on standing grounds. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the elder abuse action because she has not be personally aggrieved by her siblings' actions. The court rejected plaintiff's claims to the contrary and affirmed the judgment. View "Tepper v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

Deanna Huntley challenged the trial court's denial of her motion to divide unadjudicated community property. Deanna filed her motion more than two years after entry of a default judgment that dissolved her marriage to Frank Huntley. The trial court denied the motion on grounds Deanna had not first moved to set aside the default judgment. On appeal, Deanna argued: (1) Family Code section 2556 conferred the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate omitted community property without having to first move to set aside the judgment; (2) the dissolution judgment's silence as to the division of any property meant all of the community property remained to be divided; and (3) the trial court's error should have been reversed for proper division of the parties' community property. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded section 2556 provided the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to divide omitted or unadjudicated community property. The default judgment's silence as to any division of property required reversal and the Court remanded for further proceedings under Family Code sections 2550 and 2556. View "In re Marriage of Huntley" on Justia Law

In 2009, defendant Sharea Foster, gave birth to a son, BF. Plaintiff Shae Graham alleged that he was the biological father of BF and therefore should be recognized as BF’s legal father. However, defendant has been married to her husband, Christopher Foster, since 2004. Because “a child conceived and born during a marriage is legally presumed the legitimate child of that marriage, and the mother’s husband is the child’s father as a matter of law,” Michigan law presumed that Christopher was BF’s father notwithstanding plaintiff’s assertions. Plaintiff, nonetheless, sought to establish his alleged paternity and legal fatherhood of BF. When a minor child has a presumptive father, the Revocation of Paternity Act (RPA) allows an individual to come forward under certain circumstances and allege his paternity and legal fatherhood. The Supreme Court determined that the Court of Appeals erred by prematurely adjudicating a nonparty’s anticipated defense (here, Christopher Foster). For that reason, the Supreme Court vacated the offending portions of the judgment below, while leaving in place its judgment remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the remainder of its opinion. View "Graham v. Foster" on Justia Law

J.J.V. ("the child") was the daughter of J.V. ("the father"). In 2009, the Marshall County Department of Human Resources (DHR) removed J.J.V. from the custody of mother M.M.T. At that time, J.V. was living in Florida, where the child and the mother had resided until the mother left the father. The father came to Alabama to locate the mother and the child only to learn that DHR had removed the child from the mother's home. Without the aid of counsel, the father attempted to work with DHR, and he briefly reunited with the mother. A DHR caseworker informed him that the child would not be returned to the parents if they resided together; shortly thereafter, the father left the mother's residence. In 2010, with the aid of counsel, the father secured supervised visitation with the child. By early 2011, the father was granted unsupervised visitation with the child; he had a total of five unsupervised visits with the child. Later that year, after the child had returned from an unsupervised visit with the father, the child's foster parents contacted the child's DHR caseworker, reporting that the child had reported the father had 'hurt her butt.' After the accusation, the father's visitation was changed to supervised visitation. The child cried and said that she did not want to attend visits with the father. When at the visits, the child barely interacted with the father. The father was ultimately charged with sexual abuse, arrested and placed in the Marshall County jail, where he remained for approximately 18 months. DHR filed a petition to terminate the father's parental rights; however, the juvenile court denied that petition. DHR appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment declining to terminate the father's parental rights and remanded the case for reconsideration of DHR's petition. DHR petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the juvenile court to set aside or vacate its April 3, 2016 order, addressing the transfer of legal custody and physical custody of the child to the father. The Supreme Court granted the writ. “Given the allegations made by DHR and the contents of the report prepared by …the clinical psychologist, the juvenile court could not conclude that the concerns raised by DHR and [the psychologist] could be ignored as a matter of law. Instead, the juvenile court should have scheduled a hearing so that it could properly evaluate any evidence DHR might present (including any testimony from [the psychologist]) as to the alleged change in the child's circumstances after the entry of the April 2016 order.” View "Ex parte Marshall County Department of Human Resources." on Justia Law

Robert Carroll appealed an order denying his motion to set aside or vacate the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial, after the court entered a divorce judgment awarding Anna Carroll monthly child support of $1,387. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying a continuance of the trial or in allowing the State be named a real party in interest. The Court concluded, however, the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions when it made insufficient findings to support its award of child support. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carroll v. Carroll" on Justia Law

In 2004, Michael Burns and Kerry Burns divorced. This appeal involved a contempt proceeding between the parties that was pending before the district court for Adams County. Judge James Doyle, acting as the district judge for Adams County, issued an order requiring Kerry to appear in the Dawson County District Court and show cause why she should not be held in contempt for refusing to comply with prior orders. When Kerry did not appear for the show cause hearing the district court entered an order finding Kerry in contempt and sanctioning her to ten days in jail. Thereafter, Kerry moved the district court to vacate its order on the basis that the court did not have authority to hold an evidentiary hearing outside of the county in which it was sitting. The district court overruled Kerry’s motion to vacate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court did not act in conformity with the law when it ordered Kerry to appear in Dawson County and when it held the contempt hearing there because Dawson County was outside the pending county of Adams County. Remanded. View "Burns v. Burns" on Justia Law

Spencer Curtiss appealed the district court's Third Amended Judgment modifying his parenting time and its order denying his motion to reconsider. The Supreme Court remanded to the district court for further findings and retained jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3). The Court concluded on remand the district court made adequate findings to support its decision to suspend visitation of D.C., but that the findings suspending P.C.'s visits to the penitentiary were inadequate and are not supported by the record.The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded again for further proceedings. “On remand, the district court must address how supervised visitations by P.C. will be facilitated, and determine which party shall be responsible for any costs associated with supervised visitation by a third party.” View "Curtiss v. Curtiss" on Justia Law