Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

While a long-term marriage generally supports an equal division of property, a court may unequally divide property in a short-term marriage and award the parties what each brought into the marriage. If the district court fails to comply with the child support guidelines in determining an obligor's child support obligation, the court errs as a matter of law. Angela Allmon appealed a judgment granting her a divorce from Aaron Allmon, granting her primary residential responsibility for their child, ordering him to pay child support, and distributing their marital property. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, but reversed the child support award and remanded for the district court to correctly apply the Child Support Guidelines. View "Allmon v. Allmon" on Justia Law

As part of marital dissolution proceedings, appellant Valerie Grissom sought a domestic violence restraining order against her husband, respondent Louis Grissom. The trial court denied the request. On appeal, Valerie contended the court erred by concluding that because her injuries were suffered during and as a result of physical confrontations she instigated, they did not constitute " 'abuse' " within the meaning of Family Code section 6203. The Court of Appeal found that although section 6203 defined abuse to include an intentionally or recklessly caused bodily injury to the complainant, a finding of abuse was not mandated merely because the complainant shows he or she suffered an injury caused by the other party. The Court concluded the trial court properly recognized that a person who responded reasonably to an aggressor in this way did not commit abuse within the meaning of section 6203. View "Marriage of Grissom" on Justia Law

Samuel J. Stoorman & Associates, P.C. represented Kristy Casagranda (“Wife”) during dissolution proceedings against her then-husband Brian Todd Dixon (“Husband”). The Firm asserted a charging lien for its fees under Colorado’s attorney’s lien statute against assets the court awarded to Wife during the divorce and obtained a court order recognizing that lien. The firm later filed a motion for an entry of judgment enforcing its charging lien against maintenance payments Husband owed to Wife, seeking to have Husband redirect those payments to the Firm. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that an attorney’s charging lien could not attach to a maintenance award. The court of appeals affirmed. Because the attorney’s lien statute’s plain language provided that a charging lien attached to any judgment that an attorney helps a client obtain, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed. View "Stoorman v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In 2011, Petitioner Scott Foster’s former wife, Bronwen Foster (“Wife”), filed for dissolution of marriage and hired attorney John Plock to represent her. As part of the dissolution proceedings, the trial court ordered a parental responsibilities evaluation (“PRE”). The PRE was performed by Dr. Andrew Loizeaux. A second PRE was subsequently conducted by Dr. Edward Budd. Neither evaluation was favorable to Foster. The PREs were confidential and were not to be “made available for public inspection” without an order of the court. Foster was found guilty of violating a protection order issued in the dissolution proceedings. A deputy district attorney prosecuting the protection order matter filed the PREs with the criminal court for use in sentencing. Plock filed a motion in the dissolution proceedings, admitting that he had disclosed the PREs to the deputy district attorney. While the dissolution of marriage proceeding and the criminal cases were pending, Foster filed eleven separate lawsuits against those involved in the PRE process conducted by Dr. Loizeaux. Wife was named as a defendant, but Plock was not. The lawsuits alleged various claims, including defamation and outrageous conduct. The eleven cases were consolidated into one case. The defendants each moved to dismiss the case. Foster subsequently amended his complaints. In Foster’s amended complaint against Wife, he alleged among other things that she, through her attorney, caused both of the PREs to be disclosed in the criminal case. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether mutuality was a necessary element of defensive claim preclusion. Multiple divisions of the court of appeals concluded that mutuality need not be established for the defensive use of claim preclusion, but the Supreme Court disagreed, instead concluding that mutuality was a necessary element of defensive claim preclusion. The Court also concluded that mutuality existed in this case, as did the remaining elements of claim preclusion, and therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals on other grounds. View "Foster v. Plock" on Justia Law

A maternal great-grandmother and a maternal step great grandfather appealed after a circuit court dismissed their petition for visitation with their minor great-grandchild. The circuit court found, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed, that the great-grandparents lacked standing to bring suit. View "Petition of Willeke" on Justia Law

Under Michigan’s Probate Code, the Department of Health and Human Services has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights. The Department also has an obligation to ensure that no qualified individual with a disability is excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services of the Department. Efforts at reunification cannot be reasonable under the Probate Code if the Department has failed to modify its standard procedures in ways that are reasonably necessary to accommodate a disability under the ADA. The Department petitioned to terminate the parental rights of respondent, a person with an intellectual disability. The Supreme Court determined after review of this matter that the circuit court erred by concluding the Department had made reasonable efforts at reunification because the court did not conduct a complete analysis of whether reasonable efforts were made: the court did not consider the fact that the Department had failed to provide the court-ordered support services, nor did the court consider whether, despite this failing, the Department’s efforts nonetheless complied with its statutory obligations to reasonably accommodate respondent’s disability. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that termination of respondent’s parental rights was improper without a finding of reasonable efforts. Remand was necessary for an analysis of whether the Department reasonably accommodated respondent’s disability as part of its reunification efforts in light of the fact that respondent never received the court-ordered services. View "In re Hicks/Brown" on Justia Law

Yolanda Terry, a social worker employed by the Macon County Department of Human Resources ("DHR"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its order denying her motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity and to enter a summary judgment in her favor based on that defense. DHR assigned the case of Mildred Collins to Terry. Collins was living with her daughter Cherri Forrester (her legal guardian). Collins' grandson Ronald Person, suspected Forrester was abusing Collins. After an investigative visit, Terry concluded Collins was not in imminent danger, and no indication that legal intervention was needed to have Collins removed from Forrester's home. Collins died two days after the visit. The death certificate indicated the cause of death as "blunt force abdominal injuries with hematoma." The personal representative of Collins' estate sued Terry for failing to follow DHR policy that allowed Collins to remain in Forrester's custody. After review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the estate failed to meet its burden of presenting substantial evidence that Terry acted beyond her authority by failing to discharge her duties, i.e., investigating the report that Collins was being abused, pursuant to DHR policy and procedures, because Terry complied with DHR policy and procedures concerning unannounced investigative visits, the need for involving law enforcement, private interviews of clients, inspections of the affected areas of a client's body, and inspections of the entire home. The Court found Terry was entitled to State-agent immunity, and granted her writ application. View "Ex parte Terry" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this case to resolve a split among the appellate courts regarding the proper interpretation of La. Civ. Code art. 2331. Specifically, the question to resolve involved determining whether parties must duly acknowledge their signatures prior to the marriage in order for the matrimonial agreement to have legal effect. The Supreme Court found the acknowledgment of the signatures to be a form requirement, and the failure to meet all form requirements prior to the marriage rendered the matrimonial agreement invalid. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated the district court judgment. View "Acurio v. Acurio" on Justia Law

In response to Wife’s request for an award of attorney fees and costs, the trial court entered an order finding Husband’s conduct had unnecessarily expanded the litigation and awarded Wife fees and expenses. The decree awarded primary physical custody of the child to Wife, and permitted Wife to relocate to Arizona where she and the child resided prior to the marriage. To address problems that immediately arose concerning child custody and the exchange of the child between Arizona and Georgia, the trial court entered an amended final judgment and decree that changed the terms of the original child custody award with respect to Husband’s visitation and other details. On appeal, Husband challenged the award of attorney fees to Wife, and further asserted that even if attorney fees were properly awarded, the trial court erred in failing to offset from the final attorney fees award the amounts he had previously paid as temporary support and attorney fees. Due to the terms of the parties’ prenuptial agreement, the Supreme Court agreed with Husband that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees: “[t]he fact remains, however, that pursuant to Georgia law, when they are awarded, attorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-2 are awarded ‘as an intrinsic part of temporary alimony.’” View "Vakharwala v. Vakharwala" on Justia Law

Chad Lizakowski appealed a divorce judgment distributing marital property and awarding spousal support and attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's distribution of marital property and award of spousal support. However, the Court reversed the district court's award of attorney fees, and remanded for reconsideration of Chad Lizakowski's request for fees. View "Lizakowski v. Lizakowski" on Justia Law