Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Notwithstanding the parties’ stipulated retroactivity provision, the California Court of Appeals concluded the trial court erred in awarding Russell Stover a child care credit for any period before May 10, 2011, when he filed his motion to modify support, because any such credits effectively modified the support award and incurred arrearages retroactively in contravention of the Family Code statutes governing modification of support orders. Furthermore, the Court concluded that while Eileen Bruntz failed to timely challenge an April 2007 order containing the stipulated retroactivity provision, public policy considerations precluded the Court of Appeal from judicially estopping her from challenging the order now. Bruntz and respondent Stover shared two children and years of acrimony-fueled court contests following the demise of their romantic relationship. Bruntz challenged several orders related to Stover’s alleged failure over the ensuing years to fully pay $1,000 in monthly child support under an April 2007 support order, which contained a contested stipulated retroactivity provision. View "Stover v. Bruntz" on Justia Law

The events leading to this appeal were rooted in the parties’ 2007 divorce. In September 2005, the parties entered into a final stipulation that provided, among other things, that defendant James Billado was to pay plaintiff Laura Cramer $50,000 to buy out her interest in defendant’s business. Before the court entered a divorce judgment, defendant sought to set aside his uncounseled stipulation on the ground that, since signing the stipulation, he learned that while acting as bookkeeper, plaintiff had been stealing money from the business. The trial court rejected his claim, but found that both parties treated the various business accounts as personal accounts, withdrawing funds at will to pay for vacations, credit card debt, and other personal expenses. Defendant turned a blind eye to poor bookkeeping practices since both he and plaintiff received the financial benefit. Given this record, the trial court declined to set aside the parties’ stipulation. Plaintiff recorded a certified copy of the judgment in the Bakersfield land records to perfect her judgment lien on defendant’s property. In 2015, plaintiff filed this foreclosure action alleging that defendant had failed to pay on the 2007 judgment. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside the default judgment of foreclosure on the grounds that the trial court erred in allowing service of the foreclosure complaint by tack order and in declining to set aside the default foreclosure judgment in light of his defenses. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s orders were within its discretion and accordingly affirmed. View "Cramer v. Billado" on Justia Law

RSA 461-A:11, I(a) permits a court to modify a parenting plan only when the parties agree to specific modification terms. Because the parties here disagreed about specific modification terms, they did not “agree to a modification,” and the trial court did not have authority to modify the parenting plan pursuant to RSA 461-A:11, I(a). Accordingly, because RSA 461-A:11, I(a) did not empower the trial court to modify the parenting plan, and because the record contained insufficient findings to permit the New Hampshire Supreme Court to determine whether the trial court properly modified the plan pursuant to RSA 461-A:11, I(c), the trial court’s order was reversed to the extent that modification of the parenting schedule was ordered pursuant to RSA 461-A:11, I(a). The Supreme Court also vacated the order to the extent that modification of the parenting schedule was ordered pursuant to a different subparagraph of RSA 461-A:11, I, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Kelly & Fernandes-Prabhu" on Justia Law

The parties ultimately agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce, with the chancery court to decide certain issues: child custody, visitation, equitable division of property and attorney fees. The bulk of Candice Ballard’s appeal centered on the court’s order denying her custody of the parties’ three minor children based upon the chancery court’s determination that both Candice and Marshall Ballard were “unfit” and that neither should be awarded custody pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 93-5-24-(9)(a)(ii) (the “family-violence presumption”). The chancery court awarded custody to the Mississippi Department of Human Services but placed the children with Marshall’s parents. Candice challenged the custody decision, arguing the chancellor relied strictly on hearsay to establish her “unfitness” and history of family violence. She also argued the chancery court erred in dividing the marital estate and awarding attorney’s fees. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded with respect to the issues of custody and division of the marital estate; with respect to fees, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ballard v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Leslie Shumake appealed a Chancery Court judgment that found him in contempt for failure to pay his alimony obligations, denied his motion to modify alimony, and placed an equitable lien on his law practice to secure the payment of future alimony. Shumake argued that the chancellor erred by imposing the equitable lien, abused his discretion by failing to grant the motion to modify alimony, erred by rejecting his inability-to-pay defense to the contempt action, erred in the award of attorney fees, and erred by awarding Ms. Shumake the unpaid balance of the arrearage on the parties’ former first mortgage. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed on all issues except the chancellor’s award of attorney fees for Ms. Shumake’s successful contempt action. The Court reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for the chancellor to subtract the fees attributable to Ms. Shumake’s defense of Mr. Shumake’s modification action. View "Shumake v. Shumake" on Justia Law

In this divorce matter, the parties agreed to divide the husband’s retirement benefit based on its present value and implemented the division with a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). In 2014, after the husband received an updated benefit projection that calculated the wife’s share of the benefit using his salary at retirement instead of at divorce, he sought to modify the QDRO. He asked the court to require that her benefit be based upon the same salary data used in a 2006 calculation. The superior court denied the motion. Because the settlement did not contain clear language establishing the use of the earlier salary the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Thomson v. Thomson" on Justia Law

Lisa Reasner suffered years of sexual abuse while in foster care and after the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) approved her adoption. Years later, Reasner sued OCS after discovering that OCS might have played a role in allowing her abuse. The superior court concluded that Reasner’s claims were untimely and granted summary judgment in favor of OCS. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court found the superior court erred in granting summary judgment to OCS based on the statute of limitations because it found a genuine issue of material facts existed as to when Reasner's claims accrued. The Court found Reasner's remaining claims could have withstood summary judgment. View "Reasner v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

In this divorce matter, at the conclusion of trial, the wife physically assaulted husband's attorney. The incident led to criminal charges, and the judge presiding over the divorce testified in the criminal case as a witness. The judge still presided over the divorce matter when wife made motions to reopen the case and redistribute the marital property. She appealed when the superior court denied these motions, arguing the judge should have recused herself after witnessing the assault in the courtroom and later testifying about it. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not abuse its discretion in any of the challenged rulings and affirmed. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A district court's contempt decision will only be disturbed on appeal if the court abused its discretion. A denial of a motion for reconsideration will not be reversed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Mark and Kayla Rath were divorced in January 2013. The divorce judgment awarded Kayla primary residential responsibility of the couple's two minor children, with Mark receiving supervised parenting time. Mark appealed orders denying his motions for recusal, for an order to show cause, and for reconsideration, and from orders denying his demands for change of judge in child support modification proceedings. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded he waived his issues on appeal regarding recusal and the orders denying his demands for change of judge were interlocutory and not appealable. The Court further concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion seeking to hold Kayla in contempt and motion to reconsider. View "Rath v. Rath" on Justia Law

Section 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a), N.D.C.C., does not require both treating and non-treating physicians to testify at a medication hearing addressing a request to involuntarily treat with medication. M.G. appealed a district court's order authorizing involuntary treatment with prescribed medication. F.M.G. argued the district court erred in granting the request to treat her with prescribed medications, because the proper medical providers did not testify at the hearing under N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a), and the mandatory certification requirements under N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a)(2) were not met. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a) did not require both treating and non-treating physicians to testify at the hearing, and F.M.G. did not adequately raise the issue of whether the form used to request involuntary treatment with medication met the certification requirements under N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a)(2) before the district court. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Interest of F.M.G." on Justia Law