Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Divorced parents shared equal custody of their son pursuant to an agreement. The mother asked the superior court to modify the agreement to allow her to move with the child to Hawaii. Following a two-hour hearing the court modified custody, granting primary physical custody to the mother; it also modified legal custody to allow the mother final decision-making authority, subject to later court ratification, though neither party had asked that legal custody be modified. The father appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion when it granted modification and awarded primary physical custody to the mother, and it affirmed that part of the superior court’s decision. However, the Supreme Court held it was an abuse of discretion to modify legal custody when neither party had requested it, the parties were not on notice that it was at issue, and the evidence did not demonstrate a need for it. The modification of legal custody was therefore vacated. View "Judd v. Judd" on Justia Law

Paul Schaffner appealed a district court order denying his petition to modify his parenting time from supervised visitation to unsupervised. The district court denied his petition after finding Schaffner failed to show a material change in circumstances had occurred since the previous order establishing his parenting time. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schaffner v. Schaffner" on Justia Law

The court terminated mother’s parental rights, 22 M.R.S. 4055(1)(A),(B), finding that she is unfit to parent the children because she has abandoned them, she is unwilling and unable to protect them from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs, and she has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with them. The court also terminated the parental rights of the father of each child. Mother did not challenge the findings relating to termination of her rights but claimed that the children’s current placement, with their maternal grandparents, is unsafe, and that permanent placement there would not be in the children’s best interests. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, noting that the best interests determination in connection with the termination of mother’s parental rights was not a determination of who will adopt the children or that any particular placement is in their best interests. To the extent that mother seeks to challenge the court’s order identifying adoption as the permanency plan, 22 M.R.S. 4038-B(3), that order is interlocutory and not appealable. View "In re: Dominic B." on Justia Law

In 2014, father had partial custody of S.H.; S.H. accused mother of abuse and fled from her home to father. Father sought a temporary order of full custody. A Pennsylvania judge granted mother emergency custody. S.H. was referred to Centre County’s Children and Youth Services (CYS) because of the abuse allegations. CYS concluded that the allegation did not meet the definition of child abuse but continued its investigation, giving S.H. the option of moving into a group home or remaining with his mother. S.H. did not want to stay with her. Mother arranged for S.H. to stay in Youth Haven and objected to any contact with father, claiming that she had sole custody. CYS and Youth Haven allowed contact. After a visit, father complained about Youth Haven, which told CYS that S.H. could not stay due to problems with father. CYS informed father that he could no longer contact S.H. at Youth Haven. Hamilton filed a federal suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights by “placing S.H. in a shelter tantamount to confinement” and “arbitrarily and capriciously terminating all paternal visits and contact.” While that case progressed, S.H. left Youth Haven. A new Pennsylvania judge vacated the prior emergency custody order, granted father physical custody of S.H., and prohibited contact between S.H. and mother. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that the case was mooted when father obtained custody. View "Hamilton v. Bromley" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the trial court’s dismissal of her parentage action under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), as well as its denial of her motion to reconsider. She and father were the parents of a child born in Vermont in June 2016. The child also lived with parents for a time in Virginia. Father initiated child custody proceedings in Virginia in August 2016 and was granted custody of the child. Mother appealed that decision within the Virginia court system. Mother then filed a parentage action in Vermont. Following a joint hearing before Virginia and Vermont courts, the Virginia court retained jurisdiction over the custody case, and the Vermont court dismissed the parentage action. Mother essentially argued to the Vermont Supreme Court that Vermont, not Virginia, should have asserted jurisdiction over this child custody case. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s decision, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pierce v. Slate" on Justia Law

A parent who has committed domestic violence may rebut the presumption favoring only supervised visitation with a sufficient accumulation of direct and indirect evidence of a lack of physical or emotional danger to the child. Keanna Schneider originally appealed a district court order denying her motion to modify the parenting time of Keaton O'Hara from unsupervised to supervised parenting time. The North Dakota Supreme Court previously held the trial court erred by improperly excluding evidence, making insufficient findings, and misapplying the law in analyzing the parties' conduct. We remanded for further proceedings and retained jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3). On remand, the district court issued additional findings and an amended order. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court complied with the Supreme Court's mandate by holding an evidentiary hearing and that its additional findings were not clearly erroneous. View "O'Hara v. Schneider" on Justia Law

In domestic relations cases, the requirements of N.D.R.Ct. 8.2 must be complied with before a party's request for affirmative relief may be granted in an ex parte interim order. Attorney's fees may be awarded as a remedial sanction for contempt. Aeryn Peterson appealed an order to show cause and an order finding her in contempt. She argued the district court abused its discretion by finding her in contempt and ordering her to pay Cody Schulz's attorneys fees. Peterson and Schulz had one child together. Peterson was awarded primary residential responsibility and Schultz was awarded parenting time. Peterson moved to relocate with the child out of state. Peterson requested the court allow her to move with the child to New Mexico so she could pursue a degree in theater. Schulz moved for an order to show cause, arguing Peterson violated the judgment by moving the child out of state without his consent or a court order. Schulz also requested the court order Peterson to return the child to North Dakota "immediately and no later than August 15, 2016," and award him full costs and attorneys fees for having to bring the motion. Schulz filed a supporting affidavit claiming he served Peterson with a letter on August 4, 2016, informing her he did not consent to the move, he learned Peterson and the child were in New Mexico on August 8, 2016, and Peterson refused to return the child to North Dakota. The district court granted Schulz's motion and entered an order to show cause. The court further ordered Peterson to return the child to North Dakota. Peterson responded to the motion for an order to show cause, arguing she was entitled to respond to the motion before the court could find she was in contempt or order her to act in any specific capacity. She claimed the court's order that she return the child to the state was improper because she did not have an opportunity to respond to the motion and a hearing had not been held. After a hearing the district court entered an order finding Peterson in contempt. The court found Peterson violated the judgment and was in contempt for moving the child to New Mexico without receiving Schulz's consent. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Peterson v. Schulz" on Justia Law

This case was previously before the Idaho Supreme Court in In Matter of Doe (2016-14), 389 P.3d 141 (2016). There, the Court vacated the judgment terminating Jane Doe’s parental rights to her son M.R. and remanded the case for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the magistrate court again terminated Doe’s parental rights. The magistrate court found that M.R. was neglected as defined by Idaho Code sections 16-2002(3)(a) and 16-2002(3)(b) and that Doe’s compliance with her case plan was not impossible. Doe timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "H & W v. Jane Doe (2017-3)" on Justia Law

The fathers of minor children in New Jersey challenged the state law governing child custody proceedings between New Jersey parents. In a suit against state court judges, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, they argued that the “best interests of the child” standard that New Jersey courts use to determine custody in a dispute between two fit parents is unconstitutional. The fathers alleged that their parental rights were restricted, or that they were permanently or temporarily separated from their children, by order of the New Jersey family courts without adequate notice, the right to counsel, or a plenary hearing, i.e. without an opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine and that although mothers and fathers are, in theory, treated equally in custody disputes under New Jersey law, in practice courts favor mothers. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit, after holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the suit, which was not challenging the state court judgments, but the underlying policy that governed those judgments. The court concluded that the judicial defendants were not proper defendants, having acted in an adjudicatory capacity and not in an enforcement capacity. View "Allen v. DeBello" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to 10A O.S.Supp.2014, section 1-4-904(B)(5), alleging Mother failed to correct the conditions that led to the deprived child adjudication of B.K. B.K. was removed from the home as the result of a delusional episode in which Mother believed the police had planted listening devices in B.K.'s ears to spy on Mother. This delusional episode was reported to police by B.K.'s seventeen-year-old brother. Both a psychologist and a psychiatrist diagnosed Mother as having a delusional persecution disorder that medication would help control. When Mother said she would not take medication for the delusional disorder, the State pursued termination of Mother's parental rights because B.K. had been in DHS foster care for over 36 months. A jury returned a verdict that found Mother failed to correct the conditions. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and terminated Mother's parental rights. Mother appealed. Upon review, a majority of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment, finding undisputed evidence revealed Mother's mental disorder was the cause of B.K. being adjudicated deprived, not deficiencies in parenting. The majority opinion held that any termination must be based on the mental health ground found in 10A O.S.Supp.2014 sec. 1-4-904(B)(13) and, therefore, it was fundamental error to terminate pursuant to 10A O.S.Supp. 2014 sec. 1-4-904(B)(5). The State sought review from the Oklahoma Supreme Court to address whether the Legislature intended 10A O.S.2011, section 1-4-904(B)(13) to be the exclusive ground for termination in cases where a parent has a "diagnosed cognitive disorder" or can such a disorder be a "condition" leading to a deprived adjudication that a parent must correct under 10A O.S.2011, section 1-4-904(B)(5). The Supreme Court vacated the majority opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, and held: (1) subsection 1-4-904(B)(13) did not exclusively apply, and (2) the trial court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights based on subsection 1-4-904(B)(5). View "In the Matter of B.K." on Justia Law