Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

At a special hearing, the juvenile court issued a permanent restraining order prohibiting the child's stepfather from having any contact with the child (C.M.). The child's mother, E.S., appealed an order the juvenile court issued at the same hearing, directing the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) to immediately remove her child from her care if there is "any evidence that the minor has been exposed to [his stepfather] or if mother violates the restraining order." While the Court of Appeal appreciated the juvenile court's assessment of the need to warn E.S. in no uncertain terms there would be serious consequences if C.M. has any contact with the stepfather, the Court concluded issuing a conditional removal order was not the way to warn her. “Removal, including a temporary detention, must be made on a timely assessment of risk to the child. Here, the court may have informed E.S. about the potential legal consequences of exposing C.M. to [the stepfather], including removal from her custody and termination of parental rights. The court may have directed the Agency to immediately bring to its attention any evidence of contact between C.M. and [the stepfather] and to set a hearing to address the issue. However, the conditional removal order disregards the dependency scheme, which is carefully calculated, not only to protect the child, but also to guarantee procedural and substantive due process to the child and the parent.” View "In re C.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal from a judgment of the district court adopting the order of a family law magistrate granting Mother’s motion to modify a child support order included in the divorce judgment between Burdin and Anthony Kline. The child support order did not order Kline to pay child support. Burdin later filed a motion to modify the child support provisions of the divorce judgment, seeking an order requiring Kline to pay child support calculated pursuant to the child support guidelines. A magistrate granted Burdin’s motion. Kline appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case because there is no right of direct appeal from a magistrate’s order. On remand, the district court treated Kline’s appeal as a Me. R. Civ. P. 118(a) objection to the magistrate’s order and adopted that order as the court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 118(a)(2). Kline appealed from the court’s adoption of the magistrate’s order. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal because Kline failed to file a timely objection to the magistrate’s order as required by Rule 118, therefore waiving both his right to contest it in district court and to appeal. View "Kline v. Burdin" on Justia Law

Husband Ricky Lockamy and Wife Margie Lockamy were divorced in 2009 pursuant to a final decree that incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement. The settlement agreement provided that Wife would receive 40% of Husband’s “military retirement” payments. The trial court awarded these payments as an equitable division of marital property, and it did not award any alimony to Wife. In March 2010, the Navy informed Husband that the payments he thought were for military retirement were actually disability benefit payments and that those payments could not be divided with Wife. As a result, Husband promptly stopped making payments to Wife provided under the “military retirement” provision of the settlement agreement. Six years later, Wife filed a motion to reform the divorce decree to provide for the original 60% to 40% division of the payments from the Navy that the parties originally thought were for Husband’s retirement. The trial court determined, among other things, in an order entered in 2016, that, because Husband’s disability benefits could not be divided as marital property, it would enforce the parties’ original intent to divide those payments by reforming the decree to award alimony to Wife. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of the motion to reform, finding the trial court was not authorized to modify the divorce decree pursuant to Wife’s motion, as the motion to reform the decree was untimely. Wife was not authorized to file an actual petition for a revision of “alimony” here, as it was undisputed that she was not awarded alimony in the original divorce decree. View "Lockamy v. Lockamy" on Justia Law

Rhonda Bennett (f/k/a Donley) filed an amended motion for new trial following a habeas court order discharging the payment of restitution and any arrearage for back child support by the purported biological father of Bennett’s minor child. Concluding that she was a non-party to the underlying action and therefore lacked standing to challenge its order, the court dismissed Bennett’s motion. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, finding the habeas court erred in concluding that Bennett lacked standing. View "Bennett v. Etheridge" on Justia Law

The parties were divorced in Connecticut in 2010. At that time, appellant Husband’s child support obligation was $279 per week for the parties’ two minor children. A Connecticut court modified the support order to facilitate appellee Wife’s move to Georgia with the children, reducing the obligation to $100 per week. In 2016, Wife filed an action in Georgia to domesticate and modify the parties’ Connecticut divorce decree and the modified order. The complaint was served on Husband personally while he was in Coweta County visiting the children. Husband moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the Georgia trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Connecticut child support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), because the requirements of OCGA § 19-11-172 (a)2 had not been met. Wife argued that jurisdiction was proper under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law (UEFJL), to both enforce and modify the Connecticut child support order. The trial court ultimately denied Husband’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that it had jurisdiction to modify the Connecticut child support order; however, it granted Husband’s request for a certificate of immediate review. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Husband’s application for interlocutory review, and, having considered the record, the parties’ arguments, and the relevant legal authorities, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment. The Georgia trial court did not have jurisdiction; Wife had to modify the child support order in Connecticut, and her invocation of the UEFJL did not change that result. View "Ross v. Ross" on Justia Law

Amanda Copeland appealed the termination of Gary Copeland’s child-support obligation to his two minor children. After their divorce, Gary and Amanda were awarded joint legal custody of their minor children, with physical custody awarded to Amanda and visitation awarded to Gary. Gary subsequently filed a Petition for Citation of Contempt and For Modification and a Motion for Temporary Relief. During the trial on Gary’s petition and motion, his seventeen-year-old daughter and thirteen-year-old son testified. The chancellor found they no longer loved their father and they wished to terminate any relationship with him. Each child acknowledged sending hateful emails and texts, which included expressed desires either to kill their father or see him dead. The numerous text messages and emails admitted into evidence were filled with vitriolic invectives, expressing deep-seated anger, resentment, and ill-will not only toward their father, but also toward his parents and sister. The court determined that the conduct of the children was so egregious that was appropriate to terminate the support obligation. The issues presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court’s review were: (1) whether the chancellor manifestly wrong in granting relief that was not requested; (2) did the children’s animosity toward their father exist at the time of the divorce; and (3) was the chancellor’s decision supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court found the chancellor did not abuse his discretion, was not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, and did not apply an erroneous legal standard. The chancellor’s findings of fact were supported by substantial and credible evidence. View "Copeland v. Copeland" on Justia Law

Father lived the child and her mother, outside of Maine, until 2008, when the child was about six months old. After that time, he maintained regular contact with the child, who resided primarily in New York, but was never her primary caregiver. In 2016 Mother moved to Maine with the child. Father, who is incarcerated in Massachusetts, did not oppose the move. While he was incarcerated the child asked a neighbor for help and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services commenced a child protection proceeding. Father made no effort to take responsibility. The Department obtained a preliminary protection order, 22 M.R.S. 4032-4036, and placed the child in foster care after hospitalization for psychiatric care. Father was served with notice and provided with appointed counsel, who moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction because Father is not a Maine resident, has never traveled to Maine,and otherwise lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Maine. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the court’s rejection of that motion. The court was not required to have jurisdiction over Father to have authority to issue a jeopardy order to protect the child. View "In re Emma B." on Justia Law

Under Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5, no family case manager at the Indiana Department of Child Services can oversee more than 17 children at a time who are receiving services. The statute does not require the Department to perform any specific, ministerial acts for achieving that number. Price, a family case manager, filed a proposed class action. She alleged that her caseload was 43 children and sought an “order mandating or enjoining [D]efendants to take all necessary steps to comply with [Section 5].” The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Price’s claim prior to class certification. Judicial mandate is an extraordinary remedy—available only when the law imposes a clear duty upon a defendant to perform a specific, ministerial act and the plaintiff is clearly entitled to that relief. The statute at issue does not impose a specific, ministerial duty. View "Price v. Indiana Department of Child Services; Director of Indiana Department of Child Services" on Justia Law

Kelcey Patton, a social worker for the Denver Department of Human Services (“DDHS”), was one of those responsible for removing T.D., a minor at the time, from his mother’s home, placing him into DDHS’s custody, and recommending T.D. be placed and remain in the temporary custody of his father, Tiercel Duerson. T.D. eventually was removed from his father’s home after DDHS received reports that T.D. had sexual contact with his half-brother, also Mr. Duerson’s son. DDHS later determined that during T.D.’s placement with Mr. Duerson, T.D. had suffered severe physical and sexual abuse at the hands of his father. T.D. sued Patton under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating his right to substantive due process, relying on a “danger-creation theory,” which provided that “state officials can be liable for the acts of third parties where those officials created the danger that caused the harm.” Patton moved for summary judgment on the ground that she is entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "T.D. v. Patton" on Justia Law

A father appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his defamation, negligence, and monetary claims against mother and her sister (aunt). Father alleged that mother and aunt coached daughter into saying “Daddy hit me” and submitted defamatory audio and video recordings of daughter’s statements to his parole officer. Father also alleged that mother made false statements to his parole officer and in mother’s petition for relief from abuse. The trial court ruled that these recordings and statements were absolutely privileged. Father also brought several monetary claims against mother premised on his allegation that he had loaned money to mother. On appeal, father argues the trial court (1) erred in concluding that the recordings and statements were protected by absolute privilege and that they should have instead been protected only by qualified privilege; (2) erred in dismissing his monetary claims against mother; and (3) abused its discretion in denying his motion for a court-appointed expert. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s entry of summary judgment on all claims except for certain monetary claims. View "Couture v. Trainer" on Justia Law