Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around an adoption dispute involving a minor child, G.P. The child's step-great-grandparents, Katherine and Michael, had agreed to temporary guardianship of G.P. after being contacted by the child's birth mother during her pregnancy. After G.P.'s birth, Katherine and Michael filed for temporary guardianship in the Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County. Concurrently, G.P.'s grandparents, Angela and Randall, filed a competing petition for guardianship. The birth parents of G.P. later consented to terminate their parental rights and agreed to G.P.'s adoption by Katherine and Michael. With these consents, Katherine and Michael filed a petition for adoption in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County.The Second Judicial District Court had scheduled a hearing for the competing guardianship petitions. However, it was unaware of the pending adoption petition in the Eighth Judicial District Court. The court denied Angela and Randall's petition for temporary guardianship but set a trial date for the competing guardianship requests. A few days later, the Eighth Judicial District Court granted Katherine and Michael's adoption petition. Upon learning of the adoption, Angela and Randall moved to set aside the adoption in the Eighth Judicial District Court, alleging misrepresentation and misconduct. The court granted their motion, setting aside the adoption.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the lower court's decision. The court clarified that a motion to set aside a judgment under NRCP 60(b) could be brought by a party to the proceeding, an entity in privity with one of the parties, or a nonparty with interests directly affected by the judgment. However, Angela and Randall, as nonparties, lacked standing to move to set aside the adoption. They were not parties in the adoption proceedings, did not have rights directly affected by the proceedings, and lacked any other statutory or constitutional basis for standing. The court concluded that the district court had abused its discretion in setting aside G.P.'s adoption. View "In re Petition of Perry" on Justia Law

The case involves a woman who sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former intimate partner, alleging he sexually assaulted her after their relationship had ended. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) which barred the partner from possessing firearms and from attending the same church as the woman. At a later DVRO hearing, the trial court issued a DVRO, finding the man had sexually assaulted the petitioner and had committed subsequent acts of abuse by attending the same church as the petitioner and possessing a firearm, both in violation of the TRO.The man appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his procedural due process rights by conducting a direct examination of the petitioner, allowing her to testify about an incident of sexual assault not contained in the petition, admonishing his counsel about his method of questioning his client, and by depriving him of the opportunity to respond to a law enforcement firearms report that showed he owned a firearm.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court's procedures were adequate and did not violate the man's procedural due process rights. The court noted that the trial court had given the man several opportunities to respond to the report that he was the registered owner of a firearm, and he refused to respond fully. The court also found that the trial court acted appropriately in conducting questioning, restricting itself to eliciting material facts with general questions and clarifying confusing and incomplete testimony. The court affirmed the protective order. View "Bailey v. Murray" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Kevin Rawlings (Father) and Michelle Rawlings (Mother) who separated in 2015. The main point of contention was the primary physical custody of their two children. The district court referred the case to a domestic relations hearing officer who recommended joint legal custody and primary residence with the Father in New Mexico. Mother objected to over forty points in the hearing officer's recommendations and requested a hearing with the district court. The district court did not hold an in-person hearing but adopted the hearing officer's recommendations in its final decree of dissolution of marriage.The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, arguing that Rule 1-053.2 (2017) required an in-person hearing and that the district court did not adequately address Mother's objections. The Court of Appeals also held that the district court failed to establish the basis for its decision.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Rule 1-053.2 (2017). The Supreme Court held that the rule does not require an in-person hearing. The court also concluded that the district court provided a reasoned basis for its decision when it independently reviewed the record and adopted the hearing officer's recommendations in the final order. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the district court had jurisdiction to clarify the record and amend the final decree while the case was on appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Rawlings v. Rawlings" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a child, R.N., who was removed from his mother's care and placed in foster care with Ben and Charissa Wagner. The Wagners had previously adopted two of the mother's other children. The Department of Public Health and Human Services was granted temporary legal custody of R.N. and ordered the mother to complete a treatment plan. The Department later filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights due to her failure to complete the treatment plan and alleged abandonment of R.N. However, the mother began to engage with the Department and made positive changes, leading to the Department's shift from termination to reunification.The Wagners, unhappy with the Department's change of stance, filed a motion to intervene, asserting that it was appropriate under M. R. Civ. P. 24 and § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA. The District Court granted the Wagners' intervention motion, despite objections from the mother, the Department, and the guardian ad litem. The Wagners then filed a motion seeking an order for R.N. to be immediately placed in their care and for the Department to pursue termination of the mother's parental rights. The District Court did not set a hearing or issue a determination on the Wagners' motion. The Department filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the District Court granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had misinterpreted the law when it allowed the Wagners to intervene. The court also ruled that the Wagners did not have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of R.N. because the mother's rights had not been terminated. Furthermore, the court held that neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court had the authority to order or compel the Department to refile and prosecute its petition for termination. View "In re R.N." on Justia Law

The case involves an appellant, G.G., who sought renewal of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former partner, G.S. The original DVRO was issued based on stalking. The appellant and respondent were former romantic partners and parents of two young children. The appellant testified that the respondent had repeatedly attempted to control her during their relationship, including planting a listening device in their home, taking her phone, and following her to work. After the relationship ended, the respondent continued to stalk the appellant, appearing at her home uninvited at least 70 times. The appellant filed a request for a DVRO, which was granted for a two-year period.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially issued the DVRO. After the DVRO was issued, the appellant's unwanted contact with the respondent was reduced, but not entirely eliminated. The appellant filed a request to renew the DVRO two weeks before its expiration, asking that the order be made permanent. The trial court found no evidence that the respondent had intentionally violated the DVRO and concluded that the appellant's fear, while genuine, was not reasonable. The request to renew the DVRO was denied.The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four. The court found that the trial court did not apply the correct legal standard in denying the renewal of the DVRO. The court held that a DVRO can be renewed based on the original facts, regardless of whether they involved physical or non-physical abuse, and renewal is not conditioned on the presence or absence of "ongoing" events. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing, directing the trial court to reconsider the request for renewal consistent with the legal framework outlined in the decision. View "G.G. v. G.S." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Laleh Taghvaei Mohammadijoo and Ramin Dadashian, who were married in Iran and later settled in California. The couple separated after 12 years of marriage. The main contention revolves around two missing assets: approximately $150,000 in community funds that Mohammadijoo secured through a home equity line of credit (HELOC) and transferred to Iran for her brother to manage, and approximately $170,000 of separate property proceeds that Dadashian inherited from his father’s real estate investments in Iran. Dadashian argued that Mohammadijoo had exclusive management and control over these assets post-separation, and thus, the burden of proof should be shifted to her to account for these missing assets.The trial court declined to shift the burden of proof to Mohammadijoo. It found that there was no credible evidence as to what happened to the funds. The court also sanctioned Mohammadijoo for violating her statutory disclosure obligations but did not charge her with the value of the missing assets.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two reversed the judgment. The court held that the burden-shifting framework applies when one spouse solely controls and manages a relationship with a third party who directly oversees the management and investment of community funds post-separation. In such a case, the managing spouse must account for the missing assets. The court also extended this burden-shifting framework to missing separate property. Therefore, the trial court erred in declining to shift the burden of proof to Mohammadijoo regarding the missing assets. The case was remanded for a retrial of the community property issues. View "Marriage of Dadashian" on Justia Law

The case involves Rachel Goldstein and James Sabatino, who had a two-year relationship in Massachusetts that ended in 2017. In March 2020, Sabatino began contacting Goldstein, informing her that he had found sexually explicit photos and conversations on a cell phone she had loaned him during their relationship. Despite Goldstein's request for Sabatino to return the phone, he refused. Goldstein became concerned that Sabatino would use these texts and images to control her and ruin her career. In May 2020, a Massachusetts court granted Goldstein a protective order against Sabatino, which he violated, leading to his arrest. In June, the Massachusetts court extended the protective order for another six months. The same month, Goldstein moved to Harris County, Texas. While the Massachusetts protective order was still in effect, Sabatino began filing small-claims lawsuits in Massachusetts against Goldstein. In October 2020, Goldstein filed an application for a protective order against Sabatino in Harris County.The district court in Harris County issued a protective order against Sabatino, a Massachusetts resident, based on conduct that occurred entirely within Massachusetts. Sabatino appealed, challenging the district court's personal jurisdiction over him and its subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas vacated the order and dismissed the case, holding that the district court lacked territorial jurisdiction—a purportedly nonwaivable, third jurisdictional requirement. The court of appeals did not address personal jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals’ territorial jurisdiction analysis, but agreed with Sabatino that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court held that territorial jurisdiction is not an independent jurisdictional requirement in Chapter 7B protective-order proceedings. The court also held that Sabatino did not enter a general appearance, and thus did not waive his challenge to the district court's personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment vacating the protective order and dismissing the case. View "GOLDSTEIN v. SABATINO" on Justia Law

This case involves a marital dissolution proceeding between Monique Covington Moore and Charles Moore. During the discovery process, Covington served deposition subpoenas for the production of business records on nonparties Rocket Lawyer, Inc. and Acendi Interactive Company, LLC. Both companies objected and refused to comply with most of the subpoenas’ demands. Covington then filed a motion to compel their compliance. The trial court granted the motion in substantial part and ordered each company to pay Covington $25,000 in monetary sanctions. The companies appealed, raising several claims of error regarding the trial court’s rulings.The trial court had found that Rocket Lawyer and Acendi did not act with the requisite substantial justification in resisting the subpoenas. The court ordered them to comply with most of the document demands, subject to a protective order, and imposed monetary sanctions. The companies appealed, arguing that Covington’s motion was untimely, that her attempts to meet and confer were insufficient, and that the monetary sanctions were unreasonable, among other issues.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court’s rulings in most respects. However, it agreed with the companies that the fees and costs Covington incurred in mediation as meet and confer attempts after her discovery motions were already filed were not compensable as discovery sanctions. The court reversed the orders in part and remanded for redetermination of the sanctions awards. View "In re Marriage of Moore" on Justia Law

The case involves a Ukrainian couple, Yasamin Karimi and Roman Tereshchenko, who divorced and disputed custody of their two children. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Tereshchenko agreed to Karimi removing the children from Ukraine for safety reasons, but requested that she bring them to him in Dubai. Instead, Karimi took the children to undisclosed locations, including the United States. Tereshchenko filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction for the return of the children. The District Court granted Tereshchenko’s petition and ordered the children returned to him in France, where he was currently residing.Karimi appealed the decision, challenging the District Court's jurisdiction and arguing that Tereshchenko had consented to the children's removal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's jurisdiction and rejected Karimi's argument that Tereshchenko had consented to the children's removal. The Court of Appeals also found that the District Court had erred in determining that the children would not be exposed to a grave risk of harm if they were returned to western Ukraine. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court was permitted to order the return of the children to Tereshchenko in a third country, France, as a temporary measure due to the grave risk of harm in Ukraine. The case was remanded to the District Court to modify the order to maintain the Ukrainian courts’ authority over an ultimate custody determination. View "Tereshchenko v. Karimi" on Justia Law

The case involves Lucia Guh-Siesel, who filed for divorce from Brian Allan Siesel in Wyoming. Guh-Siesel claimed that she had been a resident of Teton County, Wyoming, for more than 60 days prior to filing the complaint. She also stated that she and Siesel were the parents of a minor child who had resided in Wyoming for five consecutive months before the filing of the complaint. Siesel, however, argued that Wyoming was an inconvenient forum and that California was a better forum because he had not been in Wyoming since October 2022, all potential trial witnesses were in California, and he and Guh-Siesel had never resided together in Wyoming.The District Court of Teton County held a hearing on Siesel's motion to dismiss. The court found that the parties had decided to relocate to Wyoming in 2022, and they had signed a lease for a home in Wilson, Wyoming. However, Siesel returned to California for work in October 2022 and has remained there since. Guh-Siesel, who was battling cancer, arrived in Wyoming in October 2022 and took steps to become a Wyoming resident. After the hearing, the district court granted Siesel’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court's decision and found that the lower court had abused its discretion when it dismissed the case. The Supreme Court noted that Guh-Siesel had been a Teton County, Wyoming, resident for more than 60 days immediately preceding her divorce filing, which satisfied the requirements for a Wyoming district court to acquire jurisdiction over a divorce action. The Supreme Court also found that the district court had not properly analyzed the factors for determining whether to dismiss a case for forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Guh-Siesel v. Siesel" on Justia Law