Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Daniel Peltier appealed an order denying his motion for relief from a child support judgment. Peltier argued the district court erred in denying his motion because the Turtle Mountain Tribal Court had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to decide his child support obligation. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the state district court had concurrent jurisdiction to decide Peltier's child support obligation, and the district court did not err in denying his motion for relief from the judgment. View "North Dakota v. Peltier" on Justia Law

J.G., the mother of minor child J.J.T, appealed a judgment terminating her parental rights to the child. J.G. argued the juvenile court erred: (1) in finding J.J.T. was deprived; (2) in denying her court-appointed counsel's motion for a continuance to prepare for trial; (3) in granting her court-appointed counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel of record and appointing that counsel as standby counsel; and (4) in denying her statutory right to counsel. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance and in allowing withdrawal of counsel, J.G.'s actions were the functional equivalent of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of her right to counsel, and the statutory requirements for termination of J.G.'s parental rights were satisfied. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Interest of J.J.T." on Justia Law

Both of ten-year-old Jane Doe II’s parents passed away in 2017. A family friend with whom Jane and her mother had been living (“Friend”) petitioned for guardianship of Jane. Jane’s father’s twin sister (“Aunt”) also petitioned for guardianship. During proceedings the magistrate court appointed a local attorney, Auriana Clapp-Younggren (“Clapp-Younggren”), to serve as both the attorney and the guardian ad litem for Jane. After trial the magistrate court followed Clapp-Younggren’s recommendation and awarded temporary guardianship to Friend so that Jane could finish the school year, but appointed Aunt as Jane’s permanent guardian. Friend appealed the magistrate court decision. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the magistrate court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry into whether Jane possessed sufficient maturity to direct her own attorney. The final decree appointing Aunt as Jane’s permanent guardian was vacated and the case was remanded so that the magistrate court can conduct a hearing to determine whether Jane possessed sufficient maturity to direct her own attorney prior to a new trial. View "In the Interest of Jane Doe II (under 18)" on Justia Law

Husband appealed an order setting aside a default judgment that incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA). He contended the trial court erred by considering evidence not presented, submitted, or admitted at the hearing, in violation of Family Code section 217. He further argued the court erroneously relied upon an incorrect legal standard when it found the failure to complete preliminary and final disclosures provided sufficient grounds to vacate the judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that if husband disagreed with the court’s assessment, he should have stated his position on the record and requested the opportunity to present live testimony as authorized by section 217. Having failed to do so, the trial court did not err in allowing wife to “‘rest on the pleadings’” instead of presenting evidence. In deciding to set aside the judgment, the trial court found that husband failed to complete the preliminary and final disclosures, as evidenced by : (1) there were no supporting documents attached to the preliminary disclosure; (2) the stipulation was prepared by husband’s attorney; (3) wife never actually exchanged any documents with husband; (4) husband was unable to produce copies of the documents that support the preliminary disclosure; and (5) husband has over $400,000 in cash and checking accounts that was not disclosed in his income and expense declaration. Here, husband prepared the necessary preliminary declarations of disclosure; however, he failed to provide the supporting documentation. Wife never completed or exchanged any declarations of disclosure, despite executing the stipulation stating that she had done so. Given the lack of compliance with the statutory requirements, the stipulation was insufficient to act as a waiver of the final disclosure. The trial court therefore correctly concluded that there had been a mistake of fact by the parties regarding whether the statutory requirements had been satisfied, and properly vacated the judgment on that basis. View "In re Marriage of Binette" on Justia Law

In July 2015, the Juvenile Court of Cherokee County, Georgia terminated the parental rights of a father and a mother as to their three minor children, I.L.M., I.T.M., and B.M. On October 8, 2015, in a separate case, the Cherokee County Department of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) filed a petition alleging the parents’ newly-born child E.G.M. to be dependent. That same day, the juvenile court entered a protective custody order and appointed a guardian ad litem for E.G.M.; an adjudication hearing on DFCS’s petition was scheduled for October 22, 2015. At the hearing on that date, all parties announced that they were ready to proceed. However, the court, on its own motion and over the parents’ objections, decided to continue the hearing until a later date, and set the adjudication hearing for November 18, 2015; no written continuance order was entered at that time. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in the case of In the Interest of E.G.M., 798 SE2d 639 (2017), to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in the manner in which it applied certain provisions of the Juvenile Code, OCGA 15-11-1, et seq., pertaining to the juvenile court’s decision to order a continuance of a dependency hearing. Finding that the continuance order did not meet the requirements of OCGA 15-11-110, and it was that flawed continuance order that caused the failure to meet the adjudication time limit of OCGA 15-11-118(a), the Supreme Court reversed: "The General Assembly has stated that dependency proceedings are to be completed expeditiously, OCGA 15-11-100 (2) , dismissal of a petition without prejudice furthers that goal by imposing a consequence for a failure to meet the statutory time requirements, see In the Interest of M.D.H., 300 Ga. 46, 57 (6) (793 SE2d 49) (2016), and in the circumstances of this case, we must conclude that the juvenile court abused the discretion afforded it under OCGA 15-11-181(a) to dismiss the petition without prejudice." View "In the Interest of I. L. M. et al., children" on Justia Law

The biological mother of a child placed under guardianship with the child’s paternal great-aunt filed a petition to terminate that guardianship and to regain custody of the child. Following a three-day trial, the district court terminated the guardianship and awarded joint custody of the child to the guardian and the biological mother, with the mother designated as the domiciliary custodian. On appeal, the court of appeal reversed the district court judgment, reinstated the guardianship, and remanded the case to the district court for purposes of establishing a visitation schedule for the mother. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to assess whether the correct legal standards were applied by the lower courts, and to review the correctness of the district court’s determination that the guardianship should be terminated. The Court held that the proper standard for determining whether an order of guardianship should be modified or terminated was statutorily prescribed by Article 724 of the Children’s Code, which, in this case, required proof by the movant/mother by “clear and convincing evidence” of “a substantial and material change in the circumstances of the guardian or child” because either “[c]ontinuation of the guardianship is so deleterious to the child as to justify a modification or termination of the relationship” or “the harm likely to be caused from a change in the guardianship is substantially outweighed by the advantages to the child of the modification.” Weighing the evidence in light of that evidentiary burden, the Court agreed with the court of appeal’s assessment that the district court erred in determining that the mother met her burden of proving the guardianship should be terminated. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal reinstating the guardianship order. View "In re: L.M.M., JR." on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal, at issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether the high income child support guidelines found at Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-3.1 inherently accounted for the reasonable needs of the children such that any discrete analysis of those needs by a fact-finder was improper. The Court also examined whether a voluntary contribution to an irrevocable non-grantor trust for the benefit of the children was an appropriate factor for a court to consider for purposes of deviating from the guidelines amount of child support under Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b). Furthermore, the Court considered the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees to the obligee in this case. The Court concluded: (1) Rule 1910.16-3.1 did not render independent examination of the reasonable needs of the children by the fact-finder improper in high income cases; (2) a voluntary contribution to an irrevocable non-grantor trust for the benefit of the children was an inappropriate factor to consider for deviation purposes under Rule 1910.16-5(b); and (3) the obligee is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees in this case. View "Hanrahan v. Bakker" on Justia Law

C.T. and D.A. appealed a juvenile court order terminating C.T.'s parental rights to her minor daughter, C.A., and earlier orders finding the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply to C.A.'s presumed father, D.A., or C.A.'s biological father, D.R. The Court of Appeal rejected these challenges and affirmed the orders. View "In re C.A." on Justia Law

In issuing a divorce decree between Terrace Solomon and Wendy Barnes (formerly Solomon), the issue of custody was reserved to be decided at a later trial. Before the custody trial could be held, Terrace was arrested and held in a United States Army prison outside Alaska. The superior court repeatedly continued the custody trial to allow Terrace’s counsel to get in contact with Terrace and arrange for his telephonic appearance at trial. But after about a year had passed, the court refused to further continue the matter. A short custody trial was held; Terrace was absent but represented by counsel. The court awarded sole legal custody and sole physical custody to Wendy. The court determined, among other things, that Terrace had a history of perpetrating domestic violence, triggering a presumption against awarding him custody. On appeal Terrace claimed the superior court abused its discretion when it refused to further continue the custody trial. Terrace also claimed the court erred in concluding he had a history of domestic violence: he contended the record was inadequate to support that conclusion and the court did not make the requisite findings to support it. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed the superior court’s domestic violence findings were insufficient and thus vacated the court’s determination concerning the domestic violence presumption. The Court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Solomon v. Solomon" on Justia Law

Natasha Reiger appealed a district court judgment granting primary residential responsibility of J.Z. to Matthew Zuraff. Social services first became involved with the family because of a positive methamphetamine screening when J.Z. was born. Both Zuraff and Reiger had a history of methamphetamine use, although Reiger testified to being sober for approximately ten months and Zuraff testified he was sober for over three years. Both parents had criminal histories related to drug use, and Zuraff was incarcerated for approximately seven months after J.Z. was born. The North Dakota social worker assigned to J.Z. declined to recommend who should be awarded primary residential responsibility, but noted Zuraff was previously the more appropriate and stable option. After review of the district court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion granting primary residential responsibility to Zuraff. View "Zuraff v. Reiger" on Justia Law