Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellant Elizabeth Wong appealed nonappealable orders and the trial court erred by staying its proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 916(a). The Court of Appeal remanded this case for: (1) the trial court to proceed immediately with a trial on the merits; and (2) the trial court to exercise close scrutiny of any additional appellate stays of trial posited by appellant based on appeals from orders entered prior to a final disposition of the merits in this dispute. View "Marriage of Wong" on Justia Law

Husband, Mark Atherton, appealed the trial court’s order denying his motion to modify spousal maintenance payments to wife, Holly Atherton, for failure to show a real, substantial, and unanticipated change in circumstances as required by 15 V.S.A. 758. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court applied an erroneous standard when determining whether husband’s employment termination resulted in a “real, substantial, and unanticipated change in circumstances” for the purposes of modification of the spousal maintenance order. The Court remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Atherton v. Atherton" on Justia Law

Trina Iverson appealed a district court order finding a prima facie case for modification of primary residential responsibility had not been established with regard to the parties' two youngest children, G.I.H. and G.O.H. Iverson also claimed the district court erred when it denied her motion to amend the findings and order. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded a prima facie case was been established for G.I.H. and G.O.H., it was unnecessary to determine if the district court erred when it denied Iverson's motion to amend the findings and order. The Court concluded Iverson established a prima facie case for modification of primary residential responsibility of G.I.H. and G.O.H. and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, it reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings to determine if modification of primary residential responsibility for G.I.H. and G.O.H. was appropriate. View "Heidt v. Heidt" on Justia Law

Dustin Erman appealed a district court judgment awarding Trista Dick primary residential responsibility of the parties' minor child. A district court's award of primary residential responsibility is a finding of fact, which will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Absent a reason for denying it, some form of extended visitation with a fit non-custodial parent is routinely awarded. A district court's ruling on decision-making responsibility is a finding of fact, reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment as to primary residential responsibility and decision-making responsibility, but reversed with regard to extended parenting time and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dick v. Erman" on Justia Law

Mother appealed an order concluding that her children were children in need of care or supervision (CHINS) due to educational neglect. In April 2018, the State filed a petition alleging that B.C., born in January 2007, Bo.B., born in May 2012, and Br.B., born in April 2013, were CHINS for lack of proper education necessary for their well-being. B.C. had been referred to an educational support team because she was not meeting certain achievement levels in her educational program. In prior years, there had been three educational neglect/truancy assessments involving B.C. In January 2018, the assistant principal reported to the Department for Children and Families (DCF) that B.C. had missed twenty-two days and Bo.B. had missed thirty-two days of school and all absences were unexcused. By March 2018, B.C. and Bo.B. had missed thirty-eight and fifty days of school, respectively. DCF contacted mother, who asserted that the absences were occurring because she was not receiving sufficient support from the school, the children were often absent due to illness, and transportation was a barrier. When asked, mother did not appear to understand the details of Bo.B.’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP). DCF set up a plan to implement services through NCSS in March, however, mother cancelled the meeting. The court found that the three children were CHINS due to the parents’ inability to provide for the children’s educational needs. The court found that the children’s absences resulted in missed educational opportunities that put them at risk of harm, especially in light of their needs. On appeal, mother argued: (1) the court erred in not requiring the State to demonstrate that the children’s absences were without justification; (2) the evidence did not support the court’s finding that missing school caused the children harm; (3) the existence of IEPs for the two young children, who were not legally required to attend school, did not support a finding of educational neglect; and (4) the court erred in admitting the school attendance records. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed as to B.C. and reversed and remanded the CHINS determinations as to Bo.B. and Br.B. "[T]he evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that Bo.B. and Br.B. were at risk of harm for educational neglect given that they were not required to attend school and mother could discontinue the services related to their IEPs without any presumption of neglect." View "In re B.B., B.C., and B.B., Juveniles" on Justia Law

M.F., the son of Nicole W. and Stephen C., appealed orders at the 12-month review hearing under Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.21 (f) directing the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency to extend the reunification period for an additional six-month period and setting the 18-month review hearing more than 23 months from the date he first entered foster care. M.F. challenged the juvenile court's finding that Agency did not provide reasonable services to his father. He also contended the juvenile court lacked authority to order continued services beyond the 18-month review date absent special circumstances not present here. The Court of Appeal concluded there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were not provided or offered to the parent, that the juvenile court was authorized to extend reunification services up to the 24-month review date if the court determined reasonable services were not provided or offered to the parent, and the juvenile court was not required to consider the need for a continuance under section 352 when extending services. View "In re M.F." on Justia Law

Respondent San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not oppose termination of the dependency of N.O., rather, the Agency recommended it. N.O.'s counsel opposed termination of dependency jurisdiction over the objection of N.O.'s parents. Mexico declined to exercise jurisdiction over Minor, who was detained in California when Minor's mother A.R. (Mother) was arrested at the international border for transporting a large amount of marijuana. Minor was ultimately placed by a California juvenile court with maternal grandmother in Mexico. A few months after her arrest, Mother was released from custody and returned to Mexico, where she participated in services through the agency Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF), which services were ordered and overseen by the juvenile court and Agency. Because Mother made substantial progress in services under her Agency care plan, Minor was returned to Mother's care. After a domestic violence (DV) incident between Mother and Minor's father S.G. (Father) in late December 2016 came to light in February 2017, Agency recommended Mother receive DV services, which were to be administered through DIF because Mother could no longer cross the border into the United States. When the court terminated jurisdiction in May 2018 it was unclear whether Mother had participated in such DV services. However, perhaps more important for purposes of this appeal, it also was unclear whether DIF had offered Mother such services, or believed they were even necessary. After multiple continuances of the section 364 review hearing, the juvenile court on March 8, 2018, granted Minor's counsel one last continuance, noting that it was "comfortable" closing the case based on the information then available to it and that it did not appear additional information regarding Minor would be forthcoming from DIF. On appeal, Minor contends the juvenile court's finding that conditions no longer existed in May 2018 that would justify the initial assumption of dependency over Minor in August 2015 was not supported by substantial evidence; that the court abused its discretion in not continuing the family maintenance review hearing until Minor was found and assessed; and that the juvenile court violated Minor's statutory right to counsel. The Court of Appeal determined Minor did not meet her burden of showing conditions still existed to justify the Agency's jurisdiction over her, and affirmed termination. View "In re N.O." on Justia Law

This case began as a highly contentious divorce proceeding between vexatious litigant-appellant Ronald Van Hook and his then-wife Dawn Cannon, in which Van Hook lost custody of his children (hereinafter the Canyon County divorce case). Van Hook was represented by legal counsel only for portions of the divorce proceeding as each of his attorneys withdrew from the case. Following each attorney’s departure, Van Hook filed a new series of pro se motions and objections to the court, which were similar and repetitive. Van Hook filed numerous motions to amend the magistrate court’s temporary custody and visitation orders, disqualify the magistrate judge assigned to the case, change venue, and find Cannon in criminal contempt. He also filed multiple petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. His pro se motions and petitions were continuously denied and largely found to be frivolous. When Van Hook appealed the Canyon County divorce case, the district court found Van Hook’s motion to recuse the magistrate judge frivolous, and that his appeal was also without foundation. The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review arose from an administrative order declaring Van Hook a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59. The Idaho Supreme Court determined Van Hook: met I.C.A.R. 59 (d)(1) because he commenced more than three pro se litigations that were adversely determined against him; met I.C.A.R. 59 (d)(2) because he repeatedly attempted to relitigate the final divorce and custody determinations by the magistrate court; and met I.C.A.R. 59 (d)(3) because he repeatedly filed frivolous motions and pleadings. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the prefiling order declaring Van Hook a vexatious litigant. View "Order Re: Vexatious Litigant (Van Hook)" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing Plaintiff’s action on the grounds that the lawsuit was, in essence, an appeal from a state-court judgment, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear it under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding that the district court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims.This appeal arose from Plaintiff’s legal challenge seeking to void two Massachusetts Superior Court conditions of probation imposed on the adult male who was convicted of statutory rape after impregnating Plaintiff when she was a minor. One of those conditions ordered the defendant to acknowledge paternity of the child. The district court decided that it did not have jurisdiction over the claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because the relief Plaintiff sought was based on her claim that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court erred in the adjudication of her case, the district court properly dismissed this case for want of jurisdiction. View "Tyler v. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts" on Justia Law

The case arose from the trial court’s dismissal of a child custody modification action, filed by Christopher Plummer (Father), on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the matter, because neither Father, nor Elia Plummer (Mother), nor the child was living in Georgia at the time of the court’s dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted Father’s petition for certiorari on whether the trial court properly dismiss the custody modification action for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA 19-9-62(a)(2). After review of the statute and the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in dismissing the action on this ground, and therefore reversed. View "Plummer v. Plummer" on Justia Law