Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A 13-year-old boy, Oscar M., sought to intervene in his parents' custody dispute after the superior court granted primary interim custody to his father, Shawn M., with weekend visitation for his mother, Marilyn P. Oscar, through an attorney, moved to intervene, arguing that his preferences were not adequately represented by his parents or the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). The superior court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The superior court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, initially handled the custody dispute. After a series of domestic violence allegations and protective orders, the court granted Shawn primary custody and Marilyn weekend visitation. Oscar, through his attorney, filed a motion to intervene, claiming his interests were not adequately represented. The GAL also moved for the court to appoint counsel for Oscar, expressing concerns about potential manipulation by Marilyn. The court denied both motions, reasoning that Oscar's preferences were already adequately represented and that his intervention would complicate the proceedings.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Oscar's interests were adequately represented by his parents and the GAL. It noted that Alaska's statutory framework provides mechanisms for considering a child's preferences without making the child a party to the litigation. The court also found that allowing Oscar to intervene would likely cause undue delay and complicate the proceedings, which would not be in Oscar's best interests. The court concluded that the superior court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Oscar's motion to intervene. View "Oscar M. v. Marilyn P." on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Heather, who moved with her three children from Minnesota to Washington to escape domestic violence. After their arrival, the family experienced intermittent homelessness, and the children faced developmental and mental health challenges. Heather also struggled with mental health and substance abuse issues. The children's school reported potential physical abuse to the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), leading to the children being placed in emergency shelter care.The King County Superior Court ordered the children into emergency shelter care, and the Court of Appeals denied review. Heather sought review of the shelter care order in the Washington Supreme Court. Department II of the Supreme Court reversed the shelter care order due to the State's failure to apply the "active efforts" standard required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). The case was remanded for further fact-finding. On remand, the trial court kept the children in shelter care, finding that returning them to Heather would place them in substantial and immediate danger.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether RCW 13.04.033(3) requires a lawyer to obtain "specific direction" from a client before seeking appellate review in child welfare cases. The court held that the statute does require such specific direction but does not mandate a separate sworn document or client signature. A notice of appeal or discretionary review filed under RAP 5.3 satisfies the requirement. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, which had dismissed the review due to the lack of a sworn, signed statement from Heather. However, as the case was moot, the Supreme Court remanded it to the trial court for any further necessary proceedings. View "In re Dependency of A.H." on Justia Law

Leslie Torgerson, a non-Indian, and Terri Torgerson, an enrolled member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate Tribe (SWO), were married in South Dakota. Terri filed for divorce in the SWO tribal court, while Leslie filed for divorce in Roberts County. Leslie moved to dismiss the tribal court proceedings, arguing lack of jurisdiction and improper service, but the tribal court denied his motion. Subsequently, Terri moved to dismiss Leslie’s state court proceedings, and the circuit court granted her motion, recognizing the tribal court’s order under the principle of full faith and credit. Leslie appealed this decision.The circuit court concluded that it shared concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the tribal court over the divorce but deferred to the tribal court’s order, which it believed had obtained valid personal jurisdiction first. The court also found that the tribal court’s order was entitled to full faith and credit, despite Leslie’s arguments to the contrary.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court erred in extending full faith and credit to the tribal court’s order. Instead, the court should have applied the principles of comity under SDCL 1-1-25, which requires clear and convincing evidence that the tribal court had proper jurisdiction and that the order was obtained through a fair process. The Supreme Court found that the tribal court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over Leslie, a non-Indian, and that the tribal court’s order did not meet the requirements for comity. Consequently, the tribal court’s order was not enforceable, and the circuit court’s dismissal of Leslie’s divorce action was reversed. View "Torgerson v. Torgerson" on Justia Law

A natural mother filed a petition to set aside the adoption of her child, D.A.P., more than five years after the final adoption decree. She claimed that the adoption was based on fraudulent misrepresentations that it would be an "open" adoption, allowing her continued contact with the child. The adoption was finalized on July 6, 2017, and the mother alleged that she was misled into believing she would maintain contact with her child post-adoption.The Neshoba County Chancery Court denied the mother's request for access to adoption records in 2021, citing the statute of limitations and lack of good cause. In 2022, the mother filed a petition to set aside the adoption decree, claiming fraud, coercion, and misrepresentation. The court dismissed her petition, noting that the mother had not appealed the original adoption judgment and that setting aside the adoption would prejudice the adoptive parents and the child. The court found no evidence of fraud upon the court, as the adoption petition clearly stated the termination of the mother's parental rights.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the mother's petition was untimely, as it was filed more than six months after the adoption decree, which is the statutory limit for challenging an adoption in Mississippi. The court also found no fraud upon the court, as there was no sworn testimony or filing indicating an open adoption. The court emphasized the importance of finality in adoption proceedings to ensure stability and security for the child. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of D.A.S." on Justia Law

Mark Rath and Heather Zins share a child, A.J.O., born in 2004. Zins was awarded primary residential responsibility, and Rath was ordered to pay child support. A.J.O. turned 18 in November 2022, ending Rath's ongoing support obligation, but he had accrued arrears. Rath was served with an order to show cause for civil contempt due to non-payment. After an evidentiary hearing, a judicial referee found Rath in contempt and ordered him to make monthly payments towards his arrears, with a suspended 20-day jail sentence contingent on a future hearing.Rath sought review by the District Court of Burleigh County, which adopted the judicial referee's findings. Rath appealed, arguing violations of his right to counsel, errors in child support calculations, and that the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act limits the State's ability to collect more than fifty percent of his income. He also claimed the defense of laches and third-party standing should prevent enforcement of his obligations.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case under a clearly erroneous standard. The court held that Rath's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because the contempt hearing did not result in immediate incarceration, and procedural safeguards were followed. The court also found that Rath's child support obligation continued despite temporary custody by the division of juvenile services and that the doctrine of laches does not apply to child support arrearages. Additionally, the court ruled that the State and Zins have standing to collect arrears even after the child reached the age of majority, and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act does not limit the State's collection efforts in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Burleigh County Social Service Board v. Rath" on Justia Law

Devon Arseneau and her ex-husband were involved in a child custody dispute in the St. Louis County Circuit Court. The court appointed Elaine Pudlowski and Brian Dunlop as guardians ad litem to represent the child's best interests and James Reid to conduct psychological evaluations. Following their testimonies, the court awarded sole legal custody to Arseneau’s ex-husband and joint physical custody to both parents. Arseneau subsequently filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pudlowski, Dunlop, and Reid, alleging that their actions during the custody proceedings violated her constitutional rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Arseneau’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity and had not acted under color of state law. The district court did not address the defendants' arguments regarding Younger abstention or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court determined that Younger abstention did not apply because there were no ongoing state proceedings. It also bypassed the Rooker-Feldman issue, finding that the merits of the case warranted dismissal. The court held that the defendants, as guardians ad litem and a court-appointed psychologist, were entitled to absolute immunity for actions within the scope of their judicial duties, even if those actions were alleged to be wrongful or illegal. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Arseneau’s § 1983 claims. View "Arseneau v. Pudlowski" on Justia Law

Two children, E.G. and J.J., through their guardian ad litem, John D. Elliott, filed a lawsuit against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) and others, alleging that the children were sexually molested by P.M., the adopted son of Annie Montgomery, while in Montgomery's foster care. The plaintiffs claimed that DSS and Montgomery were negligent in placing and accepting the children into the foster home, knowing or having reason to know of P.M.'s history of sexually abusive behavior. They sought discovery of DSS's adoption files to support their claims.The circuit court issued a protective order for certain DSS foster care files but did not rule on the adoption files. The plaintiffs then filed a motion in family court to unseal the adoption files, which was denied. The family court ruled that the plaintiffs had no legal interest in the records and had not shown good cause under section 63-9-780(C) of the South Carolina Code. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the confidentiality provision in section 63-9-780(C) does not insulate DSS adoption files from civil discovery if they meet the criteria under the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The court determined that if the files are discoverable under Rule 26(b), then good cause exists for their inspection. The court reversed the court of appeals' decision, emphasizing that protective orders can be used to maintain confidentiality while allowing necessary discovery. View "E.G. v. SCDSS" on Justia Law

David Efron and Madeleine Candelario were involved in a divorce proceeding in Puerto Rico, during which Efron was ordered to pay Candelario $50,000 per month. After the divorce was finalized, Candelario began a relationship with Judge Cordero, and Efron alleges that Candelario, her attorney, and Judges Cordero and Aponte conspired to reinstate the payments through a corrupt scheme. Efron claims this resulted in Candelario receiving approximately $7 million. Efron filed a federal lawsuit against Candelario and her attorney, asserting claims for deprivation of procedural due process, conspiracy to deny civil rights, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Efron’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court found that Efron’s claims were inextricably intertwined with the Puerto Rico court’s judgment and that granting relief would effectively nullify that judgment. The district court also rejected Efron’s argument that his claims fell under a fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Efron’s claims because they essentially sought to challenge the state court’s judgment. The court concluded that Efron’s claims for damages were not independent of the state court’s decision but were directly related to it, as they required the federal court to review and reject the state court’s judgment. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Efron v. Candelario" on Justia Law

The case involves Michelle Gilbank, who lost custody of her daughter, T.E.H., in state court proceedings in Wisconsin. Gilbank alleged that various officials involved in those proceedings violated her federal constitutional rights. The events began when Gilbank, who had a history of drug use, moved into her ex-partner Ian Hoyle's apartment. Following an anonymous tip, police and social workers investigated and found evidence of Gilbank's drug use. On August 21, 2018, Gilbank was arrested for drug possession, and her daughter was temporarily placed with Hoyle. Subsequent state court hearings resulted in the continued placement of T.E.H. with Hoyle until Gilbank regained custody in March 2020.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that some of Gilbank’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The court also ruled that the remaining claims failed on the merits, including claims of unreasonable search, denial of due process, and unlawful eviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claims based on injuries caused by state court judgments. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the merits for claims not barred by Rooker-Feldman, including those related to the urinalysis, interrogation without an attorney, and the removal of T.E.H. The court found that Gilbank had consented to the urinalysis, that her Fifth Amendment rights were not violated as her statements were not used in a criminal proceeding, and that there was no seizure of T.E.H. by government actors. The court also rejected the existence of a "fraud exception" to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. View "Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Dylan H. initiated a legal proceeding to establish paternity of a minor child, P.C., against Brooke C., the child's natural mother. Brooke's partner, Brandon B., intervened, claiming paternity based on a notarized acknowledgment he had signed. Dylan then filed a third-party complaint to disestablish Brandon's paternity, alleging fraud and material mistake of fact. The district court for Nemaha County bifurcated the issues and held an evidentiary hearing on the disestablishment claim. The court found fraud and material mistake of fact, disestablishing Brandon's paternity, and later denied a motion for a new trial.The district court's decision to disestablish Brandon's paternity was appealed by Brooke and Brandon. They also appealed the denial of their motion for a new trial. However, the district court had not resolved all claims in the case, including Dylan's action to establish paternity, custody, and support. The Nebraska Court of Appeals had previously dismissed an appeal related to genetic testing, determining it was not filed within the required timeframe and did not affect a substantial right.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and determined that the orders appealed from did not resolve all claims and involved multiple parties, thus implicating Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1). This statute requires certification for an order to be appealable when it adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties. The district court had not provided such certification. Consequently, the Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the requirements for a final, appealable order under § 25-1315(1) were not met. View "Dylan H. v. Brooke" on Justia Law