Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appeals a circuit court order denying her petition for guardianship of her great-nephew, a minor child, pursuant to RSA chapter 463 (2018 & Supp. 2020). On appeal, petitioner challenged the circuit court’s determination that she could not obtain guardianship because the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) already had legal custody of the child as a result of ongoing abuse and neglect proceedings. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that an award of legal custody pursuant to RSA chapter 169-C did not preclude the appointment of a guardian pursuant to RSA chapter 463. Accordingly, judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of B.C." on Justia Law

When former NFL quarterback Tarvaris Jackson passed away, he left behind a young daughter named Jaya, to whom he owed child support under the terms of a Minnesota court order. Jaya's mother and legal representative, Jessa Roginski, filed suit in Alabama court to domesticate the Minnesota support order. In response to a motion filed by Jackson's estate, the circuit court entered an order to strike Roginski's filings, from which she appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court. Because the Court of Civil Appeals had exclusive appellate jurisdiction of appeals in domestic-relations cases, the Supreme Court transferred this appeal to that court. View "Roginski v. Estate of Tarvaris Jackson" on Justia Law

Husband’s estate, through a special administrator, appealed a family division’s order concluding that in light of husband’s death prior to entry of a final divorce order, it lacked jurisdiction to consider the enforceability of the parties’ stipulated agreement. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the family division correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction. "Although the parties’ agreement may be enforceable as a contract independent of the anticipated divorce, the civil division of the superior court, and not the family division, is the proper forum for litigating that issue." View "Maier v. Maier" on Justia Law

J.H. appealed a trial court's order and findings of fact denying his petition to remove T.F. as guardian of M.H., appoint himself as guardian, and remove contact restrictions T.F. placed on his contact with M.H. On appeal, J.H. argued the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to remove T.F. as guardian and refusing to remove restrictions T.F. placed on his contact with M.H, arguing the finding that he was unable to civilly structure his contact with M.H. was clearly erroneous. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering T.F. remain M.H.’s guardian and its findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Guardianship of M.H." on Justia Law

A.S. appealed a juvenile court's judgment and order terminating her parental rights to her child, A.S.F. A.S. was appointed counsel when the State petitioned for involuntary termination of her parental rights. The trial court allowed A.S.’s counsel to withdraw after A.S. expressed dissatisfaction with her counsel. The termination hearing was continued and new counsel was appointed. One day before the rescheduled hearing, A.S.’s second counsel moved to withdraw. The judge heard the motion at the termination hearing. There, counsel stated a material breakdown in the attorney-client relationship had occurred. The court granted counsel’s motion on the basis of the treatment A.S. showed to her counsel and the unwillingness of A.S. to work with any attorney the court appointed. The judge found A.S.’s actions to be a voluntary waiver of her right to counsel. Counsel was allowed to leave the courtroom. The hearing proceeded with A.S. without counsel. The juvenile court entered an order terminating parental rights on June 10, 2021. A.S. appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court 61 days after the initial June 10 order terminating her parental rights was entered. A.S. argues her right to counsel was violated after the court granted her second attorney’s motion to withdraw, leaving A.S. to represent herself at the termination hearing and without advice regarding the process and deadline for appeal. The Supreme Court determined it lacked jurisdiction even to consider a claim that a party failed to timely appeal as a result of a denial of the party’s right to counsel. "We are without jurisdiction to hear A.S.’s waiver of her right to counsel argument because her appeal was untimely." View "Interest of A.S.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision dismissing Appellant's appeal from a circuit court order terminating her parental rights, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that Appellant's failure to name the children in her notice of appeal was a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal.In ordering the appeal to be dismissed, the court of appeals held that serving the children's guardian ad litem with the notice of appeal was insufficient to cure the jurisdiction defect in this case of failing to name the children in either the caption or body of the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) service of the notice of appeal upon a child's guardian ad litem is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over that child to an appellate court; and (2) R.L.W. v. Cabinet for Human Resrouces, 756 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. App. 1988), is overruled insofar as it holds that the failure to name a child in a notice of appeal from a termination of parental rights is automatic grounds for dismissal. View "M.A.B. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

K.L. and R.H. were the parents of Z.L.; their year-long relationship was defined by multiple acts of abuse by K.L., and the complete inability of either party to effectively communicate with the other. After their relationship ended, both filed requests for Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) orders against the other in December 2019. In February 2020, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that both K.L. and R.H. had acted as a primary aggressor against the other, and that neither had acted in self-defense. The court therefore issued mutual orders against both parties, and also issued orders granting joint physical and legal custody of Z.L. to both parties. The Court of Appeal reversed that order, finding the trial court erred by issuing mutual restraining orders without considering and following the relevant statutory authority. Because there was more than sufficient evidence supporting a DVPA order protecting R.H. and her child H.H. from K.L., the Court affirmed that order. It reversed the orders regarding child custody: "If, after the trial court regains jurisdiction following the resolution of the dependency proceedings involving Z.L., either party files a request for order concerning custody, the trial court shall consider and apply the rebuttable presumption of Family Code section 3044 and the factors that may overcome that presumption." View "K.L. v. R.H." on Justia Law

A New Hampshire circuit court issued an adjudicatory order finding that G.B., a minor, had been neglected, but that respondents, G/B/'s adoptive parents, were not at fault for the neglect. Subsequently, the court issued a dispositional order awarding legal custody of G.B. to the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) and requiring DCYF to seek placement for G.B. in a residential treatment facility. DCYF appealed both orders, and G.B.’s guardian ad litem (GAL), Court Appointed Special Advocates of New Hampshire (CASA), joined in appealing the dispositional order. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that the respondents did not neglect G.B. The Court further concluded that, although the circuit court did not err by ruling G.B. a neglected child and ordering G.B.’s placement in a residential treatment facility, it failed to identify legally permissible primary and concurrent case plans in its dispositional order. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "In re G.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that divorce jurisdiction requires mere residence - not domicile - and that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.020.Appellant and Respondent married in Saudi Arabia. In 2018, Respondent obtained a student visa and moved to Las Vegas. In 2020, Appellant and the child obtained dependent visas and also moved to Las Vegas. Two months later, Appellant filed a complaint for divorce. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Appellant could not establish domicile - or intent to remain in Nevada - so that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under section 125.020. The district court granted the motion, finding that, because residence is synonymous with domicile under section 125.020 and neither party had established domicile as a matter of law, dismissal was necessary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under section 125.020, residence means mere residence - not domicile - and Nev. Rev. Stat. 10.155 defines residence as physical presence; and (2) because Appellant had been physically present in Nevada for at least six weeks before she filed her divorce complaint, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 125.020. View "Senjab v. Alhulaibi" on Justia Law

Two juvenile dependency cases were consolidated for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review because they presented the same issue on review: whether the juvenile court’s dependency judgments establishing jurisdiction and wardship over each of parents’ two children exceeded the scope of the court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction under ORS 109.751, one of the statutes in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act as enacted in Oregon. Before issuing its decision in “J.S.II,” the trial court became concerned that these cases might have become moot, because the juvenile court had terminated its jurisdiction and the wardships during the pendency of the appeal. Having considered the parties’ supplemental briefs, the Supreme Court conclude that these cases were not moot. And, for the reasons discussed in J. S. II, the Supreme Court held the juvenile court had authority under ORS 109.751 to issue dependency judgments making the children wards of the court and placing them in foster care, but that it did not have authority to order parents to engage in specified activities to regain custody of the children. View "Dept. of Human Services v. P. D." on Justia Law