Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

T.T. (Mother) challenged a juvenile court’s finding that the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply to the dependency proceedings concerning her son, Dominick D. She argued the juvenile court failed to ensure that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) discharged its duty of initial inquiry into Dominick’s possible Indian ancestry under California Welfare & Institutions Code section 224.2(b). To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, but declined to address the parties’ arguments concerning harmlessness, because ICWA inquiry and notice errors did not warrant reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional or dispositional findings and orders other than the finding that ICWA did not apply. The Court accordingly vacated that finding and remanded for compliance with ICWA and related California law, but otherwise affirmed. View "In re Dominick D." on Justia Law

The Georgia Division of Family and Children Services (DFCS) was the temporary custodian of Appellants John and Brittani Chandler’s three children. The Chandlers sought a determination they had constitutional and statutory rights to object on religious grounds to DFCS’s immunization of their children. Because the juvenile court applied the wrong standard in finding that the Chandlers’ religious objection was insincere, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded this case for application of the correct standard. View "In the Interest of C.C. et al., children" on Justia Law

Angela Hansen appealed orders denying her motion for an order to show cause and her demand for a change of judge. Hansen was subject to a standing order prohibiting her from filing new motions without permission of court. Hansen and Shannon Dieterle married in 2009 and have one child. The parties divorced in 2012. Following the parties’ divorce, Hansen filed several motions primarily related to the district court’s decisions on residential responsibility and parenting time. The court entered a standing order in April 2016 prohibiting Hansen from “filing any claim, motion, or document in Sheridan County, or in any other county, related to the issues of primary residential responsibility and/or parenting time regarding [the child], without first obtaining permission from the district court of the county in which she is attempting to file.” The court entered the order due to the frivolous and duplicative nature of Hansen’s motions. The North Dakota Supreme Court treated the district court’s orders as ones denying Hansen permission to file new motions. The Court found orders denying permission to file were not appealable; therefore, that part of the appeal was dismissed. Hansen also appealed the award of sanctions for violation of the standing order, and rejecting her demand for change of judge. On those issues, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dieterle v. Dieterle n/k/a Hansen, et al." on Justia Law

The juvenile court bypassed family reunification services for appellant S.Z. (Mother) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 (b)(5) and (c)(3). Mother contended the court’s ruling was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded Mother’s argument lacked merit, but published its opinion in this case to clarify the relationship between subdivisions (b)(5) and (c)(3) of section 361.5 and the resulting burden on an appellant challenging the bypass of reunification services under those provisions. Because Mother did not make a showing under subsection (c)(3), and could not do so on this record, the Court affirmed. View "In re Raul V." on Justia Law

The HuffingtonPost.com, Inc. ("HuffPost"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate its order denying HuffPost's motion for a summary judgment based on the immunity provided in the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, and to enter a summary judgment in its favor pursuant to the immunity provided in 47 U.S.C. § 230. K.G.S. petitioned to adopt Baby Doe; the birth mother contested the adoption. The birth mother contacted Mirah Ruben, a contributor to HuffPost, and shared her version of events leading to her contesting the adoption. HuffPost published two online articles about Baby Doe’s adoption, including the full name of the birth mother, K.G.S. and included images of Baby Doe. After the articles were published, Claudia D’Arcy, a resident of New York, created a Facebook page dedicated to reuniting the birth mother and Baby Doe, which attached the HuffPost articles. The Facebook page also identified the birth mother and K.G.S. by name, and images of Baby Doe. After the creation of the Facebook page, K.G.S. stated she was “inundated with appallingly malicious and persistent cyber-bullying.” K.G.S.’ attorney compelled Facebook to take down the page because it violated Alabama’s Adoption Code. Then K.G.S. sued HuffPost, Mirah Riben, and a number of other defendants alleging that the defendants had made statements relating to the adoption that subjected them to civil liability and had unlawfully disclosed confidential information about the adoption "to create a sensationalized, salacious, and scandal-driven trial in the court of public opinion to pressure K.G.S. into relinquishing her custody of Baby Doe." After review of the circumstances of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded HuffPost demonstrated a clear legal right to mandamus relief, and its petition was granted. View "Ex parte The HuffingtonPost.com" on Justia Law

Orville Jenkins appealed a superior court’s division of property following his divorce. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected his arguments that the superior court: (1) improperly denied his motion to continue trial; (2) incorrectly allocated marital debt to him; (3) improperly authorized sale of the marital home before finalizing the property division; and (4) showed bias against him. But the Supreme Court agreed with his arguments that it was error to: (1) decline to consider whether his wife’s separate property was transmuted to marital property through contract; and (2) find that no portion of earnings on the wife’s separate investments was marital when the taxes on those earnings were paid with marital funds. The judgment was thus reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Layton v. Dea" on Justia Law

A child was taken from his mother after she brought him to the hospital. Hospital staff found the child had serious injuries. The father, who lived separately from the mother, asked that the child be placed with him. The Washington State Department of Children, Youth and Family recommended out-of-home placement, citing concern for the child’s safety. A court determined the child should have been placed with his godparents, based on the Department’s recommendation. The father moved for discretionary review of the shelter care order, arguing the court erred because the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal from a parent. The Court of Appeals denied review, and a panel of the court declined to modify its ruling. The father than moved for discretionary review by the Oregon Supreme Court, which was granted. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court became moot, as the father ultimately agreed to an order of dependency in a subsequent hearing. The Supreme Court still opined on what “reasonable efforts” the Department had to make before a child could be removed for a parent or guardian’s care. The Department argued (and the trial court agreed) that given the acute and emergent circumstances of the case, it did not violate the reasonable efforts requirement. The father argued there was no such exception for emergent circumstances. The Supreme Court provided additional guidance as to what constituted reasonable efforts, and here, held the trial court erred in excusing the Department from making reasonable efforts to place the child with the father. View "In re Dependency of L.C.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee and attorney Jessica Peck represented parents and other family members in child abuse cases in Colorado juvenile courts. She brought suit against Defendant-Appellants, Colorado Executive Director of Health Services Michelle Barnes and Second Judicial District Attorney Beth McCann, to challenge the constitutionality of § 19-1-307 of the Colorado Children’s Code Records and Information Act (“Children’s Code”). Peck alleged Section 307 violated her First Amendment rights by restricting her disclosures and thereby chilling her speech on these matters. The district court agreed and struck down both of Section 307’s penalty provisions. The Tenth Circuit thought Section 307(1) and Section 307(4) had different scopes due to their distinct language and legislative histories. As a result, the Court found Peck could challenge Section 307(4)’s penalty as unconstitutional, but has not properly challenged Section 307(1). The Court thus reversed the district court’s order insofar as it invalidated Section 307(1). View "Peck v. McCann, et al." on Justia Law

Connie and Kevin Sailer are the paternal grandparents of E.D.S. and E.R.S. Justin and Natasha Sailer are the children’s parents. When the parents divorced, they stipulated that Natasha would have primary residential responsibility of the children, with Justin having parenting time until 2022. After 2022, the judgment provides the parties share residential responsibility if Justin has no alcohol-related incidents. In July 2020, an altercation occurred between the grandparents and the parents. While the parties differed in their accounts of what occurred, it was undisputed that the children witnessed the altercation. The children have not had contact with their grandparents since the altercation, apart from the grandparents having attended some of the children’s sporting events. The grandparents filed a petition for nonparent visitation, which was opposed by Natasha Sailer. The district court dismissed the grandparents’ petition for failure to plead a prima facie case, finding they did not plead sufficient facts to establish that they have a substantial relationship with the children or that denial of visitation would result in harm to the children. The grandparents appeal the court’s order dismissing their petition. Finding no reversible error in dismissing the petition, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Sailer, et al. v. Sailer, et al." on Justia Law

B.C., by and through his parent Michelle Cox, appealed from a district court judgment affirming the Department of Human Services (“Department”) decision to deny autism voucher program funding for a gazebo. B.C. argued the Department’s rationale for rejecting the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) recommendation was insufficient, its interpretation of its regulation was unreasonable, and its conclusions of law were not supported by its findings of fact. After review of the agency and trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the agency unreasonably interpreted the regulation, and its conclusions of law were not supported by its findings of facts. The Supreme Court reversed the district court judgment affirming the Department’s denial of the autism voucher program funding for the gazebo. View "B.C. v. NDDHS" on Justia Law