Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2018, the Westchester County Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated neglect proceedings against a mother for leaving her young children unsupervised. The mother consented to a neglect finding, and subsequent permanency hearings were held regarding the placement of two of her children in DSS custody. In 2020, the Family Court trial discharged the children to the mother's custody, but later returned them to DSS after allegations of the mother's non-compliance and further neglect surfaced. In March 2022, the Family Court continued the children's placement with DSS and ordered the mother to participate in various programs and evaluations. The mother appealed this order.During the appeal, another permanency hearing was held, resulting in an October 2022 order that also continued the children's placement with DSS and reiterated the requirements for the mother. The mother appealed this order as well. While these appeals were pending, new permanency hearings and orders were issued, superseding the previous ones. The Appellate Division dismissed the mother's appeals as moot, given that the orders had expired and been replaced.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the appeals were moot because the orders in question had been superseded by subsequent orders, and thus no longer affected the mother's rights. The Court also determined that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in declining to invoke the mootness exception, as the issues raised were not sufficiently substantial or novel. Additionally, the Court declined to adopt a blanket mootness exception for all permanency hearing orders, emphasizing that such a rule would be impractical and could undermine the purpose of timely and effective judicial review in child welfare cases. View "Matter of Joshua J." on Justia Law

In this juvenile dependency case, the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) removed two children from their mother's home due to concerns of neglect. The juvenile court detained the children and ordered family reunification services for both parents, allowing CFS to provide relative visits as appropriate. The children were placed with their paternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother, R.H., frequently interfered with the parents' visitation schedules, leading to conflicts and an altercation at the children's school.The juvenile court found that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being and ordered that she have no further visits. R.H. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to reinstate her visits, but the court summarily denied the petition, finding no new evidence or changed circumstances and that visits were not in the children's best interest.R.H. appealed, claiming the juvenile court violated her due process rights by acting on an oral motion without following procedural requirements. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that grandparents who are not acting in a parental role have no constitutionally protected right to visit dependent children, and thus, R.H.'s due process challenge failed. The court also found that the juvenile court had the authority to modify the visitation order on its own motion and that any procedural error was harmless.The appellate court concluded that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being. The orders denying her further visits and summarily denying her section 388 petition were not abuses of discretion. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's orders. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

County officials in Trinity County, California, obtained warrants to take Patricia and Stanley Miroth's children into protective custody, leading to the termination of their parental rights by a state court. The Miroths alleged that the officials failed to provide required social services and committed fraud in the state child custody proceedings, which led to the termination of their parental rights. After unsuccessful appeals in state court, the Miroths filed a federal lawsuit seeking money damages for these alleged wrongs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the federal claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The district court found that the Miroths were essentially seeking relief from the state court judgments and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the Miroths' claims did not seek relief from or reversal of the state court's order. Instead, they sought money damages for alleged legal wrongs by adverse parties that preceded the state court's order. The court emphasized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to cases where the federal plaintiff asserts injury caused by a state court judgment and seeks relief from that judgment. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MIROTH V. COUNTY OF TRINITY" on Justia Law

A.M. and R.Y. were married in April 2019, separated in April 2023, and have a daughter born in August 2019. A.M. filed for divorce in April 2023, and the parties signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in December 2023, which was incorporated into an uncontested judgment of dissolution in February 2024. The MSA gave A.M. sole legal and primary physical custody of their daughter, with R.Y. having supervised weekend visitation. In May 2024, A.M. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against R.Y., alleging psychological, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as coercive control.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied A.M.'s request for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) on the same day it was filed, citing insufficient evidence of past abuse and lack of detail about recent incidents. The court scheduled a hearing for a permanent DVRO but did not grant a temporary order pending the hearing. A.M. appealed the denial of the DVTRO and requested a stay of further proceedings in the trial court, which was denied. The court set the permanent DVRO request for an evidentiary hearing in August 2024, later continued to August 2025.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that A.M. made a prima facie showing of abuse based on her declaration and accompanying evidence. The court concluded that the trial court erred in finding A.M.'s evidence insufficient and in denying the DVTRO without proper reasons. The appellate court held that the trial court has discretion to deny a DVTRO if it reasonably concludes that it is not necessary to protect the petitioner pending the noticed hearing. The appellate court reversed the order denying the DVTRO and remanded the matter for further consideration based on the totality of circumstances. View "Marriage of A.M. and R.Y." on Justia Law

S.W., a minor, was placed with foster parents A.E. and Ann.E. by the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) shortly after her birth in September 2020. In August 2022, CYF filed a petition to remove S.W. from the foster parents' home. The foster parents attended the hearing but did not seek to intervene. The trial court granted CYF's petition, and S.W. was placed with another foster family. The foster parents later filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court denied, stating they did not have standing as they had not requested S.W.'s return and had not achieved the status of prospective adoptive parents.The foster parents appealed to the Superior Court, which vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the foster parents had standing as prospective adoptive parents based on the precedent set in Mitch v. Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services Agency. However, the Superior Court panel was divided, with one judge expressing doubts about the standing of prospective adoptive parents under the current law and another judge suggesting legislative changes to grant standing to all foster parents.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and determined that the issue of standing for prospective adoptive parents was moot, as the foster parents had withdrawn their motion to intervene and for S.W.'s return. Despite this, the court addressed the substantive issue due to its public importance. The court concluded that the legislative enactment of 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1, which states that foster parents and preadoptive parents do not have legal standing in dependency proceedings unless they have been awarded legal custody, abrogated the judicially created standing for prospective adoptive parents established in Mitch. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that preadoptive parents without legal custody do not have standing in dependency proceedings. View "In the Interest of: S.W." on Justia Law

Kyle Zittleman and ShanaLea Bibler were married in 2010 and had one child in 2012. They divorced in 2016, with a Wyoming court granting Zittleman primary residential responsibility. Bibler filed motions to modify residential responsibility and child support in 2018 and 2020, but Zittleman retained primary responsibility. Zittleman moved to North Dakota in 2019, and Bibler followed in 2022. In 2023, Bibler again moved to modify residential responsibility, citing her relocation, Zittleman’s alleged non-compliance with a judgment, and the child's worsening demeanor.The Morton County district court held an evidentiary hearing in 2024, limiting each party to two and a half hours for their case. Bibler used all her time before cross-examining two witnesses and argued this violated her due process rights. The district court found no material change in circumstances and denied her motion. Bibler appealed, claiming the time limitation and the court's findings were erroneous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for constitutional claims and under an abuse of discretion standard for procedural matters. The court found that the district court did not violate due process by limiting the hearing time, as both parties were notified and did not object or request additional time. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the time limitation.The Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that there was no material change in circumstances. The court noted that Bibler's move to North Dakota, Zittleman’s adherence to the judgment, and allegations of alienation did not constitute a material change. The court also found that the district court did not err in omitting a best interests analysis, as it was not required without a material change in circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Bibler's motion to modify residential responsibility. View "Zittleman v. Bibler" on Justia Law

Alyssa Baum and Justin Aldava have a child, H.A., born in Texas in June 2019. Baum and H.A. moved to Kentucky in November 2020 to escape domestic violence from Aldava. Baum filed for an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) and temporary custody in Jefferson Family Court, recounting an incident of domestic violence in October 2020. The court granted the EPO and later a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) after a hearing, despite Aldava not being served until April 2021. Aldava filed for custody in Texas, but the Texas court did not assert jurisdiction.The Jefferson Family Court held a hearing in April 2021 and issued a DVO, granting Baum temporary custody and prohibiting Aldava from contacting Baum and H.A. Aldava later moved to dismiss the DVO for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the family court denied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the family court lacked personal jurisdiction over Aldava and that the DVO could not impose affirmative relief, such as temporary custody or firearm restrictions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that Kentucky courts could issue DVOs protecting petitioners and their children from domestic violence, even without personal jurisdiction over non-resident respondents. The court affirmed that Kentucky had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to grant temporary custody. The court also ruled that the DVO's restrictions on Aldava's firearm possession within Kentucky were valid and that entering the DVO into the Law Information Network of Kentucky (LINK) did not violate due process.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the family court's DVO in part, reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BAUM V. ALDAVA" on Justia Law

A mother sought to modify an existing child custody order to change the school district her daughter attends after moving to a new residence. The father objected, arguing that changing schools would be disruptive and limit his time with the daughter. Unable to reach an agreement through mediation, the mother petitioned the court to modify the custody decree.The Iowa District Court for Worth County denied the mother's request, determining that changing school districts was not in the daughter's best interests. The mother appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Frazier. The Court of Appeals, interpreting Frazier, concluded that the district court lacked authority to hear the mother's petition because she was not seeking to alter the parents' status as joint legal custodians. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling without considering the merits of the mother's petition.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Frazier. The Supreme Court held that a court that entered a custody decree has the authority to modify it when requested, even if the modification does not relate to who has legal custody. The Supreme Court found that the district court had the authority to rule on the mother's petition since the decree specified the daughter's school district, and the mother sought to modify that based on a change of circumstances.On de novo review, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the district court's determination that changing school districts was not in the daughter's best interests. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and affirmed the district court's order denying the modification petition. View "Venechuk v. Landherr" on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma moved to terminate a mother's parental rights due to her methamphetamine addiction and failure to provide a stable environment for her child. The child was placed in emergency custody in May 2022, and the mother entered and left multiple inpatient treatment programs without completing them. The State filed a motion to terminate her parental rights in April 2023, and a jury trial was set for August 2023. The mother failed to appear for the trial, and her attorney requested a continuance, which was denied. The trial court held a nonjury trial and terminated her parental rights.The mother appealed the decision, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The mother argued that the statute allowing the trial court to deem her failure to appear as a waiver of her right to a jury trial was unconstitutional. The Court of Civil Appeals did not substantively address this constitutional claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and found that the statute in question is constitutional. However, the court emphasized that due process requires that the record must reflect that the parent received notice of the possible consequences of failing to appear for the jury trial. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the mother had received sufficient notice. The trial court is to hold the hearing within 30 days and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Supreme Court within 15 days after the hearing. View "IN THE MATTER OF FB v STATE OF OKLAHOMA" on Justia Law

An unmarried couple, K.L.T. and M.O.J., filed a petition on September 27, 2024, to adopt three children who had been in their care since early 2022. The Cass County District Court denied their petition on October 8, 2024, citing North Dakota Century Code § 14-15-03(2), which the court interpreted as not permitting unmarried couples to jointly adopt. The case was subsequently dismissed.Following the dismissal, K.L.T. and M.O.J. moved for reconsideration on October 14, 2024. Although the district court found them to be suitable adoptive parents, it denied the motion for reconsideration. The court then certified a question to the North Dakota Supreme Court, asking whether an unmarried couple can adopt children under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03(2), noting the absence of controlling precedent in North Dakota.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed whether to answer the certified question. Under Rule 47.1 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court has the discretion to answer certified questions of law if they are determinative of the proceeding and if there is no controlling precedent. However, the court determined that answering the certified question would be purely advisory since the petition had been dismissed and the time to appeal had expired. Consequently, there was no existing case that could be resolved by answering the question.The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question and dismissed the proceeding. View "K.L.T. v. NDDHHS" on Justia Law