Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Family Law
Marriage of Saraye
Lois and David divorced in 1992, with David ordered to pay child and spousal support. Child support was to continue until their child, Shari, turned 19 and was a full-time high school student. Shari turned 18 in January 2001 and graduated high school in June 2001, but wage garnishments for child support continued until 2008. In 2021, David sought reimbursement for overpaid child support, claiming he overpaid $46,061.55. Lois opposed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and would cause her financial hardship.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied David's request, finding he did not act timely and his reasons for the delay were insufficient to overcome the prejudice to Lois. The court noted David had previously modified the spousal support order but failed to do so for child support. The court also found Lois had unclean hands, as she likely knew she was receiving overpayments. However, the court granted David $3,000 in attorney fees as sanctions against Lois.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the defense of laches did not apply due to Lois's unclean hands. The court also disagreed with David's interpretation of Family Code section 4007, noting that the original support order did not require Lois to notify David of the termination of child support. The court emphasized that it was David's responsibility to terminate the wage and earnings assignment order. Given the 13-year delay and the prejudice to Lois, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny David's request for reimbursement. View "Marriage of Saraye" on Justia Law
Mercado v. Superior Court
Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's orders were void due to lack of statutory authority and that they violated her constitutional and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it could order a vocational evaluation based on public policy and statutory provisions, including Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court emphasized that section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf failed to provide. The court also noted that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the vocational evaluation order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law
Doe v. Doe
A mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. The mother did not serve the father with the petition, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated the father's parental rights and granted the adoption. The father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. The magistrate court denied the second motion, citing res judicata. The district court reversed this decision, finding that the father's due process argument warranted consideration.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion, which alleged a fundamental error violating his constitutional right to due process, was not barred by res judicata. The court applied the fundamental error doctrine, which allows for exceptions to procedural bars when a fundamental constitutional right is at stake. The court also rejected the mother's arguments that the father's motion was barred by the doctrines of claim splitting, invited error, appellate waiver, and the law of the case.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to the magistrate court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and whether the termination and adoption judgment was void. The court also awarded the father partial attorney fees on appeal for defending against certain arguments made by the mother. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law
In re J.M.
The case involves the father of J.M. (Father) appealing an order from the Circuit Court denying his motion to dismiss a neglect petition due to defective service of process. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed the petition after J.M.'s mother passed away, leaving J.M. without a caretaker. Father, who was living in Florida and had not seen J.M. for over a year, was served with the petition by a process server. He argued that service was defective because it was not performed by a law enforcement officer as required by RSA 169-C:8, I.The Circuit Court denied Father's motion to dismiss, and the adjudicatory hearing proceeded, resulting in a finding of neglect and an order for J.M.'s out-of-home placement. Father did not immediately appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and participated in the hearing, leading to the waiver of his service of process challenge under Mosier v. Kinley.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and agreed with DCYF that Father waived his challenge by not appealing immediately. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the trial court's neglect finding, noting that Father had not seen J.M. for 18 months and had not provided any support for two years despite being financially able.The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the neglect finding was supported by evidence and that the trial court did not err in continuing J.M.'s out-of-home placement instead of placing J.M. in Father's custody under DCYF supervision. The Supreme Court clarified that appeals from a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are discretionary and must be filed within 30 days. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law
BRUENGER V. MILLER
Donna Miller Bruenger, the ex-wife of the late Coleman Miller, filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Courtenay Ann Miller, Coleman’s daughter, seeking entitlement to Coleman’s Federal Employee’s Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) benefits. Coleman had failed to designate a beneficiary for his FEGLI benefits before his death, and MetLife distributed the benefits to Courtenay. Bruenger argued that Coleman’s legal obligation under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to assign her the benefits should prevail.The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled against Bruenger, concluding that federal law precluded her claim because Coleman’s employer did not receive the QDRO before his death. Bruenger’s subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals as untimely, and the court also imposed sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal. Bruenger then sought relief under CR 60.02, which the trial court granted, allowing her to refile the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the refiled appeal as frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees to Courtenay.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the CR 60.02 relief. The Supreme Court held that RAP 11(B) authorizes the award of attorney’s fees as a sanction for frivolous appeals but found that the imposition of sanctions in this case violated due process because Bruenger was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but reversed the sanctions imposed by the Court of Appeals. View "BRUENGER V. MILLER" on Justia Law
Van Vlack v. Van Vlack
Husband and Wife married in 2012 and purchased a home in Cheyenne, Wyoming, in 2014. They shared the residence and paid the mortgage from a joint account. In 2021, they refinanced the home, and in December 2021, they separated. They discussed the division of their marital property without attorneys and obtained two appraisals for the home. Wife retained counsel to draft a stipulated divorce decree, which both parties signed. The decree awarded the home to Husband, with a provision that Wife would receive half the net proceeds if the home was sold or refinanced.The District Court of Laramie County granted the divorce and entered the Stipulated Decree in June 2022. Husband refinanced the home but did not pay Wife her share of the equity. Wife filed a motion for relief, claiming the decree entitled her to half the equity regardless of whether the home was sold or refinanced. The district court granted Wife relief under Rule 60, correcting the decree to reflect that any equity recognized through sale or refinance was to be equally divided.Husband appealed, and the Wyoming Supreme Court found the decree ambiguous and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. The district court held a hearing and found that both parties intended to split the equity in the home equally. The court awarded Wife half the equity, amounting to $106,323.40, and Husband appealed again.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the clarification under Rule 60(a) was appropriate and did not modify the original judgment. The court also found that the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were sufficient and supported by the record. View "Van Vlack v. Van Vlack" on Justia Law
Olson v. Olson
Jennie Olson and Jonathan Olson were married on August 22, 2020. Two days before the wedding, Jonathan presented Jennie with a premarital agreement stipulating that in the event of a divorce, each party would retain ownership of their separate property. Jennie signed the agreement the same day. At the time, Jennie had a net worth of $386,917, while Jonathan had a net worth of $11,591,000. The couple separated in July 2022, and Jennie initiated divorce proceedings.The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, bifurcated the trial, first addressing the validity of the premarital agreement. The court found the agreement valid and enforceable and determined that the parties had no marital property. Jennie appealed, arguing the district court erred in its findings and abused its discretion in allowing a rebuttal witness to testify and in not admitting a text message as evidence.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in finding the premarital agreement valid and enforceable. The court found that Jennie had access to independent legal representation, received adequate financial disclosure, voluntarily consented to the agreement, and that the agreement was not substantively unconscionable. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the rebuttal witness to testify or in refusing to admit the text message as evidence.The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied both parties' requests for attorney’s fees and costs, citing the premarital agreement's provision that each party is responsible for their own legal expenses. View "Olson v. Olson" on Justia Law
K. S. v. R. S.
The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between the plaintiff, K, and the defendant, R, with the intervenor, B, also involved due to a related New Jersey litigation. The key marital asset was the couple's home in Greenwich, Connecticut, valued at approximately $11 million, and several investment accounts. The defendant had previously pledged these assets as security in a New Jersey court case, which resulted in a $24.7 million judgment against him and his father. The New Jersey court ordered the forfeiture of the Greenwich property and imposed a constructive trust on the investment accounts due to the defendant's misconduct, including transferring $3 million to Slovakia.The Connecticut trial court found that the defendant had dissipated marital assets by pledging and forfeiting the Greenwich property and investment accounts. The court included these assets in the marital estate and ordered their sale, with proceeds to be divided among the plaintiff, the defendant, and the intervenor. The court also found the defendant's annual earning capacity to be $400,000 and ordered him to pay $749 per week in child support, based on his earning capacity rather than actual income. Additionally, the court allowed the plaintiff to relocate with the children to the Czech Republic and granted her motion for contempt against the defendant for failing to support the family during the pendency of the dissolution action.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in failing to afford full faith and credit to the New Jersey court orders, which had removed the Greenwich property and investment accounts from the marital estate. The Supreme Court also found that the trial court improperly calculated child support by not first determining the presumptive amount based on the defendant's actual income. The court's granting of the plaintiff's motion for contempt was reversed due to a lack of clear and unambiguous orders requiring the defendant to provide the support he allegedly withheld. The case was remanded for a new hearing on all financial issues, including the division of the marital assets, giving full faith and credit to the New Jersey court orders. View "K. S. v. R. S." on Justia Law
Mitchell v. Ramlow
Amanda Mitchell filed for a civil protection order against Nicholas Ramlow in October 2020, alleging that he was stalking her by tracking her movements and placing a tracking device on her car. The magistrate court issued a temporary ex parte protection order and scheduled a hearing. Due to COVID-19 mask mandates, Ramlow was denied entry to the courthouse for refusing to wear a mask, leading to the hearing being rescheduled. At the rescheduled hearing, Ramlow was again absent, and the magistrate court issued a one-year protection order requiring him to attend a 52-week domestic violence course and review hearings.Ramlow filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then appealed to the district court. The protection order was extended but expired before the district court heard the appeal. The district court requested supplemental briefing on mootness and ultimately dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no applicable exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Ramlow appealed the district court's decision, arguing that his appeal still presented justiciable issues and fell within exceptions to the mootness doctrine.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the appeal was moot because the protection order had expired, and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. The court found that the issues were too fact-specific to be capable of repetition yet evading review, there were no collateral legal consequences, and the case did not raise issues of substantial public interest. The court also declined to vacate the expired protection order and denied attorney fees to both parties, awarding costs to Mitchell as the prevailing party. View "Mitchell v. Ramlow" on Justia Law
Mercado v. Superior Court
Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action. The Superior Court of Orange County granted Wolf's request and later compelled Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order the evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request for a vocational evaluation and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado opposed the request, arguing it was improper under the relevant statutes and that child support issues were being handled by the Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court noted that section 3558 does not authorize vocational evaluations, section 4331 applies only to spousal support in dissolution or legal separation cases, and section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf did not provide. The court also found that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law