Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In a custody dispute between Hadzi-Tanovic and her former husband, Pavlovich, an Illinois state court ordered that Hadzi-Tanovic’s parenting time with her children be supervised. She filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against her ex-husband, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the state court judge, alleging they conspired to violate her and her children’s rights to family association and her right to a fair and unbiased trier of fact. The district court dismissed her complaint on abstention grounds.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is well established that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review such state court decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine imposes a “jurisdictional bar” that prohibits federal courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing final state court judgments The state court order at issue is final, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s finality requirement is met. Allegations of state court corruption are not sufficient to avoid the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hadzi-Tanovic has not argued that state law or procedures prevented her from raising her federal constitutional issues in state court. Parties may raise procedural and substantive due process challenges to custody orders in Illinois state court. View "Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This is an international child custody dispute between Respondent and Petitioner over their minor children. While the family was residing in Germany, Respondent took the children to the United States and refused to return them. The Hague Convention generally requires children to be returned to the state of habitual residence so that the country’s courts may adjudicate the merits of any custody disputes. The Ninth Circuit previously vacated and remanded the district court’s first order to return the children to Germany. Because the Supreme Court issued its decision in Golan while the court was considering Respondent’s appeal of the second return order, the court also remanded that order for the district court’s reconsideration. The district court then granted the petition a third time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting, on a second remand, Petitioner’s petition against Respondent for the return, pursuant to the Hague Convention, of the parties’ two children to Germany. Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that, in cases governed by the Hague Convention, the district court has discretion as to whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing following remand and must exercise that discretion consistent with the Convention. The panel held that, on the second remand, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a third evidentiary hearing when the factual record was fully developed. The panel held that, in making determinations about German procedural issues, the district court neither abused its discretion nor violated Respondent’s due process rights by communicating with the State Department and, through it, the German Central Authority View "BOGDAN RADU V. PERSEPHONE JOHNSON SHON" on Justia Law

CC (mother) and VC (father) were driving through eastern Washington when CC went into premature labor. CC gave birth to AC in a nearby hospital. AC’s umbilical cord tested positive for cannabis. Hospital staff noted that CC was disabled, that CC and VC were homeless, and that they had no baby supplies. The hospital reported its concerns to the State, and the State sent social worker Michelle Woodward to investigate. Woodward contacted CC’s family from whom she heard reports of the couple’s domestic violence, criminal history, and drug use. The State took custody of AC and temporarily placed him with a foster family. The court later found AC dependent at a contested shelter care hearing and ordered CC to participate in random drug testing and an evidence-based parenting program. The court also ordered the State to provide regular, supervised visitation. At about this time, a new social worker, Diana Barnes, was assigned to AC. The court held another dependency hearing where Woodward, Barnes, and parenting therapist Logan Wright testified in support of AC’s dependency. Woodward and Barnes relied extensively on hearsay based largely on secondhand reports and statements rather than their own personal interactions or investigations. None of these reports were submitted into evidence, no records custodian authenticated them, and none of the out-of-court witnesses whose statements were recorded in those reports were called to testify. Counsel for VC made two unsuccessful objections to the hearsay presented through the social workers. The court ultimately found that the parents’ past history with the criminal justice system and Child Protective Services supported dependency, a finding substantially based on hearsay. CC and VC appealed. The Washington Supreme Court held the trial court’s impermissible reliance on hearsay prejudiced the parents and materially affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s dependency finding for AC as to both parents. View "In re Dependency of A.C." on Justia Law

Karena and Keith Jensen (“Jensens”), as foster parents to A.P., appealed a juvenile court’s order denying their motion to modify and order approving a transition plan. Because the Jensens were not “aggrieved parties” under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.2-26(1), the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Interest of A.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff (Mother) appealed from the post-judgment order modifying the parenting plan between her and her former husband, Defendant (Father) with respect to their two minor children. Mother contends the family court abused its discretion in ordering the children to participate with Father in a therapy program operated by Family Bridges, which mandated no contact with Mother for a minimum of 90 days.   The Second Appellate District agreed and reversed the order. The court explained that nothing in the record supports the court’s finding that this significant disruption to the children’s established living arrangement with Mother was in their best interest. The order requires the children, for a minimum period of three months, to be moved out of their home and either moved across the country to Los Angeles if the Family Bridges program can be completed during a school break or moved into a new home in New York with Father until the program can be completed there during the school year. The children would not be allowed any contact with Mother during this disruptive period. Without evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to remove them from Mother’s custody for a period of at least 90 days in order to participate in the Family Bridges program, the court abused its discretion in issuing its order of December 22, 2021. View "Johnston-Rossi v. Rossi" on Justia Law

Jane Doe, a three-year-old child, was in the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the “Department”); she was six days shy of her first birthday when the State removed her from the custody of her mother and placed her with a foster family. Her mother’s attempts to stick to a permanency plan were inconsistent, and while for the majority of the life of this case, the magistrate court held fast to a permanency goal of reunification, it modified that goal in the summer of 2022 so that termination of parental rights and adoption became the primary goals for Jane and reunification became the concurrent goal. Mother appealed the district court’s change of the permanency goals. She also sought a permissive appeal from the magistrate court to appeal to the district court. The magistrate court granted the motion. The district court dismissed the case and remanded it back to the magistrate court sua sponte after determining it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Mother then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found no error in the district court’s judgment and affirmed. View "IDHW v. Jane Doe (2022-36)" on Justia Law

John Doe sought custody of his daughter, Jane Doe, who was removed from the care of her mother in Idaho when a child protection action was initiated by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW” or “the Department”). Jane Doe and her maternal half-brother were removed from the custody of their mother in December 2020 due to allegations of abusive conduct. Jane Doe had previously been removed from her mother’s custody in 2018 due to substance abuse issues. John Doe lived in Texas with his wife, who was Jane Doe’s stepmother, and their child, Jane Doe’s paternal half-sibling. At the time of the removal, John Doe was considered a “non-offending parent.” However, the initial “Adjudicatory/Disposition Report of Investigation” filed with the magistrate court noted that John Doe was listed on the Texas Public Sex Offender Website. The magistrate court exercised jurisdiction over Jane Doe in early 2021 and placed her in the Department’s legal custody. As part of the case plan for John Doe, the magistrate court ordered John Doe “to comply with and complete the approval with the [Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”)] process with the state of Texas[,]” to assess the suitability of John Doe as a placement option for Jane Doe. The ICPC process ordered by the court included a home study and a placement determination. Texas denied IDHW’s multiple requests to conduct a home study on John Doe due to John Doe’s history, which included two prior sex offenses and a past child protection order, along with allegations of physical abuse, sexual abuse, negligent supervision, physical neglect, and medical neglect. Texas also noted that John Doe was a registered sex offender who had previously failed to register. As a result, John Doe never completed a home study. John Doe thereafter requested the Idaho magistrate court revise its case plan to strike the requirement he complete the ICPC process. This request was denied, and the issue before the Idaho Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the ICPC even applied to John Doe as an out-of-state, non-custodial parent. The Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court’s order modifying the case plan and held that by its plain language, the ICPC did not apply to an out-of-state, non-custodial parent. View "IDHW v. John Doe (2022-32)" on Justia Law

Christine and Thomas O'Holleran married in 2005. They had no children. In 2015, Christine filed for divorce and in her complaint alleged “[t]hat [Thomas] is guilty of physical and mental abuse toward [Christine], and such is sufficient that this marriage should be terminated at the fault of [Thomas].” In his response and counterclaim, Thomas requested a divorce on the grounds of habitual intemperance, extreme cruelty, and irreconcilable differences. Christine subsequently moved to amend her divorce complaint to add a tort claim for emotional and physical abuse and requested damages in excess of $10,000. In his answer to Christine’s amended complaint, Thomas asserted an affirmative defense arguing that the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction to hear Christine’s tort claim. The magistrate court granted Christine’s motion to amend her complaint. The magistrate court held a bench trial on the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint, granting the divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences, divided the parties’ real and personal property, and awarded Christine spousal maintenance. The decision did not address Christine’s tort claim. Thomas and Christine both filed motions to reconsider, but neither mentioned the magistrate court’s lack of findings and conclusions regarding Christine’s tort claim. Similarly, the magistrate court did not address Christine’s tort claim in its order denying reconsideration. The issue on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was whether the magistrate court had authority to decide a tort claim by one spouse against another as an ancillary matter to a divorce proceeding. The Supreme Court determined Idaho Code sections 1-2208 and 1-2210 and I.C.A.R. 5 limited the case types that could be assigned to magistrate courts to those specified in the Seventh Judicial District’s order on local rules. That order did not give the magistrate court authority to decide civil cases seeking damages in excess of $10,000. Nor was the tort claim an ancillary matter to the divorce proceeding. Accordingly, the district court erred when it determined the magistrate court had authority to decide Christine’s tort claim. View "O'Holleran v. O'Holleran" on Justia Law

At issue is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia would recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens when neither spouse was domiciled in that nation at the time of the divorce. The question arises from Petitioner’s marriage to a woman after the woman and another man — both Ghanaian citizens — divorced pursuant to Ghanaian customary law. At the time of the divorce, the woman and man were lawful permanent residents of the United States, and neither was present or domiciled in Ghana. Based on his marriage to the woman, Petitioner became a lawful permanent resident of the United States. But when Petitioner applied to become a naturalized citizen, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined that he and the woman were not validly married. USCIS reasoned that under controlling Virginia law, the Commonwealth would not recognize a divorce granted by a nation where neither spouse was domiciled at the time of the divorce. Petitioner sought a review of the decision in the district court, which granted summary judgment to USCIS. Petitioner then brought this appeal.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Petitioner’s naturalization application. The court concluded as a matter of comity, Virginia would recognize this otherwise valid divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens, regardless of the citizens’ domicile at the time. The court explained it rejected only USCIS’s argument that pursuant to present Virginia law, the Commonwealth would refuse to recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens simply because neither was domiciled in the foreign nation at the time of the divorce. View "Michael Adjei v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

D.S. and A.S. were married and have children, ages 14 and eight. A.S. filed a petition for legal separation and an ex parte request for temporary emergency orders related to child custody and visitation, property control, and “an order that all contact between Mother and Father be peaceful and neither party disparage the other, alienate the children nor discuss details of the custody case with the child.” She alleged that D.S. had a “trigger temper” and that the “children and I have had to flee the home multiple [times] when his anger has gotten out of control.” She stated that she did not have access to the family’s bank accounts. After the court denied her ex parte request, A.S. filed, and was granted, a peremptory challenge against the judge who issued the denial. A week later, A.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), which sought personal conduct orders and a stay-away order. A.S. identified two dates on which she and her children had suffered abuse. D.S. denied the allegations and appealed the DVRO. The court of appeal reversed. The family court abused its discretion in granting the DVRO without holding an evidentiary hearing compliant with Family Code section 217. View "Marriage of D.S. & A.S." on Justia Law