Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case involves the termination of parental rights of R.A.M., the mother of P.M., a child born in 2015. In 2017, R.A.M. was convicted of child abuse after a police officer found P.M. with scratches, bruising, and bleeding from the nose. P.M. was placed in foster care and later with his paternal uncle. In 2021, the State filed a petition for the termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights, citing a continuing need for protection and services (CHIPS) and R.A.M.'s failure to assume parental responsibility. R.A.M. contested both grounds.The case was heard in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. During the proceedings, R.A.M. failed to appear for a hearing on July 5, 2022, despite a standing order requiring her to attend all court appearances. The court found her absence to be egregious and without justification, and granted the State's motion for default judgment. The court then immediately moved to the dispositional phase and concluded the hearing on the same day, finding that termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights would be in P.M.'s best interest.R.A.M. appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed the order, holding that the circuit court lost competency when it proceeded to the dispositional hearing on the same day that the grounds phase concluded. The Court of Appeals also held that R.A.M.'s due process rights were violated. The case was remanded to the circuit court with instructions to hold a new dispositional hearing.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that under Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3., the circuit court was required to wait at least two days after finding R.A.M.'s conduct in failing to appear as ordered was egregious and without clear and justifiable excuse before proceeding to the dispositional phase of proceedings. The court's failure to abide by this statutory mandate resulted in a loss of competency to proceed. Therefore, R.A.M. is entitled to a new dispositional hearing. View "State v. R.A.M." on Justia Law

In this case, Asia R. Mann, now known as Asia R. Harrison, and Brian L. Mann were disputing modifications to their stipulated dissolution decree. The main issues in the case revolved around child custody, visitation, child support, and attorney fees.Prior to this case, the couple had been granted joint legal and physical custody of their two children. However, after Brian was convicted of stalking Asia, she sought sole legal and physical custody of the children. She argued that Brian's conviction constituted domestic intimate partner abuse under the Parenting Act, and as such, the court should take specific actions to protect her and the children.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that Brian's conviction for stalking did not constitute domestic intimate partner abuse under the Parenting Act, as the act requires that bodily injury be attempted, caused, or credibly threatened. The court found no evidence of this in Brian's conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Asia's request for sole custody of the children.The court also found no error in the lower court's decisions regarding child support, health insurance, and attorney fees. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to allow Brian to choose between two school districts for the children's enrollment.Finally, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to vacate the portion of the dissolution decree that found Brian stood in loco parentis to Asia's child from a previous relationship, Maleah. The court found that the lower court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act to modify the California child custody judgment as to Maleah. View "Mann v. Mann" on Justia Law

The case involves Mariya Stephens and Kevin Lee, who were married in 2017 and have a child together. After their divorce in 2020, Stephens was granted primary residential responsibility of their child, with Lee receiving parenting time. The divorce judgment stated that if Stephens had a permanent change of duty station, the child would relocate with her. In 2021, Stephens married Charles Stephens and they had two children together. In 2022, the Stephens family contracted to build a home in Virginia and informed Lee of their plans to relocate. Stephens believed she had Lee's consent to relocate either under the divorce judgment or his text messages and emails. In April 2023, Stephens filed a motion for relocation and relocated before the district court could act on the motion.Lee objected to Stephens's relocation and requested the district court to deny her motion to relocate to Virginia. He also moved to amend the divorce judgment to give him primary residential responsibility for their child and filed a motion for contempt due to Stephens's alleged violations of the judgment. In May 2023, the district court required the Stephens family to return to North Dakota with their child. In October 2023, the district court denied Stephens's motion to relocate, awarded Lee primary residential responsibility, and granted his motion to amend the judgment.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Stephens argued that the district court erred in denying her motion to relocate. She claimed that she did not need Lee's consent due to language in the divorce judgment and, alternatively, that Lee consented to the relocation through text messages and emails. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the divorce judgment did not provide Stephens with Lee's consent for her to move their child out of state, and did not err by denying her motion and by granting Lee's motion to change primary residential responsibility. View "Stephens v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over primary residential responsibility for two minor children between Casey Kubal and Kari Anderson. The couple lived together in North Dakota, but Anderson moved to South Dakota with the children in March 2022. In April 2022, Anderson initiated litigation in South Dakota to establish primary residential responsibility. In August 2023, Kubal served Anderson with a summons and complaint in North Dakota, which were filed with the district court in October 2023. Anderson moved to dismiss the case, arguing that North Dakota was an inconvenient forum as she had already commenced litigation in South Dakota and the children continued to reside there.The District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, dismissed the case, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because North Dakota was not the children's home state when Kubal commenced the case. The court also ruled that even if it had jurisdiction, North Dakota would be an inconvenient forum. The court made its decision based on the pleadings and motion papers, noting that the parties failed to provide information regarding the South Dakota proceeding.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case. The Supreme Court found that the record was inadequate to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists under the UCCJEA. The court noted that the district court did not address the three other grounds for jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and that the nature of the rulings in South Dakota and the status of those proceedings were necessary to determine whether the district court has jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that granting Anderson's motion to dismiss without understanding what has occurred in the South Dakota proceeding was contrary to the purpose of the UCCJEA. View "Kubal v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between ex-spouses Amanda Wynell Conners and Andrew Brian Conners over child support payments. The mother filed a motion for contempt of court, alleging that the father had not made the required payments. The district court issued a citation to show cause, and after unsuccessful attempts to personally serve the father, the mother requested permission to serve the contempt materials via email.The district court allowed the email service, which the father contested, arguing that it was inconsistent with the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, which governs contempt proceedings in civil cases. The father then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, challenging the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, as amended in 1995, does not permit a party to serve process for indirect contempt by email. The court further held that substituted service under Rule 4(f) is not permitted in contempt proceedings. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court clarified that Rule 107 governs all contempt proceedings, whether punitive or remedial, that arise out of an underlying case that is civil in nature. The court also held that email service does not satisfy Rule 107(c)’s requirements for physical service directly on the specific individual accused of contempt without any intermediate intervention. View "In Re the Marriage of Conners" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the eligibility of a married individual, Costa Tingos, for Medicaid long-term care benefits. Costa and his wife, Mary, had been married for over 50 years, but had kept their finances largely separate due to Costa's history of gambling and financial mismanagement. When Costa moved into a nursing home, he applied for Medicaid benefits. However, Mary refused to provide information about her income and assets, which was necessary to determine Costa's eligibility. Costa argued that Mary's refusal to cooperate should not affect his eligibility.The case was initially heard by the Massachusetts Medicaid program, MassHealth, which denied Costa's application. Costa appealed to the MassHealth board of hearings, which also denied his appeal. Costa then sought judicial review in the Superior Court, which vacated the board's decision and remanded the case back to the board. After two more rounds of hearings and appeals, the Superior Court affirmed the board's decision to deny Costa's application.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. The court held that the board's interpretation of the phrase "refuses to cooperate" in the relevant regulation was reasonable. The court found that Mary's refusal to disclose her financial information did not constitute a refusal to cooperate within the meaning of the regulation, given the couple's long history of cooperation in other aspects of their marriage. The court also rejected Costa's argument that the board's decision was arbitrary and capricious. View "Freiner v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Christopher P. (Father) and Amanda C. (Mother) over the custody of their two children. The Family Court of Upshur County was set to hold a final hearing on the matter, but a scheduling conflict arose for Mother's counsel, who was also due to appear in the Circuit Court of Webster County at the same time. Despite Mother's counsel notifying the courts of the conflict, the family court proceeded with the hearing in the absence of Mother and her counsel. The family court then ruled that the children should primarily reside with Father.Mother appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the family court had wrongly failed to yield its hearing time to the circuit court. The ICA granted Mother a new custody hearing, but based its decision on the conclusion that the family court had applied the wrong version of West Virginia Code § 48-9-206. Father then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the ICA's decision in part, agreeing with the ICA that Mother is due a new hearing in family court, but disagreeing with the ICA's conclusion that the family court had applied the wrong version of the law. The Supreme Court found that the family court had abused its discretion by proceeding with the hearing in the absence of Mother and her counsel, and remanded the case back to the family court for a new hearing. View "Christopher P. v. Amanda C." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of whether a guardian can initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. Peter Galbraith, II, the ward, and Belinda Galbraith were married in 2015. Between 2018 and 2019, Mr. Galbraith became ill with Frontotemporal Dementia BV. Mrs. Galbraith obtained a power of attorney and later deeded the marital residence to her separate trust. In 2022, she asked Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother to take care of him, and he was moved out of the marital home. In 2023, Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother petitioned the court for a general guardianship over him and filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage without first obtaining authorization from the guardianship court. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the guardians lacked authority to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The trial court initially held that the guardian did not have the authority to file a divorce petition on behalf of the ward. After obtaining authorization from the guardianship court, the guardian refiled the petition. However, the trial court again dismissed the petition, stating that Oklahoma law does not allow a guardian to initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward. The guardian appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act does not explicitly disallow the guardianship court from authorizing a guardian to file a divorce petition on behalf of a ward. The court found that the guardian was acting to protect the ward's rights and manage his financial resources, which aligns with the purpose of the Act. The court also held that the addressed provisions of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not act as a bar to the initiation of such an action by the guardian. The court concluded that the guardianship court may authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of a ward. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH" on Justia Law

Nicole Costin, individually and on behalf of her minor son, filed a lawsuit against Glens Falls Hospital and several of its staff members. Costin alleged that the hospital discriminated against her due to her substance-abuse disorder, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. She also raised state-law claims. Costin's allegations included the hospital conducting drug tests without informed consent, reporting her to the New York State Child Abuse and Maltreatment Register based on a false positive drug test, withholding pain relief, accelerating her labor without consent, and refusing to correct their actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Costin’s action, concluding that she failed to plausibly allege that she was discriminated against due to her disability. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court agreed with the lower court's dismissal of Costin’s claims related to the denial of an epidural, acceleration of labor, and treatment of her newborn. However, the court disagreed with the dismissal of Costin’s claims related to the hospital's instigation of a Child Protective Services investigation and its administration of a drug test. The court found that Costin had plausibly alleged that these actions were based on discriminatory policies, not medical decisions. The court also vacated the lower court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Costin’s state-law claims. View "Costin v. Glens Falls Hospital" on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, Andrew M., who tested positive for methadone at birth and was placed in foster care. His biological parents, S.M. and A.M., failed to reunify with him. Despite this, the juvenile court decided not to terminate the parents' parental rights, citing the parental-benefit exception, which applies if a parent shows that they maintained regular visitation with the child, the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents, and terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even considering the benefit of a new, adoptive home.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously ordered Andrew to be removed from parental custody and provided the parents with reunification services. However, the parents failed to reunify with Andrew and their services were terminated. The court then scheduled a permanency planning hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. Andrew's appointed appellate counsel argued that the juvenile court's decision not to terminate the parents' parental rights was an abuse of discretion. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), although a respondent in this appeal, supported Andrew's counsel's position. The court agreed with Andrew's counsel and the SSA, concluding that the circumstances did not support the application of the parental-benefit exception. The court reversed the lower court's order and remanded the matter with instructions. View "In re Andrew M." on Justia Law