Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic priest. The plaintiffs alleged that the abuse occurred between 1971 and 1979 when they were aged between eight and fourteen. The defendants argued that the claims were subject to the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1).While this case was pending, the legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to revive certain prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period. However, the court found that the statutory enactment was contrary to the due process protections enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution and must yield to that supreme law. The court reversed and vacated the trial court's decision to the extent it found the statutory enactment to be constitutional.The court determined that once liberative prescription accrues, it becomes an accrued, vested right. It noted that the right to plead prescription in defense to a claim on the obligation itself is "property that cannot be taken from [the defendant]." Hence, when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of accrued prescription, his right becomes a vested property right protected by constitutional due process guarantees.The court concluded that the legislature lacked the authority to revive the prescribed claims set forth under the facts alleged in this case. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the exception anew after plaintiffs have had an opportunity to raise any additional arguments regarding contra non valentem and the timeliness of their claims. View "BIENVENU VS. DEFENDANT 1" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the plaintiff, David Beavers, brought civil claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation against his ex-wife’s alleged lover, John McMican. The main issues revolved around the interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 52-13 which specifies that post-separation conduct cannot give rise to liability, and whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of McMican.The court determined that the Rodriguez v. Lemus decision, regarding what evidence is relevant to prove pre-separation conduct, was consistent with the legislative intent of N.C.G.S. § 52-13. The court held that evidence of post-separation conduct may be used to corroborate pre-separation conduct, as long as the pre-separation conduct gives rise to more than mere conjecture.However, the court found that the evidence of pre-separation conduct in this specific case did not rise above mere conjecture regarding the identity of Mrs. Beavers’ paramour. Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. McMican. No sufficient evidence was presented to support the essential elements of Beavers’s claims against McMican, namely the sexual intercourse element of the criminal conversation claim, or the malice prong of the alienation of affection claim. View "Beavers v. McMican" on Justia Law

Christine M. Nordgren's parental rights were terminated in a Minnesota state court. Instead of appealing this decision, she filed a federal lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Hennepin County, and various other parties involved in her case, alleging a range of constitutional, federal, and state claims. She sought multiple forms of damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The district court dismissed all federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Nordgren then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court interpreted as a request to reconsider and amend her pleadings, and denied it. Nordgren appealed this decision.The Hennepin County defendants moved to dismiss Nordgren's appeal as untimely, arguing that she did not appeal the judgment in a timely manner and that the district court's order denying her motion for reconsideration was not separately appealable and did not extend the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the defendants, determining that Nordgren's motion did not qualify as an appealable motion under Rule 59(e), which is designed to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. As such, the appeal period began on the date the judgment was entered, and Nordgren's notice of appeal, filed beyond the 30-day appeal period, was untimely.Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed Nordgren's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Nordgren v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

The case originates from a dispute over the jurisdiction for a child custody matter. The parties involved are Justin Aldava and Alyssa Baum, parents of H.A., a child born in Texas in 2019. The couple moved from Texas to Kentucky, then to Washington for Aldava's work, and back to Texas. Eventually, Baum and H.A. moved back to Kentucky. In November 2020, Baum filed a petition for an order of protection in Kentucky, indicating she sought temporary custody of H.A. Aldava filed a custody petition in Texas in December 2020. The issue arises from the interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), specifically the definition of "home state" and "temporary absence".The Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that under the UCCJEA, a bright-line, objective standard should be used to determine a child's "home state" - focusing on where the child has lived in the six months preceding the custody proceeding, and not the intent of the parties. Applying this standard, the court found that neither Texas nor Kentucky had initial jurisdiction over H.A. when custody was first raised, as H.A. had not lived in any state long enough to establish "home state" status. However, Kentucky obtained temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA due to Baum's petition for an order of protection. Consequently, Kentucky was the only state with any jurisdiction over H.A., and the custody action should be heard there. The court concluded that the Texas court's later finding that Texas was H.A.'s home state did not divest Kentucky of jurisdiction. The ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. View "ALDAVA V. JOHNSON" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Nancy Robayo and Luis Robayo, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Family Court. The case focuses on a marital settlement agreement between the plaintiff, Nancy Robayo, and the defendant, Luis Robayo, who are former spouses. The plaintiff argued that she is entitled to survivor benefits in the defendant's federal civilian pension according to their marital settlement agreement. The agreement was silent on the issue of survivor benefits, leading the court to find it ambiguous in this regard.The Supreme Court concluded that the most equitable construction of the agreement does not entitle the plaintiff to survivor benefits. The court's decision was based on the circumstances of the parties' marriage, their separation, and the context of their agreement. The parties had lived separately in different states for sixteen years during their twenty-eight-year marriage and had acknowledged in their marital settlement agreement that they had not had a "marital relationship" since 2010. The court found that all of the plaintiff's rights to the defendant's pensions ended on June 30, 2018, as stated in the agreement.The Supreme Court also addressed the plaintiff's argument that the trial justice erred in taking judicial notice of defense counsel's experience litigating in the Family Court. The court found that this did not constitute judicial error. View "Robayo v. Robayo" on Justia Law

The case involves a father, J.L., who appealed against orders that declared his children, P.L and L.L, to be dependents of the juvenile court and placed them with their mother, H.T. J.L. also contested the condition of his visitation rights, arguing that the court improperly delegated its visitation authority to the children. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency maintained that J.L. forfeited the issue by not raising it at the lower court level.The parents had a child welfare history dating back to 2019, with multiple referrals regarding J.L. physically or emotionally abusing the children. The parents divorced in 2023, and shared custody until an incident occurred where J.L. allegedly punched P.L. The Agency then obtained protective custody warrants for the children. The court placed the children with their mother and ordered liberal supervised visitation for J.L., considering the children's wishes on whether visits would go forward. This order was not objected to by J.L's counsel.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California concurred with the Agency and affirmed the lower court's orders. It held that J.L. forfeited his right to contest the visitation orders by failing to raise the issue at the lower court level. Furthermore, even if the issue was not forfeited, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the lower court in allowing the children to decline visiting J.L. The court explained that it was J.L.’s responsibility to request a specific change to the visitation order if he was unhappy with the children's refusal to visit him. View "In re P.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the termination of a mother's parental rights in a case concerning two deprived children. The mother, Brianna Tatum, had sought certiorari review from the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion which upheld the trial court's final order terminating her parental rights. On certiorari, Tatum claimed that the record did not support a finding that she had waived her right to a jury trial in a parental termination proceeding.The case hinged on two key questions: whether a Court Minute memorializing a contemporaneous court proceeding could support a party's oral consent to waive a jury trial in a parental termination proceeding, and whether a party who proceeds to trial without demanding a jury trial or objecting to a non-jury trial has waived any right to a jury trial. The Court answered both questions affirmatively.The Court found that Tatum had waived her right to a jury trial by her conduct, proceeding with the non-jury trial without any demand for a jury trial or raising an objection to the non-jury trial. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with a non-jury trial. Therefore, the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was vacated, and the judgment of the trial court terminating Tatum's parental rights was affirmed. View "IN THE MATTER OF E.J.T." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled on an appeal by Allison Crary, who challenged three orders from a revocation proceeding. The orders were: denial of a motion to declare a grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional, denial of a motion for a contempt citation against Khristel and Frank Clautice, and denial of a motion for attorney fees and expenses.The case involved a minor child, with Crary having sole legal and physical custody. The Clautices, the child's maternal grandparents, had been granted visitation rights under a consent order. Crary later petitioned to revoke this order and for a contempt citation against the grandparents for non-compliance. She also sought to declare the grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional and asked for attorney fees and expenses.The Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal regarding the constitutionality of the grandparent visitation statute as moot, since the trial court had already revoked the grandparent visitation order on other grounds. The court also affirmed the trial court’s orders denying Crary’s contempt motion and motion for attorney fees and expenses. The court noted that Crary had not provided evidence at the hearing to support a contempt finding, and that the trial court was not required to hold a hearing or take evidence before denying the motion for attorney fees and expenses. View "CRARY v. CLAUTICE" on Justia Law

In this divorce proceeding, the Supreme Court of Texas was asked to consider whether a judgment was rendered through an email sent only to the parties' legal counsel. The case involved Eve Lynn Baker and Terry Lee Bizzle, who after nearly 20 years of marriage, filed cross-petitions for divorce. The trial court informed the parties that a same-day ruling would not be possible and that the court would "e-mail the parties with the decision" at the end of the following week.Subsequently, the trial court sent an email to the parties' attorneys outlining the allocation of assets. The court did not copy the court clerk on this email or otherwise submit it to the clerk for filing or entry in the record. The trial court later signed a modified version of Wife's proposed final decree, declaring the parties divorced on insupportability grounds and dividing the marital estate.However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, ruling that the postmortem divorce decree was void for want of subject-matter jurisdiction because the trial court had not rendered judgment completely resolving the divorce action before the wife passed away.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals' decision, finding that the trial court did not render judgment in the privately communicated October 4th email, and the wife's subsequent death divested the trial court of jurisdiction to render judgment in the postmortem final divorce decree. The court held that public pronouncement of the trial court's decision is not a mere formalism but an official judicial action affording the decision legal significance. View "BAKER v. BIZZLE" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah considered the appeal of Marianne Tyson who sought to access her sealed adoption records from 1978, in order to learn more about her birth parents' medical histories and any potential health risks. The district court had denied Tyson's petition, interpreting "good cause" as requiring more than a generalized desire to obtain health or genetic information unrelated to a specific medical condition of the petitioner. The district court also held that Tyson's reasons for wanting access to adoption records did not outweigh her birth mother's interest in privacy.The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed with the district court's interpretation of "good cause" and its application of the balancing test. The Supreme Court noted that the legislature did not define "good cause" in the statute and did not impose additional requirements to establish "good cause". The Court held that the district court erred in interpreting the statute to require something more than a general desire to know one's medical history. The Supreme Court also found that the district court did not properly balance the interests under the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 107, as it focused solely on the birth mother’s privacy interests and did not consider Tyson's reasons for wanting to see her adoption records.The case was remanded back to the district court to reassess Tyson's petition under the correct standard. The district court must evaluate Tyson's petition under a correct interpretation of "good cause" and conduct a proper balancing test, giving weight to both the birth mother’s privacy interests and Tyson's reasons for wanting to see her adoption records. View "In re Adoption of M.A." on Justia Law