Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Family Law
Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families
The plaintiff sought damages from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), alleging religious discrimination during child protection proceedings that led to the termination of his parental rights. The trial court dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims as time-barred but allowed some timely allegations related to the termination trial to proceed. DCF’s motion to reargue, asserting that the litigation privilege barred the remaining claims, was denied by the trial court.DCF appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the litigation privilege did indeed bar the plaintiff’s remaining timely allegations and directed the trial court to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The trial court complied, dismissing the entire complaint before the plaintiff could seek further appellate review.The plaintiff and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities argued that the Appellate Court erred in applying the litigation privilege to bar the discrimination claims. They contended that the privilege should not apply to DCF, a governmental entity, and that the legislature intended to abrogate the privilege in discrimination cases.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s timely allegations related to DCF’s conduct during the termination trial. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claims were akin to defamation, to which the privilege applies, and not to vexatious litigation, which challenges the purpose of the underlying action. The court also found that other remedies were available to address DCF’s conduct and declined to adopt a rule precluding nonpersons from invoking the privilege.However, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment to the extent that it directed the trial court to dismiss the entire complaint, as this hindered the plaintiff’s ability to appeal the dismissal of his untimely claims. The case was remanded to the Appellate Court to vacate the trial court’s judgment and to remand the case for a new judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff to appeal the timeliness ruling. View "Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law
In re Jewelyette M.
The case involves the foster parents of a minor child, J, who were initially granted intervenor status in neglect proceedings concerning J. The trial court later removed them as intervenors based on the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., which concluded that nonrelative foster parents are precluded by statute from intervening in neglect proceedings. The foster parents appealed this decision, arguing that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided. While their appeal was pending, the trial court held a hearing on a motion to revoke J's commitment to the Commissioner's custody and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents also filed a writ of error challenging this decision.The trial court initially granted the foster parents' motion to intervene in the neglect proceedings. However, after the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., the trial court removed them as intervenors. The foster parents appealed this removal, claiming that the decision in In re Ryan C. was incorrect. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to revoke J's commitment and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents were not allowed to attend the entire hearing or give a sworn statement after hearing the evidence, which they claimed violated their right to be heard under the statute.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided and must be overruled. The court held that the statute does not bar a trial court from granting a foster parent's request for permissive intervention in the dispositional phase of a neglect proceeding. The court reversed the trial court's order removing the foster parents as intervenors and granted the writ of error, remanding the case for a new revocation hearing. The court also concluded that the foster parents' right to be heard includes the right to be present throughout the proceeding and to argue at the appropriate time as to the child's best interest in light of the evidence presented. View "In re Jewelyette M." on Justia Law
Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte
Charlene Monfore petitioned for guardianship and conservatorship over her mother, Gerda Flyte, who suffers from dementia. Gerda’s son, Roger Flyte, objected and requested to be appointed instead. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found it was not in Gerda’s best interests to appoint either Charlene or Roger and instead appointed Black Hills Advocate, LLC (BHA), a for-profit corporation. Charlene appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by not appointing her and lacked statutory authority to appoint a for-profit organization.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, South Dakota, initially appointed Charlene as temporary guardian and conservator. Roger objected, raising concerns about Gerda’s care under Charlene, including medical neglect and financial mismanagement. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court found both Charlene and Roger unsuitable due to various concerns, including Charlene’s failure to provide necessary medical care and financial mismanagement, and Roger’s financial irresponsibility and anger issues. The court appointed BHA as guardian and conservator.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint Charlene, given the evidence of her inadequate care and financial mismanagement. However, the Supreme Court found that SDCL 29A-5-110 does not authorize the appointment of for-profit entities as guardians or conservators, except for qualified banks or trust companies as conservators. Therefore, the appointment of BHA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also awarded Roger one-half of his requested appellate attorney fees. View "Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte" on Justia Law
Doe v. Burnham
Pat Doe and Jarrod Burnham each filed complaints for protection from abuse against each other in December 2021. Doe's complaint was transferred to Portland for a consolidated hearing, where the court found that Burnham had abused Doe and granted her a two-year protection order effective until January 14, 2024. On January 4, 2024, Doe attempted to file a motion to extend the protection order in Bangor but was informed it needed to be filed in Portland. She mailed the motion on January 13, 2024, but it never arrived due to insufficient postage. Doe learned the order had not been extended on January 17, 2024, and filed a new protection from abuse action in Bangor.The District Court in Portland denied Doe's motion to extend the protection order, concluding it could not extend an expired order. Doe's motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the court finding that her failure to file on time was not excusable neglect and that the statute did not permit extending an expired order. Doe then filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing excusable neglect, which was also denied. The court stated that excusable neglect under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) did not apply to statutory deadlines.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decisions, holding that 19-A M.R.S. § 4111(1) unambiguously prohibits extending an expired protection order. The court also held that a motion for relief from judgment cannot be used to circumvent statutory authority, and thus the trial court did not err in denying Doe's motion for relief from judgment. View "Doe v. Burnham" on Justia Law
Doe v. Doe
This case involves the termination of parental rights and an adoption proceeding. Jane Doe 1 ("Mother") and John Doe ("Father") had a child out of wedlock. Approximately eight months after the child's birth, Mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. Mother did not serve the petition on Father, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated Father's parental rights and granted the adoption. Father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. This appeal concerns Father's second motion.The magistrate court denied Father's second motion, finding it barred by res judicata. The district court disagreed, reversed the magistrate court's order, and remanded the matter for the magistrate court to consider the motion on its merits. Mother appealed, arguing that Father's motion was barred by procedural doctrines, including res judicata and waiver.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion alleged a fundamental error that deprived him of his right to procedural due process, which in turn violated his fundamental constitutional right to raise his child. The Court concluded that the fundamental error doctrine applies to create an exception to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. The Court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the matter to the magistrate court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and, if so, whether the termination and adoption judgment is void. The Court also awarded partial attorney fees to Father for defending against certain arguments raised by Mother on appeal. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law
In re C.E.-1
The case involves a child, C.E.-1, who was found in a dangerous situation due to his parents' substance abuse. The Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition against the parents, L.F. and C.E.-2, after L.F. was found unconscious with heroin nearby, and C.E.-1 was left in her care. Both parents admitted to drug use and were granted improvement periods to address their issues. However, they failed to comply with the terms, leading the guardian ad litem to move for termination of the improvement periods.The Circuit Court of Hancock County extended the improvement periods despite the parents' noncompliance, effectively prolonging the case. The guardian ad litem objected, but the court continued the improvement periods until July 2023. The court then scheduled a dispositional hearing but instead held an ex parte meeting with all parties except the guardian ad litem. Following this meeting, the court approved a Disposition Five agreement, placing C.E.-1 in the custody of the DHS and planning for a legal guardianship with the maternal grandmother.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred by not conducting a proper dispositional hearing and by excluding the guardian ad litem from the ex parte meeting. The court also noted that the dispositional order lacked necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's dispositional order and remanded the case for a proper dispositional hearing and entry of a new order consistent with its opinion. View "In re C.E.-1" on Justia Law
K.T. v. E.S.
K.T. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-partner, E.S., with whom she shares three daughters. K.T. alleged that E.S. had subjected her to physical and sexual abuse over several years, including incidents where the children were present. She also claimed that E.S. had abducted the children from Texas to California without her consent. K.T. sought to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO, citing their exposure to E.S.'s abusive behavior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted K.T. a temporary restraining order (TRO) against E.S. but did not include the children as protected parties, citing a lack of imminent risk of harm to them. During the hearing on K.T.'s DVRO request, the court reviewed her declaration and testimony, which detailed the abuse and the children's exposure to it. The court granted the DVRO protecting K.T. but did not include the children, stating there was no credible evidence of physical or sexual abuse of the children.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had used the wrong legal standard by requiring evidence of direct abuse of the children. The appellate court held that the correct standard was "good cause" based on the totality of the circumstances, which includes the children's exposure to domestic violence. The appellate court found that K.T. had provided sufficient evidence of good cause to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in part, directing it to modify the DVRO to include the children as protected parties. The court otherwise affirmed the trial court's order and awarded costs to K.T. View "K.T. v. E.S." on Justia Law
Smith v. Smith
The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between Carol Sperry Smith and Dale Preston Smith. The key issue is the classification of a tract of land located at 4080 Racetrack Road in Grifton, North Carolina. Dale Preston Smith purchased this property before the marriage. The parties signed stipulations in January 2019, designating the property as marital property. However, Dale later filed a motion to set aside these stipulations, claiming the property was his separate property.In the District Court of Pitt County, the trial court approved a pretrial order that listed Racetrack Road as a disputed property, with Carol claiming it was a mixed asset and Dale asserting it was his separate property. The trial court classified the property as Dale's separate property and distributed it to him. Carol appealed, arguing that the stipulations were binding since the trial court never ruled on Dale's motion to set them aside.The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the trial court's order. The majority held that the pretrial order showed the parties did not agree that Racetrack Road was marital property. The dissenting judge argued that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion to set aside the stipulations meant the stipulations remained binding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court held that Carol invited any error by agreeing to proceed with the equitable distribution hearing without a direct ruling on the motion to set aside the stipulations. Therefore, she could not use this as a basis for a new hearing. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, though it did not adopt its reasoning. The invited error doctrine barred Carol from obtaining a new equitable distribution hearing. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law
In re C.K.M.
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition in September 2022 for temporary orders requiring the parents to participate in state-provided services for their child's safety. The trial court granted these temporary orders. In August 2023, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights and obtain conservatorship of the child. The parents responded with motions for sanctions, claiming the Department's actions were frivolous. The Department then moved to nonsuit its claims. The trial court expressed frustration but granted the nonsuit and planned a separate hearing for the sanctions motions.The trial court signed an order on August 21, 2023, dismissing the Department's claims and removing the case from the docket. However, the court later consolidated the cases and held a hearing on the sanctions motions, ultimately granting them and ordering the Department to pay the parents' attorney's fees. The Department appealed the sanctions order. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas vacated the sanctions order, deeming it void because the trial court's dismissal order was considered final, thus ending the court's plenary power before the sanctions order was issued.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's dismissal order was not a final judgment as it did not clearly and unequivocally dispose of all claims and parties. Therefore, the trial court retained its plenary power when it issued the sanctions order. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment vacating the sanctions order, dismissed the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re C.K.M." on Justia Law
Swing v. Swing
Kenneth and Jill Swing were involved in a divorce action that included contested issues such as the pre-nuptial agreement, equitable division of property, child custody, visitation, support, and fees. The family court issued a final order on June 8, 2021. Jill filed a motion to alter or amend this order on June 16, 2021, which the family court partially granted on August 27, 2021, issuing an amended final order. Kenneth then filed his own motion to alter or amend on September 10, 2021.The family court denied Kenneth's motion on July 14, 2022, deeming it untimely as it did not address the amended final order but rather the original June 8 order. Jill received notice of this denial on July 21, 2022, and served her notice of appeal on August 22, 2022. Kenneth moved to dismiss Jill's appeal, arguing it was untimely because his own motion did not toll the appeal period. The court of appeals agreed with Kenneth and dismissed Jill's appeal, concluding that Kenneth's motion was untimely and did not stay the time for filing an appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Kenneth's motion was timely as it was served within ten days of receiving notice of the amended final order. The Court clarified that a timely Rule 59(e) motion stays the time for appeal for all parties unless it falls into specific exceptions previously established in case law. The Court found that Kenneth's motion did not fit these exceptions and thus stayed the time for appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of Jill's appeal on its merits. View "Swing v. Swing" on Justia Law