Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A nonprofit organization sought access to confidential court records from child protective and adoption proceedings involving a young girl who died after being placed in foster care and later adopted. The girl was reported missing in 2021, and her death was confirmed in 2023. The records also contained information about her siblings. The siblings, through their counsel, did not object to disclosure as long as their identities were protected through redactions. The Department of Human Services and the adoptive father opposed disclosure, arguing that the records were confidential and that redactions would not sufficiently protect privacy.The Family Court of the First Circuit denied the request, reasoning that releasing redacted records would be misleading and would not serve the public interest in understanding the response of agencies and the court to child abuse and neglect. The court concluded that the records should remain sealed, citing concerns about the completeness and potential for misunderstanding of the redacted information.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that, under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes §§ 587A-40 and 578-15, public access to confidential child protective and adoption records is permitted when a foster child is missing, has suffered a near fatality, been critically injured, or has died, provided that information about living siblings is redacted to protect their privacy. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it limited disclosure to only those purposes that further the best interests of the child, clarifying that a “legitimate purpose” for disclosure can exist independently. The court ordered the release of the redacted records and provided guidance for future requests, affirming the family court’s authority to require agencies to prepare redacted versions for public access. View "Public First Law Center v. Viola" on Justia Law

Roger Contreras and Nancy Bourke were involved in a marriage dissolution proceeding in Cochise County, Arizona, with a decree entered in 2011. The case saw extensive post-decree litigation. In February 2020, all Cochise County Superior Court judges, including Judge Timothy Dickerson, recused themselves from the matter without providing reasons on the record, and the case was reassigned to a Pima County judge. In 2021, Judge Dickerson became the presiding judge of Cochise County Superior Court and subsequently appointed Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore. In December 2022, Contreras moved to have Bourke declared a vexatious litigant, and Judge Dickerson, despite his prior recusal, ruled on the motion without explaining his re-entry or giving the parties an opportunity to object.Judge Dickerson designated Bourke a vexatious litigant. Bourke appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bourke had waived any challenge to Judge Dickerson’s participation by failing to timely seek disqualification under relevant statutes and rules. The appellate majority did not address Bourke’s argument regarding Judge Dickerson’s appointment of Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore as a potential conflict, while the dissent argued that waiver should not apply under the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that once a judge recuses from a case, the judge remains disqualified from further participation unless the judge articulates the reasons why recusal is no longer required and allows the parties an opportunity to object. The court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s order declaring Bourke a vexatious litigant, and remanded for a different judge to rule on Contreras’ motion. View "CONTRERAS v BOURKE" on Justia Law

A married couple, who wed in 2020 and share a young child, purchased an engineering business together using loans secured by the wife’s premarital home. After their separation in 2023, the wife petitioned for divorce. The parties entered into interim agreements regarding custody, child support, and business management, but the husband repeatedly violated these orders by failing to make required payments, misusing business funds, and withholding financial disclosures. The wife raised concerns about the husband’s substance abuse and erratic behavior, providing evidence of his alcohol and marijuana use, as well as incidents of intoxication during child exchanges and at work. The husband denied these allegations but admitted to some problematic behavior in written communications.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, held multiple hearings, finding the husband in contempt several times for violating court orders. At trial, the court heard testimony and reviewed evidence regarding the husband’s parenting, financial conduct, and the parties’ competing proposals for the business. The court found the wife more credible, sanctioned the husband for discovery violations, and ultimately awarded her primary custody of the child, with the husband’s parenting time to be phased in only after he completed chemical dependency and mental health evaluations. The court also awarded the wife sole ownership of the business and her premarital home, requiring her to assume all related debts.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decisions. It held that the finding regarding the husband’s failure to make full financial disclosures was supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court also found no abuse of discretion in conditioning the husband’s parenting time on completion of evaluations or in awarding the business to the wife, as these decisions were equitable and consistent with Montana law. View "In re Marriage of Boeshans" on Justia Law

K.S. gave birth to her daughter, Jane, in August 2018 and struggled with ongoing methamphetamine abuse before, during, and after her pregnancy. Jane’s early life was marked by instability, with K.S. frequently leaving her in the care of relatives and exposing her to unsafe environments. After a series of rehabilitation attempts and relapses, Jane was adjudicated a neglected child by the Rankin County Youth Court in November 2019, and custody was transferred among family members. By early 2022, Jane was in the durable legal custody of M.F.D. and M.D., K.S.’s cousin and her husband.M.D. and M.F.D. filed a petition in the Rankin County Chancery Court in August 2022 to terminate K.S.’s parental rights and adopt Jane. Before trial, they requested the youth court to transfer jurisdiction to the chancery court, which the youth court granted, finding all matters resolved and the transfer in Jane’s best interest. The chancery court then held a trial, denied K.S.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and terminated her parental rights based on abandonment, desertion, unfitness, and failure to provide for Jane’s needs. The court also found reunification was not in Jane’s best interest and subsequently granted the adoption. K.S. appealed the termination and later filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the adoption, arguing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which was denied.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that the chancery court had subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate K.S.’s parental rights because the youth court had formally relinquished jurisdiction, and no statute prohibited such transfer. The Court also found no manifest error in the termination decision, as substantial evidence supported the chancellor’s findings. Finally, the Court declined to adopt a rule requiring automatic stays of adoption proceedings pending appeals of termination orders. The judgments of the chancery court were affirmed. View "K.S. v. M.D. and M.F.D." on Justia Law

A child was born in 2012 to Kendra and Christopher, but due to concerns about Kendra’s fitness as a parent, the child was placed with her paternal grandmother, Denise, and Denise’s long-term partner, David Lemaster, under a Cabinet safety plan. Denise was later granted permanent custody of the child, and the child lived with Denise and Lemaster for her entire life. Kendra, the child’s mother, was initially denied visitation but later received supervised and then unsupervised visitation. Denise and Lemaster jointly raised and financially supported the child, functioning as a family unit. In 2022, Denise died, and Lemaster sought to intervene in the ongoing custody case, claiming de facto custodian status and seeking custody or visitation.The Greenup Family Court granted emergency custody to Kendra and, without holding an evidentiary hearing, later awarded her full custody, denying Lemaster’s motion to intervene as untimely and finding he could not qualify as a de facto custodian. Lemaster’s motion to alter or amend was denied. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Lemaster’s intervention was untimely and that he could not be a de facto custodian since he co-parented with Denise, the legal custodian.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and remanded. It held that Lemaster had standing to intervene as a “person acting as a parent” under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and had sufficiently alleged a basis for de facto custodian status, even though he was not married to Denise. The Court found that Lemaster’s motion to intervene, filed two days after Denise’s death, was timely, as his interest was previously protected by Denise. The Court ordered the family court to allow Lemaster to intervene and to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine his status as a de facto custodian. View "LEMASTER V. STILTNER" on Justia Law

A child was born in Connecticut in July 2024 to parents who both resided in Connecticut at the time of the birth. The mother, who had previously lived in Massachusetts and had a long history with the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF), moved to Connecticut several months before the birth, enrolling in a Connecticut healthcare program and living in a domestic violence shelter there. The father had also been living in Connecticut. The Massachusetts DCF, concerned about the child’s welfare due to the mother’s history and a recent domestic violence incident involving the father, arranged to take emergency custody of the child at the Connecticut hospital immediately after birth.Two days after the child’s birth, the Massachusetts DCF filed a care and protection petition in the Hampden County Division of the Juvenile Court Department, seeking temporary custody. The Juvenile Court granted temporary custody to the department without determining the basis for jurisdiction. Later, after hearings, a Juvenile Court judge found that Massachusetts had default jurisdiction under the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (MCCJA), and subsequently, after joint conferences with a Connecticut judge, concluded that Massachusetts was the appropriate forum because Connecticut had declined jurisdiction. The parents and the child sought interlocutory appeal, and the Appeals Court allowed it. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts then transferred the case on its own initiative.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction under the MCCJA because Connecticut was the child’s “home state,” as the child lived there from birth with the parents. The Court found that Massachusetts did not have default, emergency, or appropriate forum jurisdiction, as Connecticut had not declined jurisdiction before the Massachusetts court issued custody orders. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Care and Protection of Faraj" on Justia Law

Kenneth H. Kofler and Billee K. Reis share a minor child, A.V.R. In 2017, Kofler filed a Petition to Establish Parenting Plan in Flathead County District Court, Montana. At that time, Kofler lived in Vancouver, Washington, and Reis and A.V.R. lived in Kalispell, Montana. The court issued a final parenting plan in December 2018, which allowed Kofler to gradually increase his parenting time. In 2019, Kofler requested an amendment to the plan due to his inability to move to Kalispell. Subsequent allegations of abuse by Reis led to a criminal investigation, which did not result in charges. The court issued an interim parenting plan in November 2022, requiring reunification therapy for Kofler and A.V.R.Reis relocated to North Carolina without permission and filed for emergency custody there. The North Carolina court initially granted her request but later dismissed the action after communication with the Montana court, which refused to relinquish jurisdiction. The Montana District Court reaffirmed its jurisdiction and ordered reunification therapy. Reis appealed the court's refusal to transfer jurisdiction and its award of attorney’s fees to Kofler.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's decision to retain jurisdiction, citing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The court found that Montana retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction as there was no pending proceeding in another state. The court also noted that the North Carolina court could not accept jurisdiction while the Montana proceeding was active.However, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the District Court's award of attorney’s fees to Kofler, finding no statutory or contractual basis for such an award. The court emphasized that attorney’s fees are generally not recoverable without specific legal authority. View "In re Parenting of A.V.R." on Justia Law

Deborah A. Chatfield filed for divorce from Frederick H. Chatfield Jr. on July 14, 2021. Frederick initially had legal representation, but his attorney withdrew in December 2021, leaving him to represent himself. A final hearing was held on August 23, 2024, which Frederick did not attend. The court granted the divorce and classified certain real estate in Rockport as marital property, ordering its sale. Frederick did not appeal the divorce judgment or request further findings of fact.Frederick later retained counsel and filed a motion for relief from judgment under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b), arguing that the property was nonmarital, the court lacked jurisdiction, and Deborah's belief that the property was marital was a mistake. The District Court (Rockland) denied the motion, finding that Frederick had not protected his interests during the original proceedings and had not provided justification for his absence. The court also found no credible evidence to support Frederick's claims.The Estate of Frederick H. Chatfield Jr. appealed the denial to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The court reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion, considering whether the lower court's findings were supported by the record, whether the court understood the applicable law, and whether the court's decisions were reasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion or clear error. The court noted that Frederick failed to protect his interests by not attending the hearing, not filing for further findings, and not appealing the original judgment. The court also found that the lower court had jurisdiction over the property and that Frederick did not meet the burden of proof required for relief under Rule 60(b). View "Chatfield v. Estate of Chatfield" on Justia Law

A mother and father had their parental rights terminated in two consolidated child in need of aid (CINA) cases. They appealed the termination, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the termination order and remanded for further proceedings. While the appeal was pending, the children's foster parents petitioned to adopt them, and the superior court granted the adoption petitions. On remand, the superior court did not require the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to make further efforts to reunify the family and instead reevaluated the same information, terminating the parental rights again. The parents appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the termination order a second time.The parents then sought to vacate the adoption and reopen the CINA case. The adoptive parents opposed, arguing that the parents' attempt to vacate the adoption was barred by the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree. The superior court agreed with the adoptive parents, concluding that the parents' failure to appeal the adoption decree itself within one year barred their challenge. The court also concluded that the motion to reopen the CINA case was moot because the adoption remained valid, and the children were no longer in need of aid.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's judgment. The court held that the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree under AS 25.23.140(b) applies strictly to appeals of the adoption decree itself, not to appeals of related termination orders in CINA cases. The court emphasized the legislative intent to provide finality and stability for adopted children, noting that allowing collateral attacks on adoption decrees beyond the one-year period would unreasonably disrupt the upbringing of adopted children. Consequently, the adoption remained valid, and the CINA case was moot. View "In re Adoption of C.R. and E.R. v. State" on Justia Law

Julie and Gerald Ross (Grandparents) filed a petition in district court to adopt their grandchildren, R.K. and J.K., and to terminate the parental rights of the children's biological parents, Steven and Denielle Kracht (Parents). The district court terminated the parental rights of both parents, finding that they had abandoned and neglected their children, that the father had abused the children, and that both parents were unfit. The adoption petition by the Grandparents was still pending.Parents appealed the termination order to the Utah Court of Appeals before the adoption action concluded. The Court of Appeals certified the matter to the Utah Supreme Court for original appellate review. The central issue was whether the termination order issued by the district court was immediately appealable before the adoption action concluded.The Utah Supreme Court held that Utah Code subsection 78B-6-112(3) creates a statutory exception to the final judgment rule, allowing termination orders issued by district courts to be immediately appealable. The court concluded that the statutory language of subsection 78B-6-112(3) indicates that a district court may enter a final order terminating parental rights before a final decree of adoption is entered, thus making such termination orders appealable upon entry. This decision overruled the Court of Appeals' previous decision in In re Adoption of K.R.S., which had held that no exception to the final judgment rule allowed parties to appeal a district-court-issued termination order before it was final. The Utah Supreme Court retained the case for further argument on the merits of the Parents' challenges to the termination order. View "Ross v. Kracht" on Justia Law