Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Husband Steven McAnulty was married twice: once to Plaintiff Elizabeth McAnulty, and once to Defendant Melanie McAnulty. Husband's first marriage ended in divorce; the second ended with his death. Husband’s only life-insurance policy (the Policy) named Defendant as the beneficiary. But the Missouri divorce decree between Plaintiff and Husband required Husband to procure and maintain a $100,000 life-insurance policy with Plaintiff listed as sole beneficiary until his maintenance obligation to her was lawfully terminated (which never happened). Plaintiff sued Defendant and the issuer of the Policy, Standard Insurance Company (Standard), claiming unjust enrichment and seeking the imposition on her behalf of a constructive trust on $100,000 of the insurance proceeds. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed. By stipulation of the parties, Standard was dismissed with respect to this appeal. The only question to be resolved was whether Plaintiff stated a claim. Resolving that issue required the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to predict whether the Colorado Supreme Court would endorse Illustration 26 in Comment g to § 48 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Am. L. Inst. 2011) (the Restatement (Third)), which would recognize a cause of action in essentially the same circumstances. Because the Tenth Circuit predicted the Colorado Supreme Court would endorse Illustration 26, the Court held Plaintiff has stated a claim of unjust enrichment, and accordingly reversed the previous dismissal of her case. View "McAnulty v. McAnulty, et al." on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented centered on a non-summary contempt proceeding arising out of a divorce, and former litigation in Oregon over spousal support Steven Abell owed his ex-wife Debra Abell. After a judgment of contempt was entered against him in Oregon for failure to pay support, Steven allegedly continued to refuse to pay Debra. Roughly one year later, Debra brought the underlying contempt proceeding in Idaho, charging Steven with contempt for failure to comply with the payment terms in the Oregon contempt judgment, and requesting relief from the Idaho district court, where Steven resided. The district court found Steven in willful contempt of the Oregon contempt judgment, and imposed an unconditional sanction of $5,000, making both determinations through a summary judgment procedure. Steven appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found the sanction imposed by the district court was criminal in nature, and it was imposed in error because Steven was not afforded certain protections owed an alleged contemnor in a criminal contempt proceeding. In addition, regardless of whether a civil or criminal sanction is sought or imposed, when an alleged contemnor is not in default and denies the charge of contempt, the non-summary contempt proceeding cannot be adjudicated through a summary judgment procedure. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75 requires a trial. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment of contempt was vacated, its decisions underlying its judgment were also vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings that had to start over, at the initial pleading stage, in order to proceed appropriately. View "Abell v. Abell" on Justia Law

In October 2021, Defendant flew from Japan to Missouri with her and Plaintiff’s child, L.T. In March 2022, Plaintiff filed a petition for the return of their child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”) to have L.T. returned to Japan. The district court found L.T. was “at home” in Japan before Defendant removed the child to the United States. The district court granted Plaintiff’s petition to have L.T. returned to Japan. Defendant appealed arguing Japan cannot be L.T.’s habitual residence because Sarah was coerced into living in Japan and therefore did not intend to make Japan L.T.’s home.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there is no evidence of physical abuse, violence, or threats of violence in this case. Additionally, having considered the testimony and having reviewed the text message exchanges between the parties, the court did not find evidence of the type of verbal abuse or controlling behavior that would suggest that Defendant was coerced or forced into staying in Japan. Therefore, Defendant’s coercion argument on appeal is inconsistent with the district court’s factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous. View "Naoteru Tsuruta v. Sarah Tsuruta" on Justia Law

Tyler Vetter appealed a fifth amended judgment entered after the district court denied his motion to hold Amy Salter in contempt and, on its own motion, invoked N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a) to modify a fourth amended judgment. The district court entered a judgment requiring Vetter to pay Salter child support. The judgment was amended various times (for reasons not relevant to this appeal). In a separate action, the court ordered primary residential responsibility changed from Salter to Vetter. The court subsequently entered a fourth amended judgment requiring Salter to reimburse Vetter child support amounts he paid. Two days after the court entered its order to amend the judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hamburger v. Hamburger, 978 N.W.2d 709, which explained a vested child support obligation could not be retroactively modified. Neither party appealed the fourth amended judgment. Vetter moved for an order to hold Salter in contempt for not paying him the $2,930. In consideration of Hamburger, the court, citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), ordered the fourth amended judgment “be modified to reinstate the child support obligation of Tyler Vetter” for the earlier period and to “strik[e] the obligation of Amy Salter to make reimbursement.” A fifth amended judgment was entered accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed in part: even if the trial court was correct that its original decision was based upon a mistaken view of the law, Rule 60(a) did not authorize the court’s modification. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the law when it invoked Rule 60(a) to relieve Salter of her obligations under the fourth amended judgment. View "North Dakota, et al. v. Vetter" on Justia Law

Savanna Perales appealed a district court order requiring her to return her children to North Dakota. Perales and Erik Gonzalez were divorced by a Texas divorce decree. After the divorce, both parties lived in North Dakota. Perales then relocated with the children to Georgia. The district court, in an ex parte emergency order, ordered Perales to return the children to North Dakota. Later, the court held a hearing and issued the order from which Perales appealed. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded this order was not appealable and dismissed the appeal. View "Gonzalez v. Perales" on Justia Law

Mother has seven children by several different fathers: the child at issue in this case—Jayden M. (born 2021). On November 19, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over Jayden on two grounds. On May 2, 2022, the juvenile court held the dispositional hearing. The court removed Jayden from Mother’s custody and also bypassed reunification services under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5. More specifically, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that bypass was proper under these provisions because (1) Mother’s reunification services or parental rights for Jayden’s older half-siblings had been terminated, and (2) Mother’s most recent four months of effort to address her drug addiction—did not eliminate the court’s “concerns” in light of her 20-year history of drug abuse problems and prior dependency cases. On appeal, Mother’s chief argument on appeal is that the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services was not supported by the record.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court held that the juvenile court’s finding is further supported by evidence that Mother has repeatedly relapsed after treatment and/or periods of sobriety in the past. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom and practical reality that short and recent periods of sobriety are often not enough to counter a longstanding pattern of use and relapse. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the effort underlying Mother’s brief period of sobriety after decades of drug abuse is not “reasonable.” View "In re Jayden M." on Justia Law

Carrie Pueblo brought an action against her former domestic partner, Rachel Haas seeking joint custody and parenting time for a child whom Haas conceived through in vitro fertilization and gave birth to in 2008, during the parties’ relationship. Haas moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the parties had never married and Pueblo had no biological or adoptive relationship to the child, Pueblo lacked standing to sue and also failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. After Haas moved for reconsideration, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. Pueblo then filed her own motion for reconsideration, arguing that she had standing as a natural parent, despite the lack of genetic connection, following the Court of Appeals decision in LeFever v. Matthews, 336 Mich App 651 (2021), which expanded the definition of “natural parent” to include unmarried women who gave birth as surrogates but shared no genetic connection with the children. Pueblo also argued the trial court order violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, as well as those of the child. Furthermore, Pueblo argued that any dismissal should have been without prejudice. The trial court denied reconsideration, distinguishing LeFever on the ground that Pueblo had not given birth to the child. Pueblo appealed, reasserting her previous arguments and further asserting that the equitable-parent doctrine should extend to the parties’ relationship, which had been solemnized in a civil commitment ceremony when it was not yet legal in Michigan for same-sex partners to marry. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the trial court. Because Michigan unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex couples from marrying before Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US 644 (2015), the Michigan Supreme Court narrowly extended the equitable-parent doctrine as "a step toward righting the wrongs done by that unconstitutional prohibition. A person seeking custody who demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties would have married before the child’s conception or birth but for Michigan’s unconstitutional marriage ban is entitled to make their case for equitable parenthood to seek custody." The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for that court to apply the threshold test for standing announced here. View "Pueblo v. Haas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a privately compensated temporary judge’s ruling that Plaintiff’s former husband, provided an accounting as to certain stock that was the subject of a marital settlement agreement (MSA). Among other things, Plaintiff contends Judge Johnson erred in issuing her ruling because she had withdrawn her request for an order for an accounting of her stock interest before the ruling.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiff’s notice withdrawing her accounting RFO was effective when made on June 26, 2020. Judge Johnson’s ruling granting Chris’s restoration RFO tacitly supports our holding. That is, if Plaintiff’s withdrawal of her accounting RFO had not been effective when made, Judge Johnson would not have later had to order that RFO restored. Plaintiff’s ex-husband does not cite any case that holds that a party needs a trial court’s approval to withdraw a motion. Because Plaintiff withdrew her accounting RFO, Judge Johnson did not have jurisdiction to rule on it. Her ex-husband’s restoration RFO did not restore her withdrawn accounting RFO and Judge Johnson’s jurisdiction because her ex-husband filed it after April 1, 2020, the date Judge Johnson’s appointment terminated under the parties’ stipulation. View "Marriage of DeWolfe" on Justia Law

Niagara County’s Child Protective Services successfully petitioned in Niagara County Family Court to strip Plaintiff of her parental rights over her minor son. Plaintiff appealed the Family Court’s decision. While that appeal was pending, she brought suit in federal court against officials and entities involved in terminating her parental rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   The Second Circuit vacated the judgment insofar as the district court denied Plaintiff’s motions for leave to amend and for additional time to serve defendants. The court held that the RookerFeldman doctrine does not apply when an appeal remains pending in state court. Rooker-Feldman applies only after the state proceedings have ended. View "Hunter v. McMahon" on Justia Law

Miguel D. (Father) left his eight-year-old daughter, M.D., alone inside a locked apartment that had no electricity, an empty non-operable refrigerator, and no edible food. After waking up to find her father and his truck gone, M.D. climbed through a kitchen window to look for him and was found wandering the apartment complex. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging Father failed to adequately supervise and protect M.D., and willfully or negligently failed to provide her with adequate food and shelter. The juvenile court found the petition true, took jurisdiction, and removed M.D. from Father’s custody while he was offered reunification services. On appeal, Father argued the Court of Appeal had to reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order because Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(2) prohibited the juvenile court from assuming jurisdiction over a child “solely” due to a parent’s indigence or poverty. He further argued the Court should reverse the dispositional order because the Agency failed to demonstrate there were no reasonable means to protect M.D. without removing her from Father’s custody. Because the record did not support either contention, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.D." on Justia Law