Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the procedural issue of whether a notice of appeal could be filed electronically in a termination of parental rights (TPR) case that had been sealed. The court had to interpret the relevant statutes and rules, which stated that TPR cases should be sealed upon the entry of the final order and that sealed cases were not eligible for electronic filing. The Court of Appeals had ruled that the appellant had complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the rules were ambiguous about whether a TPR case could be electronically filed after it had been sealed.However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky disagreed with the lower court. It held that the statutory law and administrative rule, read together, effectively prohibited a notice of appeal from being electronically filed in a TPR case. The Court found no ambiguity in this interpretation. It pointed out that the rules clearly stated that TPR cases were always confidential but would only be sealed upon the entry of the trial court’s final order. Once sealed, these cases were no longer subject to mandatory electronic filing.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that the appellant had not complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the notice should have been filed conventionally. As a result, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s termination of the appellant's parental rights. View "CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V. D.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was presented with a case involving the mental health of the respondent, D.E. In the case, the Circuit Court had denied D.E.'s motion to dismiss and granted New Hampshire Hospital’s (NHH) petition for guardianship. It also granted NHH’s petition for involuntary admission. D.E. appealed these decisions, arguing that his due process rights were violated by the simultaneous hearing of both the guardianship and involuntary admission petitions, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions as he was not a resident of New Hampshire nor was he lawfully detained there.The Supreme Court held that D.E.'s due process argument regarding simultaneous hearings was not preserved as it was not raised in the trial court and was therefore not eligible for review. However, the court found that at the time the non-emergency involuntary admission petition was filed, D.E. was not lawfully detained and thus the trial court did not have jurisdiction on this basis. The question of whether D.E. resided in New Hampshire, giving the court jurisdiction, was remanded to the trial court for determination.In relation to the guardianship order, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's findings that D.E. was incapacitated and that a guardianship was the least restrictive form of intervention were supported by the evidence. The court also found no error in the trial court's appointment of D.E.'s brother as guardian, despite D.E.'s preference for an independent, professional guardian. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision on guardianship, vacated the decision on involuntary admission, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of D.E." on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the appellant, Mr. James Baker, contested the decree entered by a successor district judge after the original district judge who presided over the trial retired. Mr. Baker argued that the successor judge violated his right to due process by making findings of fact and conclusions of law without a formal certification under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 63.The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that Mr. Baker had waived his right to object to the successor judge's procedure. During a status conference, in which the successor judge proposed to proceed with determining the case based on the trial transcripts, Mr. Baker's counsel affirmed this approach and requested the court to make a ruling based on the existing record. Therefore, the court ruled that Mr. Baker intentionally relinquished his right to object to the successor judge's procedure, constituting a waiver.The court also clarified that the language in W.R.C.P. 63 does not necessitate the successor judge to advise the parties of their rights under the rule. The court found no authority supporting an affirmative duty for the successor judge to do so. Hence, the court affirmed the decree of divorce entered by the successor district court judge. View "Baker v. Baker" on Justia Law

In the child protection case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant, Dominique Desiree Sciacca (Mother), contested the termination of her parental rights to her minor child, JDD. The Department of Family Services had filed a petition for termination based on Mother's neglect of the child and her failure to comply with a reunification plan. The District Court of Goshen County granted the Department's petition. On appeal, Mother did not dispute the grounds for termination but argued that her due process rights were violated because she was not physically present in court for the termination hearing, although she was allowed to participate by phone. She also contended that the court violated procedural rules by allowing her to testify by phone from the same location as the child's father, without adequate safeguards to protect her from his influence. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no violation of due process or procedural rules. The court ruled that Mother was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that the lower court had implemented sufficient safeguards during her phone testimony. View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: JJD v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

In this case, Veronica Louise Hudson and Daniel Lee Hudson, a married couple in Alaska, divorced. The major points of contention revolved around the division of marital property and the classification of a severance and bonus package received by Daniel from his former employer, BP. Veronica argued that the severance and bonus pay were marital property, while Daniel contended that they were his separate property. The trial court ruled that the severance and bonus pay were separate property, and divided the remaining marital property equally between the parties. Veronica also challenged the court's order allowing Daniel to make an equalization payment over five years rather than in a lump sum and the court's denial of her request for attorney fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska concluded that the lower court erred in classifying the severance and bonus pay without sufficient information, and in its findings related to economic misconduct and the financial condition of the parties. The court also held that the lower court abused its discretion in ordering a schedule of equalization payments over multiple years. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the purpose of the severance and bonus pay, and whether a different division of property is warranted. The court also required the lower court to reconsider the terms of any equalization payment. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of attorney's fees. View "Hudson v. Hudson" on Justia Law

In the State of North Dakota, Joshua Holm appealed from a district court's decision to issue a disorderly conduct restraining order preventing him from contacting Heidi Holm for six months. The couple's marriage had deteriorated and they agreed to separate; however, Heidi alleged that Joshua had taken money from her safe and joint checking accounts, attempted to force her into sex, and had weapons, causing her to fear him. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the decision, stating that the district court had abused its discretion by issuing the restraining order without finding that Joshua intended to adversely affect Heidi's safety, security, or privacy. The court noted that while Joshua had admittedly visited the marital home against Heidi’s wishes, this alone did not establish reasonable grounds for a restraining order. The court concluded that Heidi, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving Joshua acted with adverse intent, which she failed to do. The restraining order was, therefore, reversed. View "Holm v. Holm" on Justia Law

In the State of North Dakota, the Supreme Court was asked to review a lower court's decision to grant a disorderly conduct restraining order. The petitioner, Hattie Albertson, had filed for this restraining order against the respondent, Trent Albertson. The District Court of Bottineau County had granted the restraining order in favor of Hattie Albertson and their minor child, C.W.A., for a period of one year. This decision was appealed by Trent Albertson, and the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded the case to the lower court for more detailed findings. Upon review of these additional findings, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to maintain the restraining order.The lower court had found that Trent Albertson had made multiple threatening phone calls over two days, including threats of violence against a friend of the minor child and towards the child as well. These threats and the respondent's actions, including attempting to forcefully enter Hattie Albertson's home, led her to leave the home out of fear. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's decision, finding the evidence and testimony presented sufficient to believe that acts constituting disorderly conduct had been committed.Trent Albertson had argued on appeal that the restraining order effectively modified a residential responsibility schedule without necessary hearings and considerations. However, the Supreme Court declined to address this argument as it was raised for the first time on appeal, and had not been presented to the lower court for consideration. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the disorderly conduct restraining order and affirmed the decision. View "Albertson v. Albertson" on Justia Law

J.W. was born in 2008. Father died in 2015. J.W.'s paternal Grandmother helped raise J.W. since birth. Mother had denied Grandmother contact with J.W. since Father’s death. The court awarded Mother sole custody and granted Grandmother visitation. In 2021, Mother sought to vacate the visitation order, indicating she had moved to Southern California. Grandmother sought temporary emergency orders to enforce visitation. The court set a long cause hearing. The court provided an oral statement of decision, at Mother's request, at the conclusion of the long cause hearing on April 5, 2022, the existing order to allow one visit every other month, plus summertime visits. On June 15, 2022, the court filed Findings and Orders, reducing its oral statement of decision to writing. Grandmother served Mother with notice of the order on June 23. On May 12, Mother filed a notice and motion to vacate and substitute a new judgment or for a new trial. She filed amended notices and motions on May 27 and June 2022. The written denial was served on the parties on September 6, 2022. On September 21, 2022, Mother filed her notice of appeal, stating the appeal was taken from a June 15, 2022 judgment. The court of appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Mother filed a notice of appeal beyond the 60-day deadline. View "Z.V. v. Cheryl W." on Justia Law

V.S. and V.K., both born in India, met in 2009 in Illinois, where they both lived. In 2010, during a trip to India, they participated in the Phera Hindu marriage ceremony. In 2013, the couple had a civil marriage ceremony in Illinois. In 2019, V.S. petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage, identifying the date of marriage as December 2010. Although V.K. in his response, likewise indicated the date of marriage as December 2010. He later argued that the date of marriage was the date of the Chicago civil ceremony.The court of appeal affirmed that the 2010 Phera was not legally binding under the Hindu Marriage Act and that the parties were not married until their U.S. civil ceremony. An out-of-state marriage is “valid” in California if it “would be valid by laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted” (Family Code 308). The court upheld a determination that the Phera was not legally binding on V.K., who was not domiciled in India and did not voluntarily submit to be bound by the Act. The court properly did not treat V.K.’s initial admission that the parties were married in 2010 as a judicial admission of fact; the date of the parties’ marriage is a predominantly legal conclusion not susceptible of judicial admission as a disputed fact. Substantial evidence supports the determination that V.S. was not entitled to treatment as a putative spouse after the Phera. View "Marriage of V.S. & V.K." on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Scott filed a petition to establish paternity. Respondent-Mother Candice Foster moved to dismiss, asserting that title 10, section 7700-609(B) required a party to commence an adjudication of paternity within two years of an acknowledgment of paternity. The district court granted Mother's motion to dismiss and ordered Petitioner to pay substantial attorney fees. Petitioner appealed and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, overturning the district court's order regarding attorney fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court previously granted certiorari to address whether the Court of Civil Appeals properly affirmed the district court in dismissing Petitioner's claim. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: "Contrary to COCA's recitation of the 'undisputed facts before the court,' the record does not show that Scott firmly believed that he was the biological father when Child was born. Rather, the record before this Court fails to show when the relationship between Scott and Mother actually took place or concluded, when Scott learned of Mother's pregnancy or childbirth, when he first thought that he was Child's father, when he became aware of the Acknowledgment of Paternity, or when he came to believe Mother committed fraud. The district court erred in granting summary judgment based on its determination that section 7700-609 is a statute of repose and erred in dismissing Scott's claim." View "Scott v. Foster" on Justia Law