Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky was asked to determine whether the 2017 and 2021 amendments to KRS 413.249, which extended the statute of limitations for civil claims of childhood sexual assault and abuse, could be applied retroactively to revive claims that were already time-barred. The case arose out of the alleged sexual abuse of Samantha Killary by her adoptive father, Sean Jackman, and others. Killary filed a lawsuit against Jackman and others in 2018, after Jackman was convicted of the abuse. However, the defendants argued that the claims were time-barred under the 2007 version of KRS 413.249, which was in effect when the abuse occurred. The trial court and Court of Appeals disagreed on whether the 2017 and 2021 amendments could be applied retroactively to revive Killary's claims.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that while KRS 413.249 is a remedial statute that should be applied retroactively, the defendants had a vested right to assert a statute of limitations defense that was not overcome by the addition of a new triggering event in the 2017 and 2021 amendments. Furthermore, the court found that the 2021 amendment's provision for the revival of time-barred claims did not apply to Killary's claims because they were already time-barred at the time of the amendment's enactment. The court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claims against the defendants. The court based its decision on a long line of Kentucky cases holding that a vested right to assert a statute of limitations defense cannot be divested by retroactive legislation. View "Thompson v. Killary" on Justia Law

This case concerns a child custody dispute between Kelly K. Fitzgerald and James W.A. Jackson. The parties have two minor children, who have dual citizenship of the United States and Australia. The children have lived in Rhode Island with the Plaintiff since 2015. The Defendant, an Australian citizen, argued that the Family Court of Rhode Island lacked jurisdiction over the dispute, contending that there was a simultaneous case in Australia and that he had no personal ties to Rhode Island.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Family Court's decision over the custody dispute, confirming that Rhode Island had jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court confirmed that the Family Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over child-custody cases as a matter of law and that the defendant had waived the issue of personal jurisdiction and consented to jurisdiction in Rhode Island by availing himself of the laws of Rhode Island.The Court found that the Family Court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because Rhode Island was the children's home state at the time the proceedings were commenced, and no other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in the act. The UCCJEA treats a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying its provisions. The Court also noted that the Australian court had declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case, further supporting the Family Court's jurisdiction.The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that the Family Court should not have issued orders regarding child support and custody without first making a jurisdictional finding, noting that the defendant himself had filed a motion for custody, participated in mediation, and submitted a form prior to a hearing on child support. The Court concluded that the hearing justice did not err in finding that the Rhode Island Family Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter.Finally, the Court concluded that the hearing justice erred in not ruling on the defendant's emergency motion for temporary orders, apparently seeking visitation with the children during the summer, because at the time, no order had been entered divesting the Family Court of jurisdiction, and no appeal had been filed. The matter was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Fitzgerald v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Derrick Sherwood appealed a district court order denying his motion to vacate a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60. The court held a hearing and entered a DVPO restraining Derrick Sherwood from having contact with Valerie Sherwood, his ex-wife, and their two minor children. The order also required Derrick Sherwood to surrender his firearms to law enforcement. Later, the court amended the DVPO to remove the restriction on Derrick Sherwood’s possession of firearms. Derrick Sherwood later moved to vacate the DVPO altogether.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Derrick Sherwood’s request to treat Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness or in denying Derrick Sherwood’s motion to vacate the DVPO. The court also held that the district court did not err in awarding Valerie Sherwood attorney’s fees.Furthermore, the court held that Derrick Sherwood did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g), which allows a DVPO to require, under certain circumstances, that the respondent surrender any firearm or other specified dangerous weapon. As the DVPO was amended to allow Derrick Sherwood to possess firearms, he did not have a justiciable controversy regarding the constitutionality of this statute.The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Sherwood v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

The case involves Petitioner Victoria Deschamps who sought a writ of supervisory control over the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, in Montana due to the court's denial of her request to waive court costs and fees for inability to pay. Deschamps filed a petition for dissolution with a proposed parenting plan in the District Court and also filed a Statement of Inability to Pay Court Costs and Fees, requesting waiver of the filing fee. However, the District Court denied her fee waiver stating that her statement was incomplete.Deschamps submitted another statement which was again denied by the District Court. She then moved the court for reconsideration of its denial, explaining that she had checked boxes on the form indicating that she received certain benefits and thus did not need to include additional information, as stated on the form. This motion was also denied.Deschamps petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Montana for supervisory control, arguing that the District Court erred in denying her request to waive court costs and fees. The Supreme Court held that the District Court erred as a matter of law by requiring Deschamps to provide information beyond that which the Department of Justice requires. The court concluded that the District Court was incorrect when it deemed Deschamps’s fee waiver application “incomplete” because she completed the form by checking the boxes for specific benefits and signing the declaration.The Supreme Court accepted and granted Deschamps' petition for a Writ of Supervisory Control and remanded the matter to the District Court for the purpose of granting Deschamps’ request for waiver of court costs and fees and allowing her case to proceed without payment of filing fee. View "Deschamps v. 21st Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed a lower court’s decision to terminate a biological father’s parental rights to his child. The father, Jack Mitchell, had consented to the child's guardianship by Rachel and Joshua Thayer, following the unexpected death of the child's mother. Six months later, the Thayers petitioned to terminate Mitchell’s parental rights on grounds of intentional abandonment. The Family Court granted their petition, finding clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and deciding termination was in the child’s best interests. However, the Supreme Court found that the evidence did not meet the high standard of clear and convincing proof of intentional abandonment required to terminate Mitchell's parental rights. The court noted that Mitchell had expressed a desire for reunification with his child and had taken steps toward that goal. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Family Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding Mitchell's petition to rescind the Thayers' guardianship. View "Mitchell v. Thayer" on Justia Law

In this case, a couple, Kelley L. and Richard L., sought to have Richard adopt Kelley's daughter, Kate S., without the consent of the child's biological father, Dustin S., alleging that Dustin had abandoned Kate. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the County Court's decision, which denied the adoption petition, holding that Dustin had not abandoned Kate. The Supreme Court found that, although Dustin could have done more to be involved in Kate's life and did not fully comply with court-ordered reunification therapy and child support payments, the evidence suggested that Kelley had hindered Dustin from having meaningful contact with Kate. Therefore, they found that Dustin had not demonstrated a "settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims" to Kate. The court also noted that the county court's reference to unresolved proceedings in the District Court did not constitute an error, as it simply acknowledged another potential route to adoption without Dustin's consent if his parental rights were subsequently terminated in those proceedings. View "In re Adoption of Kate S." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the defendant, Laurie Cronan, challenged a divorce judgement entered by the general magistrate of the Family Court. She primarily disputed the magistrate's authority to preside over the contested divorce trial. Additionally, she disagreed with the magistrate's decisions regarding the distribution of the marital estate, the valuation of premarital assets, and the denial of her request for alimony.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The court found that the issue of the magistrate's authority could have been raised at the trial level but wasn't, hence it was waived on appeal. Regarding the distribution of marital assets, the court found that the general magistrate did not err in determining the value of the plaintiff's equity interest in his medical practice based on the binding shareholder agreement, rather than its fair market value. The court also upheld the general magistrate's decision to deny the defendant's request for alimony, finding that he properly considered all requisite statutory elements and that the defendant would be financially independent and self-sufficient without alimony. Lastly, the court found no error in the general magistrate's valuation of the plaintiff's premarital assets. View "Cronan v. Cronan" on Justia Law

In the State of Alaska, a woman, Lacie Chance, left her boyfriend, Jason Armstrong, in California and relocated to Alaska with their daughter. She filed for a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against Armstrong in Alaska, alleging seven years of physical and mental abuse. The superior court issued temporary 20-day protective orders and a long-term protective order against Armstrong, who had never been to Alaska. Armstrong appealed, arguing that the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction. While the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska agreed with the lower court that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, it concluded that the superior court lacked the personal jurisdiction necessary to impose affirmative and long-term obligations on Armstrong, who had no contacts with Alaska. The court emphasized that due process requires either general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant. In this case, Armstrong had no contacts with Alaska, and therefore, the court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. The court concluded that the long-term DVPO could not stand because it imposed significant and potentially long-lasting restrictions and obligations on Armstrong. The DVPO was vacated. View "Armstrong v. Chance" on Justia Law

This case involves the appeal of a Superior Court judgment in favor of the intervenor, Isabel DaPina Costa, following the grant of her motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff, Clara Martins, is the mother of Orlando A. Da Cruz who died in 2008. His death certificate referred to Costa as his spouse, but Martins disputed this, claiming Costa was merely Da Cruz's "live-in girlfriend". Martins filed a complaint in Superior Court in 2019 seeking to amend her son's death certificate. Costa intervened, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations, under G.L. 1956 § 9-1-13(a), had expired. The Superior Court granted Costa's motion for summary judgment, and Martins appealed.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. On appeal, Martins argued that her claim was not a civil action and therefore not subject to the statute of limitations under § 9-1-13(a). She pointed to another statute, G.L. 1956 § 23-3-21, which governs the correction and amendment of vital records, as the controlling statute for her claim. However, the Court found that Martins had not raised this argument at the lower court level, and thus it was not preserved for appellate review. Even if it had been preserved, the Court would have held that § 9-1-13(a) applies to her claim.The Court noted that while some requests to amend vital records may not be subject to a statute of limitations, not all such requests require the commencement of a civil action. In this case, Martins had commenced a civil action by filing her complaint in Superior Court, and as such, her claim was subject to the statute of limitations under § 9-1-13(a). Therefore, her complaint was barred by this statute. View "In re Da Cruz" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a prolonged divorce proceeding in Illinois. The appellant, Masud M. Arjmand, sought to dissolve his marriage to Muneeza R. Arjmand in 2009. In the course of the proceedings, the appellant filed multiple petitions for substitution of judge and a separate complaint against Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC and the Stogsdill Law Firm. The circuit court dismissed the appellant's complaint with prejudice, and this dismissal order was affirmed by the appellate court based on the doctrine of res judicata.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the main issue was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider prior orders denying the appellant’s petition and motion for substitution of judge in conjunction with an appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment that it lacked jurisdiction to review the petition and motion.The Supreme Court clarified that Rule 304(a) applies exclusively to final orders and does not provide jurisdiction to review rulings on requests for substitution of judge. The Court emphasized the policy disfavoring piecemeal appeals and stated that the circuit court’s Rule 304(a) findings were limited to determining the propriety of the dismissal of the appellant’s complaint. The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the appellate court should have considered the rulings on his substitution requests to promote judicial economy, noting that principles of judicial economy may not override the jurisdictional barrier imposed by an Illinois Supreme Court rule. View "In re Marriage of Arjmand" on Justia Law