Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the defendant, Laurie Cronan, challenged a divorce judgement entered by the general magistrate of the Family Court. She primarily disputed the magistrate's authority to preside over the contested divorce trial. Additionally, she disagreed with the magistrate's decisions regarding the distribution of the marital estate, the valuation of premarital assets, and the denial of her request for alimony.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The court found that the issue of the magistrate's authority could have been raised at the trial level but wasn't, hence it was waived on appeal. Regarding the distribution of marital assets, the court found that the general magistrate did not err in determining the value of the plaintiff's equity interest in his medical practice based on the binding shareholder agreement, rather than its fair market value. The court also upheld the general magistrate's decision to deny the defendant's request for alimony, finding that he properly considered all requisite statutory elements and that the defendant would be financially independent and self-sufficient without alimony. Lastly, the court found no error in the general magistrate's valuation of the plaintiff's premarital assets. View "Cronan v. Cronan" on Justia Law

In the State of Alaska, a woman, Lacie Chance, left her boyfriend, Jason Armstrong, in California and relocated to Alaska with their daughter. She filed for a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against Armstrong in Alaska, alleging seven years of physical and mental abuse. The superior court issued temporary 20-day protective orders and a long-term protective order against Armstrong, who had never been to Alaska. Armstrong appealed, arguing that the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction. While the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska agreed with the lower court that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, it concluded that the superior court lacked the personal jurisdiction necessary to impose affirmative and long-term obligations on Armstrong, who had no contacts with Alaska. The court emphasized that due process requires either general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant. In this case, Armstrong had no contacts with Alaska, and therefore, the court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. The court concluded that the long-term DVPO could not stand because it imposed significant and potentially long-lasting restrictions and obligations on Armstrong. The DVPO was vacated. View "Armstrong v. Chance" on Justia Law

This case involves the appeal of a Superior Court judgment in favor of the intervenor, Isabel DaPina Costa, following the grant of her motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff, Clara Martins, is the mother of Orlando A. Da Cruz who died in 2008. His death certificate referred to Costa as his spouse, but Martins disputed this, claiming Costa was merely Da Cruz's "live-in girlfriend". Martins filed a complaint in Superior Court in 2019 seeking to amend her son's death certificate. Costa intervened, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations, under G.L. 1956 § 9-1-13(a), had expired. The Superior Court granted Costa's motion for summary judgment, and Martins appealed.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. On appeal, Martins argued that her claim was not a civil action and therefore not subject to the statute of limitations under § 9-1-13(a). She pointed to another statute, G.L. 1956 § 23-3-21, which governs the correction and amendment of vital records, as the controlling statute for her claim. However, the Court found that Martins had not raised this argument at the lower court level, and thus it was not preserved for appellate review. Even if it had been preserved, the Court would have held that § 9-1-13(a) applies to her claim.The Court noted that while some requests to amend vital records may not be subject to a statute of limitations, not all such requests require the commencement of a civil action. In this case, Martins had commenced a civil action by filing her complaint in Superior Court, and as such, her claim was subject to the statute of limitations under § 9-1-13(a). Therefore, her complaint was barred by this statute. View "In re Da Cruz" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a prolonged divorce proceeding in Illinois. The appellant, Masud M. Arjmand, sought to dissolve his marriage to Muneeza R. Arjmand in 2009. In the course of the proceedings, the appellant filed multiple petitions for substitution of judge and a separate complaint against Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC and the Stogsdill Law Firm. The circuit court dismissed the appellant's complaint with prejudice, and this dismissal order was affirmed by the appellate court based on the doctrine of res judicata.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the main issue was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider prior orders denying the appellant’s petition and motion for substitution of judge in conjunction with an appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment that it lacked jurisdiction to review the petition and motion.The Supreme Court clarified that Rule 304(a) applies exclusively to final orders and does not provide jurisdiction to review rulings on requests for substitution of judge. The Court emphasized the policy disfavoring piecemeal appeals and stated that the circuit court’s Rule 304(a) findings were limited to determining the propriety of the dismissal of the appellant’s complaint. The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the appellate court should have considered the rulings on his substitution requests to promote judicial economy, noting that principles of judicial economy may not override the jurisdictional barrier imposed by an Illinois Supreme Court rule. View "In re Marriage of Arjmand" on Justia Law

In this Nebraska case, the appellant, Christian G., filed a motion to vacate a domestic abuse protection order issued against him, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and that the court erred in excluding his affidavit, which sought to prove he did not receive timely notice of the hearing. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that by filing a request for a hearing on the protection order, Christian made a general appearance in court, thereby conferring the court personal jurisdiction over him. The court also held that while an affidavit may be used in motion practice, including for preliminary, collateral, and interlocutory matters, it is not exempt from the rules of evidence. The court determined that the portion of Christian's affidavit that contained hearsay was correctly excluded by the district court because Christian did not properly limit his offer to the admissible parts of the affidavit. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which upheld the district court's ruling that denied Christian's motion to vacate the protection order. View "K. v. G." on Justia Law

In a domestic violence dispute that led to dueling restraining orders, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, affirmed the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees to Peter Henri Dragones III, the prevailing party. Both Dragones and his opponent, Kerry Calkins, had sought restraining orders against each other in 2022. The trial court granted Dragones's request and denied Calkins's. Subsequently, Dragones moved for attorney's fees under Family Code section 6344. While the case was pending, the legislature repealed the prior version of section 6344 and enacted a new one, which made it easier for a prevailing petitioner to obtain fees. Both parties contended that the prior version of section 6344 should apply. However, the appellate court held that the current version of section 6344 applies retroactively to all cases pending on its effective date, including this case. This decision was based on California's general rule of retroactivity for amendments to the Family Code and the established principle that newly enacted attorney fee statutes apply to cases pending on their effective date. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under the new statute. View "Dragones v. Calkins" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, Wilmot Yalartai, the plaintiff and appellant, appealed against an order dismissing his case against Jamesetta Miller, the respondent. The two are married with minor children and Yalartai had filed two cases against Miller - one for parenting responsibility and the other for divorce. After a hearing, a judicial referee dismissed the parenting responsibility case, stating that issues concerning parenting responsibility could be resolved in the divorce case. The referee's dismissal order was given without notice to the parties, and Yalartai appealed against this order.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, in its decision, stated that the dismissal order is not appealable under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02 because it was issued without notice. Thus, the court dismissed Yalartai's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(7), orders issued without notice to the parties are not appealable and litigants must first seek relief in the district court from an order made without notice. The court further explained that an adversarial record, which does not exist in this case, is required for their review. Hence, Yalartai's failure to seek relief from the dismissal order as required by law led to the dismissal of his appeal. View "Yalartai v. Miller" on Justia Law

The case involves Billie S., who appealed from a judgment by the District Court (Bangor, Roberts, J.) which terminated her parental rights to her children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2023). The mother argued that the judgment did not provide sufficient independent findings of fact to support the termination of her parental rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the mother's contention.The trial court based its decision on evidence from various sources including the Department of Health and Human Services caseworker's testimony, guardian ad litem reports, and the petitions for termination. However, the judgment simply incorporated the entirety of these sources as its "specific findings" instead of providing an independent articulation of the specific facts that formed the basis of the court’s ultimate findings regarding the mother’s parental unfitness and the best interests of the children.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that these were not the “specific findings of fact” required by Rule 52(a) or prior decisions. The court could not infer factual findings in a termination case when the adequacy of the findings was the issue at hand. As a result, the court vacated the judgment due to its lack of adequate findings that would sufficiently inform the mother and the court of the reasoning behind the decision. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Children of Billie S." on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, a dispute arose from the marital dissolution proceedings of Daniel Gilbert-Valencia (husband) and Kate McEachen (wife). The husband argued that the family court erred in awarding 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the parties’ quasi-marital property to the wife, excluding evidence of domestic violence perpetrated by the wife, and retroactively modifying the tax deductibility of spousal support payments made by the husband.The facts of the case reveal that the husband sold the house over the wife’s objections during the dissolution proceedings, believing it was his personal property. He used the net proceeds from the sale exclusively for personal purposes. The family court decided that the wife was a putative spouse, the house was quasi-marital property, and the husband had breached his fiduciary duty to the wife by selling the house and using the proceeds for personal purposes. Consequently, the court awarded 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the house to the wife.The appellate court agreed with the husband's first two contentions. It held that the family court committed an error by awarding 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the quasi-marital property to the wife without finding oppression, fraud, or malice by the husband. This decision was an abuse of discretion because it contradicted the requirement under Family Code section 1101 for such findings to justify an unequal division of community property.The appellate court also held that the family court erred in excluding a videotape that was documented evidence of the wife’s domestic violence. In addition, it found that the family court failed to consider the husband's request for a domestic violence restraining order, admitted into evidence with the wife's consent, when deciding on spousal support. This failure was deemed a reversible error.The appellate court reversed the family court's orders and remanded the case for reconsideration of the division of quasi-marital property and spousal support, and a decision on the tax deductibility of the husband's spousal support payments. View "Marriage of Gilbert-Valencia & McEachen" on Justia Law

A South Dakota resident, Abby Engel, commenced a divorce action against nonresident defendant Collin Geary in South Dakota. Geary objected to the jurisdiction of the South Dakota court and the sufficiency of the service of process. The court dismissed Geary’s objections and entered a divorce judgment in Engel's favor, dividing the couple's property and imposing certain financial obligations on Geary. Geary appealed, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and thus could not make orders affecting him or his property interests.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that the lower court lacked personal jurisdiction over Geary as he had not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in South Dakota, and the cause of action did not arise from his activities directed at South Dakota. The Court also determined that the lower court erred when it divided the parties' property and imposed financial obligations on Geary, despite lacking personal jurisdiction over him. The Court concluded that while the lower court had jurisdiction to grant Engel a divorce, it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Geary's property interests or impose financial obligations on him. View "Engel V. Geary" on Justia Law