Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah considered the appeal of Marianne Tyson who sought to access her sealed adoption records from 1978, in order to learn more about her birth parents' medical histories and any potential health risks. The district court had denied Tyson's petition, interpreting "good cause" as requiring more than a generalized desire to obtain health or genetic information unrelated to a specific medical condition of the petitioner. The district court also held that Tyson's reasons for wanting access to adoption records did not outweigh her birth mother's interest in privacy.The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed with the district court's interpretation of "good cause" and its application of the balancing test. The Supreme Court noted that the legislature did not define "good cause" in the statute and did not impose additional requirements to establish "good cause". The Court held that the district court erred in interpreting the statute to require something more than a general desire to know one's medical history. The Supreme Court also found that the district court did not properly balance the interests under the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 107, as it focused solely on the birth mother’s privacy interests and did not consider Tyson's reasons for wanting to see her adoption records.The case was remanded back to the district court to reassess Tyson's petition under the correct standard. The district court must evaluate Tyson's petition under a correct interpretation of "good cause" and conduct a proper balancing test, giving weight to both the birth mother’s privacy interests and Tyson's reasons for wanting to see her adoption records. View "In re Adoption of M.A." on Justia Law

In this case, a father, Robert D., appealed a final custody order claiming that the court had abused its discretion by not granting a continuance after his attorney withdrew from the case on the day before the trial. Robert argued that this action deprived him of the ability to retain new trial counsel. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, State of California, found that the trial court had indeed abused its discretion by refusing to assess how long a continuance might be required for Robert to obtain a new lawyer and balance that against other pertinent circumstances. However, the appellate court also found that Robert failed to demonstrate that the court’s error resulted in a “miscarriage of justice,” thus the court affirmed the final custody order. The court noted that while the trial court should have performed the necessary inquiry about the length of the continuance being sought, the error did not necessarily lead to a fundamentally unfair trial. The appellate court, therefore, maintained the trial court's decision awarding Tara sole legal custody and both parents equal physical custody of their children. View "Marriage of Tara and Robert D." on Justia Law

In this case, a father, Robert D., appealed a final custody order following a divorce, arguing that the court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a continuance after his attorney withdrew from the case the day before the trial was set to begin. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District in California agreed that when a court allows a lawyer to withdraw on the eve of trial, it has a responsibility to assess the length of a continuance that would be required for the affected party to obtain a new lawyer and balance that against other pertinent circumstances. The court determined that the trial court failed to make this assessment, constituting an abuse of discretion. However, the Court of Appeal found that Robert D. had not demonstrated that the court's error resulted in a "miscarriage of justice." As such, the custody order was affirmed. View "Marriage of Tara and Robert D." on Justia Law

The Office of Child Support (OCS) filed a parentage action against Cody Thomas, alleging that he was the biological father of a child born in 2017. However, the complaint was lodged in 2021, beyond the two-year limitations period specified under 15C V.S.A. § 402. The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Family Division dismissed the action due to lack of standing. The OCS appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that its standing should be recognized as the action served the child's best interests. The Vermont Supreme Court, however, upheld the lower court's decision. The court determined that the two-year limitation for challenging parentage under § 402 was clear and unambiguous. It further noted that the statute provided for exceptions to this rule, none of which applied in this case. The court stated that allowing parentage claims beyond the two-year limit posed risks to a child's financial and psychological stability. Therefore, enforcing finality in parentage actions was in children's best interests, aligning with the overall purpose of the Vermont Parentage Act. The court concluded that the OCS lacked standing to challenge the child's parentage and affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Booker v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky was asked to determine whether the 2017 and 2021 amendments to KRS 413.249, which extended the statute of limitations for civil claims of childhood sexual assault and abuse, could be applied retroactively to revive claims that were already time-barred. The case arose out of the alleged sexual abuse of Samantha Killary by her adoptive father, Sean Jackman, and others. Killary filed a lawsuit against Jackman and others in 2018, after Jackman was convicted of the abuse. However, the defendants argued that the claims were time-barred under the 2007 version of KRS 413.249, which was in effect when the abuse occurred. The trial court and Court of Appeals disagreed on whether the 2017 and 2021 amendments could be applied retroactively to revive Killary's claims.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that while KRS 413.249 is a remedial statute that should be applied retroactively, the defendants had a vested right to assert a statute of limitations defense that was not overcome by the addition of a new triggering event in the 2017 and 2021 amendments. Furthermore, the court found that the 2021 amendment's provision for the revival of time-barred claims did not apply to Killary's claims because they were already time-barred at the time of the amendment's enactment. The court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claims against the defendants. The court based its decision on a long line of Kentucky cases holding that a vested right to assert a statute of limitations defense cannot be divested by retroactive legislation. View "Thompson v. Killary" on Justia Law

This case concerns a child custody dispute between Kelly K. Fitzgerald and James W.A. Jackson. The parties have two minor children, who have dual citizenship of the United States and Australia. The children have lived in Rhode Island with the Plaintiff since 2015. The Defendant, an Australian citizen, argued that the Family Court of Rhode Island lacked jurisdiction over the dispute, contending that there was a simultaneous case in Australia and that he had no personal ties to Rhode Island.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Family Court's decision over the custody dispute, confirming that Rhode Island had jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court confirmed that the Family Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over child-custody cases as a matter of law and that the defendant had waived the issue of personal jurisdiction and consented to jurisdiction in Rhode Island by availing himself of the laws of Rhode Island.The Court found that the Family Court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because Rhode Island was the children's home state at the time the proceedings were commenced, and no other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in the act. The UCCJEA treats a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying its provisions. The Court also noted that the Australian court had declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case, further supporting the Family Court's jurisdiction.The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that the Family Court should not have issued orders regarding child support and custody without first making a jurisdictional finding, noting that the defendant himself had filed a motion for custody, participated in mediation, and submitted a form prior to a hearing on child support. The Court concluded that the hearing justice did not err in finding that the Rhode Island Family Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter.Finally, the Court concluded that the hearing justice erred in not ruling on the defendant's emergency motion for temporary orders, apparently seeking visitation with the children during the summer, because at the time, no order had been entered divesting the Family Court of jurisdiction, and no appeal had been filed. The matter was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Fitzgerald v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Derrick Sherwood appealed a district court order denying his motion to vacate a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60. The court held a hearing and entered a DVPO restraining Derrick Sherwood from having contact with Valerie Sherwood, his ex-wife, and their two minor children. The order also required Derrick Sherwood to surrender his firearms to law enforcement. Later, the court amended the DVPO to remove the restriction on Derrick Sherwood’s possession of firearms. Derrick Sherwood later moved to vacate the DVPO altogether.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Derrick Sherwood’s request to treat Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness or in denying Derrick Sherwood’s motion to vacate the DVPO. The court also held that the district court did not err in awarding Valerie Sherwood attorney’s fees.Furthermore, the court held that Derrick Sherwood did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g), which allows a DVPO to require, under certain circumstances, that the respondent surrender any firearm or other specified dangerous weapon. As the DVPO was amended to allow Derrick Sherwood to possess firearms, he did not have a justiciable controversy regarding the constitutionality of this statute.The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Sherwood v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

The case involves Petitioner Victoria Deschamps who sought a writ of supervisory control over the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, in Montana due to the court's denial of her request to waive court costs and fees for inability to pay. Deschamps filed a petition for dissolution with a proposed parenting plan in the District Court and also filed a Statement of Inability to Pay Court Costs and Fees, requesting waiver of the filing fee. However, the District Court denied her fee waiver stating that her statement was incomplete.Deschamps submitted another statement which was again denied by the District Court. She then moved the court for reconsideration of its denial, explaining that she had checked boxes on the form indicating that she received certain benefits and thus did not need to include additional information, as stated on the form. This motion was also denied.Deschamps petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Montana for supervisory control, arguing that the District Court erred in denying her request to waive court costs and fees. The Supreme Court held that the District Court erred as a matter of law by requiring Deschamps to provide information beyond that which the Department of Justice requires. The court concluded that the District Court was incorrect when it deemed Deschamps’s fee waiver application “incomplete” because she completed the form by checking the boxes for specific benefits and signing the declaration.The Supreme Court accepted and granted Deschamps' petition for a Writ of Supervisory Control and remanded the matter to the District Court for the purpose of granting Deschamps’ request for waiver of court costs and fees and allowing her case to proceed without payment of filing fee. View "Deschamps v. 21st Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed a lower court’s decision to terminate a biological father’s parental rights to his child. The father, Jack Mitchell, had consented to the child's guardianship by Rachel and Joshua Thayer, following the unexpected death of the child's mother. Six months later, the Thayers petitioned to terminate Mitchell’s parental rights on grounds of intentional abandonment. The Family Court granted their petition, finding clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and deciding termination was in the child’s best interests. However, the Supreme Court found that the evidence did not meet the high standard of clear and convincing proof of intentional abandonment required to terminate Mitchell's parental rights. The court noted that Mitchell had expressed a desire for reunification with his child and had taken steps toward that goal. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Family Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding Mitchell's petition to rescind the Thayers' guardianship. View "Mitchell v. Thayer" on Justia Law

In this case, a couple, Kelley L. and Richard L., sought to have Richard adopt Kelley's daughter, Kate S., without the consent of the child's biological father, Dustin S., alleging that Dustin had abandoned Kate. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the County Court's decision, which denied the adoption petition, holding that Dustin had not abandoned Kate. The Supreme Court found that, although Dustin could have done more to be involved in Kate's life and did not fully comply with court-ordered reunification therapy and child support payments, the evidence suggested that Kelley had hindered Dustin from having meaningful contact with Kate. Therefore, they found that Dustin had not demonstrated a "settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims" to Kate. The court also noted that the county court's reference to unresolved proceedings in the District Court did not constitute an error, as it simply acknowledged another potential route to adoption without Dustin's consent if his parental rights were subsequently terminated in those proceedings. View "In re Adoption of Kate S." on Justia Law