Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

ASARCO, LLC ("Asarco") appealed the district court's dismissal of its contribution action brought under section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). Asarco sought to recover from Union Pacific Railroad Co. and Union Pacific Corp. a share of $482 million in cleanup costs Asarco paid for environmental harm at the Coeur d'Alene Superfund Site in Northern Idaho. The district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that although Asarco's claim was timely, it was barred by a 2008 settlement agreement between the parties that settled Union Pacific's claims against Asarco at the same site. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Asarco's claim was timely, but that the parties' 2008 settlement agreement did not unambiguously release Asarco's claim in this case. Therefore reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(6). View "ASARCO LLC v. UPRC, et al" on Justia Law

Riverkeeper attempted to intervene in an effort to prevent LNG from constructing a liquefied natural gas facility and pipeline along the Columbia River in Oregon. Riverkeeper sought review of the Coast Guard's issuance of a letter of recommendation regarding the suitability of the waterway for vessel traffic, contending that the court has jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717r(d)(1). Section 717r(d) authorizes judicial review of agency orders and actions that issue, condition, or deny any permit, license, concurrence, or approval. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for review because the letter of recommendation was not such an order or action under section 717r(d)(1). View "Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the EPA seeking to impose emission-control technology on NSP's Sherco power plant. NSP moved to intervene but the district court denied the motion. The court concluded that NSP has sufficient Article III standing to intervene. Moreover, NSP's interests are not adequately represented by the existing parties and, thus, NSP is entitled to intervene as a right under Rule 24(a). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to enter an order granting NSP's motion for leave to intervene as of right. View "National Parks Conservation, et al. v. Northern States Power Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the EPA seeking declaratory relief in connection with its administrative enforcement proceedings against her. CBF moved to intervene but the district court denied the motion as untimely. The court concluded that when CBF moved to intervene, the proceedings had already reached a relatively advanced stage. Further, CBF conceded that its belated intervention would cause some delay and would require plaintiffs to expend "extra effort." CBF's deliberate forbearance understandably engendered little sympathy. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene. View "Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Alt" on Justia Law

The city of Jersey City and a coalition of environmental groups filed separate petitions challenging FERC's order granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction of a natural gas pipeline connecting New York and New Jersey. The court concluded that it could not consider the merits of the petitions where the environmental petitioners lacked Article III standing as an association; the court did not have original jurisdiction over claims arising from the Budget Act, Pub.L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251; and the court rejected the City's remaining standing claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. View "NO Gas Pipeline v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 960, contains a provision (section 9658) that preempts statutes of limitations applicable to state-law actions for personal injury or property damage arising from the release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant into the environment. Section 9658 adopts the discovery rule, so that statutes of limitations begin to run when a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the harm was caused by the contaminant because person who is exposed to a toxic contaminant may not develop or show signs of resulting injury for many years. CTS sold property on which it had stored chemicals as part its operations as an electronics plant; 24 years later, owners of parts of that property and adjacent landowners, sued, alleging damages from the stored contaminants. CTS moved to dismiss, citing a state statute of repose that prevented subjecting a defendant to a tort suit brought more than 10 years after the defendant’s last culpable act. Because CTS’s last act occurred when it sold the property, the district court granted the motion. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the statute’s remedial purpose favored preemption. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that section 9658 does not pre-empt state statutes of repose. Statutes of limitations promote justice by encouraging plaintiffs to pursue claims diligently and begin to run when a claim accrues. Statutes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability after a legislatively determined amount of time and are measured from the date of the defendant’s last culpable actor omission. Under the language of the statute, pre-emption is characterized as an exception to the regular rule that the “the statute of limitations established under State law” applies; it is proper to conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt statutes of repose. View "CTS Corp. v. Waldburger" on Justia Law

Dozens of suits were filed against Irving Oil Limited (IOL) alleging environmental contamination by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) occurring from 1979 to the present. At the time of this opinion, all of the MTBE suits against IOL had been settled. In 2009, IOL filed a complaint asking the superior court to declare that ACE INA Insurance (ACE) had a duty to defend and indemnify in the MTBE suits. The superior court granted IOL’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, concluding that it could not declare that IOL was entitled a judgment on the duty-to-defend count as a matter of law. IOL appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed IOL’s appeal and ACE’s cross-appeal, holding that although a decision that an insurer does not have a duty to defend its insured is ordinarily immediately appealable under the death knell exception to the final judgment rule, the exception did not apply in this case because there were no MTBE cases pending against IOL. View "Irving Oil Ltd. et al. v. ACE INA Ins." on Justia Law

Using a methodology known as "stable isotope analysis," an expert hired by the city determined that the most likely dominant source of the perchlorate found in the city's groundwater was sodium nitrate that had been used as fertilizer. The city sued SQM, the company that imported sodium nitrate into the United States. Before trial, the district court held an evidentiary hearing under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and excluded the city's expert. The court reversed the district court's exclusion of the expert's testimony. The district court should not have made credibility determinations that were reserved for the jury; the Federal Rules of Evidence did not require an endorsement from the EPA approving the expert's results and the district court's conclusion to the contrary was an abuse of discretion; the district court erroneously ruled that the expert's methodologies have not been and cannot be tested; and the district court's resolution of the reference database was an abuse of discretion and sufficient grounds for reversal where the matter was for the jury to decide. The court affirmed the district court's denial of SQM's motion for summary judgment where SQM failed to show that there was no genuine factual dispute as to whether the city's claims were barred by the economic loss rule or by the applicable statute of limitations. View "City of Pomona v. SQM" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) adopted amendments to regulations pertaining to the protection of endangered and threatened species. The amendments established a formal process through which individuals could obtain a permit to allow for the incidental taking of a threatened or endangered species. Before the agency implemented the regulations at issue, the Town of Riverhead and Twon of Riverhead Community Development Agency (collectively, Riverhead) challenged the amendments. Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, finding that Petitioners did not have standing. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners lacked standing based on their failure to allege an injury in fact and that Petitioners’ substantive challenges were not yet ripe. The Court of Appeals held that Petitioners could proceed with three of their procedural claims, as they alleged a sufficient injury regarding these claims, but Petitioners lacked standing with respect to the substantive causes of action, as those claims were not yet ripe. View "In re Ass'n for a Better Long Island" on Justia Law