Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Shell sought and obtained approval from the Bureau of two oil spill response plans, relating to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, required by the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321(j). After obtaining approval, Shell filed suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), against environmental organizations seeking a declaration that the Bureau's approval did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Shell lacked Article III standing where Shell does not have legal interests adverse to the Bureau under the APA and it may not file suit solely to determine who would prevail in a hypothetical suit between the environmental groups and the Bureau. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying the environmental groups' motion to dismiss.View "Shell Gulf of Mex. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity" on Justia Law

Alaska filed suit challenging the Forest Service's Roadless Rule in 2011. In 2001, the Forest Service adopted the Rule, which prohibited road construction, road reconstruction, and timber harvesting on millions of acres of national forest lands, including national forest land in Alaska. In 2005, the Forest Service repealed the Rule, but, in 2006, the District Court for the Northern District of California ordered reinstatement of the Rule. The court concluded that when the Rule was reinstated in 2006 after its repeal in 2005, a new right of action accrued. Under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), Alaska had six years from the time of the Rule's reinstatement in 2006 to file a lawsuit challenging the rule. Therefore, Alaska's suit is timely because it filed in 2011. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's complaint and remanded for further consideration.View "State of Alaska v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

San Diego County approved a "Remedial Action Plan" (RAP) for a remediation project at the former Otay Skeet and Trap Shooting Range (Project) in Chula Vista, and adopted a "Final Mitigated Negative Declaration" (MND). The Project involved "investigation and remediation of surface and subsurface areas impacted from historic shooting range activities" and included "remediation of soil impacted by lead and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), removal of 'White Material['], as well as the removal of target debris and wood debris from the site." The Otay Ranch, Sky Communities, and Sky Vista (collectively, Otay Ranch parties) were the former owners of the shooting range. They filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging the County: (1) did not comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it approved and adopted the MND and RAP without preparing an environmental impact report; and (2) did not comply with Health and Safety Code in approving the RAP. The Otay Ranch parties also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Real party in interest, Flat Rock Land Company, LLC was the current owner of the shooting range property and project applicant, which undertook voluntary remediation of the site before future development. The central issue in this appeal was whether, after a voluntary dismissal of a petition for writ of mandate, the trial court erred by allowing the County to recover actual labor costs incurred for an attorney and paralegals to prepare an administrative record. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order and judgment. Preliminarily, however, the Court dismissed the appeals of The Otay Ranch (a cancelled limited partnership), and Sky Communities, Inc. (a suspended corporation), for lack of capacity. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismissed the appeal of the remaining appellant, Sky Vista, Inc. (Sky Vista), which was an active corporation. View "Otay Ranch, L.P. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

ASARCO, LLC ("Asarco") appealed the district court's dismissal of its contribution action brought under section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). Asarco sought to recover from Union Pacific Railroad Co. and Union Pacific Corp. a share of $482 million in cleanup costs Asarco paid for environmental harm at the Coeur d'Alene Superfund Site in Northern Idaho. The district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that although Asarco's claim was timely, it was barred by a 2008 settlement agreement between the parties that settled Union Pacific's claims against Asarco at the same site. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Asarco's claim was timely, but that the parties' 2008 settlement agreement did not unambiguously release Asarco's claim in this case. Therefore reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(6). View "ASARCO LLC v. UPRC, et al" on Justia Law

Riverkeeper attempted to intervene in an effort to prevent LNG from constructing a liquefied natural gas facility and pipeline along the Columbia River in Oregon. Riverkeeper sought review of the Coast Guard's issuance of a letter of recommendation regarding the suitability of the waterway for vessel traffic, contending that the court has jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717r(d)(1). Section 717r(d) authorizes judicial review of agency orders and actions that issue, condition, or deny any permit, license, concurrence, or approval. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for review because the letter of recommendation was not such an order or action under section 717r(d)(1). View "Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the EPA seeking to impose emission-control technology on NSP's Sherco power plant. NSP moved to intervene but the district court denied the motion. The court concluded that NSP has sufficient Article III standing to intervene. Moreover, NSP's interests are not adequately represented by the existing parties and, thus, NSP is entitled to intervene as a right under Rule 24(a). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to enter an order granting NSP's motion for leave to intervene as of right. View "National Parks Conservation, et al. v. Northern States Power Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the EPA seeking declaratory relief in connection with its administrative enforcement proceedings against her. CBF moved to intervene but the district court denied the motion as untimely. The court concluded that when CBF moved to intervene, the proceedings had already reached a relatively advanced stage. Further, CBF conceded that its belated intervention would cause some delay and would require plaintiffs to expend "extra effort." CBF's deliberate forbearance understandably engendered little sympathy. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene. View "Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Alt" on Justia Law

The city of Jersey City and a coalition of environmental groups filed separate petitions challenging FERC's order granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction of a natural gas pipeline connecting New York and New Jersey. The court concluded that it could not consider the merits of the petitions where the environmental petitioners lacked Article III standing as an association; the court did not have original jurisdiction over claims arising from the Budget Act, Pub.L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251; and the court rejected the City's remaining standing claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. View "NO Gas Pipeline v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 960, contains a provision (section 9658) that preempts statutes of limitations applicable to state-law actions for personal injury or property damage arising from the release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant into the environment. Section 9658 adopts the discovery rule, so that statutes of limitations begin to run when a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the harm was caused by the contaminant because person who is exposed to a toxic contaminant may not develop or show signs of resulting injury for many years. CTS sold property on which it had stored chemicals as part its operations as an electronics plant; 24 years later, owners of parts of that property and adjacent landowners, sued, alleging damages from the stored contaminants. CTS moved to dismiss, citing a state statute of repose that prevented subjecting a defendant to a tort suit brought more than 10 years after the defendant’s last culpable act. Because CTS’s last act occurred when it sold the property, the district court granted the motion. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the statute’s remedial purpose favored preemption. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that section 9658 does not pre-empt state statutes of repose. Statutes of limitations promote justice by encouraging plaintiffs to pursue claims diligently and begin to run when a claim accrues. Statutes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability after a legislatively determined amount of time and are measured from the date of the defendant’s last culpable actor omission. Under the language of the statute, pre-emption is characterized as an exception to the regular rule that the “the statute of limitations established under State law” applies; it is proper to conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt statutes of repose. View "CTS Corp. v. Waldburger" on Justia Law

Dozens of suits were filed against Irving Oil Limited (IOL) alleging environmental contamination by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) occurring from 1979 to the present. At the time of this opinion, all of the MTBE suits against IOL had been settled. In 2009, IOL filed a complaint asking the superior court to declare that ACE INA Insurance (ACE) had a duty to defend and indemnify in the MTBE suits. The superior court granted IOL’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, concluding that it could not declare that IOL was entitled a judgment on the duty-to-defend count as a matter of law. IOL appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed IOL’s appeal and ACE’s cross-appeal, holding that although a decision that an insurer does not have a duty to defend its insured is ordinarily immediately appealable under the death knell exception to the final judgment rule, the exception did not apply in this case because there were no MTBE cases pending against IOL. View "Irving Oil Ltd. et al. v. ACE INA Ins." on Justia Law