Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

During excavation of an inactive gold mine in southwestern Colorado, a blowout caused the release of at least three million gallons of contaminated water into Cement Creek. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) conceded its responsibility for the spill and its impacts. The State of New Mexico, the Navajo Nation, and the State of Utah separately filed civil actions, under the Clean Water Act, in New Mexico and Utah against the owners of the mine, the EPA, and the EPA’s contractors. Defendant Environmental Restoration, LLC moved to transfer the Utah case to the District of New Mexico for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation granted the motion and centralized proceedings in New Mexico. Later, the Allen Plaintiffs (individuals who farm land or raise livestock along the Animas River or San Juan River) filed a complaint in New Mexico that included state law claims of negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. The district court consolidated the Allen Plaintiffs’ suit, including the state law claims, into the Multidistrict Litigation. Defendant Environmental Restoration, LLC moved to dismiss the Allen Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the Allen Plaintiffs did not file their complaint within Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations and therefore they failed to state a claim. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations applied to the Allen Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. The district court certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court had to apply the point source state’s statute of limitations to state law claims preserved under the CWA. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Allen, Jr., et al. v. Environmental Restoration" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the energy companies’ extraction of fossil fuels and other activities were a substantial factor in causing global warming and a rise in the sea level, bringing causes of action for public and private nuisance, strict liability, strict liability, negligence, negligent failure to warn, and trespass.The court held that the district court lacked federal question jurisdiction under Sec. 1331 because, at the time of removal, the complaints asserted only state-law tort claims against the energy companies. The court held that Plaintiffs’ global-warming claims did not fall within the Grable exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. In addition, Plaintiffs’ state law claims did not fall under the “artful-pleading” doctrine, another exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, because they were not completely preempted by the Clean Air Act.Further, the court found Plaintiffs’ claims were not removable under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The court also held that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute, Sec. 1442(a)(1), because the energy companies were not “acting under” a federal officer’s directions. The court then rejected the energy companies’ argument that the district court had removal jurisdiction over the complaints under Sec. 1452(a) because they were related to bankruptcy cases involving Peabody Energy Corp., Arch Coal, and Texaco, Inc. Finally, the court held that the district court did not have admiralty jurisdiction because maritime claims brought in state court are not removable to federal court absent an independent jurisdictional basis. View "COUNTY OF SAN MATEO V. CHEVRON CORP." on Justia Law

In 2016, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service exercised its authority under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to designate nearly 14,000 acres of riparian land in New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona as critical habitat for the New Mexico Meadow Jumping Mouse. Two New Mexico ranching associations whose members graze cattle on the designated land challenged the Service’s critical habitat determination. The district court rejected each argument and upheld the Service’s critical habitat designation. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding: (1) the Service’s method for assessing the economic impacts of critical habitat designation complied with the ESA; (2) the Service adequately considered the effects of designation on the ranching association members’ water rights; and (3) the Service reasonably supported its decision not to exclude certain areas from the critical habitat designation. View "Northern New Mexico Stockman, et al. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, et al." on Justia Law

In 2020, the Ninth Circuit vacated the EPA’s conditional registrations for three dicamba-based herbicides as violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 136n(b). The court found that the EPA substantially understated risks that it acknowledged and failed entirely to acknowledge other risks. In a subsequent petition, seeking attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), the plaintiffs in the underlying action argued that their requested attorneys’ fees should be calculated based on the market rates in San Francisco, where their petition for review was calendared for oral argument. Only one of their four attorneys is located in San Francisco. The other three are located in Portland.The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Where, as here, attorneys’ fees are incurred in connection with a petition for review in a court of appeals under FIFRA, the presumptive relevant community for calculating market rates is the legal community where counsel are located and where they do the bulk of their work. View "National Family Farm Coalition v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

TCI Pacific Communications, LLC (“TCI”) appealed a district court’s judgment holding it liable to Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. (“Cyprus”) for contribution under 42 U.S.C. sections 9601(9)(B), 9607(a), and 9613(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). This case involved claims brought by Cyprus to determine whether TCI could be held liable for environmental cleanup costs relating to zinc smelting operations near Collinsville, Oklahoma. The Bartlesville Zinc Company, a former subsidiary of Cyprus’s predecessor, operated the Bartlesville Zinc Smelter (the “BZ Smelter”) from 1911 to 1918, near Collinsville, Oklahoma. TFMC owned and operated another zinc smelter (the “TFM Smelter”) from 1911 to 1926. This case does not concern cleanup work at either smelter, but rather is an action by Cyprus seeking cost recovery and contribution for its remediation in the broader Collinsville area, within the Collinsville Soil Program (“CSP”) Study Area. Cyprus sought to hold TCI liable as a former owner or operator of the TFM Smelter whose waste was located throughout the CSP Study Area. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Cyprus and pierced the corporate veil to hold TCI’s corporate predecessor, the New Jersey Zinc Company (“NJZ”), liable as the alter ego of the Tulsa Fuel & Manufacturing Co. (“TFMC”). The district court then interpreted CERCLA and held that TCI was liable as a former owner/operator of a CERCLA “facility.” Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Cyprus Amax Minerals Company v. TCI Pacific Communications" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal was whether a watermaster appointed by the trial court to implement and administer a water rights decree had the right to appeal the trial court’s orders interpreting the decree on the grounds the watermaster disagrees with the trial court’s interpretation and the orders would increase the watermaster’s administrative burdens and costs. The Court of Appeal concluded the watermaster did not have the right to appeal because the watermaster was not aggrieved by the trial court’s interpretation of the water users’ rights under the decree. View "Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Company" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of Gordon Plaza's complaint, filed under the citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) against the City. Plaintiffs allege that a former landfill site remains contaminated with hazardous chemicals causing residents to suffer from cancer and other health conditions.Because the court found that the City raised its defense under 42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(2)(B)(iv) in both the 2018 Litigation and in its motion to dismiss in the instant suit, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering it. The court also held that neither Chevron nor Skidmore deference is warranted; the City's maintenance obligations under the Decree are "removal" actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA); and Gordon Plaza has failed to plausibly plead that the City was not "diligently" conducting a removal action. Finally, based on Gordon Plaza's repeated failure to cure its pleadings and lack of diligence to present any indication of the factual allegations with which it seeks to amend its complaint, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Residents of Gordon Plaza, Inc. v. Cantrell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Daniels appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Attorney James Goss, Attorney Matthew Hart, and law firm Facey Goss & McPhee P.C. (FGM), arguing the court erred when it concluded he could not prove defendants caused his injury as a matter of law. Defendants represented plaintiff in a state environmental enforcement action where he was found liable for a hazardous-waste contamination on his property. On appeal, plaintiff claimed defendants failed to properly raise two dispositive defenses: the statute of limitations and proportional liability. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded plaintiff would not have prevailed on either defense if raised and therefore affirmed the grant of judgment to defendants. View "The Estate of Richard S. Daniels, by and through Julie Lyford in her capacity as Executor et al." on Justia Law

In 2010, real parties in interest applied to the City of Santa Cruz to construct a 40-unit development on a parcel of land located at 1930 Ocean Street Extension. Following an initial mitigated negative declaration and years of litigation surrounding the impact of the nearby crematory at Santa Cruz Memorial Park, in 2016, the real parties in interest renewed their interest in moving forward with their project. As required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the project applicant and the City of Santa Cruz prepared and circulated the initial study, the draft environmental impact report (EIR), the partially recirculated draft EIR, and the final EIR. Following a public hearing, the city council adopted a resolution to certify the EIR and to adopt Alternative 3, a 32-unit housing project. The Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association (OSENA) filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging the City of Santa Cruz and its city council violated CEQA and the Santa Cruz Municipal Code in approving the project. The trial court concluded the City had complied with CEQA, but it determined the City violated the municipal code, and it issued a limited writ prohibiting the City from allowing the project to proceed unless and until it followed the municipal code and the court was satisfied with its compliance. Following entry of judgment, OSENA appealed, arguing the court erred by concluding the City complied with CEQA’s requirements. OSENA contended the City violated CEQA by: (1) insufficiently addressing potentially significant biological impacts and mitigation measures in the initial study rather than in the EIR directly; (2) establishing improperly narrow and unreasonable objectives so that alternative options could not be considered meaningfully; and (3) failing to address cumulative impacts adequately. The City cross-appealed, contending the court incorrectly concluded it violated the municipal code by granting a planned development permit without also requiring the project applicant to comply with the slope modifications regulations After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City, and affirmed that portion of the trial court's order and judgment concluding it complied with CEQA. The Court reversed the portion of the order and judgment concluding the City violated its municipal code. View "Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood etc. v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law