Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case centered on a contract dispute between Clean Energy Collective LLC (CEC) and two defendants, Borrego Solar Systems, Inc. (Borrego) and 1115 Solar Development, LLC (1115 Solar). CEC was a Colorado limited liability company; Borrego was a California corporation headquartered in San Diego, and 1115 Solar was a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in California. Borrego was 1115 Solar’s parent company and owned the latter in its entirety. CEC’s claims against Borrego and 1115 Solar arose from an asset purchase agreement (“APA”) to construct several solar photovoltaic projects. The APA specified that CEC would pay defendants to construct three power-generation projects in Massachusetts and allowed for additional projects pursuant to separate contracts governed by the APA’s terms. After the parties were unable to resolve disagreements regarding pricing and payments for projects subject to the APA (all of which were to be completed outside Colorado) CEC sued the defendants in Colorado, asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in concluding Borrego was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado. Because the trial court did not assess whether Borrego was essentially at home in Colorado, the Court concluded it did not fully apply the test announced in "Magill v. Ford Motor Co.," (379 P.3d 1033), and therefore erred in exercising general personal jurisdiction over Borrego. Applying the complete test itself, the Court concluded Borrego was not subject to general jurisdiction in Colorado. View "In re Clean Energy Collective LLC v. Borrego Solar Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

The issue in this case centered on the interpretation of the "right to travel" provision Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, in the context of importing fuel into Washington State. The Washington State Department of Licensing (Department) challenged Cougar Den Inc.'s importation of fuel without holding an importer's license and without paying state fuel taxes under former chapter 82.36 RCW, repealed by LAWS OF 2013, ch. 225, section 501, and former chapter 82.38 RCW (2007). An administrative law judge ruled in favor of Cougar Den, holding that the right to travel on highways should be interpreted to preempt the tax. The Department's director, Pat Kohler, reversed. On appeal, the Yakima County Superior Court reversed the director's order and ruled in favor of Cougar Den. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cougar Den, Inc. v. Dep't of Licensing" on Justia Law

Dunn County appealed a judgment declaring the Industrial Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the location of oil and gas waste treating plants. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the County lacked the power to veto the Commission's approval of the location for an oil and gas waste treating plant. View "Environmental Driven Solutions v. Dunn County" on Justia Law

GEM Razorback, LLC appealed a judgment dismissing its declaratory judgment action because GEM failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissing its claim for specific performance because GEM could not establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of a contract. GEM and Zenergy, Inc. owned working interests in two oil and gas wells located in McKenzie County. Zenergy operated the wells, but GEM had not consented to pay its share of the drilling and operating costs. GEM did not execute a joint operating agreement for the wells and consequently was assessed a risk penalty as a nonconsenting owner. In 2013, Zenergy assigned its interest in the wells to Oasis Petroleum North America LLC. The assignment conveyed all assets, including "all files, records and data maintained by" Zenergy. After the assignment, GEM requested the same information from Oasis. Oasis provided Zenergy with the requested information. However, according to Oasis, some of the requested information for the time period before the assignment was not in its possession. Because of differences in the numbers provided by Zenergy and Oasis, GEM filed applications for hearing with the Industrial Commission requesting that the Commission determine the actual reasonable costs plus risk penalty for the two wells. After a hearing, Oasis agreed to allow GEM to conduct an audit of the wells. The Commission then dismissed the applications without prejudice. During the ensuing audit process, GEM discovered there were documents it requested that were not in Oasis' possession for the time period before the assignment when Zenergy operated the wells. GEM contacted Zenergy and requested an extensive list of 39 specific types of information regarding the wells. Zenergy refused to provide GEM with the requested information. GEM then commenced its declaratory judgment and specific performance action against Zenergy. Zenergy argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the request for declaratory relief because GEM failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with the Commission before filing the complaint. Zenergy further argued the claim for specific performance failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because a provision of the assignment agreement specifically bars third-party beneficiary status. The court agreed with Zenergy's arguments and dismissed GEM's action. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "GEM Razorback, LLC v. Zenergy, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Colorado had jurisdiction to award benefits for out-of-state work-related injuries and to impose a statutorily penalty on an employer under 8-41-204, C.R.S. (2016), when the employer was not a citizen of Colorado, and had no offices or operations in Colorado, only that the employer hired a Colorado citizen within the state. The Supreme Court held that on the facts presented here, Colorado lacked personal jurisdiction over the employer. View "Youngquist v. Miner" on Justia Law

An oil-and-gas lessor sued the lessee for failure to pay royalties. The trial court concluded that the lessor’s neighboring landowners were necessary parties to the suit and dismissed the case without prejudice because the lessor failed to join them. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring joinder. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abuse its discretion in requiring joinder under Tex. R. Civ. P. 39 and dismissing the case because the adjacent landowners did not claim an interest relating to the subject of the lessor’s suit against the lessee. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc" on Justia Law

Relator-Appellant Jack Grynberg appealed two district court orders awarding attorney fees. In 1995, Grynberg filed an action in federal district court for the District of Columbia alleging 70 companies in the natural gas industry violated the False Claims Act (FCA). Specifically, he accused the defendants of using techniques that under-measured the gas they extracted from federal and Indian lands under lease agreements. Sixty of the defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the district court granted. It held the defendants were improperly joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, and that Grynberg's complaint failed to satisfy the particularized pleading requirement of Rule 9(b). Three months after "Grynberg I's" dismissal, Grynberg began filing 73 separate lawsuits against more than 300 companies in the natural gas industry. The 73 complaints, which closely resembled one another, formed the basis of this case. In this, "Grynberg II," Grynberg moved to consolidate the cases as an Multi-District Litigation (MDL), and they were eventually consolidated in federal district court for the District of Wyoming. Between the dismissal in Grynberg I and filing the complaints in Grynberg II, Grynberg served Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests with the Minerals Management Service ("MMS"), seeking data on pipeline company-purchasers of natural gas. Grynberg created "Exhibit B's" to his complaints from that MMS data, which allegedly showed the defendants were mismeasuring gas. The inaccuracy of the Exhibit Bs did not surface until long after the complaints were filed and after the government conducted a time-consuming investigation. Without yet knowing the Exhibit Bs were inaccurate, the district court denied motions to dismiss for lack of particularity under Rule 9(b), which the court read as requiring a complaint to state the "time, place and contents of the false representation, [and] the identity of the party making the false statements." After surviving the motions to dismiss, Grynberg then faced the defendants' motions for summary judgment, which argued the complaints were based on publicly disclosed information and Grynberg was not an "original source" of the information. Following discovery, a special master recommended 40 of the 73 cases be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The district court went further by holding that all 73 cases were jurisdictionally barred. Following the dismissal of the claims and the Tenth Circuit's decision in the first appeal, the district court entered two orders awarding attorney fees: (1) under the FCA's fee-shifting provision; and (2) fees relating to the first appeal on the original-source question. Between the two orders, the court granted 35 defendant groups attorney fees totaling nearly $17 million. As to the remaining defendants in this appeal, around $5.5 million of attorney fees was awarded to the FCA Appellees for district court proceedings, and around $1 million of attorney fees was awarded to the Appellate-Fee Appellees for the first appeal. Grynberg appealed the award of fees under the FCA as to seven defendant groups. He appealed the award of fees to 13 other defendant groups. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the FCA fees, but reversed the appellate-related attorney fees. View "In re: Natural Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litigation" on Justia Law

Great Lakes filed suit against ESML for breach of contract. ESML later filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the district court denied the motion. The case proceeded to trial and judgment was entered for Great Lakes. The court agreed with the district court that the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717u, does not create an express cause of action under which Great Lakes may sue for breach of contract; the NGA also does not create an implied cause of action where there is no indication of legislative intent to create a federal cause of action displacing traditional state law breach of contract causes of action; and assuming that the district court correctly held that federal issues were “necessarily raised” and “actually disputed,” the court concluded that the federal issues in this case are not “substantial,” and the federal courts cannot exercise federal question jurisdiction “without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Great Lakes Gas Transmission v. Essar Steel Minnesota LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants, the Donziger Firm and others, appealed the district court's grant of certain relief against them in favor of Chevron, in connection with an $8.646 billion judgment obtained against Chevron in Ecuador by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs represented by the Donziger Firm. The judgment award was for environmental damage in connection with the Texaco oil exploration activities in Ecuador from the 1960s-1990s. On appeal, defendants challenge the district court's judgment, arguing principally that the action should have been dismissed on the ground that Chevron lacks Article III standing, and/or that the judgment should be reversed on the grounds, inter alia, that it violates principles of international comity and judicial estoppel, exceeds any legal authorization for equitable relief, and was entered without personal jurisdiction over defendants other than Donziger and his Firm. The court found no basis for dismissal or reversal in the absence of challenges to the district court's factual findings; considering the express disclaimers by the Ecuadorian appellate courts of their own jurisdiction to "hear and resolve" the above charges of corruption, "preserving the parties' rights" to pursue those charges in actions in the United States; and considering the district court's confinement of its injunction to a grant of in personam relief against the three defendants-appellants without disturbing the Ecuadorian judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chevron Corp. v. Donziger" on Justia Law

At the heart of this case was a 2004 oil and gas lease with a five-year term between Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. and United States Gypsum Co. (“USG”). Trans-Western contacted USG to lease its land at the conclusion of an existing lease between USG and Wolverine Oil & Gas. USG and Trans-Western agreed to terms, and Trans-Western recorded its lease. Wolverine protested the recording of the new lease, claiming that its lease with USG remained valid under pooling and unitization provisions contained in its lease. In response to the protest, USG, in writing and by phone, rescinded the Trans-Western lease. Trans-Western sued for a declaration that the Wolverine lease expired. The district court determined that the Wolverine lease had expired. As part of their agreement, USG and Trans-Western executed a ratification and lease extension. Armed with the determination that the Wolverine lease was no longer in effect, in 2010, Trans-Western also filed a second amended complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment that its lease with USG was valid and damages for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, among other claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Trans-Western, determining that USG had breached the lease but denied attorney’s fees due to disputed material facts on damages. During a bench trial on damages, Trans-Western contended that it was entitled to expectation damages for both breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment because USG deprived it of the opportunity to assign the lease during its five-year term. USG contended, inter alia, that damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease, like any real property, were measured at the date of breach and not pegged to a hypothetical sale at the market’s peak. The district court rejected Trans-Western’s damages theories, finding that Trans-Western was entitled only to nominal damages based on the value of the contract on the date of breach, which had not increased since the date of execution. The Tenth Circuit certified a question of how expectation damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease should have been measured to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court held that general (or direct) and consequential (or special) damages were available for the breach of an oil and gas lease and should be measured in “much the same way as expectation damages for the breach of any other contract.” In light of the Utah Supreme Court’s holding, the Tenth Circuit remanded this case to the district court for consideration of damages. View "Trans-Western Petroleum v. United States Gypsum Co." on Justia Law