Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC (Transco), a natural gas company that sought to abandon and expand its pipeline facilities in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. To do so, Transco needed a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which it obtained. However, the certificate was subject to conditions, including that Transco receive three additional permits from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP). After receiving these permits, Transco began its pipeline project. However, three environmental advocates filed an administrative appeal with the Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) challenging PADEP's issuance of the permits. In response, Transco initiated a lawsuit in the District Court seeking to enjoin the administrative appeal, arguing that the Natural Gas Act preempts the state law allowing the appeal.The District Court rejected Transco's preemption arguments and denied its motion for a preliminary injunction. Transco appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, finding that none of the theories of preemption advanced by Transco or the state agency applied in this case. The Court held that the Natural Gas Act does not expressly preempt administrative appeals to the EHB, nor does it field preempt such appeals. The Court also found that the possibility of multiple challenges in different fora to PADEP permitting decisions under the Clean Water Act for interstate natural gas pipelines does not impose an obstacle to the purposes of the Natural Gas Act. Therefore, the Court concluded that Transco's motion for a preliminary injunction was correctly denied. View "Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co LLC v. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Dorchester Minerals, L.P. (Dorchester) and Hess Bakken Investments II, LLC (Hess) over unpaid royalties and statutory interest. Dorchester, an unleased mineral interest owner, claimed that Hess failed to pay royalties from oil and gas production from the Hueske well between May 2008 and February 2011 due to a title issue. Dorchester sought statutory interest under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 for the unpaid royalties. Hess argued that Dorchester's claim was time-barred.The District Court initially dismissed Dorchester's claim regarding the Johnson well but denied the motion to dismiss the claim regarding the Hueske well. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the Hueske well claim, and the court granted Dorchester's motion. Dorchester then moved for statutory attorney’s fees, which the court denied, concluding no single “prevailing party” existed within the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1. The court awarded Dorchester $75,166.07 in statutory interest on its Hueske well claim and dismissed both parties’ claims for attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that Dorchester's claim for statutory interest under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 was time-barred. The court concluded that the six-year limitation period provided in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(2) applied to Dorchester’s claims. The court found that Dorchester had actual knowledge of the material facts necessary for it to understand it had a claim under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 regarding the Hueske well by 2013 at the latest. Therefore, Dorchester’s claim for statutory interest under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 regarding the Hueske well was barred by the six-year statute of limitations provided in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(2). The court remanded the case for the district court to award attorney’s fees and costs to Hess as the “prevailing party.” View "Dorchester Minerals v. Hess Bakken Investments II" on Justia Law

The case involves James and Wilma Self, who filed a lawsuit as representatives of a class of plaintiffs who own unleased mineral interests in Louisiana within compulsory drilling units operated by BPX Operating Company. The plaintiffs alleged that BPX's practice of withholding post-production costs from their pro rata share of production was improper. BPX sought dismissal of the claim, arguing that the Louisiana doctrine of negotiorum gestio provides a mechanism for unit operators to be reimbursed for post-production costs not otherwise covered by specific statutes. The federal district court granted BPX's motion to dismiss.On appeal, the United States Fifth Circuit found the law unsettled on this issue and certified a question of law to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The question was whether the doctrine of negotiorum gestio applies to unit operators selling product in accordance with La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3).The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the doctrine of negotiorum gestio does not apply and cannot be a basis for liability as a unit operator is always acting "with authority." The court reasoned that the oil and gas conservation law provides a unique quasi-contractual relationship between unleased mineral owners and unit operators, which cannot be applied consistently with the doctrine of negotiorum gestio. The court further explained that a party is only a gestor if his action is taken "without authority," but a unit operator is statutorily authorized by La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) to sell an unleased owner's share of production when the unleased owner has not arranged to dispose of his share. Therefore, a unit operator who sells an owner's production under the statutory authority of La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) cannot be a gestor under La. C.C. art. 2292. The court answered the certified question and sent its judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and to the parties. View "SELF VS. BPX OPERATING COMPANY" on Justia Law

This case involves TRC Operating Co., Inc. and TRC Cypress Group, LLC (collectively TRC) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron), oil producers operating adjacent well fields in Kern County, California. Both companies pump from a shared underground oil reservoir and engage in a process known as “cyclic steaming” to make oil extraction more efficient. In 1999, a “surface expression” formed near a Chevron well, which occurs when the steaming process causes a lateral fracture from the wellbore, allowing oil and other effluent to escape to the surface. Despite Chevron’s attempts at remediation, in 2011, an eruption occurred in the area of the well, causing a sinkhole to form, which killed a Chevron employee. The state oil and gas regulator issued various orders preventing steaming in the area, which lasted four years. TRC sued Chevron, claiming Chevron’s negligent maintenance and operation of its property led to dangerous conditions which made it unsafe to perform cyclic steaming operations. These conditions led to the regulator's shut-down orders, and to TRC’s harm and damages. Chevron countersued, claiming TRC’s failure to adequately maintain its own wells was the cause of the surface expression, the eruptions, and damages suffered by Chevron. The jury found in favor of TRC, awarding approximately $120 million in damages against Chevron. Nothing was awarded to Chevron. Chevron filed motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The trial court denied the JNOV, but granted a new trial based on misconduct by a juror. TRC appealed the granting of this motion. The Court of Appeal reversed the grant of a new trial, finding that the juror was not ineligible and no prejudice resulted from the juror’s failure to disclose his prior criminal conviction or the previous civil lawsuit. Chevron also filed a protective cross-appeal, in the event the Court of Appeal found against it on TRC’s appeal. Chevron appealed the denial of its JNOV, arguing that the regulator's orders to stop steaming were the superseding cause of any harm suffered by TRC and precludes it from bearing any liability. The Court of Appeal concluded sufficient evidence was introduced to sustain the verdict, demonstrating TRC did not stop any of its steaming operations solely because of the regulator's orders, which were therefore not a superseding cause. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment against Chevron. View "TRC Operating Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Vagts family, who own and operate a dairy farm in West Union, Iowa, filed a nuisance suit against Northern Natural Gas Company (NNG). NNG operates a natural gas pipeline that runs under the Vagts' property and uses a cathodic protection system, which runs an electrical current through the pipeline to prevent corrosion. The Vagts alleged that stray voltage from the cathodic protection system distressed their dairy herd and caused them damages. The jury awarded the Vagts a total of $4.75 million in damages. NNG appealed, arguing that the district court erred in instructing the jury on nuisance without including negligence as an element of the claim and in denying NNG’s motion for remittitur.The district court held that negligence was not an element of the nuisance claim and instructed the jury accordingly. The jury found that the stray voltage from the cathodic protection system was definitely offensive, seriously annoying, and intolerable, that the stray voltage interfered with the Vagts’ normal use of land in the local community, and that this constituted a nuisance. The jury awarded the Vagts $3 million in economic damages, $1.25 million for personal inconvenience, annoyance, and discomfort, and $500,000 for the loss of use and enjoyment of land.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that under the controlling statute and precedents, negligence is not an element of a nuisance claim. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to disturb the jury's verdict on damages. The court concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by the record when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. View "Vagts v. Northern Natural Gas Company" on Justia Law

The case involves the Michigan Attorney General's attempt to shut down Enbridge’s Line 5 Pipeline, which runs underwater across the Straits of Mackinac between Michigan’s Lower and Upper Peninsulas. The Attorney General filed the case in Michigan state court in 2019, alleging violations of three state laws. Enbridge responded by moving for summary disposition, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The state court held oral argument on those dispositive motions, focusing on preemption issues, including whether the Attorney General’s claims were preempted by either the Pipeline Safety Act or the federal Submerged Lands Act.In 2020, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued a notice of revocation of the 1953 easement, calling for Line 5 to be shut down by May 2021, and simultaneously filed a complaint in state court to enforce the notice. Enbridge timely removed the Governor’s case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The district court denied the Governor’s motion to remand, holding that it had federal-question jurisdiction. The Governor subsequently voluntarily dismissed her case.Enbridge removed the Attorney General’s case to federal court in December 2021, citing the district court’s order denying the motion to remand in the Governor’s case. The Attorney General moved to remand this case to state court on grounds of untimely removal and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion on both grounds, excusing Enbridge’s untimely removal based on equitable principles and estopping the Attorney General from challenging subject-matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that Enbridge failed to timely remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and there are no equitable exceptions to the statute’s deadlines for removal. The case was remanded to Michigan state court. View "Nessel v. Enbridge Energy, LP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed a case involving Samson Exploration, LLC and several families, including the Bordages, from whom Samson held oil-and-gas leases. The families sued Samson for unpaid royalties under those leases. The Bordages claimed that they were entitled to late charges on the late charges, arguing that the leases' Late Charge Provision imposed late charges on late charges, compounding them each month. Samson disagreed, asserting that the late charges were not compounded.Previously, the trial court found Samson liable for breach of contract and awarded the Bordages $12,955,919 in contract damages, based on the interpretation of the Late Charge Provision. The Bordages argued that collateral estoppel prevented the Supreme Court from deciding whether the Late Charge Provision calls for simple or compound interest because that issue was previously resolved in another case involving Samson and a different lessor, the Hooks case.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Texas law disfavors compound interest, and an agreement for interest on unpaid amounts is an agreement for simple interest absent an express, clear, and specific provision for compound interest. The court also held that Samson’s prior litigation of the issue does not collaterally estop it from asserting its claims here. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SAMSON EXPLORATION, LLC v. BORDAGES" on Justia Law

Latigo Oil & Gas, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, filed a lawsuit against BP America Production Company, a Delaware corporation, to enforce its preferential right to purchase certain mineral interests that BP had offered for sale as part of a package deal to a third party. Prior to trial, Latigo requested a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief to prevent BP from selling the interests to the third-party buyer pending trial. The trial court granted Latigo's request for preliminary injunctive relief.The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the evidence did not show Latigo was likely to succeed on the merits. The court held that BP did not owe Latigo a duty to provide a good-faith allocation of value to the interests burdened by Latigo's preferential right. It found that whether the allocations provided by BP were inflated as alleged by Latigo was irrelevant, as the notices provided by BP met the terms of the operating agreements.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma granted certiorari and held that the trial court's grant of injunctive relief was not an abuse of discretion. The court noted that while there was no binding precedent on whether an allocation of value within a package deal must be made in good faith, substantial support for Latigo's position could be found in both Oklahoma precedent and in other jurisdictions. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant preliminary injunctive relief and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "LATIGO OIL & GAS v. BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO." on Justia Law

The City of Valdez in Alaska appealed two orders by the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA) related to the transfer of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) from BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc. (BPPA) to Harvest Alaska, LLC. The first order (Order 6) approved confidential treatment of certain financial statements submitted by the oil company and its affiliates. The second order (Order 17) approved the transfer of a required certificate and the authority to operate the pipeline. The Superior Court dismissed Valdez’s appeals, concluding that Valdez lacked standing, failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, and the case was moot. The court also ordered Valdez to pay a portion of the attorney’s fees of the oil company and other companies involved in the proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the dismissal of the appeal of Order 6, affirmed the dismissal of the appeal of Order 17, and vacated the award of attorney’s fees. The court found that Valdez had standing to appeal both orders, the appeals were not moot, and Valdez had exhausted administrative remedies with respect to Order 6 but not Order 17. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Valdez v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over oil and gas interests between Spottie, Inc., a Nevada corporation, and several other Nevada corporations and a limited liability company. Spottie alleged that the defendants had wrongfully claimed title to these interests, which were once owned by Edward Davis, who had formed Spottie as a holding company. The defendants countered that they had entered into an agreement with Davis to acquire these interests, and that Davis and Spottie had transferred the disputed interests to one of the defendants via an assignment in 2016.The district court dismissed several of Spottie's claims, leaving only a quiet title claim and a claim for unjust enrichment. After a three-day bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the assignment from Davis and Spottie to one of the defendants was valid. The court also found that Spottie had erroneously received revenue from the disputed interests and awarded damages to the defendants.Spottie appealed the decision, arguing that the district court had erred in its ownership determination, its rejection of Spottie's laches defense, its binding of a non-party to the judgment, and its award of attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part, concluding that the district court did not err in its ownership determination and its award of attorney fees. However, it reversed in part, finding that the court had erred in awarding costs for non-legal expenses. The case was remanded for the court to recalculate its cost award and to consider the defendants' request for additional attorney fees and legal costs. View "SPOTTIE v. BAIUL-FARINA" on Justia Law