Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Hawaii resident, filed an election contest complaint arguing (1) Presidential candidate Ted Cruz was not qualified to run for President of the United States and, therefore, the Republican Part was guilty of election fraud; (2) the Office of Elections sponsors racism by serving “whites only”; and (3) Governor David Ige is responsible for rampant bigotry and discrimination within the State. The State moved to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court entered judgment dismissing the complaint, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over his complaint or the relief he sought. View "Smallwood v. State " on Justia Law

Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting (MFBH) is a Maine ballot question committee that was a proponent of November 2014 Ballot Question 1 concerning bear hunting and trapping. As early as September 2013, the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife used agency resources to communicate with the public in opposition to Question 1. MFBH filed a complaint against the Department alleging that the Department’s campaign activities constituted an ultra vires expenditure of public funds. In November 2014, Maine voters defeated the ballot question. The Department subsequently filed a motion to dismiss MFBH’s complaint on the grounds of mootness and standing. In March 2015, the superior court dismissed the complaint as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case is moot and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. View "Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

The Institute, a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, filed suit against the FEC, challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. 20104(f). The district court denied the Institute's request to convene a three-judge district court pursuant to the statutory provision that requires three-judge district courts for constitutional challenges to the BCRA. On the merits, the district court held that the Institute's claim was unavailing under McConnell v. FEC, and Citizens United V. FEC. The Institute appealed. The court concluded that, because the Institute’s complaint raises a First Amendment challenge to a provision of BCRA, 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) entitles it to a three-judge district court. In this case, the Institute’s attempt to advance its as-applied First Amendment challenge is not “essentially fictitious, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and obviously without merit.” Therefore, section 2284 “entitles” the Institute to make its case “before a three-judge district court.” Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Independence Institute v. FEC" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party claimed unequal treatment under Ohio’s election laws. The court entered partial summary judgment, finding that the statutes did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments and that sovereign immunity barred state constitutional claims, effectively denying a preliminary injunction. Such denials are immediately appealable (28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1)), but the Party filed a Rule 54(b) motion, asking that portions of the decision be made final (appealable). The court has not ruled on the motion. The Party filed notice of appeal 35 days after the court issued its order. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Rule 54(b), rulings that do not dispose of an entire case do not end the action; but if the court “expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay,” it may “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.” A Rule 54(b) motion cannot request that a judgment be altered; granting the motion serves only to make a nonappealable order an appealable judgment. Unlike a Rule 59(e) request, the motion did not seek a modification of the order’s substance, but asked only that it be made appealable. Since the relevant portions of the order were immediately appealable under 1292, those portions were already a “judgment” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). View "Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced an action alleging various constitutional violations with respect to the presidential ballot. Along with his complaint, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of indigence pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 261, 27B requesting a waiver of normal court fees and litigation costs. In his affidavit, Plaintiff claimed indigence on the ground that he received public assistance in the form of veterans’ benefits. The judge concluded that Plaintiff was not indigent because he had the ability to pay the normal and extra fees and costs. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff, who received federal veterans’ benefits and a Massachusetts property tax abatement that were not dependent on his economic circumstances, was considered indigent under Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 261, 27A and therefore entitled to a waiver despite having ample financial resources to pay court fees and costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judge’s decision denying Plaintiff’s request for a waiver of normal and extra court fees and litigation costs, holding that the statute was not intended to provide for a waiver under the circumstances of this case. View "Reade v. Sec’y of Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices (COPP) issued a decision finding sufficient evidence that Terry Bannan had violated Montana’s campaign practices laws during the 2010 primary election and that civil adjudication of the violations was warranted. The COPP forwarded the sufficiency decision to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney for consideration. Bannan filed an action for declaratory relief in the Gallatin County District Court alleging that the COPP acted unlawfully by referring its sufficiency findings to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney rather than the Gallatin County Attorney. The Lewis and Clark County Attorney waived his right to participate in the action, citing Mont. Code Ann. 13-37-124(2). Thereafter, the COPP filed an enforcement action against Bannan in the Lewis and Clark County District Court. Bannan filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the COPP was obligated to assert its claims in the Gallatin County declaratory judgment action. The district court in Lewis and Clark County denied Bannan’s motion to dismiss. Bannan appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed Bannan’s appeal as premature, holding that Bannan’s appeal must be characterized as one seeking relief from the denial of a motion to dismiss, and orders denying motions to dismiss are not appealable. View "Motl v. Bannan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a candidate in 2010 for the State Senate in Senate District 31, which included all of Park County and most of Sweet Grass County. The Commissioner of Political Practices filed a civil enforcement action against Plaintiff in the Lewis and Clark County District Court following an investigation of alleged violations of campaign practice and finance laws. Plaintiff initiated a declaratory action in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, raising issues similar to those raised in the enforcement action. The Sixth Judicial District Court, ordered, sua sponte, that the declaratory judgment action be transferred to Lewis and Clark County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) as to Plaintiff, the declaratory action in Park County was duplicative, and this was an appropriate basis on which to transfer the matter; but (2) the district court’s transfer of the action to a specific department and judge within the the First Judicial District was improper. View "Wagman v. Motl" on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk sought a declaration that it was prohibited from disclosing the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, the General Assembly enacted 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014) that made voted ballots subject to CORA. The Clerk thereafter produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect. The only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. After its review, the Supreme Court held that when an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure, a prevailing requestor was entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court found that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. The district court in this case found the denial was proper, therefore Marks was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant La Mar Gunn appealed a superior court judgment declaring a tie in the November 4, 2014 general election for the Office of the Recorder of Deed for Kent County. Defendant-appellee Betty Lou McKenna moved to dismiss Gunn's election contest, arguing that Gunn failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In response to McKenna's motion, Gunn argued that the petition stated a claim, and pointed to the election recount conducted by two superior court judges, "evidenced 'malconduct on the part of election officers or clerks holding the election,'" because three different county conducted by the superior court (sitting as the Board of Canvass) resulted in three different outcomes. McKenna countered that the judges sitting as the Board of Canvass were not "election officers or clerks holding the election." The superior court denied McKenna's motion to dismiss. On appeal, McKenna argued that the superior court "missed the key point" in her motion, and that the claims asserted in Gunn's petition did not fit within the jurisdictional requirements of 15 Del. C. 5941. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Gunn's petition failed to allege any "malconduct on the part of election officers or clerks holding the election." Therefore, McKenna's motion should have been granted. This case was remanded to the superior court with directions that the judgment be vacated. View "Gunn v. McKenna" on Justia Law

Several voters filed a challenge to Sandoval County’s administration of the 2012 local election, and the district court concluded that the County’s election procedures were so dysfunctional that an immediate remedy was necessary to avoid voter disenfranchisement in the approaching 2014 election. To remedy the anticipated election day problems, the court entered a preliminary injunction that required the County to adhere to new regulations increasing the number of voting centers and voting machines. County election officials sought interlocutory appellate review of the preliminary injunction prior to the election, but the Tenth Circuit declined to intervene at that time. The election went off without a hitch, and the Court reviewed the County’s challenge to the injunction. In addition, the Court considered a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot presented by the voters who brought the suit. Concluding the issues raised by the grant of the preliminary injunction were mooted by the passage of the 2014 election, the Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fleming v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law