Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Education Law
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In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a private school, Concordia Preparatory School, was sued by a student and her mother for alleged violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex-based discrimination in federally-funded educational programs. The plaintiffs claimed that the school's tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) constituted federal financial assistance, thus making it subject to Title IX.The school moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it did not receive federal financial assistance and was therefore not subject to Title IX. The district court denied the school's motion, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the school's tax-exempt status constituted federal financial assistance for Title IX purposes. However, the court certified an interlocutory appeal on this issue.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court reasoned that while tax exemption is a benefit, it is not equivalent to "receiving Federal financial assistance" as required by Title IX. The court explained that the term "assistance" implies aid, help, or support, which suggests a grant of funds. Tax exemption, however, is merely the withholding of a tax burden rather than an affirmative grant of funds. Furthermore, the court distinguished tax exemption from the indirect receipt of federal funds as was the case in Grove City College v. Bell.As such, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that tax-exempt status does not equate to "receiving Federal financial assistance" for purposes of Title IX. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Buettner-Hartsoe v. Baltimore Lutheran High School Association" on Justia Law

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In this appeal, the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA) challenged a resolution issued by the Public School Employees’ Retirement Board (PSERB), which addressed how it intended to apply a statute related to the withdrawal of public school employees from a multi-employer pension system. The Commonwealth Court dismissed PSEA’s action for lack of standing. The court held that PSEA had not shown a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in PSERB’s action or inaction, as PSEA's true dispute was with school district employers over subcontracting, not with PSERB.However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed this decision, finding that PSEA did have standing to challenge the resolution. The Supreme Court held that PSEA’s interest in the issue was substantial as it far exceeded the interest of the public at large in the correct application of the statute. The court also found that PSEA’s interest was direct because the resolution was causally connected to the harm PSEA alleged in its ability to effectively negotiate over subcontracting decisions. Additionally, the court found that PSEA’s interest was immediate because the causal connection was real and concrete, not remote or speculative. The court noted that PSEA's averments established a substantial, direct, and immediate interest sufficient to warrant a request for the sort of remedy that a declaratory judgment action seeks—a clarification of the law to resolve a dispute between interested parties over its meaning. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded the matter to allow PSEA’s action to proceed. View "PSEA v. PSERB" on Justia Law

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In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the appellant, Brittany Jones, claimed she was sexually abused by a teacher between 2009 and 2011, when she was a high school student. She brought her claims under the Child Victims Act (CVA) of New York, which revived time-barred claims of child sexual abuse victims, and provided a two-year window from August 14, 2019 to August 14, 2021 for the filing of such claims. However, Jones filed her suit four months before the commencement of this window. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York, in a summary judgment, ruled in favor of the school district, holding that Jones's premature filing created a valid statute-of-limitations defense for the school district.This decision was appealed and the key question before the appellate court was whether the six-month waiting period created by the CVA was a statute of limitations. The appellate court concluded that neither the text of the CVA nor any precedent from New York courts provided clear guidance on this issue. Given the significant state policy interests implicated by the CVA, the appellate court decided to certify the question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether the six-month waiting period for claims under the CVA establishes a statute of limitations, a condition precedent to bringing suit, or some other affirmative defense. The court reserved its decision on the appeal pending the response from the New York Court of Appeals. View "Jones v. Cattaraugus-Little Valley Central School District" on Justia Law

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The case involves Matthew Boermeester, a former University of Southern California (USC) football player, who was expelled from USC for engaging in intimate partner violence. Post-expulsion, Boermeester filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, which was denied, leading to an appeal. Initially, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Boermeester had a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at the live hearing. However, the California Supreme Court granted USC’s petition for review, reversed the opinion, and held that Boermeester did not have such a right.In the remanded case, the Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence supports USC’s decision and found no denial of fair process in USC’s use of an investigator-adjudicator or in its appeals process. Boermeester claimed USC’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that USC’s use of a combined investigator-adjudicator procedure denied him fair process. The court found that the combined investigator-adjudicator process, without more, does not deny fair process and that Boermeester received considerable, adequate appellate process. Hence, the denial of the writ was affirmed. View "Boermeester v. Carry" on Justia Law

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The case involves an appeal by a student, Matthew Boermeester, who was expelled from the University of Southern California (USC) for intimate partner violence. Following his expulsion, Boermeester filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, which was denied. He then appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which initially ruled in his favor, concluding that Boermeester had a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. However, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that Boermeester did not have such a right.After the case was remanded back to the Court of Appeal, Boermeester argued that USC's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that USC's use of a combined investigator-adjudicator procedure denied him fair process. The Court of Appeal disagreed and found that substantial evidence supported USC's decision and there was no denial of fair process in USC's use of an investigator-adjudicator or in its appeals process.The court also noted that Boermeester's claims of investigator bias were unsupported and that he was provided a substantial amount of process, including multiple layers of review. Boermeester's argument that the investigator's conduct of phone interviews contravened USC's policy was also rejected. The court concluded that there was nothing inherently unfair about USC's combined investigator-adjudicator model or the specific procedures followed in this case. Therefore, the denial of the writ was affirmed. View "Boermeester v. Carry" on Justia Law

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In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Parents Protecting Our Children, an association of parents, sought an injunction against the Eau Claire Area School District in Wisconsin to stop the enforcement of the District’s Administrative Guidance for Gender Identity Support. The parents argued that the policy violated the Due Process and Free Exercise Clauses of the U.S. Constitution by interfering with their right to make decisions on behalf of their children. The District Court dismissed the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the parents failed to identify any instance where the policy was applied in a way that infringed on parental rights.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court held that the parents' concerns about potential applications of the policy did not establish standing to sue unless the policy resulted in an injury or created an imminent risk of injury. The court stated that the parents had brought a pre-enforcement facial challenge against the policy without any evidence of the School District applying the policy in a manner detrimental to parental rights.The court also noted that the Administrative Guidance did not mandate exclusion of parents from discussions or decisions regarding a student’s gender expression at school. The court found that the alleged harm was dependent on a speculative "chain of possibilities," which was insufficient to establish Article III standing. Therefore, the court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Parents Protecting Our Children, UA v. Eau Claire Area School District" on Justia Law

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In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Ohio State University suspended in-person instruction, transitioned to virtual learning, restricted campus access, and provided limited refunds to students. Brooke Smith, a student at the university, filed a class-action lawsuit against the university, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Smith argued that students had lost the benefits of their education without sufficient refunds.The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether discretionary immunity, which shields the state from lawsuits for certain highly discretionary decisions, was a jurisdictional bar or an affirmative defense to suits brought against the state. The court held that discretionary immunity was indeed a jurisdictional bar, not an affirmative defense. This means that when the state makes highly discretionary decisions, such as its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction as the state has not waived its sovereign immunity for those decisions.However, the court noted that discretionary immunity is not absolute and does not extend to the negligent actions of the state's employees and agents in the performance of these activities. The court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which had found that discretionary immunity was an affirmative defense, and remanded the case back to that court to determine whether Ohio State University was protected by discretionary immunity in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. View "Smith v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

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In the case, a group of students from the University of San Francisco (USF) sued the university for breach of contract, alleging that the university did not deliver on its promise to provide in-person instruction and should refund a portion of their tuition fees due to the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision, which granted USF's motion for summary adjudication, concluding that the students failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether USF promised to provide exclusively in-person instruction.The court determined that there was an implied-in-fact contract between USF and the student appellants, established through matriculation and the payment of tuition. However, the court found that the contract did not explicitly promise exclusively in-person instruction. The court also distinguished between general expectations of in-person classes and enforceable contractual promises for exclusively in-person instruction. The court held that the students failed to establish a breach of contract based on the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.The court further held that the students could not pursue quasi-contract claims, as a valid and enforceable contract existed between the students and USF. The students' promissory estoppel claim also failed, as they did not establish any clear and unequivocal promises from USF for in-person instruction. The court stated that the record did not reflect any such promise.The court dismissed the students' claims relating to the Fall 2020 and Spring 2021 semesters, as they were aware these semesters would be conducted either entirely remotely or in a hybrid format prior to enrolling or paying tuition for those semesters. Thus, the students could not reasonably have believed USF contractually promised to provide in-person education for these semesters. View "Berlanga v. University of San Francisco" on Justia Law

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The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with two consolidated cases involving two New Jersey parents, who claimed they were retaliated against for protesting school policies related to mandatory masking during the COVID-19 pandemic. One parent, George Falcone, was issued a summons for defiant trespass after refusing to wear a mask at a school board meeting, while another parent, Gwyneth Murray-Nolan, was arrested under similar circumstances. Falcone claimed retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, while Murray-Nolan argued the same and also claimed she was deprived of substantive due process. The district court dismissed both cases. On appeal, the court found that Falcone had standing to sue, reversing and remanding the lower court's decision. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Murray-Nolan's case, concluding that refusing to wear a mask during a pandemic was not protected conduct under the First Amendment. View "Murray-Nolan v. Rubin" on Justia Law

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In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs, The Arc of Iowa and several parents of children with disabilities, sought to challenge a provision of the Iowa Code that prevents schools from imposing mask mandates unless required by other laws. They had received a preliminary injunction from a lower court that had been vacated by this court due to changing circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic. On remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring that the phrase 'other provisions of law' in the contested Iowa Code section includes Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and that the contested Iowa Code section cannot be cited as the sole basis for denying a student's request for reasonable modification or accommodation under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act that requires others to wear masks.The defendants, the Governor of Iowa and the Director of the Iowa Department of Education, appealed to the Eighth Circuit, raising issues of exhaustion of remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), standing of the plaintiffs, and the propriety and necessity of the relief granted by the district court.The appellate court, after de novo review, found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for standing, which include having suffered an injury in fact, traceability of the injury to the defendant's conduct, and the likelihood of redress by a favorable judicial decision. The court found that the general risks associated with COVID-19 were not enough to constitute "imminent and substantial" harm for standing. It also concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the alleged injuries were fairly traceable to the conduct of the Governor or the Director of the Department of Education. As a result, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss due to lack of standing. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds" on Justia Law