Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Belcourt School District operates within the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. The North Dakota Constitution requires that the District provide education to children who are Indians or reside on Indian reservations. The Tribe and School District have agreed to share responsibility for educating students, both Indian and non-Indian, residing on the Reservation, and entered into agreements in 2006 and 2009 that provided the District with exclusive authority to administer "day-to-day operations" at Turtle Mountain Community High School, including supervision and employment of staff. Tribe members sued, alleging defamation, excessive use of force, and multiple employment-related claims. The Tribal Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the District and its employees for claims related to the employees' performance of their official duties. The Tribal Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the District signed the agreements, subjecting itself to Tribal jurisdiction. The federal trial court concluded that the Tribal Court had jurisdiction, based on the agreements. The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction, reasoning that the District was clearly acting in its official capacity, in furtherance of its obligations under the state constitution, when it entered into the agreements, View "Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Fort Yates School District operates within the Standing Rock Indian Reservation. The North Dakota Constitution requires that the District provide education to children who are Indians or reside on reservations. In 2003, the District and the Tribe entered into an Agreement, providing that both the Standing Rock and the Fort Yates School Boards would govern the school system; that all property or equipment purchased under the Agreement would generally be joint property; and that it "neither diminishes nor expands rights or protections afforded … under tribal, state or federal law." After a fight between two students, A. was suspended and C. obtained a restraining order against A. A. allegedly violated the restraining order by verbally harassing C. at school. The school suspended A. for 10 additional days. Murphy sued on behalf of her daughter, C., a Tribe member, in the Tribal Court, which held that it had jurisdiction. The District did not appeal to the Standing Rock Supreme Court, but filed suit in federal court against Murphy and the Tribal Court. The district court dismissed and remanded to the Tribal Court. The Eighth Circuit reversed with respect to Tribal Court jurisdiction, but affirmed dismissal of the Tribal Court on sovereign immunity grounds. View "Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Leetaru, a graduate student at and former employee of the University of Illinois, sought to enjoin the University from taking further action in an investigation of him, as a student, regarding allegations that he violated the University’s “Policy and Procedures on Academic Integrity in Research and Publication.” Leetaru alleged that the defendants failed to comply with the University’s rules and regulations governing student discipline and that their actions exceeded their lawful authority, were arbitrary, resulted in a gross injustice, and deprived him of due process. The circuit court dismissed, finding that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Claims. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, citing the right to seek injunctive relief in circuit court to prevent unauthorized or unconstitutional conduct by the state, its agencies, boards, departments, commissions and agents, or to compel their compliance with legal or constitutional requirements, which includes actions to require compliance with administrative rules and regulations. Leetaru’s claims may proceed in circuit court without offending principles of sovereign immunity. Leetaru does not question the right of defendants to investigate research misconduct, but only claims that in investigating misconduct, defendants are obligated to adhere to policies and procedures promulgated by the University and that they have failed to do so. View "Leetaru v. Bd of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill." on Justia Law

When Mother and Father’s marriage was dissolved in 1994, the trial court awarded Mother primary care and custody of the parties’ daughter (Daughter) and ordered Father to pay child support. In 2011, after Daughter enrolled at Ball State University (BSU), Mother petitioned to modify child support, requesting that Father pay Daughter’s postsecondary educational expenses. Daughter withdrew from BSU in 2012 and attempted to enroll at Indian University Northwest. BSU, however, would not release Daughter’s official transcript because of her outstanding tuition bill. Mother requested to join BSU as a supplemental defendant. The trial court granted the request and ordered BSU to release the transcript. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court’s order was appealable as of right under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(3); and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in granting Mother’s motion for joinder, as Mother failed to carry her burden in demonstrating that BSU was a necessary party under Trial Rule 19. View "Ball State University v. Irons" on Justia Law

The Foundation, a non-profit corporation, acts as a conduit for tax exempt gifts to benefit UCLA. Luskin, a director, pledged $40 million to support construction of a UCLA campus conference center. Save Westwood sought to rescind the donation and to require the Regents of the University of California to pay the city taxes allegedly owing, alleging that the Foundation is “mandated by its by-laws and incorporation documents to exclusively fund charitable undertakings,” that this limitation “applies to the financing of the construction of buildings for exempt purposes,” and that the Luskin grant was applied toward activities that exceed the Foundation’s powers. The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Save Westwood argued that neither free speech rights, nor rights of petition were implicated because the claims sought enforcement of the Regents’s fiduciary duties, citing an exemption for public interest lawsuits. It voluntarily dismissed Luskin and the Foundation. The trial court granted the motion to strike. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that claims against Luskin were based on letters about the donation and constructon, which constituted an exercise of free speech on a matter of public interest. The Foundation’s pledge toward the conference center was also an exercise of free speech. Neither Luskin nor the Foundation was a governmental entity, so their actions cannot be “an illegal expenditure or waste.” They owed no mandatory duty to avoid donating funds in a manner that might jeopardize the Foundation’s tax exempt status. View "Save Westwood Vill. v. Luskin" on Justia Law

In 2012, the North Mac School District adopted a resolution of intent to issue working cash bonds in the amount of $2,000,000. Bettis filed a petition, seeking to submit the proposition to the voters at the April, 2013 election. Marsaglia and O’Neal filed objections to the petition on seven bases, including that the petition sheets were neither numbered nor securely bound, as required by the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/28-3. The electoral board sustained the objections. Bettis sought judicial review. The caption of the petition identified only Marsaglia and O’Neal as opposing parties, but Bettis also served, by certified mail, all members of the electoral board, counsel for the board, counsel for the objectors, and the District Secretary. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, noting that the appeal was moot because the election had passed, but holding that failure to serve the electoral board as a separate legal entity required dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that courts may not add to or subtract from the requirements listed in the statute, which does not require the naming of parties and does not require that a copy of the electoral board’s decision be attached.View "Bettis v. Marsaglia" on Justia Law

This class action arose out of the termination of approximately 7,600 former teachers and other permanent employees of the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) as a result of Hurricane Katrina and the State of Louisiana’s subsequent takeover of Orleans Parish schools. Although the district court denied defendants’ exceptions of res judicata, a five judge panel of the court of appeal unanimously found that res judicata ordinarily would apply to the facts of this case, but that exceptional circumstances barred its application. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted two writ applications to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiffs’ claims against the OPSB and/or the State defendants, and, if not, whether the OPSB and/or the State defendants violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights in relation to the plaintiffs’ terminations. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that res judicata applied but found no exceptional circumstances that would preclude its application. Furthermore, the Court found that, even if res judicata did not apply to certain parties’ claims, neither the OPSB nor the State defendants violated plaintiffs’ due process rights.View "Oliver v. Orleans Parish School Board" on Justia Law

In 2005 Greene and his wife had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and obtained a discharge from all their debts except federal student loan debt of $207,000. As part of the bankruptcy case they sought an order that the Department of Education cancel their debt on the ground that having to repay it would inflict undue hardship. The Greenes claimed that the statute of limitations prohibited collection of their loans, penalties and interest on the loans were caused by the DOE’s negligence, and the loans should be discharged as reparations for slavery and discrimination.” The Seventh Circuit rejected the undue hardship defense on the ground that “the Greenes initiated this case and the DOE has not counterclaimed or sought any judgment … there is no actual controversy.” In 2010 the Department began to garnish Greene’s wages and he sought an injunction. The DOE counterclaimed. The district court ordered Greene to pay the debt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that DOE’s counterclaim was not barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or failure to make a compulsory counterclaim in the bankruptcy proceeding.View "Greene v. U.S. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Sallie Mae, real party in interest, appealed an order awarding plaintiffs attorney fees and costs after plaintiffs successfully opposed Sallie Mae's motion to quash a business records subpoena seeking electronically stored information regarding student loans. The court concluded that the trial court did not err by concluding that Sallie Mae lacked substantial factual justification for refusing to comply with the second subpoena. Therefore, the award of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion and the court affirmed the judgment.View "Vasquez v. CA School of Culinary Arts" on Justia Law

The Louisiana legislature established the Scholarship Program in 2012 to provide funding to low-income parents with children in failing schools so that they may have the option of sending them to better schools, including private schools, of their own choosing. Parents seek to intervene in this litigation between Louisiana and the federal government over the state's voucher program. The court concluded that the parents met the requirements for intervention as of right and reversed the district court's denial of their motion to intervene. View "Brumfield, et al. v. Dodd, et al." on Justia Law