Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After Diagnostics obtained a judgment against plaintiff, plaintiff filed a Claim of Exemption seeking a judicial declaration that seven of his Fidelity Investments accounts were exempt from levy. The court held that the money that a person sets aside for the “qualified higher education expenses” of his children under Internal Revenue Code section 529 (so-called “section 529 savings accounts”) are not exempt from the collection efforts under the California Enforcement of Judgments Law, Code of Civil Procedure section 680.010 et seq., of a creditor who has a valid judgment against that person. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling to the contrary and reversed the trial court's finding that plaintiff's retirement accounts are fully exempt from collection because the trial court did not apply the proper legal standard in evaluating the exemption for private retirement accounts. View "O'Brien v. AMBS Diagnostics" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Kansas Board of Education (the “Board”) adopted curriculum standards establishing performance expectations for science instruction in kindergarten through twelfth grade. Appellants, Citizens for Objective Public Education, Kansas parents, and school children (collectively, “COPE”), contended that although the standards purported to further science education, their concealed aim was to teach students to answer questions about the cause and nature of life with only nonreligious explanations. COPE also claimed two plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers who objected to their tax dollars being used to implement the Standards. The district court disagreed, and dismissed the suit without prejudice for lack of standing. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded all of COPE's theories of injury failed, and affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "COPE v. KS State Board of Education" on Justia Law

Parents of a severely disabled child (T.R.) prevailed in a suit against the school district where the child was abused by his special education teacher. A jury awarded a substantial verdict and the school district challenged the verdict, alleging that the parents are not the proper parties to file suit. In this case, the victim was a minor when the challenged conduct occurred but turned 18 by the time of trial; his disability rendered him incompetent even after he reached majority; a bank had been appointed to serve as his guardian; and that same bank oversaw a trust that paid for the minor’s medical bills. The court concluded that the parents have Article III standing to directly seek past medical expenses and to seek future home care expenses on behalf of T.R.; the Bank, as guardian, should have filed suit to recover the claims T.R. would otherwise possess - those for future home care expenses, physical pain and anguish, and impairment - by suing in their name on his behalf; the Bank owed a fiduciary duty to T.R., and absent a showing of conflict, the parents could not circumvent the Bank by filing suit on T.R.'s behalf; the court found that the district court's refusal to allow ratification of the parents' actions was an abuse of discretion because nothing in the text of Federal Rule 17(a)(3) or the court's decisions applying it supports the district court's decision; and federal statutes at issue do not authorize recovery for the parents' mental anguish based on the mistreatment of their son. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rideau v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Middle school and high school cheerleaders, through their parents, sued Kountze Independent School District after the District prohibited them from displaying banners at school-sponsored events containing religious messages or signs. The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting mootness in light of its subsequent adoption of a resolution providing that the District was not required to prohibit religious messages on school banners. The trial court denied the District’s plea. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because the District voluntarily discontinued its prohibition on the display of banners containing religious messages or signs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the resolution only states that the District is not required to prohibit the cheerleaders from displaying religious messages on school banners and reserves to the District discretion in regulating those banners, this case was not moot, as the challenged conduct might reasonably be expected to recur. Remanded. View "Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The DOJ filed a motion for further relief in this 40-year-old case in order to gain oversight and some level of control over Louisiana’s school voucher program. The district court granted the DOJ’s motion for further relief and thus mandated annual reporting requirements for Louisiana’s school voucher program. Appellants moved to vacate the district court's order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e), 60(b)(4), and 60(b)(5). The district court denied the motion. The court held that the order concerning the voucher program is beyond the scope of the district court’s continuing jurisdiction in this case and is therefore void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court should have granted the Rule 60(b)(4) motion. The order is reversed and the injunction is therefore dissolved. View "Brumfield v. Louisiana State Bd. of Edu." on Justia Law

Hattiesburg High School (“HHS”) filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the Mississippi High School Activities Association (“MHSAA”), alleging that its decision to declare one of HHS’s students ineligible to participate in athletics was arbitrary and capricious. The Forrest County Chancery Court agreed, and it vacated the penalties that MHSAA had imposed against HHS. MHSAA appealed. Because the Supreme Court found that HHS failed to state a legally cognizable claim or cause of action, we vacate the decisions of the Forrest County Chancery Court. View "Mississippi High School Activities Association, Inc., v. Hattiesburg High School" on Justia Law

In the underlying “school finance” case, Shawnee Mission School District No. 512 (U.S.D. 512) filed a motion to intervene. Plaintiffs opposed U.S.D. 512’s entry into that litigation, and the State did not object. The district court panel denied the motion to intervene, concluding that the State adequately represented U.S.D. 512’s interests and that the motion to intervene was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the panel did not abuse its discretion in denying U.S.D. 512’s motion to intervene as a matter of right, as (1) U.S.D. 512’s interests were not adequately represented by the parties in this case; but (2) U.S.D. 512’s motion to intervene was untimely. View "Gannon v. State" on Justia Law

Christine B., the mother of student "A.F.," filed suit claiming that the Espanola Public Schools failed to address appropriately her daughter's disabilities in the educational program it formulated for her. Before any hearing could be held, Christine sought to mediate her dispute. In the end, the parties signed a settlement agreement. As a result of the settlement, Christine B. asked the administrative agency to dismiss her Individuals with Disability Education Act (IDEA) claims with prejudice. Despite the satisfactory result she received through mediation, Christine B. filed suit again, though not pursuant to IDEA, but under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The allegations in her federal court complaint and those in her original IDEA administrative complaint were nearly identical: both alleged that A.F. suffered from the same disabilities and both contended that the school district failed to take her disabilities into account in her educational program. Agreeing with the school district that Christine B. failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the district court dismissed her lawsuit. Christine B. appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. View "A.F. v. Espanola Public Schools" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, once a standout high school basketball player, sued 942 U.S.C. 1983) Valley View Community School District, and the Illinois High School Association, raising claims of First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, substantive due process, unconstitutional policy, section 1983 conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and indemnification under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. He alleged that the District and IHSA singled him out for residency investigations, which rendered him ineligible to participate in basketball for 10 days, because his mother complained to the District. The district judge determined that plaintiff failed to comply with local Rule 56.1 and deemed admitted all of the defendants’ properly supported facts and disregarded plaintiff’s additional facts that lacked evidentiary support. Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to include with that motion “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law,” organized by numbered paragraphs and referring to supporting materials that substantiate the asserted facts. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants complied; plaintiff, in opposing summary judgment, was required to, but did not comply. View "Friend v. Valley View Cmty Unit Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a Superior Court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, Fairwinds Church and Fairwinds Christian School (collectively, “Fairwinds”), in an action brought by former student Kimberly Hecksher under the Child Victim‟s Act. Hecksher sued Fairwinds under the Act, arguing that Fairwinds, a small, religious school, was grossly negligent for failing to prevent sexual abuse by Ed Sterling (her foster father and her teacher at Fairwinds), that occurred while she was a student. Hecksher alleged that Sterling's wife and fellow-Fairwinds employee, Sandy Sterling, observed Sterling abusing Hecksher on school property, and that Sandy's knowledge of and tortious failure to report the abuse should have been imputed to Fairwinds. Hecksher also argued that Fairwinds was grossly negligent for failing to have a sexual abuse prevention policy in place and for not responding to red flags that Sterling posed a serious risk to Fairwinds students. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment, finding several instances where reasonable jurors could have found differently than did the Superior Court. The Supreme Court therefore concluded material issues of fact remained, specifically as to whether Sandy's knowledge and conduct could be imputed to Fairwinds, and whether Fairwinds was grossly negligent for failing to have any sexual abuse prevention and detection policies in place and for failing to act on red flags that Sterling posed a serious risk to female students. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for trial. View "Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc., et al." on Justia Law