Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Board appeals the district court's order doubling the compensation of Donald Massey, the part-time Court Compliance Officer (CCO). Massey monitors the integration efforts of the Tangipahoa Parish School System. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). On the merits, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the information that Massey provided in calculating his salary, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by crediting Massey with time spent working as a CCO when many of the tasks that Massey reported to have performed were outside the scope of his duties and responsibilities as a CCO. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board" on Justia Law

Whitaker is a transgender boy whose high school will not permit him to use the boys’ bathroom. He sued, alleging violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and the Equal Protection Clause. The defendants appealed denial of a motion to dismiss, arguing that appellate jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). The district court subsequently vacated its certification and the Seventh Circuit denied permission to appeal. The district court’s decision to withdraw certification destroyed jurisdiction to consider the petition under section 1292(b). View "Kenosha Unified School District v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama Board of Education ("SBOE") and several of its executive directors petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by respondent Sharper Adams and numerous employees of the Birmingham Board of Education (BBOE). Petitioners sought to have all claims dismissed with prejudice on immunity grounds. The BBOE failed to submit a financial-recovery plan to the SBOE by an April 2, 2012, deadline, and its minimum-reserve fund remained underfunded. Once complete, the financial-recovery plan included, among other things, a reduction in force ("RIF"), which required that the jobs of the respondents, among others, be eliminated. The circuit court determined that petitioners had violated the respondents' federal due-process rights by depriving them of their property interest without due process of law because, the circuit court concluded, the petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Students First Act ("the SFA"). Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the SFA, a state law, required that the respondents receive notice of the fact that the implementation of the RIF would result in the termination of their employment positions with the BBOE and that the petitioners failed to give the respondents such notice. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the respondents' federal due-process rights had been violated. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part, and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition with regard to claims against the individual administrators in their official capacities, finding they were entitled to immunity. The Court denied the petition with regard to claims agains the SBOE. View "Ex parte State of Alabama Board of Education et al." on Justia Law

N.L. met Nicholas Clark at school track practice. She was 14, and he was 18. Both were students in the Bethel School District. Neither N.L. nor any responsible adult on the field knew that Clark was a registered sex offender who had previously sexually assaulted a younger girl who had been about N.L. 'sage at the time. The Pierce County Sheriff's Department had informed Clark's school principal of his sex offender status, but the principal took no action in response. Clark persuaded N.L. to leave campus with him and raped her. N.L. sued the district, alleging negligence. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the School District’s duty to N.L. ended when she left campus and whether its alleged negligence, as a matter of law, was not a proximate cause of her injury. The Court answered both questions “no,” affirming the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing the trial court’s dismissal of this case on summary judgment. View "N.L. v. Bethel Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

New Public School District #8 appealed a judgment affirming the State Board of Public School Education's decision approving annexation of certain real properties to the Williston School District. New Public School District argued the State Board erred in approving the petition for annexation because the property to be annexed was not contiguous to the Williston School District before the petition was heard. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Public Sch. Dist. #8 v. North Dakota Bd. of Public Sch. Edu." on Justia Law

Defendant, National Heritage Academies, Inc., was a company that owned and operated a number of public, independently operated schools, including Linden Charter Academy (LCA) located in Flint, Michigan. Plaintiff, Craig Hecht, was a white teacher who had been employed by defendant at LCA for approximately eight years, most recently serving as a third-grade teacher. The student body at LCA was predominantly black. This race discrimination case came about over the color of a computer table: an aide returned a brown table to plaintiff's classroom. Upon noticing her mistake, the aide asked plaintiff whether he'd prefer to have the brown table she brought, or the white table that had previously been in the room. Whether or not plaintiff's next statement in response to the computer table question was a "tasteless joke" with no racial animas ultimately lead to plaintiff's termination with defendant. Plaintiff sued under Michigan's Civil Rights Act (CRA), claiming that the employer's reason for firing him was racially motivated. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). After review, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err by affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for JNOV on plaintiff’s claim of discrimination under the Civil Rights Act (CRA), "[t]his case turned on circumstantial evidence, on the credibility of plaintiff’s proofs that suggested there were racial reasons for his treatment and on the credibility of defendant’s nonracial justifications for firing him." The Court concluded based on the evidence presented and all the inferences that could be reasonably drawn from that evidence in favor of the jury’s liability verdict, that a reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant violated the CRA. The Court found error in the calculation of future damages and reversed the trial court on that ground. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hecht v. National Heritage Academies, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of D.S., a minor student with intellectual disabilities, filed suit against the school district and others, in state court, seeking damages for premises liability and negligent supervision because D.S. was raped by another student in an unsupervised area of Southwest during the school day, and because D.S. was repeatedly bullied and sexually harassed by her classmates and peers. Defendants removed to federal court, claiming that plaintiff's causes of action arose under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., and then moved to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(1) and (6). The district court denied plaintiff's motion to remand and dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies. The court concluded that plaintiff’s theories of liability arise out of Missouri statutory and common law, and the disposition of claims for premises liability and negligent supervision is not dependent on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Even if the relief plaintiff requested were available under both state law and the IDEA, the well-pled complaint rule protects plaintiff's right to choose a state law cause of action. The court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that non-IDEA claims that do not seek relief available under the IDEA are not subject to the exhaustion requirement, even if they allege injuries that could conceivably have been redressed by the IDEA. Finally, the court denied plaintiff's request for attorney fees because defendants had a reasonable basis for their removal request. The court reversed and remanded to state court. View "Moore v. Kansas City Public Sch." on Justia Law

Harris is the principal at Peterson Middle School in the Santa Clara Unified School District. Stampolis, a district board member, has a son who attends Peterson. In October 2014, Harris obtained a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., 527.6) against Stampolis after he became aggressive toward her when she confronted him about how he was regularly late to pick up his son after school. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that sufficient evidence supported conclusions that Stampolis made a credible threat of violence toward Harris on August 27, 2014; that it is reasonably probable that unlawful harassment may occur in the future absent a restraining order; and that the harassment caused Harris emotional distress. View "Harris v. Stampolis" on Justia Law

Appellants are a sub-class of moderately to severely disabled children who have moved to intervene in a class action brought on behalf of all disabled students in the LAUSD against the LAUSD (the Chanda Smith Litigation). Appellants seek to intervene to challenge the legality of a new policy, adopted by LAUSD in 2012 as part of a renegotiation of the Chanda Smith parties’ settlement. The district court denied the motion to intervene. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellants’ motion as untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and further erred when it found intervention unnecessary to protect appellants’ interest in ensuring the receipt of public education consistent with their disabilities and federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Smith v. LAUSD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alfred Fuciarelli was a tenured faculty member at Valdosta State University (“VSU”). Fuciarelli was at one time also assistant vice president for research and a dean of the graduate school. After he complained about VSU’s “noncompliance with laws, rules and regulations,” VSU terminated Fuciarelli’s contract to serve as an assistant vice president and dean. Although Fuciarelli remained as a member of the faculty, his salary and benefits were reduced. Fuciarelli appealed his termination to the Board of Regents which affirmed VSU’s decision. Thereafter, Fuciarelli filed suit against the Board of Regents, William McKinney, individually and in his official capacity as president of VSU, and Karla Hull, individually and in her official capacity as a former acting vice president of VSU, seeking damages under both the Public Employee Whistleblower Retaliation Act, and the Taxpayer Protection Against False Claims Act (“TPAFCA”). The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the public employee whistleblower retaliation claim, but granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the taxpayer retaliation claim on the ground that Fuciarelli failed to obtain the approval of the Attorney General before filing suit. The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether it correctly held that the TPAFCA did not require the Attorney General to approve taxpayer retaliation claims brought under subsection (l) of the Act. Because the plain language of the statute required the Attorney General to approve a taxpayer retaliation claim prior to filing suit, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary. View "McKinney v. Fuciarelli" on Justia Law