Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2017, when Plaintiff was in elementary school, he was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, language disorder, and anxiety. Between 2017 and 2021, Plaintiff's parents asked Defendant School District at least four times to allow Plaintiff to be accompanied at school by an ABA therapist, at no cost to the school district. The school district denied the first three requests and did not respond to the fourth request.Plaintiff's father filed a three-count complaint against the school under the Rehabilitation Act on behalf of his child. The complaint did not mention the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act. The district court denied Plaintiff's claim based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff appealed.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding Plaintiff needed to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA before bringing this suit because his complaint was not brought under the IDEA. View "Z. W. v. Horry County School District" on Justia Law

Kean University implements New Jersey’s Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace through its Affirmative Action Office, which conducts an investigation and prepares a report. Kean’s Chief of Staff reviews the report and makes a final determination. A final determination by the Chief of Staff may be appealed to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission. In 2016, adjunct professor Borowski was accused of making insensitive in-class statements about gender, immigration status, ethnicity, and religion. The Chief of Staff ruled against her. Borowski’s teaching assignment was terminated.Borowski appealed to the Commission, which recognized that material facts were in dispute, and referred the matter to an ALJ. Before a decision on the ensuing hearing, Kean alerted the ALJ of an intervening Commission decision, holding that adjunct professors were not civil service employees entitled to appeal final determinations of Policy violations. The ALJ dismissed Borowski’s appeal; the Commission affirmed.Instead of appealing in the state-court system, Borowski sued in federal court. The district court relied on Younger abstention to dismiss the case. The Third Circuit vacated. Younger abstention prevents federal court interference with only certain types of state proceedings, such as quasi-criminal civil enforcement actions. An appeal to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission is neither quasi-criminal nor within another category of Younger-eligible proceedings. Another prerequisite for Younger abstention is that the state proceeding must be ongoing; the Commission’s dismissal was final. View "Borowski v. Kean University" on Justia Law

John MM. Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, C.M. (Doe’s mother), and B.S. (Doe’s father) (collectively real parties in interest), sued petitioner Victor Valley Union High School District (the district) for negligence and other causes of action arising from an alleged sexual assault on Doe while he was a high school student. During discovery, real parties in interest learned video that captured some of the events surrounding the alleged sexual assault had been erased. Real parties in interest moved the superior court for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary and issue sanctions against the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. The trial court concluded the erasure of the video was the result of negligence and not intentional wrongdoing, and it denied the request for terminating sanctions. However, the court granted the request for evidentiary, issue, and monetary sanctions because it concluded that, even before the lawsuit was filed, the district should have reasonably anticipated the alleged sexual assault would result in litigation and, therefore, the district was under a duty to preserve all relevant evidence including the video. On appeal, the district argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled the district was under the duty to preserve the video when it was erased and, therefore, that the district was not shielded from sanctions by the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f). The Court of Appeal concluded the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f) did not shield a party from sanctions for the spoliation of electronic evidence if the evidence was altered or destroyed when the party was under a duty to preserve the evidence. The Court found the record supported the trial court’s ruling that the district was on notice that litigation about Doe’s alleged sexual assault was reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, the safe-harbor provision did not apply. The Court granted the real parties’ petition in part and directed the trial court to reconsider whether the form of sanctions imposed were warranted. View "Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Colorado’s Attorney General and the Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”) (collectively, “the State”) sought to enjoin the respondent corporate entities and individuals that made up the career school known as CollegeAmerica (collectively, “CollegeAmerica”) from engaging in conduct that the State believed to be in violation of Colorado law. Specifically, the State contended that several aspects of CollegeAmerica’s marketing and admissions operations constituted deceptive trade practices under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”) and that CollegeAmerica’s institutional loan program, “EduPlan,” was unconscionable under the UCCC. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, as did the division below, that the State’s CCPA civil penalty claims were equitable in nature and thus CollegeAmerica was not entitled to a jury trial on those claims. The Court further concluded the division erred in remanding this case for a new trial without first assessing whether CollegeAmerica had, in fact, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of significant public impact and, if so, whether the evidence sufficiently established such an impact. Finally, the Court concluded the division correctly determined that CollegeAmerica’s EduPlan loans as a whole were not unconscionable, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the division’s conclusion that individualized evidence regarding the probability of repayment was necessary to establish unconscionability. View "Colorado v. Center for Excellence in Higher Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of William Marsh Rice University d/b/a Rice University (hereinafter, “Rice” or “the University”) dismissing his claims under Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”) as well as his state law breach-of-contract claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim but reversed its summary judgment in favor of the University with respect to Plaintiff’s Title IX claims and remanded. The court explained that Plaintiff has not alleged any breaches of the University’s Code or associated policies. Moreover, as the district court accurately observed in evaluating Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim, the Code expressly provides that “[t]he procedures used . . . by SJP are not those used in court cases and are not intended to create contractual rights[.]” In the absence of contractual rights and the University’s intent to be bound, the court held that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim. Moreover, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the University on the grounds that the record clearly indicates that material fact issues remain in dispute as to whether Plaintiff has successfully advanced a Title IX claim against the University. View "Doe v. William Marsh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Granite State Trade School, LLC (GSTS) was a gas training school providing fuel gas fitting training courses and licensing exams in New Hampshire since 2007. GSTS was approved as a gas training school prior to the adoption of the current gas fitting regulatory framework. In 2020, defendant New Hampshire Mechanical Licensing Board (Board) directed GSTS to submit to an audit by producing its curriculum, instructor information, and exam materials. In response, GSTS brought suit seeking a declaration that “GSTS training and testing is grandfathered and exempt from compliance” with the audit request because its programs predated the current regulations. Alternatively, GSTS asked the trial court to find Rules Saf-Mec 308 and 610 “arbitrary and capricious” because the rules failed to protect the “integrity and security of the program education materials, and exams,” and were “overburdensome.” GSTS sought to enjoin the Board from: (1) requiring the production of proprietary materials created by GSTS; (2) terminating its training program; and (3) declining to accept certification from GSTS. The Board moved to dismiss; the trial court granted the Board’s motion. The court ruled that the plain and ordinary meaning of the language contained in Rules Saf-Mec 308 and 610 did not “relieve prior approved programs from their continuing obligations” to comply with the regulatory scheme. The trial court also ruled that Saf-Mec 610 “is a valid exercise of the state’s police power and not arbitrary or capricious” and dismissed GSTS’s claim that Saf-Mec 308 was arbitrary and capricious. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Granite State Trade School, LLC v. New Hampshire Mechanical Licensing Board" on Justia Law

This case started more than fifty years ago when Minnie Liddell sued to desegregate the St. Louis public school system. The NAACP joined the lawsuit, and the State of Missouri (among others) became a defendant. The parties struck a deal that lasted until 1999 when they agreed to end Missouri’s remedial obligations. The Missouri Legislature ratified the parties’ settlement agreement and created a charter-school option. A group of charter schools complained to the Missouri Legislature, which altered the funding formula in 2006. The revised formula, part of Senate Bill 287, is what has led to the current dispute. The St. Louis Public School District and one of the plaintiffs asked the district court to enforce the settlement agreement by having Missouri reimburse it for the special-sales-tax revenue it had lost under the new funding formula. The district court sided with Missouri, and both sides appealed. Plaintiffs continued to believe that the St. Louis Public School District should receive all the special-sales-tax revenue. And Missouri argued that the desegregation-spending condition finds no support in the settlement agreement.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment but vacated the part requiring charter schools to spend those funds on “desegregation measures.” The court explained that there has been no “disproportionate adverse financial impact” on the St. Louis Public School District because it never had a right to keep all the special-sales-tax revenue for itself. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that allowing charter schools to spend their money as they see fit is inconsistent with the “purpose” of the settlement agreement. View "Deric Liddell v. State of Missouri" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education (“CMS”) and cross-appeal by Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of his child, A.B. Plaintiff filed an administrative action in North Carolina, alleging that CMS violated the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”), by failing to provide A.B. with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) through an individualized education plan (“IEP”). The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) dismissed Plaintiff’s action as time-barred by a one-year statute of limitations. CMS filed an original civil action in district court, seeking a judicial determination that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiff’s administrative action. Plaintiff and A.B. filed a counterclaim, asking the district court to decide the merits of the underlying IDEA claim. The district court agreed with the SHRO and held that the statute of limitations did not bar Plaintiff’s IDEA claim, but it held that Plaintiff needed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing the merits to federal court. Both parties appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding as to CMS’s appeal and held that the statute of limitations does not bar Plaintiff’s IDEA claim. But, because Plaintiff’s counterclaim is compulsory, the court concluded that he need not exhaust. Therefore, the court reversed on that issue and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that the Plaintiff was prevented from filing a timely administrative petition because CMS withheld information it was required to provide him. Therefore, his IDEA petition was not barred by the statute of limitations. View "Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education v. Aleah Brady" on Justia Law

Parents and guardians of students with disabilities brought an enforcement action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, alleging that the New York City Department of Education must immediately fund their children’s educational placements during the pendency of ongoing state administrative proceedings. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court denied. Plaintiffs appealed from that denial.   The Second Circuit affirmed. As a threshold jurisdictional matter, the court held that although the Plaintiffs are not yet entitled to tuition payments for the portion of the school year that has yet to occur, their claims are nevertheless ripe because they also seek payments for past transportation costs. On the merits, the court held that the IDEA’s stay-put provision does not entitle parties to automatic injunctive relief when the injunctive relief concerns only educational funding, not placement. Applying the traditional preliminary injunction standard, the court concluded that Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek because they have not shown a likelihood of irreparable injury. View "Mendez v. Banks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota (University) following the elimination of the University’s men’s gymnastics team. He then sought a preliminary injunction to reinstate the team pending the outcome of the litigation. The district court denied the motion for the preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiff’s delay in filing for the injunction undermined his claim of irreparable harm and that the other preliminary injunction factors favored the University. Plaintiff appealed the order denying the motion for the preliminary injunction. At issue on appeal is whether Plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm, and second, whether he unreasonably delayed in bringing the claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it has found that “delay is only significant if the harm has occurred and the parties cannot be returned to the status quo.” Here, the men’s collegiate gymnastics season begins in December at the earliest and January at the latest. The goal of a preliminary injunction is “to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.” Given that the injunction motion was not filed until November 2021 and that the majority of the coaching staff and other gymnasts had left the University by this time, it would have been improbable, at best, for the team to have competed in the 2021–2022 season. Because Plaintiff sought an injunction after it would have been possible “to preserve the status quo,” the court held that the delay was unreasonable and that it consequently defeated Plaintiff’s goal of preventing irreparable harm. View "Evan Ng v. Board of Regents of the U of M" on Justia Law