Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, in committing a respondent under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01), the circuit court must make an explicit finding that the respondent is substantially probable to commit sex offenses in the future if not confined. The Act was subsequently amended to include the required element of a substantial probability to reoffend within the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person.In 1973, Snapp pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent liberties with a child. In 1992, he pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse. In 1997, after Snappwas again charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, the state filed a petition and obtained his commitment under the Act. In 2004 and 2007, Snapp filed applications for recovery, seeking release from his civil commitment. Both of those applications were denied. In 2010, Snapp filed another application for recovery. A bench trial was held in 2018, The court denied Snapp’s petition, finding he was “still a sexually dangerous person and in need of confinement.” The appellate court vacated, finding that precedent required an express finding of a substantial probability to reoffend.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. The General Assembly eliminated the requirement of a separate explicit finding by the circuit court that the respondent is substantially probable to reoffend if not confined. View "In re Commitment of Snapp" on Justia Law

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In 2007-2011, the Department of Justice and the FBI issued press releases disclosing Appellant’s role in the mortgage fraud crimes with which he and his co-conspirators were charged. The press releases included Appellant’s name, age, and the charges against him, and some limited employment history. The notices remain publicly available on the DOJ and FBI websitesThe Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s action alleging that the continued online public availability of the government’s press releases relating to Appellant’s guilty plea and sentencing violated his statutory and constitutional rights. Appellant’s Privacy Act claim was barred by the Act’s two-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when a cause of action arises; while information may be repeatedly accessed after publication, the “single publication rule” provides that the limitations period runs only from the date of original dissemination. The court declined to apply equitable tolling. While individuals may have a constitutional privacy interest in certain, highly sensitive information, Appellant did not have such an interest in the information at issue. Rejecting an Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" claim, the court held that the district court applied the correct test in determining whether the press releases were punitive in purpose or effect. View "Doe v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Americans and co-conspirators based in China schemed to obtain EB-1C work visas fraudulently for Chinese nationals. Their clients each deposited about $300,000 into a client-owned American bank account. The government did not prosecute the Chinese clients but sought forfeiture of the funds. The Chinese nationals filed claims for the funds.The State Department denied visa requests to allow certain Chinese nationals to attend the forfeiture trial. The U.S. Attorney unsuccessfully worked with their attorney and DHS to obtain parole letters granting them entry without a visa. The Chinese argued that their inability to attend violated the Due Process Clause by preventing them from presenting an “innocent owner” defense, 18 U.S.C. 983(d)(1). The district court denied the motion, noting other means to present their testimony, such as by video conference, and that counsel could present their defenses. All the Chinese were represented by counsel at trial; four attended and testified. The court instructed the jury that the government bore the burden of proving that the “funds made the . . . visa fraud scheme easy or less difficult or ensured that the scheme would be more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.”The jury found that the government had satisfied its burden of proof as to all the funds, that five Chinese nationals—four of whom had testified—had proved that they were innocent owners, and rejected the remaining innocent-owner defenses. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation. View "United States v. Approximately $281,110.00 Seized from an East-West Bank Account, ending in the number 2471" on Justia Law

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Following a preliminary hearing, petitioner Dr. Sanjoy Banerjee was charged in an information with two counts of presenting a false or fraudulent health care claim to an insurer (a form of insurance fraud, counts 1-2), and three counts of perjury (counts 3-5). The superior court denied Banerjee’s motion to dismiss the information as unsupported by reasonable or probable cause. Banerjee petitioned for a writ of prohibition to direct the superior court to vacate its order denying his Penal Code section 995 motion and to issue an order setting aside the information. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause and an order staying further proceedings on the information, pending the Court's resolution of the merits of Banerjee’s petition. The State filed a return, and Banerjee filed a traverse. The State argued the evidence supported a strong suspicion that Banerjee committed two counts of insurance fraud and three counts of perjury, based on his violations of Labor Code section 139.3(a) between 2014 and 2016. During that period, Banerjee billed a workers’ compensation insurer for services he rendered to patients through his professional corporation and through two other legal entities he owned and controlled. The insurance fraud charges are based on Banerjee’s 2014-2016 billings to the insurer through the two other entities. The perjury charges were based on three instances in which Banerjee signed doctor’s reports, certifying under penalty of perjury that he had not violated “section 139.3.” Banerjee argued: (1) the evidence showed he did not violate the statute's referral prohibition; (2) even if he did not comply with section 139.3(e), the “physician’s office” exception to the referral prohibition applied to all of his referrals to his two other legal entities; and (3) the patient disclosure requirement of section 139.3(e), the referral prohibition of section 139.3(a), and the physician’s office exception to the referral prohibition were unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Banerjee did not violate section 139.3(a) by referring his patients to his two other legal entities; and (2) the evidence supported a strong suspicion that Banerjee specifically intended to present false and fraudulent claims for health care benefits, in violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(6), by billing the workers’ compensation insurer substantially higher amounts through his two other legal entities than he previously and customarily billed the insurer for the same services he formerly rendered through his professional corporation and his former group practice. Thus, the Court granted the writ as to the perjury charges but denied it as to the insurance fraud charges. View "Banerjee v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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In 1992, Grant was convicted of homicide and other crimes that he had committed while he was a juvenile. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. Parole is unavailable to those convicted of federal crimes, so the sentence effectively condemned Grant to die in prison. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court held (Miller v. Alabama) that the Eighth Amendment permits a life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence for a juvenile homicide offender only if the sentencer could have imposed a lesser punishment based on the offender’s youth at the time of the offense.At Miller’s resentencing, the judge recognized that youth can impair judgment and thereby mitigate culpability, stated that a life sentence for Grant would be too harsh, given his juvenile offender status and individual circumstances, and sentenced Grant to a term of 60 years on his homicide-related convictions with an undisturbed five-year consecutive sentence, Grant argued that his 65-year sentence violates Miller because it incarcerates him to his life expectancy, thereby amounting to a de facto LWOP sentence. Grant contends that Miller forbids such a sentence for a juvenile homicide offender unless he or she is incorrigible, which Grant is not. The Third Circuit affirmed. Miller only entitled Grant to a sentencing hearing at which the district court had the discretion to impose a sentence less than LWOP in view of Grant’s youth at the time of his offenses; that is what he received. View "United States v. Grant" on Justia Law

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Herrera, an Illinois state prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against three correctional officers of the Cook County Jail for failing to protect him from assault and denying him prompt medical care. In his timely filed original complaint, Herrera named each of the defendants “John Doe” as a nominal placeholder until he could ascertain the proper identities of the officers. Herrera then twice amended his complaint to include their actual names—but did so outside of the two-year limitations period set by Illinois law.The district court denied a motion to dismiss, reasoning that suing “John Doe” defendants constituted a “mistake” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), so that Herrera’s amended complaint “related back” to his original complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Knowingly suing a John Doe defendant is not a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c). Whether Herrer satisfies the factual test for equitable tolling is beyond the scope of an interlocutory appeal and should be considered on remand. View "Herrera v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

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Texas state prisoner Haverkamp, a biological male at birth who identifies as a transgender woman, sued, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause by denying Haverkamp medically necessary sex-reassignment surgery and by failing to provide certain female commissary items and a long-hair pass. Texas’s Correctional Managed Healthcare Committee has a policy concerning the treatment of gender disorders. Based on the state’s advisory, the district court ordered service of Haverkamp’s operative complaint on Dr. Murray, whom the state identified as the proper defendant if Haverkamp were seeking sex-reassignment surgery, and the nine Committee members who had not yet been named as parties. The district court subsequently denied motions to dismiss, concluding that the state was not entitled to sovereign immunity.The Fifth Circuit vacated. Haverkamp’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity because the Committee members are not proper defendants under Ex Parte Young; Haverkamp fails to allege they have the requisite connection to enforcing the policies Haverkamp challenges. In light of the state’s representations to the district court that these defendants are the proper state officials to sue, the court did not dismiss them from the case. View "Haverkamp v. Linthicum" on Justia Law

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Kensu, a resident of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder. He has filed several actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983 during his sentence; he won $325,002 after the jury found that five defendants had been “deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need[s].” Since then, Kensu has filed several more suits against MDOC and Corizon, a correctional health care contractor, including putative class actions, some of which remain pending.The complaint, in this case, had 808 numbered allegations plus additional sub-allegations, spanning 180 pages. Although his counsel failed to identify this case as related to any of his earlier actions (in violation of a local rule) the district court determined that it was a companion to Kensu v. Borgerding, and reassigned it. Finding his complaint too long and unclear, the district court dismissed, allowing Kensu to try again. His second effort was still too long and unclear. The district court explained the problems with Kensu’s complaint in more detail and gave him one last chance to amend it. Kensu made his complaint longer instead of reducing it to a plain statement of his grievance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. View "Kensu v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

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In March 2020, the District of Columbia's mayor declared a public health emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department of Corrections responded by instituting policies intended to protect its employees and inmates from the coronavirus. On March 30, inmates at D.C. correctional facilities filed a class action, asserting claims under 28 U.S.C. 2241 and 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The district court appointed amici to investigate conditions at D.C. correctional facilities; based on their report the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order on April 19, generally requiring Corrections to address identified problems. Although COVID cases in the facilities decreased, significant problems remained. In June 2020, the district court entered a preliminary injunction, ordering the defendants to ensure inmates receive medical attention within 24 hours after reporting medical problems, to contract for COVID-19 cleaning services, ensure quarantine isolation units are nonpunitive and provide access to confidential legal calls. Corrections took steps to comply. One month later, Corrections moved to vacate the preliminary injunction due to changed circumstances. Amici reported substantial improvement but imperfect compliance with the preliminary injunction.The district court denied the motion. The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(2), the preliminary injunction has expired; the cases are now moot. View "Banks v. Booth" on Justia Law

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A superior court judge summarily denied petitioner Nancy Michelle Mendoza's petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein she claimed she received ineffective assistance of counsel at her sentencing hearing. The California Supreme Court later issued an order to show cause (OSC) returnable to the superior court on the same claim. The case was then assigned to the same judge who had previously denied Mendoza’s petition. More than 40 days later, Mendoza filed a peremptory challenge to the judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. A different judge denied the challenge as untimely. Mendoza sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal to direct the superior court to vacate its order denying her peremptory challenge, and to disqualify the original judge. The Court found her petition presented an issue of first impression as to whether her peremptory challenge was subject to section 170.6(a)(2)’s 60-day deadline following a “reversal on appeal” and assignment to the original judge for “a new trial” (in which case Mendoza’s challenge was timely); or section 170.6(a)(2)’s 10-day deadline for criminal cases assigned to a judge for all purposes (in which case Mendoza’s challenge was untimely). The Court determined the 60-day deadline did not apply. The Court found the proceedings on Mendoza's petition would not constitute a new trial; thus the 10-day all purpose assignment deadline applied. Applying this deadline, the superior court properly denied Mendoza’s challenge as untimely. View "Mendoza v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law