Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Bokhari is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Pakistan. While living in Wisconsin, Bokhari allegedly conducted a fraudulent scheme with his brothers, bilking a nonprofit entity that administered the E‐Rate Program, a federal project to improve internet and telecommunications services for disadvantaged schools, out of an estimated $1.2 million, by submitting false invoices. In 2001, while the alleged fraud was ongoing, Bokhari moved to Pakistan, where, according to the prosecution, he continued directing the illegal scheme. In 2004, a federal grand jury in Wisconsin indicted the brothers for mail fraud, money laundering, and related charges. The brothers pleaded guilty and were sentenced to more than five years in prison. The government submitted an extradition request to Pakistan in 2005. Bokhari contested the request in Pakistani court, and the Pakistani government sent an attorney to plead the case for extradition. In 2007, following a hearing, a Pakistani magistrate declined to authorize extradition. In 2009, the U.S. secured a “red notice” through Interpol, notifying member states to arrest Bokhari should he enter their jurisdiction. In the U.S., Bokhari’s attorneys moved to dismiss the indictment and quash the arrest warrant. The district court denied Bokhari’s motion pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the appeal as an improper attempt to seek interlocutory review of a non‐final pretrial order. View "United States v. Bokhari" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, pretrial detainees at a detention center, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against prison guards and the Sheriff, alleging a variety of constitutional violations. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity where the record supported a claim of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The record also supported a claim for failure to protect plaintiffs from harm in violation of the Due Process Clause and the district court correctly denied the guards qualified immunity on this claim. Given the fact that the Sheriff was not at the detention center, he could not have used excessive force against plaintiffs, nor could he have an opportunity to intervene to prevent the guards from employing excessive force. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity with respect to the Sheriff. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Edwards, Jr., et al. v. Byrd, et al." on Justia Law

The European Community filed suit against RJR, alleging that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering scheme with organized crime groups in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., laundered money through New York-based financial institutions and repatriated the profits of the scheme to the United States, and committed various common law torts in violation of New York state law. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the federal and state law claims; the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that RICO cannot apply to a foreign enterprise or to extraterritorial conduct; the court concluded that, with respect to a number of offenses that constitute predicates for RICO liability and were alleged in this case, Congress had clearly manifested an intent that they apply extraterritorially; and, as to the other alleged offenses, the Complaint alleged sufficiently important domestic activity to come within RICO's coverage. The court also concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the European Community's participation as a plaintiff in this lawsuit destroyed complete diversity; the European Community is an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. 1603(b) and therefore, qualified as a "foreign state" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(4); and its suit against "citizens of a State or of different States" came within the diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc." on Justia Law

A former inmate brought sued the Department of Corrections alleging that the Department negligently failed to protect him after he reported being threatened and that he was subsequently assaulted and seriously injured while in prison. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the inmate had not shown that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question whether the Department breached its duty to protect him from reasonably foreseeable harm. Specifically, the superior court concluded that the communication of the threat was too general to put the Department on notice that the inmate was at risk for the attack he suffered. The inmate appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the inmate presented evidence that raised a genuine issue of fact as to the foreseeability of the attack he suffered. View "Mattox v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of four felonies, with forfeiture specifications, for running a marijuana-distribution operation out of a building he and his brothers owned on Scranton Road. Common Pleas Court Judge Nancy McDonnell issued a sentencing entry listing the property at Scranton Road as property to be forfeited. On October 11, 2011, Appellant appealed the sentencing order. On January 13, 2012, Judge McDonnell issued a journal entry reiterating Appellant’s sentence and ordering transfer of the property. On October 23, 2012, Appellant sought a writ of prohibition to vacate Judge McDonnell’s January 13, 2012 order, arguing that Judge McDonnell lacked jurisdiction to enter the order. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition, concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 2981.04 vested Judge McDonnell with jurisdiction to conduct forfeiture proceedings even after the notice of appeal was filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McDonnell did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and that any errors in the proceedings should be addressed on appeal. View "State ex rel. West v. McDonnell" on Justia Law

In 2012, the State filed a complaint seeking forfeiture of $7550 in United States currency. The complaint named both the $7550 and Patricia West as defendants in the caption. West filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the State failed to obtain service on her within 120 days of the filing of the complaint pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4. The circuit court granted West’s motion to dismiss, concluding that because the State knew that West had an interest in the currency, West must be subject personally to the jurisdiction of the court. On appeal, the State asserted that West was not actually a defendant but only an interest holder in the currency, and the inclusion of West as a named defendant in the complaint did not change the substance of the action as an in rem proceeding against the currency. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, because the State did not personally serve West, who was listed as a defendant in the caption of the complaint, the circuit court did not err in dismissing the action against West. View "State v. West" on Justia Law

Apple introduced the iPad in 2010. To send and receive data over cellular networks (3G), customers had to purchase a data contract from AT&T and register on an AT&T website. AT&T prepopulated the user ID field on the login screen with customers’ email addresses by programming servers to search for the user’s Integrated Circuit Card Identifier to reduce the time to log into an account. Spitler discovered this “shortcut” and wrote a program, the “account slurper,” to repeatedly access the AT&T website, each time changing the ICC-ID by one digit. If an email address appeared in the login box, the program would save that address. Spitler shared this discovery with Auernheimer, who helped him to refine the account slurper, which collected 114,000 email addresses. Auernheimer emailed the media to publicize their exploits. AT&T fixed the breach. Auernheimer shared the list of email addresses with Tate, who published a story that mentioned some names of those whose email addresses were obtained, but published only redacted email addresses and ICC-IDs. Spitler was in California. Auernheimer was in Arkansas. The servers t were physically located in Texas and Georgia. Despite the absence of any connection to New Jersey, a Newark grand jury indicted Auernheimer for conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(ii), and identity fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7). The Third Circuit vacated his conviction. Venue in criminal cases is more than a technicality; it involves “matters that touch closely the fair administration of criminal justice and public confidence in it.”View "United States v. Auernheimer" on Justia Law

Clark was indicted under 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1)(A) for having used an eavesdropping device to record a conversation between himself and attorney Thomas without her consent and having used a device to record a conversation between himself, Judge Janes, and Thomas while Janes was acting in the performance of official duties, without the consent of either. Defendant stated that he was in court and attorney Thomas was representing the opposing party; there was no court reporter nor was there any recording device, so he made recordings to preserve the record. He claimed he had a first amendment right to gather information by recording officials performing their public duties. The circuit court dismissed, holding that the statute is unconstitutional on substantive due process and first amendment grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that if another person overhears what we say, that person may write it down and publish it, but if that same person records our words with a recording device, even if it is not published in any way, a criminal act has been committed. The statute goes too far in its effort to protect individuals’ interest in the privacy of their communications and burdens substantially more speech than necessary to serve interests it may legitimately serve. It does not meet the requirements necessary to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

Denver police arrested Marvin Booker on a warrant for failure to appear at a hearing regarding a drug charge. During booking, Booker died while in custody after officers restrained him in response to alleged insubordination. Several officers pinned Booker face-down to the ground, one placed him in a chokehold, and another tased him. The officers sought medical help for Booker, but he could not be revived. Booker’s estate sued Deputies Faun Gomez, James Grimes, Kyle Sharp, Kenneth Robinette, and Sergeant Carrie Rodriguez, alleging they used excessive force and failed to provide Booker with immediate medical care. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion because disputed facts precluded summary judgment. The Defendants appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Estate of Marvin L. Booker, et al v. Gomez, et al" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of wanton endangerment and sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence taken from his residence because, under the circumstances, the warrantless search of the residence was allowed under the emergency doctrine exception, and even in the absence of exigent circumstances, the police officers were entitled to conduct a protective search; and (2) the circuit court did not err in allowing the jury to hear testimony regarding the out-of-court identification of Petitioner made by the victim. View "State v. Kimble" on Justia Law