Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

DeCoteau was convicted of gross sexual imposition in 1996. His 2012 habeas petition had six claims. The district court dismissed, finding four claims time-barred, one procedurally barred, and the other without merit, but granted a certificate of appealability as to whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act limitations period applies on a claim-by-claim basis. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. AEDPA’s one-year limitations period applies to “an application” for habeas corpus, running from the latest of: the date on which judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time for seeking review; the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed; the date on which a newly-recognized constitutional right was initially recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or the date on which the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The court rejected DeCoteau’s argument that the word “application” focuses on the date of the latest claim within the entire application, allowing review of all claims if one is timely. View "DeCoteau v. Schweitzer" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of two firearms, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court subsequently sentenced Defendant as an armed career criminal to fifteen years imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) district court correctly refused to suppress two statements Defendant made regarding the presence of firearms inside his residence based on alleged Miranda violations; and (2) the district court did not err in labeling Defendant an armed career criminal subject to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of complicity to commit aggravated murder, two counts of attempted aggravated murder, and related crimes. After a mitigation hearing, the jury recommended death for the three aggravated murders. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation prior to his mitigation hearing. The trial court denied Defendant’s petition for postconviction relief. The court of appeals vacated Defendant’s death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing, concluding that trial counsel’s decision to present only positive mitigation evidence was unreasonable, and undiscovered mitigating evidence might have influenced the jury’s appraisal of Defendant’s culpability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel were deficient by failing to conduct a thorough and adequate investigation into Defendant’s background before his mitigation hearing; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in determining that counsel’s deficiency was prejudicial under Strickland.View "State v. Herring" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two felony counts of possessing cocaine for sale and the People filed a petition to forfeit the $2,709 in cash found in her possession. Defendant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the civil forfeiture order because the forfeiture action was "tried" more than two years after she entered her plea, in violation of the statutory mandate that the two actions be "tried in conjunction" with each other; and the trial court's grant of summary judgment violated her constitutional and statutory right to trial by jury. The court rejected defendant's arguments, holding that a civil action to forfeit less than $25,000 cash need not be tried or otherwise settled at the same time that the criminal defendant enters a plea on the "underlying or related" criminal drug charges. Further, defendant's right to a jury trial was not violated where, in this civil forfeiture action, defendant did not raise any procedural improprieties in the trial court's handling of the summary judgment motion, or its earlier order deeming admitted the People's requests for admission. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "People v. $2,709 U.S. Currency" on Justia Law

In 2009, following a joint investigation by the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General and the Centre County Drug Task Force into cocaine trafficking by appellee Gregory Palazzari, appellee was arrested and charged with multiple drug trafficking offenses under the Controlled Substances, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Drug Act). The Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the Attorney General’s Office petitioned the trial court for forfeiture of Appellee’s property located at 605 University Drive, State College pursuant to the Forfeiture Act, alleging that appellee had used the property for the storage and sale of cocaine, as well as a place to meet his drug supplier. In a discretionary appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the general applicability of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to forfeiture proceedings brought pursuant to the Forfeiture Act, specifically, the availability of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1035.2, Pa.R.C.P. in such proceedings. Although the trial court granted forfeiture of the property to the Commonwealth upon its motion for summary judgment, the Commonwealth Court reversed, broadly holding that the Rules of Civil Procedure generally and Rule 1035.2 in particular were inapplicable to forfeiture proceedings. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the Rules of Civil Procedure applied to forfeiture proceedings where they do not conflict with the Forfeiture Act, and that there was no conflict between the entry of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1035.2 and the Act. As such, the Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth.View "Pennsylvania v. All That Certain Lot et al (Palazzari)" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree sexual assault and sentenced to three to five years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court did not err in (1) failing to allow Defendant to inquire on redirect examination into the nature of his witness’ felony conviction after he was impeached by the State; (2) not granting the parties’ joint motion for mistrial; and (3) admitting certain hearsay statements under the excited utterances exception. The Court further held that because the record was incomplete, the Court could not reach Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal.View "State v. Castillo-Zamora" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of disorderly conduct. Over Johnson’s objection, his appeal was heard by a panel of two appellate division judges. That panel affirmed. Johnson then filed a petition for rehearing, contending that the participation of only two judges at the hearing violated Code of Civil Procedure section 77(b) and made the panel more likely to prejudge the outcome and “less susceptible to persuasion by oral argument than they would otherwise be.” The appellate division rejected Johnson’s arguments. The court of appeal vacated and ordered that Johnson’s appeal be heard by a panel of three judges.View "Johnson v. Appellate Div." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against four defendants alleging that they conspired to fabricate a mental incompetency determination in connection with criminal proceedings filed against Plaintiff in Utah. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s case for failing to properly serve the defendants within ninety days of filing the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) questions existed whether the affidavits of service on three of the defendants established a prima case of valid service, and the fourth defendant waived any objection to lack of proper service; (2) the district court did not err in failing to enter a default against the defendants; and (3) the district judge did not err in not granting Plaintiff’s motion to transfer the case to another district court. Remanded for a hearing to determine the validity of service of process.View "Lundahl v. Gregg" on Justia Law

Defendant Tiffanie Felix appealed her conviction for the sale or delivery of 200 milligrams or more of heroin following a jury trial. She argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow her to impeach the credibility of the State’s key witness in various ways, depriving defendant of a fair trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Felix" on Justia Law

King was in custody awaiting a probable cause determination in 2007. After being rapidly tapered off psychotropic medication by jail medical staff, complaining of seizure-like symptoms, and being placed in an isolated cell for seven hours, King was found dead. His estate sued La Crosse County and individual employees. After a remand, six weeks before the trial date, King’s counsel asserted in a letter to the defendants that the correct standard for jury instructions was one of objective reasonableness, not the deliberate indifference standard that had been used by both parties in the pleadings, the summary judgment briefing, the subsequent appeal, and post-remand pretrial preparations. The assertion was correct, but defendants moved that King be precluded from arguing the applicability of the objective reasonableness standard because of her tardiness in asserting the argument. The district court ordered that the case be tried as scheduled under the deliberate indifference standard. The Seventh Circuit reversed, acknowledging that King’s long, unexplained delay in asserting the correct standard was puzzling and problematic, but stating that the district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation of how the defendants would suffer prejudice as a result of the delay. The court subsequently clarified that the reversal applied only to the individual defendants, not the county. View "King v. Kramer" on Justia Law