Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking in heroin and cocaine and of unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his apartment by police officers during the execution of an “anticipatory search warrant,” claiming that the officers had executed the search before the “triggering events” stated in the affidavit had occurred. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting convictions, holding (1) where, as in this case, the Commonwealth applies for an anticipatory search warrant and the judicial authorization to execute the search is conditioned on the occurrence of a specific future event, the search is authorized by the warrant where there is equivalent compliance with that condition precedent; and (2) in this case, there was both equivalent compliance with the warrant’s triggering conditions, and compliance with those conditions provided probable cause to search Defendant’s residence. View "Commonwealth v. Colondres" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on self-defense; (2) the district court did not commit clear error by failing to instruct on second-degree intentional murder; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments by vouching for the credibility of some witnesses, discussing facts not in evidence, and disparaging the defense, but the statements did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (4) the district court did not err in excluding evidence suggesting that a third party might have had a motive to commit the murder; (5) Defendant did not preserve his argument that the district court violated his confrontation rights by limiting cross-examination of a state witness; and (6) the presumed instructional error and the instances of prosecutorial misconduct did not cumulatively deny Defendant a fair trial. View "State v. Knox" on Justia Law

Williamsburg executed a $200,000 bail bond for the release of a criminal defendant. Following his release, the defendant was scheduled to appear in court on July 20, 2012. The defendant failed to appear, and the court ordered the bond forfeited. On July 23, the court clerk mailed a bail forfeiture notice to Williamsburg. Under the notice and Penal Code, section 1305,1 Williamsburg had until January 24, 2013 to surrender the defendant to custody or move to set aside the forfeiture. Williamsburg moved to extend the exoneration period on January 22, 2013. On February 1, 2013, the court heard the motion and ordered the exoneration period extended 169 days to Saturday, July 20, 2013. On July 22, the first court day following July 20, Williamsburg filed its second motion to extend the exoneration period. It noticed the motion to be heard on August 27. Williamsburg filed the declaration of Investigator Smalls, describing his investigation into the defendant’s whereabouts and stating he was confident that defendant was still in Los Angeles County. The court denied the motion, without a hearing, and entered summary judgment on the forfeited bond. The court of appeal reversed. Williamsburg had a statutory right to an oral hearing. View "Cnty of Los Angeles. v. Williamsburg Nat'l Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of fleeing and evading in the second-degree, being a felon in possession of a handgun, and being a persistent felony offender in the first-degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence found incident to a Terry stop; (2) abused its discretion by imposing limitations upon Appellant’s hybrid counsel arrangement, but the error was harmless; (3) did not err by admitting evidence of other crimes; (4) did not err by permitting the Commonwealth to refer to Appellant’s his post-arrest silence; (5) properly denied Appellant’s motions for a continuance; and (6) did not err by imposing court costs. View "Nunn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Smith, labeled as a “snitch,” was attacked by other inmates in the Varner Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction. He was removed from the Unit and placed in protective custody. Smith alleges that correctional officer Johnson later returned him to the general population in the Varner Unit, without Smith’s consent and in violation of departmental policies. According to Smith, the next day another inmate severely beat him with his fist and a lock, causing scarring, a lost tooth, migraines, blurred vision, sensory losses, dizzy spells, and psychological symptoms. After the attack, Smith claims that Johnson and other officers punished him using “major disciplinary policies.” Smith unsuccessfully pursued grievances and filed a pro se claim with the State Claims Commission. The Commission dismissed Smith’s claim for failure to prove any negligence by the Department of Correction. Smith next filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging “deliberate indifference for [his] safety” and cruel and unusual punishment. The district court dismissed, ruling if the Claims Commission had jurisdiction over Smith’s constitutional claim, the action was barred by claim preclusion; if the Commission did not have jurisdiction over that claim, issue preclusion barred Smith’s claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that neither doctrine barred the suit. View "Smith v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was charged with multiple crimes arising out of the bombings at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. After jury selection commenced, Petitioner filed his third motion to change venue, asserting that pretrial publicity and public attitudes were so hostile and inflammatory that he would be unable to receive a trial before a fair and impartial jury in Boston. Petitioner then filed a second petition for mandamus, which largely made the same claims and relied on the same types of data as the third motion for change of venue. The district court denied the third motion for change of venue. The First Circuit denied the second mandamus petition after noting that knowledge of a high-profile case does not equate to disqualifying prejudice, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to mandamus relief because (1) it was not clear and indisputable that pretrial publicity required a change of venue; (2) the ongoing jury selection process did not suggest pervasive prejudice; (3) Petitioner failed to demonstrate irreparable harm; and (4) the balance of equities did not favor granting mandamus relief. View "In re Tsarnaev" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, criminal mischief, and elder abuse for his conduct during one incident. Defendant filed a pretrial motion requesting that the court order the State to elect between prosecuting him for either aggravated assault or elder abuse, arguing that his federal double jeopardy protections and the protections of Montana’s “multiple charges” statute would be violated if he were prosecuted for both offenses. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the elder abuse statute was neither a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault nor a specific instance of aggravated assault. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal, holding (1) Defendant may be prosecuted for more than one offense arising out of the same transaction; and (2) Defendant’s double jeopardy claim and reliance on the protections of the multiple charges statute were premature. View "State v. Violette" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal attempt to commit murder, two counts of first-degree robbery, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant’s conviction of criminal attempt to commit murder and affirmed the remainder of his convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that Defendant’s confession was voluntary and by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his confession; (2) the trial court erred by admitting Defendant’s redacted confession to the jury, and the improper redaction constituted reversible error; and (3) the jury unanimously convicted Defendant of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. Remanded. View "Sykes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(C)(2)(a), which defines “gross sexual imposition” and subjects an offender to a mandatory term of imprisonment when evidence other than the victim’s testimony is admitted corroborating the violation. Appellant in this case pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition. The State introduced testimony regarding Appellant’s alleged confession to the offenses and argued that the confession constituted corroborating evidence, and thus a mandatory prison sentence was required. The trial court concluded that application of section 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violated Appellant’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 2907.05(C)(2)(a)’s requirement of a mandatory prison term when corroborating evidence is introduced is unconstitutional because corroboration bears no rational relationship to the crime’s activity; and (2) in cases in which a defendant has pled guilty, imposing a mandatory prison term pursuant to section 2907.05(C)(2)(a) when corroborating evidence of the charge of gross sexual imposition is produced violates a defendant’s right to a jury trial. View "State v. Bevly" on Justia Law

In 1999, Christeson was convicted of three counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Christeson’s conviction and sentence and denial of his post-conviction motion for relief. Under the one-year limitations period imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U. S. C. 244(d)(1), Christeson’s federal habeas petition was due on April 10, 2005. Nine months before that deadline, the court appointed attorneys Horwitz and Butts to represent Christeson, 18 U. S. C. 599(a)(2). The attorneys subsequently acknowledged that they failed to meet with Christeson until six weeks after his petition was due. There is no evidence that they communicated with him at all. They finally filed the petition 117 days late. The district court dismissed; the Eighth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Christeson, who has severe cognitive disabilities, relied entirely on his attorneys, and may not have known of the dismissal. About seven years later, the attorneys contacted attorneys Merrigan and Perkovich to discuss Christeson’s case. Christeson’s only hope for merits review was to move under FRCP60(b) to reopen final judgment on the ground that AEDPA’s statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled. Horwitz and Butts would not file that motion, premised on their own malfeasance. In 2014, Merrigan and Perkovich unsuccessfully moved to substitute counsel. The Eighth Circuit dismissed, reasoning that they were not authorized to file on Christeson’s behalf. The Missouri Supreme Court set an October 29, 2014 execution date. The district court denied a second motion as untimely, stating that Horwitz and Butts had not “abandoned” Christeson, and reasoning that allowing the motion would permit “‘abusive’” delays in capital cases. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court stayed execution and reversed, stating that the denials contravened its 2012 decision, Martel v. Clair, concerning the “interests of justice” standard, and noting the obvious conflict of interest with respect to the original attorneys. View "Christeson v. Roper" on Justia Law