Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his involvement in a drug trafficking enterprise. The district court subsequently determined that it had not addressed an important claim that defendant raised in his original 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, which the district court had denied. The district court concluded that it was proper to reopen the petition via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Reaching the merits of the petition, the district court held that defendant's trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate and granted the section 2255 petition, vacated his conviction, and granted him a new trial. The government appealed. The court concluded that this claim falls squarely within the “mistake [or] inadvertence” prong of Rule 60(b)(1). That provision’s one-year time bar has long since expired, however, and because of the exclusivity requirement discussed above, defendant cannot now bring his claim through Rule 60(b)(6). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instruction to reinstate the verdict and sentence. View "United States v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

Shortly before Pettaway was to be released from federal prison, the government sought his commitment under 18 U.S.C. 4246 on grounds that he was mentally ill and dangerous. After a hearing, the district court committed Pettaway for hospitalization and treatment, finding by clear and convincing evidence that commitment was appropriate. The Eighth Circuit vacated, expressing no opinion as to the appropriateness of Pettaway’s commitment, but stating that the commitment order must do more than recite Pettaway’s mental diagnosis and the opinions of mental health professionals that Pettaway’s unconditional release would create the relevant risk of dangerousness. The court heard contrary evidence in the form of testimony from Pettaway and must give some indication as to what information in the record it relied upon– such as Pettaway’s behavioral or psychological history; results of formalized assessments; recent observations, treatment notes, or interview impressions of mental health professionals; or its impressions of Pettaway’s own testimony – in reaching its conclusion. View "United States v. Pettaway" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Jose Cardenas guilty of one count of robbery, and three counts of burglary. As to counts 1 and 3, the jury found true: that defendant had personally inflicted great bodily injury upon a person 70 years of age or older; and that he had burglarized and robbed a person who was 65 years of age or older. In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted that he had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of 18 years in state prison with credit of 451 days for time served. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the great bodily injury enhancement attached to counts 1 and 3; (2) the trial court erred in imposing sentences on both counts 1 and 3 in violation of Penal Code section 654; (3) the trial court erred in imposing punishment on the two enhancement allegations attached to count 1; and (4) the trial court erred in calculating his presentence custody credits. Upon review, the Court of Appeal modified defendant’s sentence and presentence custody credits and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

Hughes guides hunting parties, charging $1,600 to $2,600 per person for accommodations, meals, hunting stands, field dressing, and carcass-cleaning facilities. To hunt buck in Iowa, a hunter must have a “tag.” Non-residents must enter a lottery. Hughes gave his non-resident clients tags belonging to others. After they killed a buck, Hughes falsely reported to the Iowa DNR that the tag owner had killed the buck. The bucks were transported out of state. Hughes was indicted under the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. 3371, which prohibits selling in interstate commerce any wildlife taken in violation of state law. The value of the wildlife determines whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor. The court instructed the jury: you may, but are not required to, consider, the price the wildlife would bring if sold on the open market between a willing buyer and seller; the price a hunter would pay for the opportunity to participate in a hunt for the wildlife; or Iowa’s valuation of the wildlife in state prosecutions where such wildlife is unlawfully taken. The jury found that the market value of the wildlife exceeded $350. The district court sentenced Hughes to three years’ probation, $7,000 in fines, and $1,802.50 in restitution. The Eighth Circuit reversed; the jury was not properly instructed as to the meaning of “market value.” View "United States v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Valdes was traveling by train. During a layover, DEA agents approached Valdes because he fit their profile of a drug courier, searched Valdes’s luggage, and found bundles of cash totaling $239,400. Each bundle was covered with several layers of packaging. Valdes stated that the money was his and that he was traveling to purchase computers for his computer recycling business. No drugs were found in his luggage. A drug-sniffing dog alerted to the bag containing the currency. The agents did not arrest Valdes. They told him that he was free to go but seized the currency. The government filed a civil forfeiture complaint under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) alleging that the currency was furnished or intended to be furnished for a controlled substance. Valdes filed a claim, asserting an ownership. His wife also filed a claim, based on a community property and innocent ownership interest. After they filed their claims, but before they answered the complaint, the government served special interrogatories. The government moved to strike the claims and answers, arguing that the claimants failed to respond to interrogatories, so that they lacked standing. The district court agreed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. By blending standing and the merits, the court nullified Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 protections that put the burden on the government to prove by a preponderance of evidence that property is forfeitable, 18 U.S.C. 983(c). View "United States v. Funds in the Amount of $239,400" on Justia Law

In 1989, Petitioner, a prisoner at Grafton Correction Institution, was convicted of aggravated murder and other crimes. After a hearing in 2005, the parole board denied Petitioner parole. The board later determined that it should not have held the parole hearing because Petitioner had not yet served his minimum sentence at that time. Therefore, the board vacated its 2005 decision and continued Petitioner’s parole eligibility to 2015. In 2014, Petitioner filed this original action against the warden, claiming that the parole board violated his due process rights by vacating its 2005 decision. The warden filed a motion for summary judgment under Ohio R. Civ. P. 56(C). The court of appeals granted the motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err by ruling on Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment under the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) properly granted summary judgment to the warden based on res judicata, as a habeas corpus action filed by Petitioner in 2013 was virtually identical to the complaint in this case. View "Brooks v. Kelly" on Justia Law

In 1982, Gacho was arrested, along with others, and confessed his involvement in two murders, signing a written statement. Gacho and Titone stood trial in Judge Maloney’s court. Gacho’s girlfriend was the star prosecution witness, having witnessed the key events. Her testimony largely aligned with Gacho’s confession, which was admitted at trial. The jury found Gacho guilty in 1984 and he was sentenced to death. Judge Maloney was corrupt; he has “the dubious distinction of being the only Illinois judge ever convicted of fixing a murder case.” Gacho claims that Maloney solicited a bribe from him but his family could not raise the money. Titone’s family paid Maloney $10,000 to fix his case, but he was convicted anyway. Gacho also claims that his trial lawyer, McDonnell, the son-in-law of Sam Giancana, longtime boss of the Chicago Outfit, was operating under an impermissible conflict of interest and was otherwise ineffective. The district court dismissed, without prejudice his most recent federal habeas petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court issued a non-final, non-appealable order. Gacho may refile his petition after he exhausts state remedies. View "Gacho v. Butler" on Justia Law

Taylor was charged with conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiring to launder money. The government offered to dismiss the drug conspiracy count and recommend a two-year sentence if Taylor pled guilty to money laundering. Taylor did not accept the plea. After trial, the court granted judgment of acquittal on the money laundering count. The jury found Taylor guilty on the drug count. Taylor received the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. His conviction became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2255’s limitation period in January 2012. Taylor filed a timely motion to vacate, arguing his attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to communicate his decision to accept the plea; failing to request a “cautionary tail” instruction; and failing to request a lesser included offense instruction. After a hearing, Taylor moved to amend to add a claim that his attorneys were ineffective for presenting a defense theory that essentially conceded guilt. The court allowed amendment and granted the motion to vacate on Taylor’s amended claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed with instructions to reimpose the sentence, finding that Taylor’s amended claim did not relate back to any original claim. View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant to search Appellant’s home, vehicle, and workplace, the police seized a computer, hard drive, and compact disc that were found to contain sexually explicit images and videos depicting minors. Appellant was subsequently charged with one count of possession of child pornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, asserting that the officer who applied for the search warrant had deliberately or recklessly omitted material information from her affidavit. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that an officer seeking to obtain a search warrant has no duty as a matter of law to inquire further in order to dispel serious doubts about either the credibility of an informant upon whom the officer relies or the veracity of the allegations underlying the attempted showing of probable cause. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that an affiant never has a duty to make further inquiry before presenting a warrant application to a magistrate. View "United States v. Tanguay" on Justia Law

A federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees may proceed in forma pauperis and commence a civil action without prepaying fees or paying certain expenses, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a), but a “three strikes” provision prevents a court from granting in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . . , brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” A state prisoner filed three federal lawsuits that were dismissed on grounds enumerated in section 1915(g). While the third dismissal was pending on appeal, he filed four additional federal lawsuits, moving to proceed in forma pauperis in each. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit and a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. A prior dismissal on statutorily enumerated grounds is a strike, even if the dismissal is the subject of an ongoing appeal. Section 1915 describes dismissal as an action by a single court, not as a sequence of events involving multiple courts. The Court noted that a judgment normally takes effect, and its preclusive effect is immediate, despite a pending appeall. The “three strikes” provision was “designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.” To refuse to count a prior dismissal because of a pending appeal would produce a leaky filter. View "Coleman v. Tollefson" on Justia Law