Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to operating under the influence (OUI), elevated to a Class C felony by two prior convictions for operating under the influence. Defendant appealed, asserting that his 2013 OUI conviction - one of the two convictions that enhanced his 2014 charge - was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike that conviction from the indictment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to meet his burden on collateral attack of demonstrating that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

In 2009, Tolliver agreed to deliver drugs for Tyson. Tolliver left Tyson's house with cocaine. A confidential informant had described Tolliver’s car and a drug packaging operation at Tyson’s house. Two officers, in plain clothes, stopped Tolliver, exited their unmarked car, and pointed a gun at Tolliver. According to Tolliver, he backed up about a car length. Tolliver, who was unarmed, then realized that he was dealing with police. He claims that he did not want the officer to think that he was reaching for a gun, so he sat motionless, with his hands on the steering wheel, and his foot on the brake. He claims that the officer shot him while he was in that position and that he became unable to control the car, which rolled toward the officers. The officers fired 14 times and Tolliver was struck by seven bullets. He pled guilty to aggravated battery of a peace officer and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, but then sued for excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. A convicted criminal may not bring a civil suit questioning his conviction until the conviction has been set aside. Tolliver’s suit rests on a version of the event that completely negates the basis for his conviction. View "Tolliver v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence and having an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing that the magistrate court and circuit court erred by failing to suppress evidence from the traffic stop that led to his convictions because the law enforcement officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the totality of the circumstances led to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore, the lower courts did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Olson" on Justia Law

Petitioners-inmates Curtis Cook and Joe Hold, Jr. filed "petition[s] for release order" pursuant to the Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (APLRA). Petitioners also filed requests for in forma pauperis ("IFP") status. Both requests for IPF status would ultimately be denied. Then both filed for writs of mandamus relief, seeking that the Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the IFP orders. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction over the cases and remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the petitions to the Supreme Court. Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions arose from actions seeking relief based on the conditions of their incarceration, rather than from actions giving rise to their incarceration. Therefore, the proceedings underlying the petitions are civil, not criminal, in nature. However, the mere fact that the Department of Corrections was the agency charged with overseeing Cook's and Holt's incarceration did not bring their mandamus petitions within the Court of Civil Appeals' exclusive appellate jurisdiction either. Having determined that only the Supreme Court could review the cases, the Court then turned to the merits of petitioners' claims. The Court then found neither petitioner met his burden proving he was entitled to mandamus relief, and denied both requests. View "Ex parte Curtis J. Cook, Jr." on Justia Law

Inmate Troche alleges that in 2001 he was severely beaten by Officer Crabtree and that after he received treatment for his injuries, he was placed in isolation and deprived of food. Troche alleges he submitted an Informal Complaint Resolution, initiating a three-step grievance procedure. Troche never received a response and submitted a notification of grievance form to the inspector of institutional services. Receiving no response, he sent, via internal prison mail, correspondence to prison personnel to inquire about the status of his grievance. After receiving no response, he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. Crabtree submitted declarations that Troche had filed complaints days after the incident, but did not submit an informal complaint to Crabtree’s direct supervisor or the staff member most directly responsible for the incident, as required, and that an investigation had determined that his complaints were without merit. The court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Administrative Code authorizes an inmate to proceed to step two of Ohio’s grievance procedure if he does not receive a response to his informal complaint within a “reasonable time.” Such authorization is not granted to inmates who fail to receive a response to a notification of grievance form at step two of the process. Troche was not required to proceed to a step-three appeal. View "Troche v. Crabtree" on Justia Law

In 1986, after Moreland waived trial by jury, a three-judge panel found Moreland guilty of the aggravated murders of his girlfriend Glenna, her adult daughter and three grandchildren, and of the attempted aggravated murders of three other grandchildren. The panel sentenced Moreland to prison and death. He exhausted direct appeal and state-post-conviction remedies. In 2005, Moreland filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. In 2012, while Moreland’s appeal of that denial was pending, Moreland filed a motion for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b) and a motion to amend the already-denied 2005 petition under FRCP 15, seeking to raise claims about his waiver of his right to a jury trial, and trial counsel’s failure to use certain police reports and to obtain an expert to challenge the state’s blood evidence. The Sixth Circuit held that Moreland’s motions were second or successive habeas petitions that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider. Rather than denying Moreland’s motions, that court should have transferred them as requests for permission to file. Considered as requests for such permission, Moreland’s requests do not meet the gatekeeping requirements for presenting claims in a second or successive habeas petition. Moreland has not established a basis for relief. View "Moreland v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Sledge Jeansonne Louisiana Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act, could be applied retroactively to defendant’s criminal misconduct which occurred prior to the effective dates of these statutes. Defendant Lynn Foret, a medical doctor who specialized in orthopedic surgery, pled guilty in federal court to one count of health care fraud, for criminal acts that occurred between 2003 and 2009. The trial court granted Dr. Foret’s declinatory exceptions, dismissing with prejudice, the State's action for penalties under the Sledge Jeansonne Act and dismissed with prejudice causes of action under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s rulings, finding that the conduct regulated by the substantive statute was the underlying fraud, rather than the subsequent guilty plea. Therefore, even though the State's cause of action could not have accrued until Dr. Foret pled guilty, application of the Acts nonetheless attached new consequences to his criminal misconduct, which occurred before the Acts became effective. One judge on the appellate panel dissented, reasoning the plain language of the Sledge Jeansonne Act demonstrated it was the guilty plea that gave the State Attorney General the authority to act, not the criminal activity, and because the guilty plea was entered after the effective date of the statute, its application herein would be prospective, not retroactive. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Sledge Jeansonne Act was not an impermissible retroactive application of the law. After review, the Supreme Court held that both the Sledge Jeansonne Act and Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act operated prospectively only, applying to causes of action arising after the effective date of each Act. The Court affirmed the court ofappeal ruling finding that the statutes at issue could not be retroactively applied to this defendant’s past criminal conduct. View "Louisiana v. Foret" on Justia Law

The 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that prisoners qualified to proceed in forma pauperis must pay an initial partial filing fee of “20 percent of the greater of ” the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account or the average monthly balance of the account over the preceding six months, 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1). They must pay the remainder in monthly installments of “20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” The initial fee is assessed on a per-case basis and may not be exacted if the prisoner has no means to pay it; no monthly installments are required unless the prisoner has more than $10 in his account. Bruce, a federal inmate and a frequent litigant, argued that monthly payments do not become due until obligations previously incurred in other cases were satisfied. The D.C. Circuit disagreed, holding that Bruce’s monthly payments were due simultaneously with monthly payments for earlier cases. A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. Section 1915(b)(2) calls for simultaneous, not sequential, recoupment of multiple monthly installment payments. The Court rejected Bruce’s reliance on the contrast between the singular “clerk” and the plural “fees” as those nouns appear in the statute, which requires payments to be forwarded “to the clerk of the court . . . until the filing fees are paid.” Section 1915’s text and context support the per-case approach. View "Bruce v. Samuels" on Justia Law

In 2011, Asakevich pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography and attempting to entice a minor via the internet, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court sentenced Asakevich to life in prison. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Asakevich’s petition for a writ of certiorari on October 7, 2013, so that Asakevich’s conviction became final. He had one year to file a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(1). Asakevich has not filed a section 2255 motion. On October 6, 2014, Asakevich filed a pro se “Motion for Extension of Time to File 28 U.S.C. 2255 Motion,” seeking pre-approval for a 90-day extension. The district court denied Asakevich’s motion, reasoning that there was no published authority for enlarging the time for filing a section 2255 motion before the statute of limitations expires. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal courts do not lightly grant relief in non-existent cases or offer advisory opinions about what they might do if an action were filed. Asakevich requested an advisory opinion about whether he could obtain an extension for an action not yet in existence and one that may never come into existence. View "United States v. Asakevich" on Justia Law

Officer Brooks conducted a traffic stop of Williams for failing to activate his turn signal prior to changing lanes. Williams did not cooperate with instructions from Brooks and Officer Kehl, which led to a physical confrontation. Sergeant Trump arrived at the scene. Officer Brooks arrested Williams for resisting law enforcement. A state court judge dismissed the charge. Williams sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and failure to protect in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers, relying on a videotape of the incident from a dashboard camera and rejecting arguments that there were material questions of fact as to the unlawful stop and arrest claims, excessive force claim, and failure to protect claims. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to not consider the state court’s findings and to use and rely on the pretrial diversion agreement View "Williams v. Brooks" on Justia Law