Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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On August 31, 2012, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He was placed on three years formal probation. Shortly after being placed on probation, Appellant was deported. He later illegally reentered the country. In 2014, his probation was reinstated, and on June 25, 2015, the sentencing court transferred probation supervision and jurisdiction from San Bernardino County to Los Angeles County, where Appellant permanently resided, pursuant to section 1203.9. On April 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate his plea pursuant to section 1473.7. By then, he had already completed his probationary sentence. On August 23, 2021, the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s motion and directed him to refile the motion in San Bernardino County Superior Court.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellant should have filed his motion to withdraw his plea in the county where he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. The question was whether the phrase “full jurisdiction” is meant to remove the authority of the original sentencing court from everything associated with the case or whether “full jurisdiction” refers only to matters relating to the probationary sentence. The court held that section 1203.9 was enacted solely to effectuate more streamlined and effective supervision of probationers statewide by ensuring that the court of their county of residence is empowered to supervise and adjudicate issues arising as a result of the probationary grant. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

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The attorney appointed to represent Defendant moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant did not file a response.The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to withdraw. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. The court wrote that consistent with Crawley, it holds that Defendant’s restitution order does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal because he is liable for the same restitution amount regardless of the ultimate recipients. View "USA v. Fults" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order dismissing a criminal complaint against Defendant as barred by double jeopardy, holding that neither double jeopardy, issue preclusion under the Double Jeopardy Clause, or common law issue preclusion barred the present prosecution.The first criminal case against Defendant ended in a mistrial intentionally provoked by the prosecutor. Thereafter, Defendant argued that double jeopardy, and, in the alternative, issue preclusion barred the State from prosecuting the instant case. The circuit court granted relief, concluding that Defendant was in jeopardy of being convicted of the offenses now charged. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the present prosecution did not place Defendant in jeopardy for any of the same offenses; and (2) issue preclusion did not bar the instant prosecution. View "State v. Killian" on Justia Law

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Claimant claimed $34,918 found in his car during a traffic stop. When he failed to fully respond to the government’s special interrogatories, the district court sanctioned him by striking his claim and entering a default judgment forfeiting the money to the government. Claimant appealed, arguing that the district court relied on an incorrect interpretation of Rule G(8).   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that an individual cannot “fail to comply” with an unknowable obligation. A party fails to comply with discovery obligations after a court order defines those obligations. Thus, Rule G(8) authorizes striking a claim for “failing to comply with” Rule G(6) only if the claimant has reason to know of and violates Rule G(6) special interrogatory obligations. The court wrote that it cannot conclude that Claimant knew or should have known that Rule G(6) obligated him to provide more information than he had provided. Claimant articulated a facially reasonable belief that the bank records and check receipts he supplied “firmly established” his relationship to the cash by “showing where the money comes from, [and] where the money was transferred and sent.” He claimed that additional documents requested by the government exceeded the scope of Rule G(6). Nothing in the record indicates that Hester had actual or constructive knowledge of additional obligations—the district court neither found that he should have known he was violating the Rule nor issued an order compelling him to respond to interrogatories. View "United States v. Christopher Hester" on Justia Law

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The complaint, filed in September 2021, alleged that “San Francisco’s criminal legal system is in a state of crisis,” as over 400 criminal defendants had cases pending past their statutory deadline for trial. Of the defendants, 178 were in jail, typically locked in cells for 23 hours a day.The trial court dismissed, reasoning that, under the “Ford” decision, one department of a superior court may not restrain the implementation of a judgment entered by another department. On appeal, the defendants challenged the plaintiffs’ taxpayer-standing cause of action based on Penal Code provisions that impose a duty on the courts (and others) to expedite criminal proceedings, including by prioritizing them over civil cases, and to follow specific procedural steps before a criminal trial may be continued beyond statutory time limits.The court of appeal reversed. Ford is not relevant; the plaintiffs did not seek to review, revise, or reverse any decision in an individual criminal case. The court rejected the defendants’ alternative legal challenges, noting that courts must implement calendar management procedures, in accordance with local conditions, to ensure that criminal cases are assigned before the last day permitted for trial. With respect to standing the court stated that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded “waste” or “illegal expenditure” of public funds and did not impermissibly challenge a discretionary act. View "Raju v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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In May 2022, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence on the basis that the 230 years to life sentence was unauthorized because his three prior violent or serious felony convictions under the “Three Strikes” law all arose from the same underlying case. Consequently, appellant contended he should only be sentenced as a second strike offender. The court construed this as an application for writ of habeas corpus and denied relief.Subsequently, Defendant appealed the order denying post-conviction relief. Because courts have the discretion to initiate an independent review of the denial of a post-judgment motion, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's petition. View "P. v. Hodges" on Justia Law

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17 people were killed a commercial tourism duck boat operating on Table Rock Lake in the Ozarks, sank during a storm. The government charged the captain and the managers of the duck boat company, with felony counts of “seaman’s manslaughter” under 18 U.S.C. Section 1115 and misdemeanor counts of operating a vessel in a grossly negligent manner. The government alleged that the charged offenses occurred on “Table Rock Lake, a navigable water of the United States within the Western District of Missouri and within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.” The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, adopting a report and recommendation that concluded the prescriptive reaches of Sections 1115 and 2302(b) is defined by admiralty law and do not cover the alleged conduct. The government appealed the dismissal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a review of the statute’s history leads to the conclusion that the origins of seaman’s manslaughter are in the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts. Here, the government objected to the district court’s reliance on Edwards as binding precedent regarding the status of Table Rock Lake and argued that the evidence of commercial activity on Table Rock Lake presented, in this case, established that the lake is navigable in fact. However, before deferring to Edwards, the district court reviewed all of the evidence submitted by the parties and found that the nature and frequency of commercial shipping on the lake had not substantially changed since the Edwards decision. Thus, the court wrote that it detects no clear error in the district court’s finding or conclusion. View "United States v. Kenneth McKee" on Justia Law

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After defendants Frayba and William Tipton pled guilty to committing insurance fraud, they were ordered to pay victim restitution to Nationwide Insurance Company of America (Nationwide). Later, Nationwide petitioned the trial court to convert the criminal restitution orders to civil judgments against both defendants. Defendants opposed. Relying on Penal Code1 section 1214, the trial court granted Nationwide’s petition and entered civil judgments against the defendants. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred because (1) Nationwide “failed to provide citation to any . . . authority supporting” conversion of the victim restitution orders to civil judgment; and (2) Nationwide’s petition lacked supporting evidence. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tipton" on Justia Law

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In pleading guilty to wire fraud and tax evasion, Defendant agreed to forfeit to the Government his interests in Jreck Subs, a franchised chain of sandwich shops that he used to perpetrate his fraud. Claimants, the Swartz Family Trust and Orienta Investors, LLC filed third-party petitions asserting an interest in the forfeited property. The district court granted the Government’s motions to dismiss the petitions, finding that the Trust’s petition was not submitted before the thirty-day deadline to file such petitions expired and that Orienta failed to state a claim under the forfeiture statute, as either the holder of an interest superior to the Government or as a bona fide purchaser for value. The district court also denied Orienta’s motion for reconsideration, as well as Orienta’s motion for leave to amend its petition.   The court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court concluded that the Trust’s petition was correctly dismissed as untimely and that Orienta’s petition does not state a claim. The court remanded, however, to allow the district court to further consider Orienta’s motion for leave to amend its petition with respect to its claim that it is a bona fide purchaser for value. The court explained that here, two things potentially tip the scales in favor of granting Orienta leave to amend its bona fide purchaser claim. First, the district court based its dismissal of that claim primarily on a technical issue. Second, the Government acknowledged that additional factual development was necessary to resolve whether Orienta’s petition stated a bona fide purchaser for value claim. View "United States v. Swartz Family Trust" on Justia Law

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During a routine traffic stop, Houston Police Officer fatally shot a man. Plaintiffs, including the parents and estate of the victim, brought multiple claims against the officer who fatally shot the man, two other police officers, and the city. The individual defendants claimed qualified immunity. The district court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss in response to Plaintiffs’ complaint, dismissed Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal and requested reassignment to a different district judge. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs that the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims against Defendant for excessive force, denial of medical care, and unlawful arrest was an error. The court reversed and remanded those claims. The court explained that taking as true that Defendant had no reason to believe the man was armed and that the shooting officer knew the man was seriously injured and likely could not move, a police officer would know, under these precedents, that to handcuff the man was an arrest without probable cause under clearly established law. The court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims is affirmed. The court denied, as moot, Plaintiffs’ request for reassignment to a new judge. View "Allen v. Hays" on Justia Law