Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first degree murder and related crimes. After the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of death, remanded the matter for a new penalty determination and reconsideration of the question of a restitution fine under the currently applicable statute, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding (1) no prejudicial error occurred during the guilt phase of trial; (2) the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror for cause under Witt based solely on written questionnaire responses regarding his views on capital punishment, and therefore, the penalty judgment must be reversed for error under Wainwright v. Witt and Witherspoon v. Illinois; and (3) the question of Defendant’s restitution fine must be remanded for reconsideration because Defendant’s restitution fine was imposed pursuant to a statute that was subsequently repealed in its entirety and replaced by a statute lessening punishment. View "People v. Covarrubias" on Justia Law

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For five days in September 2013, lane closures on the George Washington Bridge caused extraordinary traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey. The closures were allegedly orchestrated as revenge against the Mayor of Fort Lee for his refusal to endorse New Jersey Governor Christie for reelection. In 2015, a grand jury returned a nine-count indictment against Baroni and Kelly based on the “Bridgegate” political payback scheme. With the exception of Count 9, the indictment alleges that Baroni and Kelly committed their offenses with unidentified “others.” The only other individual identified by name in that indictment is Wildstein, who has pled guilty in a separate case. A consortium of media groups took legal steps to force the disclosure of a letter, authored by one of the prosecutors, that purportedly identifies unindicted co-conspirators. The district court ordered the letter to be disclosed. “Doe” intervened and sought to block public access to the letter. The court denied his request. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the letter in question is a part of the general discovery process and not subject to any First Amendment or common law right of public access. View "N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc v. United States" on Justia Law

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D.A. filed a petition for the expungement of several criminal conviction records. The trial court granted the petition and ordered the expungement of certain records related to D.A.’s convictions. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a second petition asking for the expungement of civil forfeiture records. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the expungment statutes apply to arrests and criminal convictions but not to civil forfeitures. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of D.A. second expungement petition, holding that Indiana’s expungement statutes do not reach civil forfeiture records. View "D.A. v. State" on Justia Law

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A 49-count indictment charged 51 Outlaws Motorcycle Club members with racketeering, mail and wire fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, extortion, running an illegal gambling business, witness tampering, and firearms offenses; 19 were charged under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute. The indictment included a forfeiture notice. The FBI executed search warrants on Indiana clubhouses and residences and seized items bearing the Outlaws insignia. The FBI sought forfeiture of patches, shirts, hats, belt buckles, signs, mirrors, flags, calendars, and pictures, which were use to deter other groups from infringing on Outlaw territory. In plea agreements, 18 Outlaws agreed to forfeiture. The court received Carlson’s letter, which it interpreted as a motion to intervene under 18 U.S.C. 1963(l)(2). Carlson asserted that he was entitled to direct notice, having been elected by the collective membership to manage Outlaws' indicia and memorabilia, which were owned by the collective membership, not by individuals. The government had provided notice to each defendant and had posted notice on the of government forfeiture website. The district court denied Carlson’s motions, finding that Carlson had not shown that the government was aware of Carlson or his alleged interest, nor demonstrated a property interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Indiana law: “[o]wnership cannot be conferred by a wave of a magic semantic wand.” The asserted collective ownership mechanism was “designed solely ‘to insulate from forfeiture.” View "United States v. Bowser" on Justia Law

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Defendant Eric Stevenson is a former Member of the New York State Assembly representing a district in the Bronx. Stevenson was convicted of conspiracy to commit honest servies wire fraud, conspiracy to commit federal programs bribery and to violate the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 371, accepting bribes, and extortion under color of official right. On appeal, defendant challenged his 36 month sentence, the district court's order of forfeiture in the amount of $22,000, and the district court's designation of defendant's contributions to the New York State pension fund as a substitute asset for forfeiture. The court concluded that the application of sentencing enhancements under both USSG 2C1.1(a)(1) and 2C1.1(b)(3) did not constitute double counting; the court rejected Stevenson's claim of sentence disparity and concluded that the district court did not commit procedural error in its computation and application of the sentencing guidelines; the court declined to reverse the district court's forfeiture order where the calculation of the amount of forfeiture is not subject to any statutory thresholds that increase penalties and remains within the province of the sentencing court; and Article V, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution is preempted to the extent that it would prevent forfeiture of Stevenson’s contributions to or benefits from a state pension or retirement system up to $22,000, the amount ordered forfeited. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

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Former FBI agent Robert Lustyik wanted to help his friend and business partner, Michael Taylor, in return for payment. Taylor owned American International Security Corporation (AISC), a company that offered security and defense contracting services. The Department of Defense awarded AISC a contract in 2007 to provide training and related services to Afghan Special Forces. In mid-2010, the United States began investigating AISC regarding fraud and money laundering in connection with the 2007 contract. In September 2011, the United States filed a civil forfeiture action against assets owned by Taylor and AISC, which resulted in the seizure of more than $5 million dollars from AISC’s bank account. Lustyik used his status as an FBI agent to impair the government’s investigation of Taylor, including attempting to establish Taylor as a confidential source. Lustyik was indicted on charges related to the obstruction of justice. Prior to trial, Lustyik pleaded guilty to all charges in the indictment without a plea agreement. After his plea, his lead counsel withdrew and Lustyik obtained new counsel. On the eve of sentencing, counsel sought an order allowing him to obtain security clearance to review classified material he believed might be relevant for sentencing. The district court, having previously reviewed the documents, deemed them irrelevant to the sentencing issues, denied the motion, and subsequently sentenced Lustyik to 120 months’ imprisonment. Lustyik argued on appeal that the district court’s order denying his counsel access to the classified materials violated his Sixth Amendment rights at sentencing. Finding that the district court’s decision was not presumptively prejudicial to Lustyik’s advocacy at sentencing, nor did the district court abuse its discretion in concluding the documents were not relevant for sentencing, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Lustyik" on Justia Law

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Chicago Police officers pulled over a car driven by Rosado for failing to use a turn signal. After stopping the car, the officers “claimed to have seen” a badge, handcuffs, and a handgun in plain view “between the brake lever and center console.” They arrested Rosado for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and for violating the armed habitual criminal statute. Another officer approved the report as establishing probable cause. Rosado spent about 18 months in jail before receiving a copy of the dash cam video recorded when he was arrested, which, contrary to the officers’ accounts, showed that Rosado had used an operable turn signal. The state court dismissed the charges. Rosado filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Rosado’s false‐arrest claim as barred by the two‐year statute of limitations. Because his claims of conspiracy and failure to intervene arose from the false‐arrest claim, those were also dismissed. The court dismissed Rosado’s due‐process and respondeat‐superior claims on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rosado did not promptly file. He knew the officers had fabricated probable cause by February 2014, when he received the video, and still had seven months to timely file suit. Rosado’s unexplained failure to timely file precluded equitable tolling. View "Rosado v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

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D.W. was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual in June 2004. D.W. requested discharge from civil commitment in December 2014. The district court found the State's expert, Dr. Jennifer Krance, and the independent expert, Dr. Stacey Benson, agreed D.W. remained a sexually dangerous individual and had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. D.W. appealed when the district court denied his petition for discharge from civil commitment. Because the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of D.W." on Justia Law

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Petitioner Ernest Cox was incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison. He filed a civil complaint against real parties in interest, officials and employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), seeking monetary damages. Simultaneously, he filed a petition for relief from the government claims filing requirement. "The complaint is not a model of clarity, but in general alleges claims of sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of due process." Respondent superior court deemed the civil complaint to be a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the court then denied. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, asserting respondent superior court erred in deeming the civil complaint to be a habeas corpus petition and that the court had to consider his petition for relief from the government claims filing requirement on its merits. Real parties in interest conceded respondent superior court erred. The Court of Appeal agreed, and ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate. View "Cox v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Patricia Cornwell, a well-known crime novelist, and her spouse filed suit against their former business managers Anchin Block & Anchin and the company’s principal, Evan Snapper, alleging New York state law claims of negligent performance of professional services, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on all three claims and awarded Plaintiffs $51 million in damages. Thereafter, the district court vacated the jury’s decision, ruling that it had incorrectly instructed the jury and that Defendants’ statements to the Department of Justice (DOJ) were protected by a qualified privilege and therefore should not have been considered by the jury. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly found that it incorrectly instructed the jury on New York’s statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty claim; and (2) the district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for Defendants on the DOJ issue. Remanded for a new trial. View "Cornwell Ent., Inc. v. Anchin, Block & Anchin, LLP" on Justia Law