Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A barge exploded in 2005, while under way between Joliet and Chicago with a cargo of slurry oil. Deckhand Oliva did not survive. Claiming that Egan, master of the tug that had been pushing the barge, told Oliva to warm a pump using a propane torch, the United States filed a civil suit. Open flames on oil carriers are forbidden by Coast Guard regulations. The judge determined that the government did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Oliva was using a propane torch at the time of the incident. There was no appeal. Two years later, the government charged Egan under 18 U.S.C.1115, which penalizes maritime negligence that results in death, plus other statutes that penalize the negligent discharge of oil into navigable waters. The judge found that the prosecution had established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Egan gave the order to Oliva, that the torch caused the explosion, and that Oliva died and that the barge released oil as results. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court has said that the outcome of a civil case has preclusive force in a criminal prosecution. If the government could not prove a claim on the preponderance standard, it cannot show the same thing beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Egan" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at the Topeka Correctional Facility (TCF - an all-female state prison), Plaintiff-Appellant Tracy Keith was raped by a prison maintenance employee. Plaintiff filed a section 1983 suit alleging that prison officials, including Warden Richard Koerner, violated her Eighth Amendment rights by creating an environment in which sexual misconduct was likely to occur. The Warden defended primarily on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment to Warden Koerner on qualified immunity. Plaintiff appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Warden Koerner created an atmosphere where “policies were honored only in the breach, and, as a result, he failed to take reasonable measures to ensure inmates were safe from the risk of sexual misconduct by TCF employees.” Because plaintiff possessed “a clearly established constitutional right” and presented evidence of a constitutional violation by Warden Koerner, the Tenth Circuit concluded summary judgment was inappropriate on qualified-immunity grounds. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Keith v. Koerner" on Justia Law

New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-410 NMRA stated that evidence of a nolo contendere plea made in settlement of a criminal proceedings was not admissible in civil proceedings against a defendant making such a plea. In this case, the issue presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's consideration was whether evidence of a nolo plea was admissible in a civil case for misrepresentation where the plaintiffs sought to introduce a nineteen-year-old nolo plea of one defendant to support an argument that the defendant fraudulently failed to disclose his nolo plea during the formation of a joint business venture. The Court held that evidence of the nolo plea was inadmissible under both the express terms and the underlying purpose of Rule 11-410(A)(2), and the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that basis. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals which held to the contrary. View "Kipnis v. Jusbasche" on Justia Law

Defendant’s 2007 first-degree murder conviction was affirmed. Defendant filed a post-conviction petition in 2010 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficient evidence, which was dismissed as frivolous. The appellate court affirmed. On March 25, 2012, defendant mailed a petition for relief from judgment (Code of Civil Procedure section 2-1401), claiming perjury by a state’s witness. Defendant attached a “proof/certificate of service,” which stated that the petition was mailed “with proper first-class postage attached thereto” via the prison mail system.” The certificate did not indicate that the petition was mailed via certified or registered mail as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 105. The petition was marked “received” on April 11 by the clerk’s office and file-marked and docketed on April 23. On May 24, the circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely and stated that the petition contained no argument of merit. An assistant state’s attorney was present. The appellate court vacated. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, rejecting defendant’s argument that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over the state, based on his own failure to properly serve the state. A section 2-1401 petitioner must serve the responding party with notice in compliance with Rule 105. If the respondent is not properly served, the court lacks personal jurisdiction unless the respondent waives service or makes an appearance. The defendant is estopped from claiming service was improper based on his own failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 105. View "People v. Matthews" on Justia Law

In 1991, Hill crept into Teresa's Cincinnati apartment and removed their six-month-old daughter, Domika. Days later, police found Domika’s body in a vacant lot behind Hill’s house. A neighbor had heard Teresa telling Hill that she was going to court for child support. Hill responded that he would not pay. Two neighbors saw Hill enter the yard of Teresa’s apartment building on the night Domika was taken. Hill did not participate in the search for the child and was “snickering” as Teresa talked to police. Domika was wrapped in a shirt that “looked like” a shirt Hill owned. The baby formula box, in which Domika was found, was like one that Hill’s aunt had placed next to Hill’s garage. Batch numbers on a can from the aunt’s pantry matched batch numbers on the box. A forensic expert testified that the trash bag wrapped around Domika had been directly attached to a trash bag from Hill’s kitchen. On the day Domika’s body was found, a bus driver overheard a young man, crying, telling another, “he could not believe what he had done to a little baby,” and that “he might get the chair.” The driver contacted police and picked Hill out of a photo array. State courts affirmed Hill’s convictions and rejected his petitions for post-conviction relief. Hill filed a federal habeas petition in 1998. In a second amended petition in 2005, Hill asserted aBrady claim in a “sweeping assertion” without identifying any evidence. In 2007, Hill discovered a suppressed police report. In 2012, Hill moved the court to expand the record to include a transcript of Teresa’s grand jury testimony. The district court granted habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Hill's Brady claim, filed beyond the one-year limitations period, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), is procedurally barred and lacks merit. View "Hill v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In 2009, Luna County Deputy Sheriff Gabriel Maynes attempted to pull over plaintiff Anna Gutierrez for running a stop sign. Instead of pulling over, Gutierrez sped up, driving to an apartment complex where her mother, plaintiff Patsy Flores, lived. The deputy managed to taser Gutierrez as she exited her vehicle. When the deputy caught up with her, a scuffle ensued. Flores came out of her apartment and pleaded for the deputy to stop hitting her daughter, but she too was tasered. The State of New Mexico would later charge Gutierrez with several offenses, but those charges were dismissed. Because of the traffic stop and later scuffle, Gutierrez suffered multiple injuries, including two fractured ribs. Plaintiffs Gutierrez and Flores appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment (based on qualified immunity) to Deputy Maynes on three of their 42 U.S.C. 1982 claims: excessive force, unlawful entry, and unlawful seizure. The district court concluded plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to overcome the qualified immunity defense. They appealed the district court’s judgment, but after careful consideration of the arguments the parties made at trial and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed plaintiffs failed to meet their burden, and affirmed judgment in favor of the deputy. View "Gutierrez v. Luna County" on Justia Law

Hawaii News Now (HNN) submitted an application for extended coverage for the criminal case, State v. Nilsawit, which involved the controversy regarding the Honolulu Police Department’s then-practice of allowing undercover police officers to engage in sexual conduct with people selling sexual services during sting operations. The district court prohibited HNN from televising or publishing the faces or likenesses of three officers involved in the case. HNN filed a motion for leave to appeal. The district court denied HNN’s motion, concluding that HNN exceeded the five-day period within within which a motion for review of an order regarding coverage must be filed under the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii (RSCH) Rule 5.1(f)(8). HNN appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed HNN’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where the request for extended coverage originates from a member of the media, review of a district court’s decision regarding that request is limited to the procedure set forth in RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8); and (2) further, there is no independent statutory authority that would allow the ICA to review the district court’s decision. View "State v. Nilsawit" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal proceedings. One week later, Petitioner asked the court clerk for the name of the judge assigned to his petition. Superior Court Judge John M. Thompson subsequently summarily denied Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. Petitioner then filed a new petition for writ of habeas corpus, and, in addition, Petitioner alleged that he was denied his statutory right to peremptorily challenge Judge Thompson. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to reassign the assessment of Maas’s petition for writ of habeas corpus to a judge other than Judge Thompson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a petitioner who requests the name of the judge assigned to examine his habeas corpus petition is entitled to notice of that assignment and is entitled to peremptorily challenge the assigned judge, so long as all of the procedural requirements of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 170.6 have been satisfied. View "Maas v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder and assault. Defendant was found unfit to proceed due to mental disease or disorder, and the proceedings against him were suspended until further court order. Defendant was committed to the custody of the Director of Health. The Director then moved for a transfer of Defendant’s custody from the Hospital to the Department of Public Safety (DPS). The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that pending a ruling that he had regained fitness, as an unfit person, Defendant could not be transferred to the DPS. The day after the Director’s appeal, the circuit court found Defendant fit to proceed and committed him to the custody of the DPS. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the Director’s appeal as moot, ruling that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear the appeal because custody of Defendant had already been transferred from the Director to the DPS and no exception to the mootness doctrine applied. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s order, holding that the ICA erred in not considering the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. Remanded. View "State v. Tui" on Justia Law

Appellants N.C. and Alethea Young, Ph.D., appealed superior court orders denying Dr. Young’s motion to quash a subpoena for N.C.’s psychological records issued by appellee, the New Hampshire Board of Psychologists (Board), and dismissing N.C.’s petition for a declaratory judgment to prevent the Board from obtaining the records. N.C. has been a patient of Young for many years, attending at least two therapy sessions per week since the age of two. In August 2013, when N.C. was still a minor, she informed Young that her father, S.C., had physically and emotionally abused her. According to Young, throughout her treatment of N.C., she witnessed what she described as S.C.’s aggressive and humiliating treatment of his daughter, both in public as well as in therapy sessions. In September, S.C. filed a written complaint against Young with the Board. The complaint alleged that Young had breached her professional obligations by: (1) becoming personally over-involved with N.C., thus sacrificing her objectivity; (2) providing counseling to both S.C. and his daughter, thus creating an insurmountable conflict of interest; (3) violating RSA 169-C:29 (2014) by failing to timely report suspected abuse of a child to DCYF; (4) violating RSA 633:1, I-a (2007) and 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) by detaining and concealing N.C., who was a minor at the time, from S.C. when she drove N.C. to Vermont without S.C.’s knowledge or consent; and (5) failing to respect S.C.’s wishes that she no longer treat his daughter. On appeal, appellants argued that the trial court erred in enforcing the subpoena because the Board failed to establish that it had just cause to issue the subpoena. Appellants also contended that, even if just cause existed to issue the subpoena, once they objected, the subpoena could not be enforced by the court because the Board failed to sustain what, in their view, was the additional burden necessary to pierce the patient’s privilege by showing that there was a reasonable probability the records were relevant and material and that the Board had an essential need for them. Furthermore, appellants argued that, even if the Board met the burden necessary to pierce the privilege, the court erred in not conducting an in camera review of the records before ordering compliance with the subpoena in order to limit the scope of disclosure. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with appellants that the statute required a court order to obtain a patient’s records when there was an objection to compliance with a subpoena based upon a claim of privilege. However, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that, under the circumstances of this case, the privilege must yield to the Board’s proper exercise of its regulatory responsibilities with regard to its licensee, Dr. Young. View "N.C. v. New Hampshire Board of Psychologists" on Justia Law