Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case involved interpretation of chapter 7.90 RCW, the Sexual Assault Protection Order (SAPO) Act. In this case, the commissioner granted petitioner Megan Roake's temporary SAPO, and it was served. Respondent Maxwell Delman moved to dismiss, challenging both the assertion of nonconsensual assault and the claim of reasonable fear of future dangerous conduct. At the later hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition, holding that Roake's petition was legally insufficient because the petition failed to allege a reasonable fear of future dangerous acts. Roake appealed the dismissal, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that the final order statute, RCW 7.90.090, did not require proof of a reasonable fear of future dangerous acts. It further held that the SAPO Act provided no basis for considering the validity of the temporary order in determining whether to grant a final protection order. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that RCW 7.90.130(2)(e) provided the procedure and opportunity to contest the sufficiency and validity of the petition and temporary order, and that the trial court correctly held that Roake's petition was legally insufficient under RCW 7.90.020(1). View "Roake v. Delman" on Justia Law

Collateral estoppel is not applicable to issues determined in the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal when the issues are “only a small part of a larger, ongoing criminal investigation.”Defendant in this case was cited in the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal with the civil violation of reasonable and prudent speeds. Defendant was also charged criminally in Superior Court with driving under the influence, serious bodily injury resulting and reckless driving. Defendant sought to dismiss his criminal charges, arguing that the Traffic Tribunal magistrate determined that he was not operating the vehicle, and therefore, the issue could not be relitigated based on collateral estoppel. The Superior Court magistrate granted the motion to dismiss. A Superior Court justice reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in matters that are only a small part of a larger, ongoing criminal investigation, the Traffic Tribunal’s process is insufficient to estop a later criminal proceeding. View "State v. Minior" on Justia Law

Kaleb Basey was the subject of a joint criminal investigation conducted by the Alaska State Troopers (AST) and the Fort Wainwright Criminal Investigation Division. He was a party to two federal cases stemming from that investigation. First, Basey was indicted by a federal grand jury in December 2014 and was the defendant in a federal criminal case. Second, Basey brought a federal civil rights lawsuit in January 2016 against more than a dozen named individuals, including AST officers, based on their alleged actions during the investigation and his arrest. Basey filed two public records requests with AST seeking records related to his specific investigation, records related to AST’s use of military search authorizations, and disciplinary and training certification records for two AST investigators who were defendants in the civil case. About a week later AST denied Basey’s requests on the basis that all of the information he requested pertained to pending litigation. Basey appealed to the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety; the Commissioner denied the appeal. The denial letter stated that the requested records “pertain to a matter that is currently the subject of civil and/or criminal litigation to which [Basey is] a party” and that pursuant to AS 40.25.122 the records “continue to be unavailable through [a public records request] and must be obtained in accordance with court rules.” Basey subsequently filed a complaint to compel AST to produce the records. The State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that two statutory exceptions justified the denial of Basey’s requests. On appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court, Basey argued AST had to comply with his requests for the records he requested. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State could not establish disclosure of these records “could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings” or that either of these pending actions “involv[es] a public agency” as required by the statutory exceptions the State cited. View "Basey v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety, Division of Alaska State Troopers" on Justia Law

In 2004, McCain was charged with felony murder, aggravated robbery, and falsification. Judge Froelich, of the Montgomery County Court, entered a not-guilty plea on McCain’s behalf after McCain “stood mute.” McCain’s later claimed that he attempted to plead guilty at his arraignment. Later, before Judge Huffman, McCain pleaded guilty to felony-murder and aggravated-robbery. Judge Huffman erroneously informed McCain that he would be subject to postrelease control on the felony-murder charge. Felony murder is an unclassified felony to which the postrelease-control statute does not apply. The sentence erroneously included postrelease control on both convictions. Judge Huffman later issued a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the error. McCain requested records relating to his arraignment, including video and transcripts. Judge Huffman denied his request. In 2016, McCain sought a writ of mandamus in the Second District, claiming that his attempt to enter a guilty plea at his arraignment divested Judge Huffman of jurisdiction; demanding a full copy of the arraignment transcripts, Referee Report and Video; and claiming constitutional deprivations and ineffective assistance of counsel. He sought to invalidate his plea agreement. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed dismissal. Habeas corpus, not mandamus, is the appropriate action when an inmate seeks release. The court rejected McCain’s argument that his alleged attempt to enter a guilty plea divested Judge Huffman of jurisdiction; a trial court’s jurisdiction does not end until a final judgment has been entered. Judge Huffman properly corrected the sentencing error. View "McCain v. Huffman" on Justia Law

In 2003, Rickman was convicted of five counts of aggravated sexual battery, two of forcible sodomy, one of abduction of a minor, one of object sexual penetration, one of taking indecent liberties with a minor, and one of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arising from Rickman’s abuse of his biological and step-children over several years. He was sentenced to 75 years of imprisonment with 60 years suspended. In 2015, the Commonwealth sought to have Rickman civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, Code 37.2-900 to -921 (SVPA), which calls for a hearing within 90 days to determine whether probable cause exists. The respondent may waive a hearing and either party may request a continuance. The deadline for Rickman's probable-cause hearing was November 26. The parties exchanged emails to find an available date for the assistant attorney general, the Commonwealth’s expert, Rickman’s counsel, and the court. They settled on January 8, 2016. In an email to the assistant attorney general and court docket clerk, Rickman’s counsel acknowledged that she was available that day, but “[would] need to note an objection. Neither party sought a continuance. After November 26, Rickman unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the SVPA petition. The circuit court civilly committed Rickman. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The requirement, even if violated, does not require dismissal of the SVPA petition. The options are orders: granting a conditional, temporary release, expediting the proceeding, and disallowing evidence at the hearing. The court should make its discretionary decision by balancing any prejudice to the respondent, the length of and reasons for the delay, and any bad faith. View "Rickman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 1981, McDermott was sentenced to life in prison. The Adult Parole Authority (APA) has repeatedly denied McDermott parole, most recently in 2015, finding substantial reason to believe that his release would create undue risk to public safety, or would not further the interest of justice. "The offender brutally stabbed the female victim to death while her minor children were in the house. He has completed programming, but lacks insight…. has gone some time without an infraction and [has] a supportive family." McDermott alleged that the APA had considered its erroneous belief that he had a history of stalking the victim and had violated a protection order. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District's denial of relief. To obtain mandamus relief, McDermott must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, a clear legal right to relief, that APA has a clear legal duty to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the course of law. The APA’s obligation to “investigate and correct any significant errors” arises when it is presented with “credible allegations, supported by evidence, that the materials relied on at a parole hearing were substantively inaccurate.” The evidence did not demonstrate that his APA record contained inaccurate information or that the APA relied on inaccurate information. McDermott sought no relief relating to alleged inaccuracies in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s report regarding inmates over the age of 65 who were parole-eligible. View "McDermott v. Adult Parole Authority" on Justia Law

In 2004, McKinney was convicted of five counts arising from a single event: robbery, aggravated theft, receiving stolen property, and two counts of failing to comply with a police officer’s order. He was sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 20.5 years. The Third District rejected arguments that the robbery and theft counts and the two failing-to-comply counts were allied offenses of similar import but reversed his conviction for receiving stolen property and remanded for resentencing. He was resentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 18.5 years. Ten years later, McKinney moved to “Correct Void Allied Convictions/Sentences” and for a resentencing hearing, then filed a mandamus petition, seeking to compel the trial judge to merge the convictions that he claimed were for allied offenses and arguing that until the judge does so, there is no final, appealable order. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Third District’s dismissal of the petition. McKinney has unsuccessfully litigated whether he was improperly convicted of duplicative charges, so his effort to collaterally attack his convictions as allied offenses is barred by res judicata. When “a plain and adequate remedy at law has been unsuccessfully invoked, a writ of mandamus will not lie to relitigate the same issue.” View "McKinney v. Schmenk" on Justia Law

Inmates, sentenced to indeterminate prison terms for crimes committed before 1996 sentencing reforms, alleged that the parole board has an unwritten policy of denying parole to old-law offenders, noting statements by board members that all inmates likely to be paroled following the reforms have been released. The complaint alleged that the board wastes $119 million annually by failing to give inmates meaningful parole consideration. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District's dismissal of their mandamus petition. Prior denials do not equate to failure to give meaningful consideration. The Adult Parole Authority has “wide-ranging discretion in parole matters,” subject to an inherent expectation “that a criminal offender will receive meaningful consideration for parole.” The inmates did not establish that officials have already predetermined that the seriousness of their offenses outweighs all other factors. They committed aggravated murder in the course of a robbery, first-degree murder, complicity to commit aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, and crimes involving a minor. The board has not held them to account for offenses more serious than they actually committed nor based its decision on factually inaccurate information. Weighing the seriousness of the crimes, as compared to whatever evidence of rehabilitation the inmates presented is the point at which the parole board exercises its discretion. The court also rejected requests for a declaration that the parole board members were guilty of public corruption and for sanctions for alleged “public corruption” and “dereliction of duty.” View "Bailey v. Parole Board" on Justia Law

Martin was convicted in Cleveland Heights Municipal Court of receiving stolen property and other charges. The Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal for lack of a final order. Martin sought a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Buchanan to issue a final, appealable order. The Eighth District denied the petition because Judge Buchanan had set the matter for a hearing to address the finality of the judgment, so Martin had an adequate remedy at law. Martin’s petition also sought a writ of prohibition against the clerk of courts, alleging that a third party had posted his bail in an unrelated case and that the clerk had fraudulently applied those sums to the fines and costs assessed in this case. The Eighth District also denied that writ, finding that the depositor had consented to that disposition of funds. While his appeal was pending, Judge Buchanan issued a judgment entry. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Martin’s mandamus petition was moot. Three elements are necessary for a writ of prohibition: the exercise of judicial power, lack of authority to exercise that power, and lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The clerk’s action did not constitute the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial authority. View "Martin v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

Swain sought a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals to compel the Ohio Adult Parole Authority to expunge its records of allegedly inaccurate information and to provide him with a “meaningful opportunity for parole based upon accurate factual findings.” The Tenth District dismissed for failure to attach to his affidavit of indigency a certified statement from the institutional cashier. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. When an inmate files a civil action or appeal against a government entity or employee in a court of common pleas, court of appeals, county court, or municipal court, he must comply with R.C. 2969.25's procedural requirements, including, for a waiver of the filing fee, submission of an affidavit of indigency and a statement showing the balance in his inmate account for each of the preceding six months, certified by the institutional cashier. Noncompliance warrants dismissal. In the Tenth District, Swain also moved to proceed in forma pauperis, attaching the required affidavit and stating that a statement of his prison account was attached; no statement was filed. He subsequently filed another affidavit with a statement of the running balance in his prison account. Swain’s belated attempt to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C) “does not excuse his noncompliance” and the statement was not certified by the institutional cashier. View "Swain v. Adult Parole Authority" on Justia Law