Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

North River Insurance Company and its bail agent (collectively, North River) asked for its bail money back. The court said no: the prosecution had not decided whether to extradite the fugitive from Mexico. North River sought a continuance, to give the prosecution enough time to decide. The court refused that as well. Because prosecutors would not decide, and because prosecutors would not agree to a delay to allow themselves to decide, North River had to forfeit its bail money, said the trial court.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that where the bail company has complied with its obligations, government prosecutors should not be able to use their own indecision to allow the government to keep bail money. The bond is a contract between the bail company and the government. Section 1305 governs that contract. The bail company performed its end of the bargain. The trial court vitiated the bargain by allowing the government to escape all obligations simply by proclaiming irresolution. View "P. v. The North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District of South Dakota challenging the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a custody matter involving his minor daughter, C.S.N. Petitioner claimed that the Tribal Court’s refusal to recognize and enforce North Dakota state court orders awarding him custody of C.S.N. violated the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A. The district court granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court after concluding that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. As a result, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court is not obligated under that statute to enforce the North Dakota court orders awarding custody of C.S.N. to Petitioner. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court. The court further explained that its conclusion that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes is further supported by the fact that when Congress intends for tribes to be subject to statutory full-faith-and-credit requirements, it expressly says so. View "Aarin Nygaard v. Tricia Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s entry of an order of forfeiture as part of his criminal sentence for his drug and money laundering conspiracy offenses.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there are two paths available to defendants who plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement but who later seek to allege that ineffective lawyering caused a mistaken, involuntary, or unknowing guilty plea. Defendants can either file a collateral attack on the guilty plea under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255,3 or, before the imposition of sentence, move to withdraw the guilty plea under Rule 11. However, the court explained that but what a defendant “may not do is pick and choose which portions he wishes to abide by and which he wishes to appeal.” Thus, the court explained that if Defendant wishes to pursue relief from his sworn stipulation that his Florida condo and credit union money was forfeitable, he must do so through a Section 2255 motion challenging the entire guilty plea. The result, if successful, would be for all parties to start over. View "USA v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Police officers seized just over $8,000 in a search of Appellant’s home carried out as part of a drug trafficking investigation into her then-boyfriend, K.B. The local police turned over the funds to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, which initiated an administrative forfeiture procedure to claim the funds as proceeds from drug sales. Acting pro se, Appellant filed a claim to the assets, forcing the government to terminate its administrative seizure and open a judicial forfeiture proceeding in district court.  She failed to timely oppose the ensuing judicial proceeding, and the clerk of court entered default against the funds. Appellant, still acting pro se, then sent several letters to the district court and the U.S. Attorney’s Office seeking leave to file a belated claim to the seized assets. The district court held that Appellant had not shown excusable neglect, denied her an extension of time to file a claim, and entered final default judgment against the seized assets.
The Second Circuit vacated the grant of the motion to strike and the entry of default judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in granting default judgment to the government. Appellant’s letters are properly viewed as seeking both to lift the entry of default and to be granted leave to file an untimely claim to the assets. So understood, Appellant’s motion should have been assessed under the more permissive good cause standard, as is any other motion to lift entry of default in a civil suit. View "U.S. v. Starling" on Justia Law

G.G. ran away from home at age 13 and fell into the hands of a sex trafficker who used the now-defunct Backpage.com to advertise her. G.G. sued under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1595, which allows sex trafficking victims to recover damages from those who trafficked them and from anyone who “knowingly benefits … from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in” sex trafficking. She alleges that Salesforce should have known that Backpage.com was engaged in sex trafficking of minors. Salesforce had a close business relationship with Backpage—providing advice and custom-tailored software — and “knowingly benefited from its participation.”The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the case, rejecting arguments that a “venture” must be primarily a sex-trafficking venture; that a participant must have had constructive knowledge of the specific victim; that “participation in a venture” requires direct participation in a “common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit”; and that to knowingly benefit requires that the sex trafficker provide the participant with a benefit because of the participant’s facilitation of a sex-trafficking venture and that the participant must have known that this was the reason for the benefit. Those theories seek to impose restrictions on the civil remedy that are inconsistent with the statutory language. View "G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Brothers pleaded guilty to conspiring to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act. The district court ordered the forfeiture of various real properties and financial accounts linked to the RICO conspiracy. Several third parties came forward to claim an interest in one or more of the forfeited assets, including the brothers’ sister, Ilana Bangiyeva (“Bangiyeva”), and one brother’s wife, Irina Alishayeva (“Alishayeva”). The court rejected most of Bangiyeva’s claimed ownership interests. As to Alishayeva the court granted a life estate in and the exclusive use of one of the properties after finding that she owned a one-third interest in that property as a tenant in common with the Government, which owned the remaining two-thirds interest. Bangiyeva appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the final order of forfeiture in that respect. Additionally, the Government cross-appealed, asserting that the district court erred as a matter of law in granting Alishayeva a life estate in the relevant property at the expense of the Government’s majority ownership interest. The court agreed with the Government and vacated that part of the final order of forfeiture and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that in granting Alishayeva full and exclusive use of the 110-37 69th Ave. property for the remainder of her life and marriage, the district court accorded the Government less than the full bundle of property rights that it would otherwise be entitled to as a tenant in common under New York state law. The district court was without legal authority to do so. View "US v. Ilana Bangiyeva" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were arrested by Sheriff’s deputies for stashing their client’s cell phone in a bag only minutes before the police executed a search warrant for child pornography on that phone.  Plaintiffs alleged that District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney ordered the arrest. Following the arrest, the DA, in a statement to the press, and ADA, on the courthouse steps, publicly accused Plaintiffs of concealing evidence of a crime and knowingly possessing child pornography. After Plaintiffs were acquitted they filed this federal lawsuit for unlawful arrest. The district court entered judgment against the Deputies and denied the DA’s and ADA’s motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claim. The district court also denied the district attorneys’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ defamation claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims. The court wrote that on remand, the district court should determine whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the defamation claims. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs. The court explained it believes “a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests here.” However, even if Defendants made their allegedly defamatory statements as part of their official duties, the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that state-agent immunity does not protect against intentional defamation. View "Megan Garcia, et al v. Pamela Casey, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued police officers under Sec. 1983 after the officers made warrantless entry into their apartment. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and Defendants appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed. While warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, there is an exception when officers act with probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and an objectively reasonable basis to believe that exigent circumstances exist.Here, the officers were dispatched to the scene in response to a report of domestic violence. The report received by the officers explained that the 911 call came from a neighbor who thought “abuse” was occurring and heard a “verbal argument,” “someone being thrown around,” and “yelling and screaming” in the upstairs apartment. The neighbor stated that a woman, her boyfriend, and a child lived in the apartment. This created anm exigency, justifying warrantless entry. View "Benedda Cotten v. Ryan Miller" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court’s denial of her peremptory challenge. The Second Appellate District denied the petition for failure to demonstrate a prima facie case entitling her to extraordinary relief. After Petitioner filed a petition to review, our Supreme Court stayed all further proceedings pending its review. The court ultimately granted the petition and transferred the matter back to the court with directions to vacate its order denying the petition for writ of mandate and issuing an order to show cause. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying the peremptory challenge because the subsequent lower court proceeding, specifically the subject hearing, constitutes a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2).   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court explained that there is no indication, despite the constitutional and practical distinctions between a new trial and the subject hearing, that the Legislature intended such a hearing on remand be considered a new trial under section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). To the contrary, the legislative history of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) “does not support the assertion that the Legislature intended to permit a [peremptory] challenge at any hearing on remand in a criminal case.” Thus, section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2), was not intended “to counter every possible situation in which it might be speculated that a court could react negatively to a reversal on appeal.” The court concluded that the hearing conducted after a reversal and remand of a trial court’s order denying a petition for resentencing is not a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). View "Estrada v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant victimized over a million Americans by furthering a country-wide “scareware” scam that tricked innocent computer users into paying for unnecessary software to remedy entirely fabricated issues purported to plague their devices. An apparent fugitive—having sought for years to evade paying even a cent of the $163,167,539.95 in restitution ordered for her role in the scheme—Defendant sought vacatur of that aging monetary judgment. The district court denied Defendant’s motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that an arguable basis clearly supported the judgment imposed, and it cannot be said that there was a “total want of jurisdiction” or a “clear usurpation of power” such that any defect renders the judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4). Further, the court explained that Defendant’s aggregated circumstances are not extraordinary such that she is entitled to vacatur under Rule 60(b) catch-all, and the district court soundly exercised its discretion in denying her such relief. This outcome is wholly consonant with our directive to “delicately balance the sanctity of final judgments . . . and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Thus, the court held that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion for vacatur under Rule 60(b)(4) and (b)(6). Accordingly, Defendant remained liable for $163,167,539.95 in restitution—an amount that would justly recompense the victims. View "FTC v. Kristy Ross" on Justia Law