Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Pipkin was sentenced to state prison for two years after his probation was revoked with respect to a 2009 felony grand theft conviction. As a condition of parole with respect to this qualifying offense, Pipkin was committed to Atascadero State Hospital in October 2011, for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO), Penal Code section 2962. Before Pipkin’s release from parole, the District Attorney filed a successful section 2970 petition seeking Pipkin’s continued commitment as an MDO for an additional year. In May 2015, the District Attorney filed a recommitment petition for the one-year period beginning October 13, 2015. However, in August 2015, Pipkin’s qualifying conviction for grand theft was reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, so Pipkin moved to dismiss the pending recommitment petition, arguing that further commitment as an MDO was not authorized because his qualifying conviction must now be treated as a misdemeanor “for all purposes.” (Penal Code 1170.18(k)). The trial court, in March 2016, denied Pipkin’s motion and granted the recommitment petition. After Pipkin’s MDO commitment expired in October 2016, no further petition for recommitment was filed. The court of appeal dismissed his appeal because Pipkin is no longer subject to civil commitment. View "People v. Pipkin" on Justia Law

Ryan Lee sued four Sheriff’s Deputies, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. On July 4, 2014, Lee and his wife, Tamila Lee, attended a barbecue where they consumed alcohol. After the couple returned home, an altercation broke out over a set of car keys. Tamila, in an attempt to keep her husband from driving, blocked him from exiting their home, and a physical struggle ensued. Deputies Mark O’Harold and Todd Tucker arrived first and entered the home with Tamila’s consent. Shortly afterward, Deputies Amanda Weiss and Chad Walker also arrived at the Lees’ home and separated the Lees for questioning. Lee was largely uncooperative. Tucker attempted to detain him, and another struggle broke out. O’Harold and Weiss, hearing a commotion, reentered the home. O’Harold applied an arm bar hold to Lee. Lee collided with the kitchen cabinets and refrigerator, and Weiss then struck him twice in the shoulder in an effort to force him to let go of the refrigerator. O’Harold also struck Lee twice in the neck. Tucker drew his Taser and applied it three to five times to Lee’s back, with each application lasting approximately three, five, and eight seconds respectively. Lee then lost consciousness. Throughout the incident, Walker observed but did not intervene. Weiss then handcuffed Lee and escorted him to Weiss’ squad car. Lee subsequently pled guilty to misdemeanor domestic violence. The district court granted the motion as to Lee’s First Amendment retaliation claim and the portion of his excessive force claim based on handcuffing, but denied it as to the remainder of his excessive force claim. The district court concluded that the facts remaining in dispute, when viewed in the light most favorable to Lee, precluded a grant of qualified immunity. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s determination of evidentiary sufficiency at the summary judgment stage. As to the purely legal challenge defendants raised on appeal, the Court concluded the district court correctly held that defendants used excessive force and did so in violation of clearly established law. The appeal was dismissed as to the factual challenges, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Lee v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Bingham had a 1993 conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault but was not required to register as a sex offender at that time because the conviction occurred before the 1986 enactment of the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1). Under section 3(c)(2.1) of the Act as amended in 2011, Bingham’s 2014 felony theft conviction triggered a requirement that he register as a sex offender on account of his 1983 conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault. Sex offender registration was not reflected in the trial court’s judgment. Bingham argued that the registration requirement was unconstitutional as applied to him on due process grounds and that it violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The appellate court upheld the Act. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, concluding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. That court was not exercising any of the powers delineated in Ill. S. Ct. Rule 615(b)(2) with respect to defendant’s argument, which did not ask the reviewing court to reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken, nor did it ask to set aside or modify any “proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.” View "People v. Bingham" on Justia Law

The Washington civil forfeiture statute allows law enforcement agencies to seize and take ownership of property that had a sufficient factual nexus to certain controlled substance violations; if law enforcement cannot prove the forfeiture is authorized, the claimant would be entitled to have the property returned and receive reasonable attorneys' fees incurred to get the property back. This case presented two issues of first impression for the Washington Supreme Court regarding the attorney fee provision of the statute: (1) who qualifies as a claimant when the property at issue is owned by a corporation; and (2) is a substantially prevailing claimant's fee award strictly limited to fees incurred in the forfeiture proceeding itself? The Court held: (1) a corporate shareholder who did not file a claim in the forfeiture case is not a claimant and cannot recover fees pursuant to the statute's plain language; and (2) the award is not strictly limited to fees incurred in the forfeiture proceeding itself - the statute gives courts discretion to award fees from the related criminal case if reasonably incurred for the primary purpose of resisting the forfeiture. View "Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12 Inclusive" on Justia Law

In January 2014, a General Order was issued under the authority of the Chief of the Barnegat Township Police Department that applied only to that department. The Order instructed officers to record by MVR several categories of incidents. It was undisputed that the MVR recordings at the center of this appeal were made in compliance with the Order. The MVR recordings at issue documented an incident in which police officers pursued and arrested a driver who had allegedly eluded an officer attempting a traffic stop. One officer’s decision to deploy a police dog during the arrest led to internal investigations and criminal charges against the officer. Approximately four months after the driver’s arrest, plaintiff John Paff sought access to the MVR recordings under OPRA and the common law. The Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office (OCPO) opposed disclosure. Plaintiff filed a verified complaint and order to show cause, seeking access to the MVR recordings on the basis of OPRA and the common-law right of access. The trial court ordered disclosure of the MVR recordings. A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s determination. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division panel, concurring with the panel’s dissenting judge that the MVR recordings were not “required by law” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, that they constituted criminal investigatory records under that provision, and that they were therefore not subject to disclosure under OPRA. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the trial court for consideration of plaintiff’s claim of a common-law right of access to the MVR recordings. View "Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutors Office" on Justia Law

Wheelchair-using detainees sued Cook County, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, based on purportedly inaccessible ramps and bathroom facilities at six county courthouses. The district court certified a class for purposes of injunctive relief. The named plaintiffs also sought damages individually for the same alleged violations. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the equitable claims and entered a permanent injunction, finding that the defendants had violated the ADA. Relying largely on the same findings, the court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on liability in their personal damage actions, then submitted the question of individual damage awards to a jury. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. The district court improperly relied on its own findings of fact when it granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their damage claims. When equitable and legal claims are joined in a single suit, common questions of fact should be tried first to a jury unless there are extraordinary circumstances or an unequivocal waiver by all parties of their jury trial rights. The court upheld the class certification. View "Lacy v. Cook County, Illinois" on Justia Law

The “prisoner mailbox rule” applies when a prisoner is forced to rely on the Department of Corrections to ensure that his Me. R. Civ. P. 80C petition is filed, that prisoner places the petition into the control of the Department, and the Department fails timely to deliver the petition to the clerk of court.Petitioner signed a petition pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 11002 for judicial review of a Department decision finding that he had committed a disciplinary infraction. The State moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim, arguing that because the clerk of court received Petitioner’s petition one day outside of the thirty-day statutory window, the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Petitioner urged the superior court to apply the prison mailbox rule, whereby the court would consider the petition filed on the date Petitioner deposited it with prison officials for forwarding to the clerk of court rather than the day it was received by the clerk of court. The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. After setting forth the circumstances above under which the prisoner mailbox rule applies the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the prison mailbox rule for any unrepresented prisoner under the circumstances of this case, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the superior court for reinstatement of the Rule 80C petition. View "Martin v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s complaint for a writ of procedendo against Franklin County Common Pleas Court Judge Jenifer French, holding that the intermediate appellate court properly dismissed Appellant’s complaint for failure to attach the statement of inmate account required by Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C).In his complaint, Appellant alleged that he had filed a petition for postconviction relief and that Judge French had not yet ruled on the petition, as required by Ohio R. Crim. P. 35(C). The court of appeals dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Appellant had failed to comply with the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s noncompliance with section 2969.25(C) required dismissal of his complaint. View "State ex rel. Neil v. French" on Justia Law

Michelle Renee Lamb was born a male, but from a young age, however, displayed feminine characteristics and identified as a female. Lamb was in state prison experiencing gender dysphoria. For this condition, she received medical treatment. However, she claimed the treatment was so poor that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The undisputed evidence showed Lamb received hormone treatment, testosterone-blocking medication, and weekly counseling sessions. A 1986 precedent, Supre v. Ricketts, 752 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986), suggested these forms of treatment would preclude liability for an Eighth Amendment violation. Based partly on this precedent, the district court granted summary judgment to the prison officials. Lamb challenged the grant of summary judgment. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded no genuine issue of material fact existed: “In light of the prison’s treatment for Michelle’s gender dysphoria, no reasonable factfinder could infer deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials. And the district court did not improperly curtail Michelle’s opportunity to conduct discovery. Thus, we affirm the award of summary judgment to the prison officials.” View "Lamb v. Norwood" on Justia Law

Daniel Phillips was convicted of multiple counts of indecent or lewd acts with children under the age of sixteen. The mother of the children sued Phillips, alleging various torts arising out of his crimes. The mother moved for partial summary judgment in the case, arguing that Phillips's conviction for the crimes established his liability for the torts. In response, Phillips argued that because his conviction was the product of an Alford plea--where a defendant admitted there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, but nonetheless insisted that he did not commit the crimes--his conviction could not preclude him from disputing liability in the civil case. The district court agreed with the mother, granting partial summary adjudication in her favor on the issue of liability. Phillips asked the district court to certify that decision for immediate review. The district court did so, and Phillips timely petitioned the Oklahoma Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court granted the petition and, finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, affirmed. View "Martin v. Phillips" on Justia Law